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ABSTRACT 
This thesis investigates the ernergence and growth of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI; 
Party of Liberation). HTI is a branch of the inte111ationa] 1noven1ent, Hizb ut-Tahrir. The 
party has been very successful at utilising political space to recruit and n1obilize activists , 
build loyal cadres with a deep grasp of its ideology, and most in1portantly, create a 
con1n1on identity an1ong n1e111bers. 
Its ability to forge a collective identity within the 1nove111ent has led to a high rate of 
1ne111bership retention. Drawing on extensive interviews conducted in the field, the 
thesis describes the journey a person undergoes before becoming a n1e1nber of HTI. The 
intervievvs vvill focus on the processes of 'culturing' and socialization to which 
prospective recruits are subject, which result in behavioural , cognitive and affective 
changes. It is this transforn1ation that produces a cl istinctive Hizb ut-Tahrir identity. 
This study notes that while collective identity is the n1ost in1portant factor iri l-ITrs 
growth, it is by no 1neans the only one. Other factors have also contributed to its gro\vth. 
The open political systen1 that followed the collapse of the authoritarian Ne-w Order 
govern1nent enabled the party to en1erge publicly after son1e two decades of underground 
activity, and begin overtly recruiting n1en1bers and launching collective actions. f 
exan1ine the party's resource n1obilization strategies and examine how these strategies 
have resulted in its successful n1en1bership recruitn1ent, raising of funds and expansion of 
its organizational structure. (_'.onsideration is also given to how the party ' s anti-systen1ic 
rationalistic ideology has led to potential n1e1nbers choosing HTI over other Islan1ist 
1nove1nents in Indonesia 
This thesis en1ploys a structural-cognitive approach to understanding the groYvth of HTI. 
The political opportunity structure and resource 1nobilization variant of the social 
111overnent theory will be utilized to understand the structural factors that in1pacted HTL 
The cognitive factors \vill be explained by using the theories of ideology and identity. 
This theoretical approach allows for a n1ore con:iprehensive understanding of HT l's 
gro\vth. 
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GLOSSARY 
Ahn1adiyah (son1etin1es spelt as Ahn1adiyya): It is a sect founded by Ghulan1 Mirza 
Ahn1ed in India. Men1bers of the sect be] ieve that Ahn1ed is a Prophet (who is 
subordinate to Muhan1n1ad) while others within the sect consider hin1 a re'forn1er. Most 
Mus! in1s do not consider Ahn1acliyahs to be Mus! im s. 
Al-Muhajiroun: It is the n1oven1ent founded by On1ar Bakri Mohamed , the forn1er leader 
of HT in Britain. The group subscribes to a radical Islan1ist ideology, which is inspired 
by both Salafi and HT teachings. It has chapters in Europe and Asia. The group was 
proscribed in 2010 due to its links to te1Torisn1. 
Amir: The tern1 is used to describe the leader of HT worldwide. 
Ansar: It refers to Muslin1s in Medina who assisted Prophet Muhamn1ad upon his arrival 
in the city. 
Aqidah: Islarnic belief in the idea of the Oneness of God and Prophet rvruhan1n1ad as his 
Messenger. 
Bai 'ah: It is the pledge of allegiance to leader or teacher. Such a practice is co1111non in a 
Sufi brotherhood and Islan1ist n1ove111ents. 
Bid'ah: It is a pejorative tenn used to refer to innovations introduced to lsla1n, vvhich 
contradict its teachings. 
I>a 'awah (also spelt da 'wa or dahvah): A tenn that can literally be translated as the call 
to Islarn. It also refers to Islarnic rnissionary activity~ proselytizing or predication rneant 
to rnake Muslin,s n1ore observant of Islarn. The tenn dak1,,vah is used to describe the 
uno±Ticial underground Islarnic student 1nove1nent during the New' Order regi1ne. 
Dali!: The evidence used to support Islan1ic rulings and edicts. 
Dar-al-harb: The abode of un=believers, referring to areas under non=Muslin1 rule. 
Dar-al-lsla1n: (also spelt dantl Islan1): The abode of lslan1, referring to areas under 
Muslin1 rule . 
Dar-al-kr{/1~: The abode of ignorance and refers to areas where Islan1ic laws are not 
applied. 
Daris: Its literal translation is student. It is a tenn used to describe a person ,vho is part of 
a HT studv circle . 
., 
Dauroh: A retreat that is focused on Islan1ic studies. 
lX 
· Eid-ul-Fitr: A Muslin1 celebration to n1ark the end of the n1onth long obligatory fast that 
Muslin1s undertake yearly. 
Fuqih: Islan1ic jurist or an expert in lslan1ic laws. 
Ford: An Islan1ic obligation 
Fardhu ain: an individual obligation that every Muslin1 n1ust fulfill. 
Fardhu kijc1yah: A collective obligation of Muslin1s that n1ust be fulfilled by son1e 
J'vlusl in1s. 
Fatvva: lslan1ic edict issued by a senior Muslirn cleric. 
Fikrah: Islan1ic thought or \vay of thinking 
Fiqh: lslan1ic jurisprudence 
Habaib (Also Habib): Used to describe an Indonesian religious scholar of Arab descent. 
Hadith: The traditions of Prophet J'vluhan1n1ad con1prising the collections of his sayings 
and practices. 
Halaqah (son1eti1nes spelt halaqa): lslarnic study circle. Ir refers to a cell \Vi thin the HT 
organizational structure. 
Hanafie: One of the four accepted schools of jurisprudence originating fron1 the 
teachings of In1an1 Abu Hanifa (699-767), a seventh century Muslirn jurist. The 
adherents of this school are concentrated in Turkey, South Asia, Central Asia and the 
Levant areas. 
Hanbali: One of the four accepted schools of jurisprudence originating fro1n the 
· teachings of Irnarn Ahn1ad Ibn Hanbal (780-855), a ninth century Muslin1 jurist. The 
adherents of his school are in the Arabian Peninsula. It is also seen to be the rnost rigid of c..; 
the four schools ofjurisprudence. 
Hi=biyvin: Mernbers of HT and HTI. 
Hizbul Khilafah: It is a breakaway group fonned by HTI dissidents in 1999 with the 
san1e objectives as HTI. It is largely inactive. · 
(jrna · al-sahabah: Literally 1neans consensus of the Prophet's co1npanions. Hovvever it is 
used to refer to the different schools of jurisprudence in Islam. 
Ikhwan: Islan1ic Brotherhood. An abbreviation someti1nes used to describe the Mus1i1n 
Brotherhood m·ovement 
I,nam: Usually referred to the person ,vho leads a Muslim congregation prayer but can 
also refer to an Islmnic scholar. 
X 
lr~faq: Donations rnade in the nan1e of God. 
Jihad: Literally striving in the cause of Islan1. Muslin1s believe that the personal struggle 
to attain spirituality is a lesser jihad while the struggle to strive for society is seen as a 
greater jihad. This greater jihad could be anything frorn rnissionary activity to holy \Var. 
Islan1ists and neo-fundan1ental ists n1ost often use it to describe sorne forn1 of anned 
action. 
Jahil: State of ignorance. 
JahUzvah: Literally the age of ignorance. It is used in the n1odern context by son,e 
Islamists to describe the predicatnent of present Muslirn societies for abandoning ls lam . 
. _hlbab (also known as h(jab): Headscarf worn by Muslirn worn en. 
l(etua [!nnan: Chainnan or Leader 
J(hilc?f'ah: Caliphate 
Khittah: Founding principles 
Ki4,,•: Disbelief in Islarn or acts that contributes to disbelief. 
Nlc1 'szd: Refers to a HT leader \Vho is in -charge of several districts ., often making up one 
or several cities 
_A1abda ': The basis of an ideology. 
Madrasah (also spelt rnadrasa): an Islan1ic school, which has a stronger, focus on 
traditional Islan1ic studies such as the subjects of Islan1ic jurisprudence. So1ne 111adrasahs 
n1ight also teach subjects such as Mathen1atics and the Sciences. 
A1t{fc:zhim: Literally a tern1 that refers to concepts but used here to describe conc~pts 
associated vvith HT's ideology. 
A1qjelis Al-[.lnunah: The legislature assen1bly in a Caliphate. 
A1tnvlid Nabi (also spelt as A1aulid): A tern1 used to refer to the celebrations of Prophet 
Muhan1111ad's bi1ihday. 
Mazhab (also spelt as nzadhhab): One of the schools of jurisprudence 
Media U1111nat: A fcninightly ne,vspaper produced by HTI 
Jvfu 'tarnad: A ten11 that refers to a HT leader \Vho is responsible for a HT \Vilayah or 
province. He is nonnally the leader of HT in a country. 
XI 
Muhcfjiroun: The group of early Muslin1s in Mecca who followed Prophet Muhan11nad 
when he n1igrated to Medina 
1,1/ujaddid: Refers to a person who appears in every century to revive Islan1. 
1\1/ushullah: A prayer roon1 where a Muslin1 can perforn1 the daily obligatory prayers. 
1,✓1ushr(f: A rnale leader of a HT cell 
Jvfushr[la: A fen1ale leader of a HT cell 
A1u 'tazilah: It is a school of theology that en1erged in the eight century. The school relied 
on the synthesis of rational thought and Islarnic theology. The school takes a logical 
approach at deriving Islarnic laws. 
1Vaqhba: Literally the tenn is used to describe the tragic Arab loss to Israel during the 
1948 Arab-Israeli Vlar. 
Naqib: HT leader at the district level 
1Viqab: Face veil used by son1e Nluslin1 vvon1en. The practice is usually associated with 
Wahhabi and Salafi Muslirns, although not exclusively so. 
Pengr~jiaan: Literally refers to the act of studying. It is no\v often used to refer to a 
religious class . 
.._ 
Pesantren: lslarnic boarding and day school where students receive an intensive religious 
education . 
Pesantren Kilat/ Pesantran Rcunadan: Intensive Islan1ic classes organized during school 
holidays or during the ~1uslirn holy IllOnth of Rarnadan 
· Qias: The use of logic and rational thoughts to derive an Islarnic ruling. 
Reforn1asi: Literally it rneans reforr11ation. It is used to describe the rnovernent that ., 
sought a regin1e change in Indonesia between 1997 and 1998. 
Riba ': Literally refers to usury. Often used to refer to the taking or giving of interest, 
\Nhich n1any Muslirns consider to be prohibited in Islarn 
Salafisn1: Literally it refers to the ,vay of the predecessors. It is a sect that prornotes a 
retu111 to the \Vay of the Prophet and his co1npanions. They accept the Qu 'ran and Hadith 
as points of reference in deriving Islarnic lavvs and reject the need to follovv only one of 
the n1azhabs. The sect considers Shiites and Sufis as deviants. Most contetnporary 
lslarnist rnovernents are Salafis to sorne degree, 
.,..., 
Salafi-Jihadi: It refers to extreme Salafis1n. which advocates the use of violence in order 
to change a society to be rnore Jslatnic 
.. 
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Shafi'e: One of the four accepted schools of jurisprudence originating fron1 the teachings 
of In1an1 Abdullah Ahn1ad Al=Shafi ~e (767=820), an eighth century Muslin1 jurist. Hi s 
adherents are found in Southeast Asia, parts of India and North Africa . 
. Sherri 'ah (also spelt Sharia): Islan1ic law 
Sheikh: A tenn used to refer to n1en of considerable knowledge or those of higher 
learning 
Shiite: It is one of the tYvo n1ain branches of Islan1. The key difference that separates 
Shiite Islam fro1n Sunni Islmn is the belief that Ali (599-661), the Prophet's son-in-lavv 
and cousin is the rightful heir to the Prophet. About 15% of iV[uslitns are Shiite. 
Shura: Consultation and deliberation used to arrive at a decision i111pacting the Muslim 
comtnunity . Ts often used to show con1patibility of Islam and den,ocracy 
Sunnah: Nonnative practice and exmnples as laid dovvn by the Prophet. 
Sunni: It is one the two 1nain branches of Islmn. lJnlike Shiites, Sunnis do not believe in 
Ali's right to succession although Ali is revered as one of the four Caliphs of Islatn. 
There are four 1nain schools of thought that are often identified as being part of the 
school. 
Tadarz-~j: A gradual change brought about by the gradual impletnentation of Islamic laws. 
Tahlilan: This is a Sufi practice of reading special supplications on Thursday nights. It is 
also done during such occasions as birthday celebrations, the birth of a newbon1 and after 
a person has passed away. 
Tafiir: The exegesis of the Qur'an 
Ta~1zr: A concept, within Islainic jurisprudence, denoting a Muslin1 who is an apostate 
that deserves to be punished through killing. 
Tanziln: Literally translates as putting the house in order. It is used by HT to describe the 
otiicial recognition of a new chapter as being part of its global structure. 
Tassawz,(f It is the din1ension of spirituality in Islan1 that focuses on the development of 
one 's internal self. 
Tauhid: It is a tern1 in Islan1, ,vl)ich focuses on the belief in the Oneness of God . 
Thalibul nusrah: A concept developed by An-Nabhani to describe the· process of seeking 
assistance frorn po,verful individuals within society in an effort to change the 
govenunent through a revolution. 
Thaqqfa ghayr mutabannah: They are un-adopted texts of HT, which are 11011-
cornpulsory readings. Men1bers are encouraged to read then1. These are often books 
written by HT leaders. · 
Xl 11 
Thaqc~fc:t 1nutabannah: They are adopted texts of HT which are con1pulsory readings for 
dari s and 111en1bers of HT. These texts are norn1ally by HT's ideologues like An-Nabhani 
and Zalloun1 
Tsatq[f: A process of culturing as described by HT. 
[Jnunah (also spelt un1111a): A con1n1unity of believers, as used to describe all Muslin1s 
[!lcnna: Islan1ic scholars 
[lshr: A con1pulsory land tax in1posed on Muslin1s under Islan1ic la\vs. 
[!srah (son1etin1es spelt usra): These are study cells, en1ployed as the ba~ic unit of 
organization, in n1oven1ents like the Muslin1 Brotherhood. 
~ . . 
Wahhabis: An Islarnic sect \Vhich originated \Vith the eighteenth century reforn1ation 
n1overnent of Ivluharnrned Ibn Abel al-\Va hab (1703- 1787). It is the ofiicial religion 
practiced in Saudi Arabia after Al- \Vahab fonned an alliance \Vith Ivluhan11ned Ibn Saud, · 
an Arabian tribal leader. Wahabisrn is sirnilar to Salafisn1, although they are not exactly 
the san1e. Adherents of Wahhabisn1 tend to be oriented tovvards \Vahhabi scholars in 
Saudi Arabia. 
fVakql(son1etin1es spelt vvaq±): It is a religious endown1ent usually in the fon11 of a 
building or land for charitable purposes. l Jsually waqqls are appo1iioned for the building 
of a n1osque or Islan1ic school. 
fflilayah: Li terally it rneans a province . It forn1s the territory that rnakes up the larger HT 
unit . This unit often fo llovvs the national boundarv of a countrv. However there are sorne 
., .,, 
H1ilaJJahs that are rnade up of several countries. 
Zakat: It is one of the five pillars of Islan1, ,vhich involves giving a fixed po1iion of one ' s 
wealth to charity. It is an obligation only for those who can afford it. 
NOTE: The rendering of i\rabic tern1s and proper narnes follow both international 
convention and Indonesian usage by Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia. No diacritics are given in 
the thesis 
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CHAPTER ONE: COMPREHENDING THE PHENOMENON OF HIZB UT-
TAHRIRIN INDONESIA 
We need to carry this message from the East to the West so that on Judgment Day, \A/e 
can be proud that we have fulfilled our responsibilities that Allah has ordained for us. By 
Allah! Noth ing can dign ify , liberate, and elevate this unnnah except for the return of the 
Khilqlah (Mah1nud Atchay, Leader of Hizb ut-Tahrfr United Kingdon1 at the 
Inten1ational caliphate Conference in Jakmia, August 2007) 
On August 2007, an estin1ated 80,000 to 90,000 people gathered in the Bung Karno 
Stadiurn in Jakarta, Indonesia to call for the re-establishn1ent of the caliphate. Hizbut 
Tahrir Indonesia (HTI), a chapter of the transnational rnovernent Hizb . ut-Tahrir (HT), 
whose key airn is the revival of the caliphate, organized the event. 1 ln a theatrical 
perforn1ance during the event, two groups of Indonesian Muslin1 boys ran into the 
stadiun1. One group carried flags of Islan1ic countries, while the other carried flags of 
'oppressor states ' (U-nited States, Britain, France and Israel) . The boys carrying the flags 
of the oppressor states started attacking the boys carrying the flags of Muslin1 countries. 
In a drarnatic turn of events, a different group of boys carrying the black and white flags , 
bearing the Muslin1 proclan1ation "There is no God but Allah and Muhan1n1ad is hi s 
Messenger" (the flag of HT) drove the boys carrying the flags of the oppressor states out 
of the stadium. The perfonnance sought to convey that Mus-li1ns are currently being 
oppressed by villainous Western irnperialist powers and that it is only with the re-
establish1nent of the caliphate that the Mus lirn world will be free. HT 111e1nbers are thus 
seen to be heroes who are out to etnancipate the Muslitn ,vorld. The 1nessage that the 
caliphate is a necessity for the Musi itn vvorld was repeated by 1nost of the speakers 
invited to the event, including M.ah111ud Atchay, a leader of HT in the United Kingdon1 
(quoted above). While, the revival of the caliphate is a call 1nade by many Islamic 
thinkers and reforn1ers since its abolish1nent in 1924, HT and HTI, have taken this 
concept to a nevv level by rnaking it an obligation for all Muslirns .2 Evidence frotn 
1 The thesis has spelled HT as Hizb ut-Tahrir, which is the correct transliteration from Arabic but would 
use the localized spelling of HT, which is Hizbut Tahrir when discussing the Indonesia n chapter of the 
party. 
2 lt 111 ust be noted that the Ottoman caliphate differed from th e idealized ca liphate of HT in having political 
authority in the Ottoman Empire only, and at best a so ri of nominal recognition among Muslims elsewhere. 
Since 1908, the caliph has lost most of his power to the Constitutional rnoven1ent in Turkey. 
several surveys indicates that fevv Indonesians a.spire for the establishrnent of an Islan1ic 
state and even fevier believe in the revival of the caliphate. 3 This is but one of the reasons 
that rnake HTI a paradox and an interesting case study. 
Focus of Study: Why Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia? 
The ernergence and growth of HTI is in1po1iant for several reasons. Islan1 in Indonesia 
has often been described as being localized and is thus different fron1 the Islan1ic 
heartland in the I'v1iddle East. While, Indonesian Islan1 ,vas never entirely divorced frorn 
the garnut of different Islmnic ideologies elsevvhere, such as the ideas associated ,vith the 
iVlB and the Iranian Revolution, these ideologies have taken a local forn1 through groups 
that are independent frorn their ideological inspirers. This rnakes HTI unique. It is 
perhaps the only organization that is controlled entirely by a Middle East based 
leadership. Its operations, funding and selection of senior leaders, are decided overseas 
by the HT headquaiiers. Representatives fron1 the Atnir of HT are sent to Indonesia 
several tin1es a year to rnonitor the activities of the party in the country.4 
Panly due to its links to the Middle East, the party has been secretive about its sources of 
funding, the personalities vvho are part of its central leadership as well as the linkages 
between the party and its parent organization in the Middle East. Despite it secretive 
nature, Ken Ward observed that HTI has re1nained largely unnoticed by the country ' s 
. authorities despite its transnational agenda, ,vhich contradicts the concept of the unitary 
state of Indonesia (Jlegara Kesatuaan Republik Indonesia, NKRI). He noted that the 
secretiveness and non-confonnity of HTI have not protnpted frequent public wa111ings 
from political leaders or security authorities about the need for vigilance towards the 
party . This 1s 1n a country where officers often rail against foreign conspiracies that 
3 Evidence from th e Lernbaga Survey Indonesia (LSI) survey conducted in 2004 showed that only 5°/o of 
Indonesian Muslims support HTI's idea of the caliphate. A.nother survey conducted in October 2006 
indicated that only 7.2% of Indonesian Muslims suppo11 HTI. See LSI " Prospek Islam Politik' ', p. 14. 
Accessed from www.lsi. or.id on 21 January 2007. Surveys conducted by the LSI are seen to be the most 
accurate in Indonesia . 
4 
HT defines itself as a political party although it is not a party in the conventional sense of contesting 
elections and being involved in democratic processes. The word pai1y is thus use throughout the thesis to . 
reflect HT' s self- definition. See Mohamed -awab Mohamed-Osman, "Reviving the Caliphate in 
Malaysia," Studies in C0r1/lict and Terrorism 32, no. 7 (2009), p. 647. 
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threaten to vveaken and break up Indonesia. 5 While the reason for this could be HTI' s 
relatively peaceful approach to political ·activisn1, it is still strange that the party is not 
seen to be a threat, especial ly in light of th e fact that even a legal Tslat11ic political paiiy, 
such as the Prosperity Justice Party (Parta; Keadahan Sejahtera, PKS), and Shhte 
groups, are constantly under public scrutiny for their supposed hidden agendas. 6 
So1ne of the other ideas that the party espouses such as its rejection of den1ocracy and 
capitalis1n also 1nake HTI interesting. Several surveys conducted in Indonesia have 
shown that, in general, Indonesians believe in the ideals of den1ocracy and capitalisn1. 7 
As such , it is politically inexpedient for a group to reject such ideas that have bec0111e so 
rnainstrean1 in Indonesia. To add to thi s conunclrun1 , HTI seen,s to be attracting large 
numbers of Muslim professionals, who work in r11ulti -national con1panies (lv1NC) and are 
thus part of the capitalistic venture in Indonesia. Many of HTI 's activities are held in the 
'Golden Triangle ' area of Jakarta, which houses 111ost of the global financial institutions 
and regarded as the epicentre of capitalisn1 in Indonesia. Yet, the san1e individuals se.ek 
to overthrow the Indonesian econon1ic systen1. HTI is not just an interesting case study, 
due to its unconventional ideas, but also due to the rapid growth that the party seerns to 
be undergoing in Indonesia 
The Growth of HT/ 
HTI first 111ade its public entry in July 2000, and later in that year, the party organized the 
first international caliphate conference, which officially propelled the organization into 
the public realrn. 8 It \Vas reported that about tvvo thousand people attended the event. f n 
August 2007, seven years after the first conference, the pariy organized the conference 
referred to earlier in this chapter \vhere an estirnated 80,000 to 90,000 people attended. 
5 Ken Ward, "Non-violent extremists? Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia", Australian Journal qflnternational 
,1/lairs 63, no. 2 (2009), p. 140 . · 
6 The PKS is an Indonesian Islamist political pa1iy. Tslamist student activists founded it as the Justice Party 
in 1998. It was subsequently renamed the Prosperity Justice pariy after failing to meet the minumum 
electoral threshold in 1999 elections. It is cuffently the fourth largest party in th e Indonesian parliament. 
7 
~n example of this is the survey conducted the Indonesian Survey Bureau (LSI) in May 2006, which saw 
82% of correspondents agreeing that democracy is the best way of governance. See LSI "Prospek Islam 
Politik", p. 11. Accessed fron1 www.lsi.or.id on 21 January 2007 . 
8 Tbe first issue of the republished Al-lslan1 featured an article about the importance of rev iving th e 
caliphate. See Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia, "Hijrah Menuju Khilafah Islamiyah ," Al-Jslan1, l July 2000 ., pp. 1-
,.., 
.1..,. 
·, j 
The size of these gatherings pales vvhen con1pared to the conferences and gatherings · 
staged by other Muslin1 organizations, such as Nahdlatul [ !larna (NU) and 
Muhmnn1adiyah. No other Islan1ist organization, \Vith the exception of PKS, has had 
attendances vvith such large nun1bers. While it n1ust also be qualified that n1ost attendees 
at the event \Vere not n1ernbers ofHTI , the scale of the event in itself 1nakes it significant 
\Vhen con1pared to the first conference organized in 2000. Within a span of seven years, 
the party \Vas able to galvanize attendees by several folds. By 2007, HTI had also 
established chapters in all thirty-three Indonesian provinces. This is a clear reflection of 
the rapid growth that the organization has undergone. 
\tVithin eleven years, since its en1ergence in 2000, HTI has not only seen an increase in 
its nurnber of n1ernbers but also becorne n1ore visible in the Indonesian public realn1. HTI 
leaders con1plained about the difficulty of getting the n1ass 111edia to cover its progran1s 
in the earlier days of its public en1ergence. 9 At least two reports that covered the first 
international caliphate conference ridiculed both HTI as an organization and the ideas it 
espoused, criticizing it as n1arginal and insignificant. 10 By 2007, HTI had increased its 
n1edia presence in both the local and international 111edia. With the exception of coverage 
by Republika, which tended to be favorable to HTl, the tone of son1e articles took a rnore 
alannist tone and portrayed HTI as a 1najor threat to Indonesian society. Ho\vever, H.TI 
leaders were also invited to represent the view of conservative Islan1 in debates held to 
discuss Islainic issues. 11 
-Despite, having the irnage of a radical Islan1ist group, son1e pron1inent national and 
military leaders were willing to attend and participate iri HTI' s events. Speakers at HTI 
events included former Health Minister Siti Fadilah Supari , forn1er Youth and Sports 
Minister. Adyaksa Dault Tyasno Sudarto, fonner chainnan of M.uhan1madiyah Atnien 
Rais and fonner anny chiefs of staff Ryainizard Ryacudu and Tyasno Sudarto .12 It is 
q 
- ~1ohamed Nawab ~1ohamed Osman, "Reviving the Islamic Caliphate: Hizbut Tahrir and Its Mobilization 
Strategy in Indonesia," Terrorisrn and Political Violence 22, no. 4(2010), p. 607. 
l O , • . . 
For an example ot such article, see Nasrullah Ali Fauzi , "Belum Apa-Apa Sudah Antidemokrasi ," Pan.Ji 
i\1asyarakat, 7 June 2000; Heny Mohan1111ad and Kholis Bahtiar Bakri, ''Khilafah Islamiyah: foarat Pelali 
iVfaraton," Gatra, IO Jun 2000., p. 90 -91. . 
11 After the pornography laws were passed, a debate was held by Indonesian Channel One to discuss the 
iss ue . HTT leader, RokJ1mat S Labib was invited to debate against Siti ~1usdah Mulia, a prominent Muslim 
feminist. See http: //hizbut-tahrir.or.id/2008/09/ 16/debat-kontroversi-ru u-anti-pornografi -s iti-musdah-
m u I ia-vs-rokhmat -s-l abi b-mei/ . Accessed on 12 November 2008. 
i 
2 See T nternational Cris is Gro up, "Ind onesia : I.mpli cations of the Ahmadiyab Becree," in !CG Asia Rep ort 
(J akarta/Brussels2008). _ 
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likely that these figures could have tnaintained relationships with HTJ for personal 
reasons rather than a real belief in its ideals. Nevertheless, HTl \,yas successful in 
convincin!I one of these figures about their ideas. Siti Fadilah, the fonner health minister 
~ - . . 
still retnains close to HTI figures and consults the1n on a range of different issues. 13 lt 
,,yas through the advice of HTI leaders that Siti Fadilah was able to tnake an 
announcetnent that the HlNl strain of the svvine flu virus was 1nan-1nade and likely to 
have been transtnitted to the developing countries by the goven11nents of developed 
countries. 14 Subsequently, she published a book, Saatnya Dunia Berobah (Titne for the 
world to Change), in which she alleged that the U.S. and the World Health Organization 
(WHO) were conspiring to secure Indonesian satnples of the avian flu virus in order to 
have a n1onopoly on vaccines. She received extensive support fron1 HTI n1en1bers 
including several scientists and doctors who assisted her in writing the book. 15 The book 
was launched at a HTI event and the party was also involved in a can1paign supporting 
Siti Fadilah 's decision to close NAMR1J, the US JVaval lvfedical Research [}nit 
laboratory in the country. It is perhaps an exaggeration to clain1 that HTl \Vas solely 
responsible • for the closing down of this facility . Nevertheless, the party's role in 
supporting the Health Minister played an in1portant role in adding pressure to the 
Indonesian governn1ent to do the san1e. 
Since its en1ergence, HTI' s political influence has increased_ progressively. In 2006, 
utilizing the Muslin1 Connnunity Forun1 (Forun1 [lnunat ls.Zani, FUT), 1-ITI through its 
forn1er chairn1an, Muhan1n1ad al-K.haththath, organized the so-cal led 'One Mi 11 ion 
Muslin1 March'. The 1narch, which in fact dre\v far less than a rnilljon people .called for 
the enact1nent of anti -pornography la\vs. l 6 A vvatered dovvn version of the initial 
proposed legislation vvas passed in the Indonesian parlian1ent. The 111arch organized by 
FUI and HTI placed an added pressure on the Indonesian governn1ent to enact the la\,ys. 
Perhaps an even clearer exan1ple of HTI's lobbying is over the issue of the banning of 
Alunadzyah. Through organizati'ons like the Indonesian [llcuna Council (Mt(jelis [llcuna 
13 Interview with Hafidz Abdurrahman , 12 August 2010 , Jakarta and Interview with Muhammad Al ~ 
Khaththath, 25 July 2011, Jakarta. 
14 1 .. j 1 1 t 1s sair... t mt t 1ese governments wanted to 
15 
"Lima Tuntutan Umat", Forum Umat Islam, http: // swararnuslim.cont/siyasah/n10re.php 
?id=5963_0_6_0_m. Accessed on 25 May 2011. 
16 
"Minggu, Aksi Sej uta Umat", Kompas, 20 May 2006 . . Muhammad Al-Khaththath was the coordinator 
for the march. Also see Osman, "Hizbut Tahrir and its Mobilization Strategy in Indonesia", pp. 601 -609. 
5 
Indonesia, MUI\ HTI \vorked to push for the banning of Ahmad(vah. The party 
coordinated the efforts of s0111e Isla111ic groups under the an1bit of FUI to hold 
den1onstrations and public talks to pressure the Indonesian governn1ent to ban the group. 
While the party (and the other Isla1nic groups) did not attain its goal of banning the 
Ahmadzyah, the governrnent ' s decision to restrict the activities of the Ahmadzyah \Vas 
seen as a rninor victory by HTI leaders. 17 
Inte11Jreting Tsla1nis111 
The tenn Islan1isn1 has becon1e a highly contested tern1 and has attracted debates and 
controversies throughout the world. Graharn Fuller has described Islan1isr11 as a body of 
faith that has sornething irnpo1iant to say about 110\v · politics and society should be 
ordered in the conternporary Muslirn world and irnplen1ented in son1e fashion. 18 The 
erninent scholar on lslarn, John Esposito has described Islan1isn1 as Islan1 interpreted as 
an ideology to support political and social activisn1. 19 Denonoeux defines Islan1isn1 as the 
usage of Islarn by individuals, groups and organizations to pursue political objectives?) 
All these definitions basically see Islan1isn1 as providing political solutions to 
conten1porary societal challenges. However these definitions tend to be lin1ited in their 
scope and fai I to take into account the con1plexities associated \Vith the concept of 
Islan1isrn. i\nother approach to understanding lslarnisn1 is that taken by proponents of 
security studies. 
Since 9/11 so1ne te1Toris1n and security expe1is have atte1npted to link the concept of 
IsJarnisn1 to violence and acts of teITor. Rohan Gunaratna has described Islatnis1n as a 
dangerous ideology~ ,vhich grew out of IsJan1ic teachings.21 Gunaratna sees Islain as a 
reli gion that in spires a dangerous ideology of Islarnisn1. Such assertions are unfortunately 
alarmist in nature. Gunaratna has atten1pted to substantiate his clain1s by naJTating the 
vi e,Ns of terrorist groups and figures vvithout checking whether they are based on Islainic 
17 
.. Another Bl ow to Pluralism", JakDrta Post, 7 June 2008 . 
1 ~ Graham Fu] ler. The Future cf Political Jsla~n ( -ew York, Pal grave 2003), p. xi. 
~~ 1\iiddle East Quarterly, "Is lslamism a Threat? A Debate," ]\,fiddle East Quarterly 4, no. 4 (1999) . 
..: L, Guilain Denoeux, "The Forgotten Swamp: 1 ·avigating Political Islam," 1i1iddle East Policy 9, no. 2 
(2002), p. 61 . 
2 1 Rohan Gunaratna. Inside Al-Qaeda (London: Hurst & Co, 2002). 
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teachings. As such, his definition of Islan1is111 bears little relevance for the purposes of 
this thesis. 
A scholar that has gone to great lengths at defining Islatnistn is the distinguished expert 
on Islam, Olivier Roy. Roy's conception of Islatnism is without doubt the most nuanced. 
Hence, I will accord tnore discussion to his \vork. Roy argues that Islainisrn is an 
ideology in which the adherents return to the preaching in the Qur ' an and Sunnah of the 
Prophet by 111 eans of a political revolution to change the syste111, but is less concerned 
about the application of lslan1ic law.22 Roy also -wrote about ' neo-fundamental isn1 ', an 
ideology that, he argues, is beginning to replace Islainistn. He argues that unlike 
Islan1ists who operate within a national context, neo-fundan1entalists reject the 
boundaries of the nation-state and seek to re-establish the caliphate. -Neo-fundainentalists 
also seek to i1nplen1ent Islan1ic laws and return to a concept of true Islan1.23 Exan1ples of 
neo-fundan1entalists according to Roy are groups like Al-Qaeda, Salqfzs and HT. While I 
aver that Roy 's distinction between Islan1isn1 and neo-fundan1ental ism is a very 
in1portant idea, I ditler slightly on the distinction he has drawn betvveen the two groups. 
I agree with Roy's definition of ' neo-fundan1entalisn1' being an ideology that focuses on 
the return to true Islan1 (Qur'an and the exan1ple of the Prophet). Neo-fundmnentali sts 
en1phasize strongly on personal piety, often with great attentioi:1 to the n1inutest details . 
Neo-fundarnentalists also tend to lack interest in rnajor social and political issues. Son1e 
apolitical Salcr/1 and Tahlighi Ja,naat would fall in this category. Us ing Roy's analysis as 
a reference point, I define Isla1nisn1 as an ideology that thinks of Islarn as . a systern 
(political, econon1ic and social) and seeks to bring about a political transfonnation of 
society and state. This includes the in1plen1entation of Isla111ic la,v and the frmning of 
econo1nic activities in Islan1ic tenns. While Islan1isn1 is also associated ,vith perceived 
notions of piety such as in one's dressing, dietary habits and being 1nore observant of 
Islmnic rituals, the e1nphasis on piety is secondary to the rnain e1nphasis on political 
transfonnation. In this respect groups like the MB , Al=Qaeda and HT would fall \Vithin 
the category of Isla1nists . 
. , . .., 
-~ Olivier Roy, The Failure of Political ]shun (London" LB Tauris , 1994), pp. 35-39 . 
23 ibid, p. 84-90 . 
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For the purpose of this thesis, I ,vill use the above definition of Islmnisn1 to describe HT. 
It is a 111oven1ent that seeks the replacen1ent of all Muslin1 states with a caliphate; the 
party is also focused 1nore on the need to replace the current systen1s vvith Islan1ic 
systerns. Likevvise, the focus on personal piety and Isla111ic rituals is secondary to the 
n1ain airn of reviving the caliphate as will be shown in later sections of the thesis. 
Literature Revie\-v 
Works on lslarn, especially those related to Islarnic political n1oven1ents, have grown 
rapidly follovving the events of 9/ 11. While son1e good analytical vvorks have en1erged 
frorn these studies, a large nun1ber of these works tend to be alarn1ist in nature, warning 
that lslmnic 1nove1nents are a threat to ,vorld peace. HT and HTI are often cited as 
exarnples of such dangerous lslan1ic political rnovernents. The studies of Islan1ist 
n1overnents in Indonesia have also increased significantly in the last few years. The 
irnportant role that lslan1ic groups played during the political dernonstrations in 1998 led 
to the dernise of the New Order regirne under Suharto and the t,vo Bali bornbings only 
served to increase the interest in Indonesian lslan1is1n. In the next section, a review of 
works on lslan1is111 in Indonesia, ,vill be undertaken. 
Islan1isrn in Indonesia 
. Works on Isian1isn1 in Indonesia can be broadly grouped into three categories. The first 
category of works is vvritten in a descriptive style. These vvorks tend to be superficial 
surveys of Islmnist rnovernents. Often, these works provide a historical background, 
ideology and beliefs of these 1nove1nents without providing any analysis or posing 
serious research questions. 24 Often, these vvorks are glaring with factual eITors and 
inconsistencies in the line of ann1n1ent. One such work described the arowth of Islan1ist u b 
rnoven1ents as a passing rno1nent in Indonesian history. 25 It then points out that the 
24 
For examples of these works, see Imam Tholhah and Choirul Fuad Yusuf (eds), Gerakan lslarn 
Kotemporer Era Reformasi (Jakarta: Badan Litbang Agama dan Diklat Keagamaan Depag) 2002); S 
Yunanto (ed), J\1ilitant lslmnic lvfovenzents in Indonesia and Southeast Asia (Jakarta: The Rideap Institute 
and Frederich Ebe11 Siftung, 2003) and Khamami Zada, Islam Radikal, Pergulatan Ormas-Ormas Islam 
Garis Keras (Jakaria: Teraju , 2002). 
:s Djamhari ~1akruf, "Radikalisme Islan1 di Indonesia: Fenori1ena Sesaaf' in BaJ1tiar Efendy and Soestrino 
Hadi (eds) Agarna dan Radika!isme Di lndonesia (Jakarta: Nuktah , 2007), pp. 3-33. 
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' 111oderate' form of lslatn that is entrenched in Indonesia, as etnbodied in Muslim 
organizations like the Nahdlatul Ulcana and Muharn1nadiyah, will overcon1e the 
challenge of such tnovem·ents.26 These works provide new infonnation about different 
Islmnist groups but do not contribute significantly to ne\v understandings of Islm11is111 
and Islmn in Indonesia. 
Tefforis111 and security studies experts have vvritten the second category of work. These 
,vorks posit the vievv that Islatnistn in Indonesia poses a threat to the country and the 
region. 27 'Expe1is' such as Sadanand Dhun1e and Zachary Abuza do precious little to 
understand the thinking, ideology and n1ethodology of the different categories of 
Islan1ists by lun1ping all of then1 together as the san1e. 28 Sin1ilar to their contributions to 
the larger body of literature on Isla111is111 , these vvritings are phrased in an alannist 
fr1shion and serve only to create fea.r and anxiety about the threat of Islam. These 
supposed experts have little understanding of Indonesian politics, society, languages and 
custon1s, which n1akes it ditiicult for any value to be extracted fron1 their research. Greg 
Fealy con1n1ented that n1any of these writers rely heavily on intelligence briefings and 
docrnnents. This often leads to errors, particularly due to a lack of understanding of 
in1portant Islan1ic tern1inology.29 Natasha Han1ilton-Hart expressed sin1ilar views in her 
insightful article about terrorisn1 studies in Southeast Asia. Her scathing attack on sorne 
of the leading experts on terrorisn1 in the region is targeted at their acaden1ically 
unproductive atte1npts to reconstruct the trail of terrorist activity on the basis of official 
inforn1ation. The upshot of this n1isunderstanding and n1isrepresentation is that terrorisn1 
is often conflated with the ideology of Islan1isn1. 30 
26 ibid, p. 33 and Azyumardi Azra, Pergolakan Polirik fslanL Dari Fundan1entlisme. Aiodernisn1e Hingga 
Post-A1odernisrne (Jakarta: Paramadina, 1996). 
27 For instance, see Rohan Gunaratna (ed), Changing Face qf Terroris1n (Singapore: Eastern University 
Press, 2004 ). · 
28 An example of this Zachary Abuza's asse1iion that there is nexus of Muslim terrorist (JI), Sa/qfi 
communities and Islamic political patties (PKS) seeking to fom1 an Islamic state in Indonesia. See Zachary 
Abuza, Political Islmn and Violence in Indonesia (London: Routledge, 2005), p. 81. Sadanand Dhume 
asse1is that little differentiates the PKS and groups like JI. The share the same ideology and thinking and . 
goals. See Sadanand Dhume, "Indonesian Democracy's Enemy Within" Yale Global, l December 2005. 
29 Greg Fealy and Aldo Borgu, local Jihad: Radical Islmn and Terrorism in Indonesia (Canberra: ASPI, 
100') ') ] 7 
..., . - , p. _;.., , 
30 International Crisis Group, "Al -Qaeda in Southeast Asi.a: The Case of the 'Ngruki Network ' in 
Indonesia," in ICC/ Asia Report (Jakarta/Brussels2002) , p. 303 . 
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Country specialists and expetis such as Martin Van Bruinessen, Robert Hefner, Greg 
Barton and Greg Fealy are responsible for the third category of work. 31 They charted new 
directions in the study of lslarnist n1overnents in Indonesia. Unlike the terrorisn1 expetis, 
these scholars' authoritative, detailed and highly reliable accounts of Islan1ist 1noven1ents 
in the region have shed nevv light in the understanding of Islan1 in Indonesia. An1ongst 
the first scholars to broach the historical din1ension of Islan1ist groups in Indonesia is 
Martin Van Bruinessen. 32 According to hin1 the n1ost conten1porary Islan1ist n1oven1ents 
..,.., 
are otT-shots of t\vo historical Islan1ist n1ove1nents. the Masvun1i and Darul Islan1_-'-1 His ~ ~ 
article also gives a concise description of the organizational structure, ain1s and 
ideologies of the rnoven1ents. Van Bruinessen represents a scholarly tradition that 
utilizes prirnary sources such as interviews and docu1nents produced by Islarnist 
n1oven1ents. Di±Terences are dravvn between Islan1ist n1oven1ents operating in 
Indonesia. 34 The approach taken by these scholars is a 111ore nuanced one where different 
aspects of n1ove1nents are exarnined. While acknowledging the threat of violent Islarnist 
' 
n1oven1ents., these scholars adopt a n1ore open attitude towards non-violent Islarnist 
rnovernents. ln fact., they see the potential of sorne of these n1overnents to rnake positive 
contributions in Indonesia. 
I hav~ personally been influenced by their style of vvriting. I have undertaken in-depth 
prin1ary research through the study of docun1ents and extensive interviews to understand 
HTT. While acknovvledging the radical vision that HTI subscrjbes to, I shall undertake 
the study of the radical ideology of HTI within the context of Indonesia. My study ain1s · 
to understand HTI frotn an authentic perspective, providjng an analysis of its thinking, 
goals and strategies. 35 In dojng ~o, I intend to take a neutral stance tovvards studying the 
1novernent. 
31 One of the best works on Islam in Indonesia is Robert Hefner's Civil Islam. See Robert Hefner, Civil 
{~-fmn: A1uslims and pemocrati::ation in lndonesia (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000). 
-- Also see C Van D1Jk, Rehellion under the Bonner qf!slom: The Dorul ls/am in Jndonesio (The Hague: 
M. Nij hoff. 1981 ). 
33 i1a1iin Van Bruinessen, 11 Genealogies of Islamic Radicalism in Post-Suhario Indonesia, 11 Southeast Asia 
Research l 0, no . 2 (2002) .. pp. 11 7-154 . 
3 ➔ See Fealy and Borgu, Local Jihad, pp . 12-18 and International Crisis Group, "Why Salafism and 
!e1Torism Don ' t Mix," in !CG Asia Report (Jakarta/Brussels2004). 
_,) Although I am not a member of HTI, I attended several internai meetings and study circles, vvhich are 
not open to outsiders. I also interact with HTI leaders and members at a personal level. As such, my 
analysis is as close as it gets to the insider's views of HTI. 
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Scholarships on Hizb ut Tahrir 
It is indeed surprising to note the dearth of scholarship on HT. HT has been an important 
moven1ent vvithin th e Middle East for rnuch of the 196Os and 197Os. The party's 
influence and strength could be seen from its ability to infiltrate the an11ies of Syria, 
Jordan, Egypt and Tunisia where the party has atte1npted coups. 36 In rnore recent tit11es , 
HT is also believed to be the largest Isla1nist opposition group operating in Central 
Asia. 37 The in1portance of HT is however not reflected in the nun1ber of acaden1ic works 
\vritten about the party. To date, there have been only two books, one 111onograph , one 
conference report as well as several journal miicles focusing their attention on HT. These 
works are based on HT ' s activities in Centra l Asia and Britain . It is even n1ore 
problen1atic as n1any of these works look at HT through the natTO\V lens of 
terrorisn1/security studies 
Historical-Political Fran1e 
The rnost in1portant vvork to date on HT is Suha Taj1-Farouki ' s, A Fur1da1ne11tal ()uest: 
Hizb al-Tahrir and the Search jl)r the caliphate. The book, vvhich adopts a historical 
analysis of HT, oilers an excellent overvievv of the history ancLideology of the party. 38 
Taji-Farouki also provides extensive details on the life and thinking of the founder of 
HT, An-Nabhani. 39 For Taji-Farouki, HT is a religo-political n1oven1ent, which grew out 
of the context of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Nevertheless, it grevv to b~co111e a 
transnational Islmnic rnove1nent, partly due to repression frorn the Arab regilnes in the 
Middle East, forcing 111e111bers to escape to ,vestern countries. Her book also gives detads 
aboi1t the organizational structure of the n1oven1ent. The extensive intervievvs conducted 
by the author and the use of a ,vide body of prilnary docurnents, affinns this study as the 
best account of HT. In spite of this, there are several ,veaknesses in this vvork and its 
36 Suha Taji-Farouki, A Fundmnental Quest: Hizb al-Tahrir and the Searchjc)r the Caliphate (London : 
9rey Seal, 1996). This book is seen to be the fairest treatment of the paiiy by many HT activi sts. 
:;
7 Ahmed Rashid, Jihad: The Rise qfA1ilitant fr:;/an1 in Central Asia ('(ale: Yale Uni vers ity Press, 200 2) . 
38 Taji-Farouki , Fundmnental Quest, pp. ] 51 -1 87. . 
39 Another example of an analysis of An-Nabhani's thinking is Suha Taji-Farouki , "Islami c Discourse and 
Modern Political l\1ethods: An Analysis of Nabhan i's Rea.ding of Canonical Textual Sources of Islam," Th e 
American Journal qflslamic Social Sciences 11 , no. 3 (1994) , p. 365 -393. 
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theoretical underpinnings are weak. Little is also 111entioned about the n1odes of 
recruitn1ent and n1otivations for joining HT. The book is rather lin1ited in its 
geographical coverage to HT activities 111 the Nliddle East and Europe, ·with lin1ited 
infonnation about its activisn1 in Asia. 
Another scholar vvho has written about HT is Peter Mandaville. Mandaville has 
described HT as a n1oden1ist radical Islan1ist groLip that operates on Classical Leninist 
lines. He elucidates that "activists travel the country, setting up closed cells in tO'wns and 
universities .. indoctrinating n1en1bers in the party 's beliefs and \,vorldvie\,v. "40 In his 
second book, Global Islarnic Politics, I\1andaville atte1npts to explain the features that set 
Al-Qaeda and HT apart. Here he draws an analogy with the Bolshevik Revolution in 
vvhich HT is described as the advocates of "khilqlah in one country" while Al-Qaeda is 
depicted as being rnore Trotskyite and favouring a continuous worldwide jihad. He also 
addresses the in1portance of identity as a factor in attracting young Muslin1s to HT, 
arguing that party r11en1bers and activists rnust b~ encouraged to see Islar11 as a higher 
order identity while de-ernphasizing their national affiliations.41 This is the key strength 
of Mandaville' s work. In Chapter 7 of the thesis I shall address the in1portance of identity 
in retaining n1ernbers within HTl. Mandaville also succinctly explained aspects of HT's 
organizational structure and recruit1nent strategies. These aspects of HT and HTI vvill be 
discussed in Chapter 5. Nonetheless, Manda ville ' s grasp of HT' s beliefs and ain1s is 
proble1natic. His asse1iion that HT advocates the fonnation of a caliphate in one state is 
inaccurate. HT has n1aintained that the party will call on all Muslirn states to unite. under 
one caliphate, failing which it is obliged to wage jihad against those, ,,vhich have refused · 
to join.42 He also made the tn istake of refeITing to HT as being;a Salafi 1nove1nent.4 3 This 
1nistake could have ste1nn1ed fro1n his belief that HT and Al-Muhajiroun (an offshoot 
group of HT) are more or less the satne. 44 Whjle Al-Afuhajiroun does subscribe to a 1nore 
Salqfi orientation, An-Nabhani the founder of HT has been critical of Salafi thinkers and 
rejects their ideology. 
-! O Peter Iv1andaville, Tronsnational lvfus/im Politics: Re-Imagining the Ummah (New York: Routledge, 
2004), p. 129. 
4 1 Peter ~1andaville. Global Political ls/am (1 -ew York: Routledge, 2007), p. 270. 
4
~ ibid. 
43 
·t .d 'J71 111 , p.-'--' 
44 · Mandav1lle, Transnational Islam, p. 116. 
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In his seminal work, Globalised ls,Ja,n, Olivier Roy's analysis includes a case study of 
H-T. He refers to HT as one of the "neo-fundarnentalists'' groups. Sin1ilar to traditional 
fundan1entahst groups, he holds that HT seeks to establish an Islarn ic state (caliphate), 
irnplernent Isla1nic laws as well as return to what they dee1n to be a state of true Islam . 
He also proposes that certain di1nensions of HT's ideology refer to traits that are present 
in neo-fundatnentalist 1nove1nents. He notes that, 
HT has become an uprooted and deterritorialised rnovernent, with no thought of taking 
power in a given country. The caliphate it wants to establish has no teITitorial basis. HT 
uses pseudo-Koranic tern1inology, taken out of context, with no consideration of history 
and social circumstances. Its concept of Khilafc7t has little to do with the historical 
caliphate; even if the party sees 1924 as the year when it ended, this does not mean that it 
wishes to revive the Ott01nan political syste1n. In fact, for HT, the caliphate is not a real 
geographical entity and has no territorial or sociological roots. It has to be established as 
soon as possible for the whole urnmah and not on a specific territory. This global and 
abstract conception of the urnrnah is typical of neo-fundan1ental isn1. The developn1ent of 
HT exemplifies how a fonner Tslamist party tun1ed neo-fundarnentalist, even if it differs 
. 4~ from all other neo-fundmnental1st 1novements. -
While Roy's analysis on HT's conception of the caliphate and the urnmah is succinct and 
vvjll be extrapolated in greater detail later in the thesis, his clain1 that HT is de-
territorialized in all aspects does not fit in ,vith · son1e of the findings of this study. Later 
chapters of the thesis will de1nonstrate that the HT chapter in Indonesia rernain s strongly 
attached to its chapters in the Middle East_ and even takes orders fron1 this central 
leadership. The 1nore i1nportant aspect of Roy ' s ,vork is his contribution to the study of 
Islan1isrn. As highlighted above, Roy brought fo1ih a new recognition that lslan1isn1 is 
today shaped by a confused understanding of identity, especially an1ongst Muslin1 
youths. His analysis is thus a study of HT that exan1ines both the 111acro and n1icro 
din1ension of Islan1isn1 and draws a correlation bet,veen these factors. This approach of 
con1bining the historical-hern1eneutic approach and the sociological approach will be 
adopted in this thesis. 
45 Olivier Roy, Globalized Islarn: The Search.for a New Ununah (New York: Columbia University Press , 
2004). , p. 238. 
] ·, 
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Terrorisn1 and Radicalis111 Frante 
Recent literature on HT has prirnarily atternpted to study the group through the lens of 
international terrorisn1 and Islarnic radicalisn1. Exmnples of these ,vorks include Zeyno 
Saran's Hi:zb ut-Tahrir: Jslan1 's Political Insurgenc~y and The Challenge qf Hizb ut-
TcJhrir: Dectj7hering a1ul Con1bating Radical ls.Zcunist Ideology edited by the sarne 
author. Zeyno Baran also coined the phrase 'conveyor belt for terrorisrn' to describe 
HT. 46 Other authors go further, by in1plicating HT as the next Al-Qaeda and ,varning of 
the danger they can pose to the international cor11111unity.47 In his assessn1ent of HT in 
Central Asia, Ariel Cohen predicts that HT could well becon1e the next Al-Qaeda. He 
believes that HT is atternpting to overthrow the Central Asian governn1ents through 
violent coups.48 Echoing this vie,v is Rohan Gunaratna ,vho clain1s that rnany Al -Qaeda 
rnernbers, such as Abu Musab Al-Zarqa,vi and Khalid Sheikh Muhan1n1ad, were forn1er 
n1ernbers of HT. 49 The approach undertaken by these 'experts' is often security and 
policy oriented and tends to be written with a politicized agenda. As a response to the 
earlier works by Baran and Cohen, Swiss acaden1ic, Jean Francois-Mayer has contested 
the vie,vs expressed by Baran and Cohen. 5° Few of these studies take a nuanced approach 
to analyzing HT. With the exception of Francois-Mayer ' s work, the key research focus of 
these authors dwells in detennining ,vhetber HT is a security threat. Baran and Cohen do 
not provide n1L1ch useful insights of the context. in which HT in Central Asia operate. 
These vvorks are also n1a1Ted vvhh factual inaccuracies. For instance, Baran in an attetnpt 
to cluster HT and Al-Qaeda together observed: 
46 Zeyno Baran , "The Road from Tashkent to the Taliban : An Islamist Terror Group Is Undermining a U.S . 
Ally," The National Revie1v, 2 Apr 2004. Accessed from http: //www.nationalreview.com on 14 January 
2005. 
47 Ariel Cohen, "Hizb Ut-Tahrir: i\n Emerging Threat to U.S. Interests in Central Asia. ," in Heritage 
Foundation Backgrounder (Heritage Foundation, 2003 ). 
4S·t·d / 1 11 , p . .:... 
49 Rohan Gunaratna, "Links with Islamic Groups" in Zeyno Baran (ed) , The Challenge ofHizb ut-Tahrir: 
J?eciphering and Cmnbating Radical Islarnist Ideology (Washington: Hudson Institute, 2004). 
)U Sadek Hamid, ." Islamic political Radicalism in Britain: The Case of Hizb ut-Tahrir' ' in Tahir Abbas (ed) 
Jslornic Political Radicalisn1_ A European Perspective (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press , 2007); 
Noman Han if "The caliphate: Islam's Challenge to Global Order?". Accessed on 
http:// usa.mediamonitors.net on 4 October 201 L Jean Francois Mayer, "Hizb ut-Tahrir - The Next Al-
Qaida, Reall y? PS/0 Occasional Paper (Geneva, PSIO, Federal Depa1iment of Foreign Affairs DF A 
Political Affairs Di vision IV) No 4, pp . 3-24 . and Houriyah Ahmed and Hannah Stuart, Hi::.b Ut-Tahrir: 
ideology and Structure (London: Center for Social Cohesion, 2009). 
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While Al-Qaeda can be thought of as the overarching syrnbol representing rnilitant, 
radical Islam, HT's global networks directly convey the radical Islan1ist n1essage to th e 
Muslim grounds. 51 ,.__. 
It js also 1nisleading to lump HT together with terrorist groups such as Al-Qaeda. This is 
especially given that HT has been severely criticized by groups subscribing to the Salafi-
jihadist ideology. As early as 1980, the spiritual guide of Osan1a Bin Laden, Abdullah 
Azzan1, wrote a vehen1ent critique of HT arguing that the group has strayed fron1 Isla111 . 
More recently, the ICG wrote of the tension between the 5'alqfz's (the religious ideology 
that Al-Qaeda subscribes to) and their HT 'brothers'. 52 The ICG has also declared that 
HT is incapable of posing a serious threat to any of the authoritarian regin1es in Central 
Asia as it lacks funds, 1ne111bers and institutional support. 
More recently, in his book The Is1canists , Ed Husain, a tanner n1e1nber of HT in Britain , 
has argued that HT posed a serious threat to Britain and n1ust be countered conclusively 
by the govenunent. 53 The book is a first~hand account of hovv an individual becornes 
dra\ivn to radical groups like HT. While Husain falls short of labeling HT as a terrorist 
group, he unequivocally calls tor the banning of HT. His argun1ent is based on his 
personal experience. He believes that the ideas HT advocates have resulted in the n1urder 
of a Christian Nigerian student by a radical Muslin1 student wh~ ,vas influenced by HT ' s 
'd s4 1 eas. 
Unlike the vvorks of Baran and Cohen, Husain's analysis of I-IT provides details of HT ' s 
ideology, the context of its ernergence in the UK and his personal n1otivation for joining 
HT. The infonnation in the book provides a fresh perspective on the HT in the l JK. 
N-ohvithstanding its strength, the work's singular ,veakness is that it tarnishes all 
Tslarnists with sarne brush. Husain does not advance a clear working definition tor the 
tern1 Islarnist. While acknowledging differences an1ongst groups like the MB, Jarnaar-e-
51 Zeyno Baran, Hizb ut-Tahrir: Jslan1 ·s Political Insurgency (Washington: Hudson Institute, 2004), p. 13 . 
52 International Crisi s Group, "Radical Islam in Central Asia: Responding to Hizb Ut-Tahrir," in !CCi Asia 
Report (Osh/Brussels2003), p. 31 
53 See Ed Husain, The lshunist: rVhy I Joined Radical ]shun in Britain, PVhat I Saw Inside and ftVl1y I le~/t 
(London: Penguin , 2007). Ed Husain's colleague Ma~jicl Nawaz has also written several opinion pieces 
approaching HT along similar lines. For instance, see Maajid Nawaz, In and Out oflslmnisrn (London, Th e 
Quilliam Foundation: 2008), pp. 1-11. 
54 Husain, The fslamist, p . 152. 
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Is.Zami, HT and Wahhabi, he regards all of then1 as security threats to Britain. Moreover, 
Husain ' s analysis is also flawed given that he was part of the HT in Britain when it can1e 
under the leadership of On1ar Bakri Muhan1111ad at a critical juncture. This ,vas vvhen 
On1ar Bakri ,vas sacked fron1 his position, as he ,vas deen1ed to have strayed fron1 the 
n1ethodology espoused by HT. Inevitably, Hussain's assessn1ent of HT in Britain is 
based solely on the period vvhen the HT leadership in the country veered fron1 the key 
ideology of the pa11y . . It is the purpose of this thesis to correct son1e of these enors, 
especially vvith regard to understanding HT's ideology. It will also atten1pt .to provide an 
alternative view of HT that difiers frorn the radicalisn1/terrorisrn centric perspective. 
The Social 1~ove1nent Fraine 
One of the rnore recent theoretical approaches used to study HT is the social 1noven1ent 
theory (Stv1T). While there are different interpretations of social rnovernent theory, ,vhich 
will be elaborated upon later in the chapter, SMT can be loosely understood as aff inter-
disciplinary approach that seeks to understand the en1ergence of n1overnents launching 
collective action against the state to bring about social transforn1ation. 55 Several variants 
of SMT have en1erged. One of then1 is the functionalist approach, which contends that 
movetnents ernerge and grow due to social deprivation of individuals. Another branch of 
SMT is the political opportunity structure, which argues that movernents ernerge due to 
exte111al political factors that give opportunities for 1nove1nents to e1nerge and grow. A 
third branch of SMT is the resource n1obilization theory, ,vhich highlights that 
1nove1nents e1nerge and gro\v due to the availability of resources. The final variant of 
SMT is the fra1ning theory, which argues that 1nove1nents grovv due to their ability to 
market ideas by achieving intellectual resonance with individuals vvho1n they target for 
recruitrnent. SMT has been en1ployed by E1nmanuel Karagiannis in his book on HT in 
Central Asia. 56 Through a synthesis of different variants of SMT, Karagiannis studies the 
55 For the purpose of the thesis, collective action is defined as direct actions such as protests, 
demonstrations, public rallies undertaken in pursuit of movement's go_als. Violence as a fo1111 of collective 
action is preclude from this study given that HTI is not a violent movement and has never undertaken any 
act of vio lence. See Sidney Tarrow, "Cycles of Collective Action: Between Moments of Madness and the 
Repertoires of Contention" in Mark Traugott 's (ed) Recurrent Patterris of Collective Action (Durham, C: 
Duke University Press, 1995), p. 89. . 
56 Emmanuel .Karagiannis, Political Jsla,n in Central Asia: The Challenge of Hizb ut-Tahrir (New York: 
Routledge, 2009) . Also see other articles by the author of HT in Central Asia. See Emmanuel Karagiannis, 
"Political Islam and Social .Movement Theory: The Case of Hizb ut-Tahrir in Kyrgyzstan" Religion, State 
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etnergence of _HT as an opposition force _ in three Central Asian Republics; Kazakhstan, 
lJzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. He concludes that SMT does not satisfactorily explain the 
e1nergence of HT. Instead, he argues that it is HT's ideology that is the key factor leading 
to its e111ergence in the region. Another itnportant aspect of his work is his asse,setnent on 
links betvveen _HT and other Islatnist 111ove111ents, such as the l~la,nic Jvfovernent of 
[Jzbekistan (IMU) and the l~la,nic Renaissance Party of Tc~jikistan (IRPT). 57 He debunks 
so1ne of the earlier studies on HT in Central Asia linking these groups to HT. 
Karagiannis' book provided a theoretically and etnpirically rich treattnent of HT in 
Central Asia, which n1akes the book an excellent introductory work on HT in Central 
. 'i8 
.Asia.~ - Nonetheless, the study suffers frorn several proble1ns. A n1ajor gap m 
I(arangianis' work is its theoretical fran1ework. He treats ideology as a factor that lies 
outside of SMT, as is evident fro1n his definition of ideology. This is despite the fact that 
there are views within SMT that ideology should be an integral part of the theory. It 
seen1s that the author is unaware of these debates as they are not n1entioned or discussed 
in the book. While he alludes to the role of ideology in n1obilizing collective actions, he 
does not explain further the actual relationship between ideology and collective actions 
or how HT 111en1bers relate to its ideology. As such, the book does not satisfactorily 
explain the actual in1portance of ideology in the growth of HT in Central Asia. 59 
Beyond the problen1 with its theoretical approach, there are a nun1ber of factual 
inaccuracies and gaps in the book. The author's account of I-fT' s history seerns to sl10,v a 
lack of rigorous research. For instance, the account on splits \vithin HT is speculative and 
vvill be addressed in the next chapter of the thesis. 60 Perhaps, the biggest pro~len1 vvith 
the book is an over-reliance on intelligei"1ce reports frorn the governrnents of Kazakhstan 
and Uzbekistan. This is especially so, since the authoritarian nature of their regirnes 
n1akes any infon11ation about HT en1erging fron1 the countries suspect. There has been a 
tendency for these governn1ents to exaggerate the threat of HT in their countries to 
& Society 33 , no . 2. (2005) , pp. 137-149; Emmanuel Karagiannis , "Political Islam in Uzbekistan: Hizb ut-
Tahrir Al-Jslmni" Europe-Asia Studies 58 , no. 2. (2006), pp. 261- 280; Emmanuel Karagiannis , "The 
Challenge of Radical Islam in Tajikistan : Hizb ut-Tahrir Al-lslmni" Nationalities Papers 34, ho. 1. (2006) , 
pp . 1-20. 
57 For details of the IRPT, see Olivier Roy, The Nnv Central Asia: The Creation of Nations (New York : 
New York University Press, 2000). 
~~ Karanggianis, .Political lslarn in Central Asia, pp . 58-68. 
) 9 "b"d 9 0'1 · I 1 , pp. _ 1-1 .c., - • 
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justify the use of harsh political oppression. As in Karangianis' ,vork, I shall also discuss 
the in1portance of ideology. The relationship between ideology and SMT as well as the 
links bet,veen _ ideology and collective identity ,vill be discussed cogently within a larger 
theoretical discussion. In this thesis, I shall also explain ,vhy ideology plays an i111portant 
role ,vhen potential paiiy 111e111bers have to choose bet\veen HTI and other Indonesian 
Isla1nist n1ove111ents. 
Interpreting Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia 
The literature on HT in Indonesia is scarcer. Only tvvo books, seve'ral thesis and short 
articles have been written about HTI. Atten1pts by sorne scholars to assess HTI reveal 
several flavvs. Firstly, there is a lack of understanding of the actual ideology of HT. Most 
authors such as Agus Salin1 and Syarnsul Arifin refer to HTI as a rnodernist r11oven1ent 
,vith Jan1roni and Jarnhari even suggesting that HTI is a Salaj? rnovernent. Secondly, 
rnany of these sources have factual inaccuracies or serious errors about the history of 
HTI. 61 These inaccuracies often lead authors to draw erroneous conclusions about HTI. 
The assurnption by rnany authors that HT is a splinter group of the MB is due to the fact 
that rnany of these authors have not understood the conflict between HTI and the MB 
inspired Ja,naah Tarbiyah (JT) 1nove1nent ,vithin the Le1nbaga Dak:wah Kampus (LDK). 
Lastly, rnost works on HT tend to rely on lirnited prirnary sources produced by HTI. All 
of these works do not cite kev texts of HT. son1e of which have vet to be translated to 
- - ., - - - - - - - ·' . - - . . ., . . -
.Bahasa Indonesia. Such ,vorks are irnpo11ant in trying to understand the ideology, beliefs 
and objectives of the patiy. As a result of these proble1ns, the corpus of research on HTI 
with the exception of Agus Salirn ' s thesis , has not contributed significantly to our 
understanding of the history and develop1nent of HTI. 
Terrorisn1 and Radicalisn-1 Frante 
The tendency to classify all radical lslan1ist groups together can be seen in n1any studies 
61 The best work on HTI to date is an article by Greg Fealy. In spite of this, even this work suffers from 
several historical inaccuracies including the assumption that Abdullah Bin Nuh pursued HT due to 
disappointment with other Islamic groups in Indonesia. See Greg Fealy, "Hizbµt Tahrir in Indonesia: 
Seeking a "Total 11 1vf uslim Identity", in Shahram Akbarzadeh and Fethi t1anso~iri ( eds), Islam and Political 
Violence.- lvluslinz Dia::..pora and Radicalisn1 in the 1-vest, (London and New York: l.B. Tauris, 2007), pp . 
151-164. 
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on HTI. These works tend to be alannist in nature and are often vvritten with a systematic 
I 
atte111pt to portray HTI as a dangerous organization that could potentially destabilize 
Indonesia. Such an agenda could be seen in the atte1npt of one such work to link HTI to 
the larger Salafi 1nove1nent in Indonesia, vvhich is dee1ned to be a threat to the country. 62 
It describes HTI 's ideology, objectives and the political ancLeconotnic systetn envisioned 
by the 1nove1nent. Virtually no analysis of these areas is 1nade except for the claitn that 
HTI is a threat to Indonesia. As highlighted earlier, the authors' understanding of HTl's 
ideology is al so erroneous. Jajang and Ja1nrohi write: 
HT;s ideology is based on the Salc{/zsm of Rida, Abduh 's reformi sm and Al -Afghani's 
I 1 . 61 pan- s an11sn1. -
This is a direct contradiction of the actual ideology of HT and HTl. Figures such as 
Rashid Rida, Muhan1n1ad Abduh and Jan1al Al-Din Afghani have been constantl y 
criticised by HT ideologues and n1e111bers for having sold Isla111 out to the west. A HT 
leader writes: 
The strategy of bridging the gap between !slain and the west were caITied out by so 
called Muslim refonners such as Sir Syed Ahn1ad Khan, Muharnn1ad Iqbal , Jamal Al 
Afghani , Muhammad 'Abduh .. and Rifa'a al Tahtawi , Rashid Rida., Taha Husayn~ and 'A li 
'Abdul Raziq, most of whom they alleged maintained a close relati onship with the British 
· 64 or French governments, either overtly or covertly. -
Despite the weaknesses stated above., the book provides son1e introductory infonnati on 
about HTI' s objectives, 1nethodology and activities in Indonesia. 
Another work on HTI utilising this lens is Muhamn1acl Iqbal Ahnaf's The Irnage r~f the 
C)ther as Ene,ny: Radical Dis(:ourse in Indonesia . This book analyses the systetnati c 
construction of the in1age of the 'Other ' by HTI and the A1ajelis Jvlz,(/ahidin Indonesia 
(MMI). The author docu1nents discourse patten1s in the groups' publications and 
62 Jajang Jahroni and Jamhari , Gerakan Salajz Radikal di Indonesia (Jakarta : PT RajaGrafindo Persata, 
2004), pp. 161-205 
63 ibid, p. 176-177. 
64 Shaikh Talib Awadallah , Th e Beloved by A llah E,nergence qf light J1-mn A 1-Aqsa A1osque Launch qf 
Hi::b ut-Tahrir's March (London: Khilafah Publications, 2006) , p. 28 . 
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speeches stereotyping non-Muslin1s as being hostile towards Islan1 and env1s10111ng 
Islan1 1s in1111inent victorv over all other civilizations.65 Ahnaf n1akes the case that 
., 
asse11ions of HTI and MIVII on several issues ·are n1isleading. He accuses these groups of 
ignoring the actual Qur' anic verses to justify the· literal interpretation of the Qur' an 
proposed by these fundan1entalist groups. This discursive approach to studying HTI 
provides an interesting approach in studying 1noven1ents like HTI. In criticizi_ng HTL the 
author hin1self is guilty of the sarne n1istake about the literal reading of the Qur'an, albeit 
in the opposite n1anner. His interpretation of the Qur ' an is tlavved fron1 an atte1npt to give 
a liberal reading to the text, failing to acknowledge that certain verses frorn the Qur~ an 
do enjoin Muslin1s to take up anns under special circun1stances. The biggest pr0blen1 
with the book lies in its sloppy research, leading to factual inaccuracies that could have 
been easily avoided had the author read son1e basic HTI texts. For instance, the author 
notes that HT. and HTI have no organizational structure, central figures or top leader. 66 A 
scan of literature on HT vvould reveal that HT is a highly structured organization with a 
hierarchical leadership. 67 The book is also n1arred by nurnerous errors in its account of 
history and n1ethodology. Sirnilar to other works written within the terrorisrn/security, 
Ahnaf grouped HTI and MMI within the sarne radical extrernist category failing to 
realize distinct ditTerences between the ideology and n1ethodology of the two groups. 
Social Moven1ent Frante 
Another theoretical fraine\vork that has been e1nployed in a study on HTI is the social 
1nove1nent fran1e . Agus Salitn's The Rise of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (1982-2004): Its 
Political Opportunity Structure, Resource }vfobilization and Collective Action Fra1nes is 
perhaps the 1nost infonnative academic vvork on HTI so far. He assesses the emergence 
of HTT utilizing the key vadants of SMT~ nan1ely the political opportunity structure, 
resource n-1obi I ization and framing. Salin1 · s \VOrk is , groundbreaki!1g reseai·ch that 
captures aspects of HTI ' s history and its evolution fron1 the tin1e it was a clandestine 
group to the point where it beco1nes a legal political organization. Nevertheless, several 
65 Muhammad Iqbal Asnaf, The ltnage of the Other as Enemy: Radical Discourse in Indonesia (Bangkok: 
Silkworm Books, 2006). 
66 ibid, P: J 0. 
67 For instance, see Taj i Farouki, Fundamental Ques( pp. 114-152. 
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proble1ns can be identified in this work. Besides n1aking the same etTor of categorizing 
HTI as a Salqfi 1noven1ent and describing Abdullah Bin Nuh as the first leader of HT!, 
the thesis did not engage SMT satisfactorily.68 There was an absence of an overarching 
argurnent or theoretical fra1nework to link each of these variants of the theory . ~ach 
variant of the theory was used independently to explain the e1nergence of HTl . 
Furthennore, his assess1nent of the 1nacro ditnensions of HTI's e1nergence meant that the 
tnicro di1nensions of HTI's emergence were not discussed. This includes reasons for 
1ne1nbers joining HTI or their choice of HTI over other Islmnic groups. 
Historical-Political Fran-1e 
The study of its history is yet another way to understand HTI. An exatnple of this 
approach is that undertaken by Indonesia specialist, Ken Ward. In his article, he traces 
the trajectory of the future of political Islan1 in Indonesia through the study of HTI's 
history. Ward highlights several reasons as to why HTI has avoided being targeted by the 
Indonesian authorities despite its sen1i-clandestine organizational structure. The author 
also devotes a section on HTI and violence, which conclusively rebuts assertions that 
HTI is involved in violent activities.69 Even so, the article has several factual errors 
already highlighted earlier. 70 While acknovvledging the [1ct that HTI's influence has 
grown , the author does little in trying to understand the reason for this grow1h. As such , 
the atiicle ' s conclusion that HTI is likely to grovv but is unlikely to attain its goals of 
reviving the caliphate in Indonesia is supported by little en1pirical data.71 Nevertheless, 
his analysis is useful in understanding the larger dynan1ics of HTI ' s history and its 
irnpact on the future of HTI. 
Another work that seeks to exmnine HTI fron1 a narrative fran1e is Syan1sul Arifin 's 
Ideologi Dan Praksis Gerakan Kaun1 Fundarnentalis. The book analyses the ideology of 
68 Agus Salim , "The Rise of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (1982-2004 ): Its Political Opportunity Stru cture, 
Resource ~1obilization and Collective Action Frames" Unpublished Masters Thesis (Jakatia : Syarif 
Hidayatullah State Islamic University, 2005) . 
69 Ken \\lard , " Non-violent extremists" , p. 149. 
70 Similar to earlier writings on HTL the author argued that Abdullah Bin N uh inv ited AI-Ba ahdadi to ~ ~ 0 
Indonesia. ibid , p. 150. The author al so does not seen1 to reali ze that the offi cial spelling of HT is Hizb ut-
Tahrir rather than th e localized spelling of HT whi ch is Hizbut Tahrir. Throu ghout th e arti cle th -: laruer HT 
~- ._. 
is spelled in the localized spelling (Hizbut Tahrir) . 
71 
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HTI through its exan1ination of its history and activities. It looks at factors that have 
shaped HTI's ideology and how this ideology in tu111 has shaped the social relationship 
between its rnernbers. 72 The author categorizes HTI's ideology as funda111entalist, 
arguing this on the basis of its rejection of rnodernisn1 and its definition of the concept of 
the nation state based on lslarn as a political systen1:73 In spite of this, the \Nork bears 
several \Veaknesses. For one, his atte111pt at analyzing the religious and political ideology 
of HTI is not unde1iaken con1prehensively. He dra,vs his conclusion about HTI's 
ideology by referring to t,vo books, the Structuring of a Party and the Methodology of 
Hizb ut-Tahrir \Vritten by its founder An-Nabhani. The lack of reference to other 
irnportant vvorks of An-Nabhani such as the Political ,~ysten1 of Islan1 and the $ysten1 qf 
lslan1 has resulted in a serni-accurate portrayal of HTI's ideology. As a result, aspects of 
HTrs ideology such as its proposed political, social and econon1ic systerns are ignored. 
Besides Greg Fealy ' s \Vork, \Vhich cornes closest to accounting for the rise of HTI in 
Indonesia, the rest of the research-work has done little to account for the growth of HTI 
in Indonesia. It is the ain1 of this thesis to fill this gap in literature through the utilization 
of a con1bination of both the historical-political approach and social rnovernent approach. 
Research Questions and Central Argu1nent 
It is the ai1n of this study to investigate the grovvth of HTI in Indonesia. It seeks to 
exarnine why HTI has experienced rapid gro\.v1h. Scholarly works on HTI tend to focus 
on the grou1f s history, organizational structure and ideology. Unfortunately, the 
naJTative and description of these studies have been largely inaccurate. The thesis will 
offer new insights on HTI's history, organizational structure and ideology. This research 
\Nil I also be adding considerable new details about HTI and correcting e1Tors in existing 
literature. Nonetheless, its prnnary focus lies in explaining HTI's rapid grovvth in 
Indonesia. 
In trying to con1prehend the gro\vth of HTI, a senes of s1naller questions are posed. 
Firstly, this study seeks to understand why HTI en1erged publicly in 2000 and the 
72 Syamsul Arifin , Jdeologi Dan Praksis Gerakan Kaunz Fundanzentalis (Jakarta: U11M Press, 2004), p. 3. 
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political factors that itnpact on the pmiy's strategies. Secondly, it will exan1ine HTI's 
recruitn1ent and n1obilization strategies by asking how HTT recruits 111ernbers, builds 
organizational capacity and secures material resources. Thirdly , the thesis explores the 
reason why HTI 111e1nbers choose HTI over other Islamist groups or organizations. 
Lastly, this disse1tation seeks to understand \Vhy rnetnbers rernain in the patiy despite 
having no guarantee of real tangible benefits or results frorn their activistn. Here I will 
dra,v on the POS and RMI variants of the Social Move1nent Theory (SMT), 
incorporating also theories of identity and ideology as a fran1ework, to better understand 
and answer the questions posed. 
The central argurnent of this study is that tl!e key to understanding HTrs grcnvth lies in 
the role that collective identity plays in attracting new 1nen1bers and retaining its existing 
rnen1bers within the party. Factors such as institutional and non-institutional 
oppotiunities ,vithin the Indonesian political systetn, HTI's resource 1nobilization 
strategies and the anti-systernic ideology of HTL serve as political, organizational and 
religious incentives for individuals to join the pariy and launch collective action. 
Notwithstanding this, collective identity ren1ains the tnost crucial factor in the party ' s 
grovvth. 
'-
Theoretical Approach 
This thesis seeks to go beyond the radicalisrn and the historical-political approaches of 
studying HT and HTI. It ain1s to delve into some aspects of HTI ' s history, organizational 
structure, goals, ideas and prograrns ,vithin a theoretical fran1ework. These issues \viii be 
addtessed \Vi thin the larger context of an analysis of HTI 111oven1ent. 
FVhy SMT? 
Social 1nove111ent theorists have sought to assess the e111ergence and success of a 
n1oven1ent through several social n1oven1ent fra111eworks. As highlighted earlier, SfVIT 
has several variants including those that involve relative deprivation, political 
opportunities, resource 1nobilization, frarning mfrl identity. The key strength in the use of 
SMT lies in the fact that it offers an alternative explanation to understanding Islan1isn1 in 
Indonesia. Earlier conventional interpretations of Islan1ic activisn1 tended to study the 
phenon1enon as a direct outco1ne of accun1ulated cultural grievances, distinct cultural 
traits or an expression of socio-econo1nic grievances. SMT seeks to provide a n1ore 
con1prehensive explanation for the rise of lslarnic political 1noven1ents by taking into 
consideration both the external socio-political and religious environn1ent that a 
n1oven1ent operates in, the internal dynan1ics that shape n1oven1ents, decisions, strategies 
and activities as \,vell as the n1otivations and attractions of individuals drawn tovvards a 
social n1oven1ent. This being the case, SMT is useful in answering son1e of the questions 
that are posed in the thesis. 
SMT as a theory has evolved over tin1e. Earlier SMT theorists tried to understand the 
en1ergence of social rnovernents through the ·strains ' theory. This theory argues that a 
variety of strains in society, due to relative deprivation, n1ay produce psychological 
grievances that can only be alleviated through collective action. 74 The key weakness of 
this theory is its assurnption that social actions take place in a sporadic fashion and are 
not the result of proper strategies and calculated n1oves. 75 As cited above, relative 
deprivation links social change to psychological states of individuals. Nonetheless, there 
are n1any reasons that n1ay be responsible for changes in a person 's psychological state. 
This rneans that while relative deprivation rnight be a reason why individuals launch 
collective actions , it 1nay not necessarily be the sole reason. 
The rethinking of this earlier approach ca1ne about vvith the e1nergence of the resource 
rnobilization th eory (RMT) , a variant of SMT. Rather than viewing social rnove.tnents as 
consisting of individuals who behave in an irrational n1anner in response to structural 
issues that ex ist in the society, this theory assun1es that individuals involved in social 
rnove1nents act in a rational manner. According to the resource rnobilization theory , 
74 Ted Gurr, Why j\1en Rebe/. .Princeton, (NJ: Princeton University Press, 1970). It must be added here that 
relative deprivation theory is part of the collective behaviour theory, which also includes the structural -
functionalism theory and symbolic interactionism . For a discussion on collective behaviour theory, see 
Steven J\11. Buehler, Social A1overnents in Advanced c·apitalisrn: The Political EconotnJ' and Cultural 
<;'_011srruc rio11 cf Social Activi.srn ( · evv \ ' ork : Oxford Uni versity Press , 2000), pp. 19-29. 
i ::- Doug McAdam, Politicul Process and the Development of-Black Insurgency._1930-1970 
(Chicago : University of Chicago Press. 1982), pp . 17-19. 
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social n1ove1nents 1nust be able to mobilize key resources if they are to en1erge. 76 Thi s 
approach focuses on the internal dynan1ics of a social n1oven1 ent such as its 
organizational structure, ability to secure financial support and creation of fonnal 
institutions and infonnal netvvorks aitned at assi stin g it towards its end goal. -While 
providing an understanding of the dynatnics and tactics of social 1noven1ents it also 
analyzes the growth, decline and change of the 1nove1nents from the standpoint of their 
ability to procure and mobilize resources towards their stated objective. In essence, the 
theory tnakes the case that 1nove1nents, which are n1ore successful at recruitn1ent of 
n1en1bers and n1obilizing resources, are also likely to be n1ore successful in attaining thei r 
goals. A key weakness of the RMI is its failure to assess exten1al factors that could 
han1per or assist the grovvth of a social n1oven1ent. While RMT is a powerful tool for 
analyzing social 1nove1nents at the rnacro level , it does little at assessin g cognitive factors 
such as individual incentives and tnotivations for joining then1. 
The political opportunity structure (POS) theory seeks to con1prehend externa l factors 
that in1pact a social n1oven1ent's action , strategy and ability to 111obilize 111en1bers and 
supporters towards a certain goal. 77 In a way, these political opportunity structures refer 
to the din1ensions of the political environn1ent that provide incentives for , or constraints 
against, people undertaking collective action. 78 Existing political opportunity structure 
argun1ents have concentrated on its four central din1ensions, 11an1ely, declining state 
repression, increasing political access, di visions mnong the elite and the co-opting of 
influential allies.79 These din1ensions tend to focus on institutional POS and as such are 
not exhaustive. There are also other dirnensions of POS that are 111ore contexts specific. I 
have defined these dirnensions collectively as non-institutional POS. Political 
opportunity structures are i1nportant in exan1ining the political and socio-econon1ic 
conditions that allo,v social 1nove1nents to e111erge and grow. Studies, ,vhich apply POS, 
have sho,vn that changes in political and socio-econon1ic contexts irnpact the likelihood 
of a group unde1taking collective action. In surn , POS can be used as a heurist ic device to 
7
1.; John D. McCmihy, and Mayer N. Zald, "Resource rvlobi li zation and Social Movement: A Pa11 ial 
Theory" in John D. McCarth y, and ~1ayer N. Zald (eds), Social i\lfovemenrs in an Organi: ationul Sociery: 
Collected Essc7:ys (New Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1987, pp. 15 -48 . 
n 'b' _;) -I Ill . 
78 Sidney Tarrow, Power in Movement: Social Movernents and Contentious Politics (New York : 
Cambridge Universi ty Press, 1998). 
79 Doug McAdam, John D . McCmthy, and Mayer N. Zald (eds) , Cmnparative Perspectives on Social 
Movement (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996). 
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generate hypotheses about how changes in political context in1pact on the incentives (or 
disincentives) for social n1oven1ent actors to launch collective action and explain the 
reaction of actors tovvards di±Ierent political systen1s. One key lin1itation of POS is the 
di±liculty to prove en1pirically that a given change in dirnension of POS is likely to alter 
the incentive for or against collective action. Sin1ilar to RMT, POS theory does little to 
cornprehend or understand the perspectives of individuals ·within social n1oven1ents. 
Another irnportant variant of SIVlT is frarning theory. Fran1ing is a process \Vhereby 
actors in a social 111ove111ent, produce, arrange and disserninate discourses that resonate 
an1ong those they intend . to 111obilize. 80 In practice, the concept refers to the 
interpretations of events provided by social n1oven1ent organizations that are intended to 
resonate vvith the beliefs of suppo1i.ers. 81 The theory integrates social psychological 
fr=tetors \Vith SMT. Like\,vise, fran1ing theory atternpts to link n1icro factors (i.e. social 
psychological factors) and n1acro factors (structural and organizational factors). 82 It 
argues that only when there is ;;frarne alignrnenC~ that recruitrnent and n1obilization 1s 
possible. 83 Frarnes offer cognitive tools for rnaking sense of events and experiences by 
interpreting causation, evaluating situations, and offering prescriptive ren1edies. 
84 The 
fran1ing theory also provides an insight into how n1oven1ents act to change the cognitive 
structure of targets , and the conditions, \Vhich lead to the success of 1nove1nents in doing 
so. However, the theory has rernained largely under-developed and the en1pirical case 
studies that utilize this theory often vie\v fratning fro1n the perspective of the 1nove1nent 
rather than individuals. Fran1ing theory could be rnore effective in studying n1icro factors 
if the theory is rehabilitated \Vith other social psychological theories. 
Another problem that has emerged · vvithin discussions on fratning theories is the 
tendency for scholars of SJVIT to discount the itnportance of ideology and to use the tenn 
ideology and fran1ing interchangeably. In an in1portant vvork discussing the relationship 
80 David Sn ow, E Burke Richford David Snow, Steven K. \Vorden and Ro.bert D. Benford, "Frame 
Ali gnment Process, i1icromobilization and i1ovement Participation,'' An-zerican Sociologist Revierv 51 , no . 
4 ( 1986), pp.461-481. 
81 
Robert Benford, "Frame Disputes within the ~ uclear Disam1ament rv1ovement ," Social Forces 7 L no. 3 
( 1993), pp . 677-70 l. 
: ~ Snow (et al.) , '·framing", 1986, p. 464 
X ' . l .. ..J 
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84 Quintan Vii il--.'toro wicz, Radical /y/am Rising: lvfuslin-1 Extretnisn-1 in the west (Boulder, Toronto and 
Oxford : Ro wman & Littlefield Publishers , 2005) , p. 16. 
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between the concepts of fratning and ideology, Oliver and Johnston argued for the 
distinct usage of fratnes and ideologies. They argued that ideologies tend to link theory, 
nonns and values in an inter~connected fashion. Ideologies also focus on the content of 
the whole syste1ns of belief, are historically stable in nature and tend to define 
1novements' boundaries. 85 On the other hand, they argue that fratnes tend to be shallow, 
are situated specifically in areas of contention, and can be assi111ilated relatively easily 
and quickly. 86 While the authors 1nade a convincing case about the distinction between 
the concepts of fratnes and ideologies, they did not propose any signifi cant \vay whereby 
ideologies can be included within SMT. A possible fran1ew_ork for the inclusion of 
ideology vvithin SMT will be proposed later in the chapter. 
In response to criticistns about the failure of both the RMT and POS approaches in 
addressing the questions of how structural inequality gets translated into discontent, Mc 
Adan1 and associates offer the concept of n1icro-n1obilization. By this, they n1ean 
inforn1al networks, which are held together by strong bonds that are used as the basic 
building blocks of social n1oven1ents. Nevertheless, this idea has been criticized fr1r 
failing to illustrate how n1oven1ents transforn1 individuals into n1oven1ent actors. Alberto 
Melluci is perhaps the first SMT theorist to argue for the inclusion of co 1 lective identity 
within SMT. He notes that the collective identity fonnation process refers to the process 
in which actors produce n1eanings, con1n1tmicate, negotiate and 111ake decisions. 87 This 
1neans that social n1ove1nent actors often undergo changes in their behaviour and 
,._ ..... 
thinking after being socialized within the culture of a particular social n1oven1ent. 88 The 
inclusion of collective identity vvithin SMT is also an important atten1pt at bri_nging and 
understanding the n1icro perspective of the individual actor within a social 111oven1ent. 
Nonetheless, Melucci does not elaborate on exactly how collective identity can be 
included into the study of social 111oven1ents. 
85 Pamela E . Oliver and Hank Johnston , "What a Good Idea! Ideologies and Frames in Social Movement 
. ~ 
Research" A1obilization: An International Quarter(v 5, no. 1. (2000), p. 47. 
86 ibid. . 
87 This definition was made by Alberto Melucci who first proposed the need for SMT theorists to include 
collective identity in studies of social movements . See Albert Melucci , Getting Involved : 1dentity and 
Mobilization in Social Movements in B Klandersman, H, Kriesi and S Tarrow (eds) International Social 
lvfovenwnt Research, Volume 1, (Greenwich: JAI Press , 1988), p . 333. 
88 F Polletta and :tvf. J. Jasper, "Collective Identity and SGcia111ovements," Annual RevieH1 qfSociology 
27(2001 ), p. 284. 
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In line vvith this approach, Quintan Wiktoro\vicz brings his analysis of an Islarnist group 
to the individual level. He asks an in1portant question about why individual Mus1in1s 
choose to join radical Isla1nic groups, vvhich are deen1ed risky and o±Ter little benefits to 
thern. In ansvvering this question, Wiktorovvicz proposes that individuals go through four 
processes, nan1ely, cognitive opening, religious seeking, fran1ing and socialization before 
adopting a collective identity, as defined by the social n1oven1ent.
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He further ,1rgues that individuals involved in radical Tsla1nic groups often experience a 
cognitive opening which challenges their prevailing beliefs, 1naking then1 open to new 
ideas and are thus n1ore susceptible to being influenced by these groups.
90 This cognitive 
opening could occur as a result of different experiences such as dfacri1nination, socio-
econon1ic crisis and political oppression. He notes that n~any of these individuals 
experiencing a cognitive opening try to resolve their difiiculties through a process of 
·religious seeking ' .91 It is at this stage that lslan1ist groups develop fran1ing strategies to 
attract these individuals to their cause. 92 Individuals are then exposed to a 'culturing 
process' through which they are exposed to a group 's ideology and n1ade to believe that 
their salvation lies in furthering the group's objectives. The process of collective identity 
fon11ation is in1po1iant in understanding the perspective of the individual. Nevertheless, 
the problen1 with this approach is its failure to capture the n1acro factors that in1pact 
social rnovernents. In addition, Wikiorovvicz also see1ns to be describing the process of 
individuals joining the n1oven1ents rather than explaining the reasons for then1 doing so. 
The Role l~( Ideology 
Another proble111 related to the utilization of.SMT in this thesis is its · inability to explain 
the gro\vth of HTI vis-a-vis other Isla111ic groups. Since the collapse of the New Order 
regirne, there has been a pro! iferation of both radical and n1oderate Islan1ic groups. 
Muslin1s in Indonesia can choose frorn a rnyriad of different Islarnic organizations that 
exist vvithin the Indonesian society. SMT does not explain the reasons as to vvhy 
89 Wihorowicz, Radical Jslmn Rising, p. 84. 
90 
·t 'd . .1 )1 . 
91 'b'd l 1 . 
a--, . 
_, _ An 1mporiant work that built on Wiktorowicz's path breaking work is that by Gabriele Maffanci. He 
chartered out the process of how young Briti sh Muslims beco111e radicalized. See Gabriele Maffanci , 
Understanding A1lts!im Jdentizv: Rethinking Fundamentalism (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007). · 
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individuals decide to choose one organization over another. It 1s 111 this regard that 
Freeden's concept of ideology can fill the theoretical gap. 
Freeden regards ideology as "configuration of logically 'de-contested' rnean1ngs of 
concepts". 93 According to Freeden an ideology has three con1ponents: core concepts, 
adjacent concepts and peripheral concepts. 94 Both adjacent and peripheral concepts .tend 
to evolve with tin1e and are open to diverse interpretations. Ideology thus takes a 
'particular route frotn the core through adjacent concepts, to peripheral ones, as \vel l as 
9s by the reverse n1ove1nent'. - · 
The ideology of Islan1isn1 111akes a good test for Freeden' s definition. lslan1isn1 as a 
concept that consists of sorne core beliefs such as the need to i1nplernent Islamic la\VS 
and the in1portance of an lslan1ic political, econon1ic and social systen1. For instance, 
groups inspired by the MB tend to accept den1ocracy as being an in1portant tenet of the 
lslan1ist ideology whereas Islainists inspired by the Al-Qaeda notion of lslan1isn1 reject 
den1ocracy, arguing instead for a theocracy or a sen1i-theocracy to be forn1ed in lslan1ic 
countries. Adjacent and peripheral concepts, such as the correct n1ethod to bring about an 
Islan1ic systen1, often bring about n1ajor intra-ideological debates. Despite the in1portance 
of ideology as a key to understanding the gn.1,vth and success of social rnovernents,. it is 
often ignored in literature on social n1oven1ents. This thesis wiU thus atten1pt to touch on 
the use of ideology in studying social 1nove1nents. 
Towards an Integrated Structural-Cognitive IY/odel 
The analysis of various theories above reveals that none of these theories on their o,vn 
are· su±Ticient to answer the questions that are posed in the thesis. As such, a synthesis of 
variants of SI\1T, theories of identity and ideology is needed to address son1e of the 
issues raised earlier in the thesis. As highlighted above, the key lin1itation of the rnacro 
approaches (POS and RMT) is that these theories tend to ignore the n1icro level factors 
93 ibid 
q .,, -, 
_.., Michael Freeden, Ideologies and Political Themy: A Conceptual Approach (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press , l 996), p. 30 . 
<.) ~ .b. I 
- I IC p. 81. 
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(identity and ideology). 96 In the san1e \Vay , n1icro level analysis \iVhich tends to focus on 
ideology and identity have a tendency of ignoring the larger n1acro level factors that 
irnpact the gro\vthof soc ial rnove1nents. 
It rnust be ackno,;yledged that the proposed theoretical fran1e,;york is con1plex. 
Neve1iheless, it is i1npo1iant that in trying to understand the gro,vth of HTI, both 
structural (1nacro) and cognitive (n1icro) factors are taken into account to answer all the 
questions that this thesis poses. In this proposed integrated n1odel , both the 1nacro and 
rnicro perspectives will be assessed. At the n1acro level, POS will assist us in 
understanding the incentive for actors vvithin a n1oven1ent to ernerge and laur1ch 
collective action against the state. It will be shown that perceived institutional and no11-
institutional opportunities in the Indonesian political systen1 allo,;y HTI to en1erge 
publicly, conduct public events and launch collective action in an effort to recruit 
rnen1bers. R1v1T explains the strategies ernployed by HTI to recruit and n1obilize 
rnernbers towards its fold. As highlighted above, both POS and RMT explain incentives 
for individuals to join the rnovernent but do little to account for the decision-n1aking 
process undertaken by individuals or the transforn1ations that individuals undergo to 
becorne n1en1bers of a group like HTI. It is in this regard that the concepts of ideology 
and collective identity are essential. The concept of ideology as defined by Freeden 
explains the decision-rnaking process of individuals and why potential n1en1bers choose a 
group like HTI over other Islan1ic or Islmni st groups. Most i1npo1iantly, the four 
processes described by Wiktoro,;yicz, explain collective identity forn1ation , and the 
changes that individuals undergo after adopting the collective identity. A synthesis of 
these theories and concepts would provide for a better understanding of HTI' s rapid 
gro\vth in Indonesia. 
Data Acquisition 
ll6 Examp les of works utilizing POS include Carrie Rosefsky Wickham, lv.fobilizing Islam : Religi on, 
Activisnz, and Political Change in Egypt (Nevv York: Columbia University Press, 2002). Other works 
utilizing Rl\-1T incl udes , Janine A. Clark, Islam, Charity, and Activism: }diddle Class Nenvorks and Social 
H'e{jc-:zre in Egypt, Jordan, and Yernen (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004) . v\lhile these ,,,vorks 
provide an excellent insight to the oppo1iunities created and strategies employed by Islamist movements in 
their challenge to the state, it does little to examine the views of individuals towards these movements. 
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I have cotnbined doctnnentary and field,vork approaches to acquiring data on HT and 
HIT. I have exan1ined rnost of the literature produced by HT in English, Bahasa 
Indonesia, 1\!Ialay and Urdu. ~1y poor Arabic proficiency 1nade n1e depend on an 
interpreter to translate several works vvritten by An-Nabhani which have yet to be 
translated into ~nglish. I have also read non-adopted texts, \Vhich are typically written by 
leaders of HT. So111e of these rnaterials were inaccessible and were provided to me by 
tnernbers of HT in India, Malaysia and Australia. I have also obtained every copy of the 
1nonthly HTI joun1al, Al-VVa 'ie, and collected the weekly HTI' s bulletin, Al Is lain, since 
2004. Since 2008, I have also gathered copies of HTI's fortnightly newspaper, Media 
l Jn1n1at. Beyond the docu1nentary research, I follow the 111ain websites of HTI and HT on 
a daily basis. I read blogs and Internet forun1s linked to HTI n1en1bers and their critics. 
Several 111e1nbers of HT in Indonesia, Malaysia; Australia, United Kingdon1 and Lebanon 
have also added n1e as a 'friend ' on the social netsvorking site, Facebook, that allows n1e 
to access in1portant events as well as discussions related to HT. I have viewed videos 
produced by HTI and watched videos uploaded by HT and HTI n1en1bers on Youtube. 
Apart fron1 gathering docun1entary and visual representations of facts and data, I have 
conducted fielchvork trips to Indonesia, Malaysia, Lebanon, Jordan and Britain between 
2007 and 2011 to intervievv HT and HTI rnernbers and ex-n1ernbers. I intervie,ved more 
than one hundred n1en1bers of HT in different parts of th€ world, vvith the most 
intervie\vs conducted \Vith 111e1nbers of HTI. In Indonesia, I rnet activists in Bogor, 
Banda Aceh, Pekanbaru, Batan1 and Bali. I also conducted interviews with leaders of 
1najor Muslin1 organizations in Indonesia \vho vvere both supportive and critic~l of HTI. 
In 2010, I intervievved HT' s n1edia representatives fron1 Denn1ark, Holland, Lebanon, 
Turkey, Pakistan and Belgiun1 at a HT event held in Beirut. They provided n1e vvith a 
gli1i1pse of HT's history, activities and political standing vvithin these countries. In 
N[alaysia, I conducted intervievv1s \Vith 1nernbers of HTI 1 iving in Malaysia as \Ve \ I as 
\Vith leaders of HT in Malaysia.' All interviews with the exception of three vvere f~1ce-to-
face n1eetings. 
Beyond interviews, I have been a participant observer at several HT events in Indonesia, 
Malaysia and Lebanon. I \vas al lo\ved to attend several halaqah sessions in Malaysia and 
Indonesia where I observed the internal process of cadre building. I attended public talks, 
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se1111nars and conferences organized by HTI or those that featured pron1inent HTI 
leaders. I observed HTI n1en1bers at several den1onstrations held in central Jakarta. At 
these events, I \Vas able to interact \Vith n1en1bers of HTI \Vho vvere ahvays \Villing to 
share their thoughts about lslarn and HTI. I also attended n1aior Islarnic events such as 
~ ~ 
the Muslin1 Cornrnunity Congress (Kongres [!nunat Islam) in 2010 to observe HTI ' s 
leaders and rnen1bers interacting with leaders and 111en1bers of other Ivluslin1 
organizations. I \Vas privy to sorne of the breakout sessions during the congress ,vhere 
HTI n1e1nbers \Vere actively involved in the forn1ulating of strategies for the Muslin1 
con1n1unity in Indonesia. In 2007, l attended the second international conference held by 
HTI and in 2010, I attended a conference organized by HT in Lebanon. These ,_. . 
conferences provided r11e \Nith opportunities to observe the interactions between 
rnernbers of HT frorn di±Terent parts of the vvorld. At a less fon11al level, I \Vas invited by 
HTI leaders and n1ernbers to their hon1es where I had opportunities to dine with then1 and 
\Vas able to observe their lives at a rnore personal level. 
Lbnitations to Data Acquisition 
There were several lirnitations that I encountered during the fieldwork process. Men1bers 
of radical groups like HTI vievved 1ne suspiciously, since they had no reason to trust a 
researcher or scholar con1ing frorn Australia or Singapore, seeking to understand their 
1nove1nent. Their i1n1nediate reaction vvas to assu1ne that such individuals are ,vorking 
for intelligence services. As such .. I n1ade little progress with leaders of HTI during n1y 
first few intervie,Ns. Subsequently. as J gained their trust, they opened up to rne and 1 was 
given good access to the party, perhaps better than other scholars working on HTI. This 
could have been due to the fact that HTI leaders and 1ne1nbers saw 1ne as a prized 
potentj al recruit. 
Another problen1 associated ·with researching a se1ni-clandestine 1nove1nent like HTI is 
the unwi1lingness of ordinary n1en1bers of the party to speak to researchers. In general , 
n1e111bers \viii first seek pennission frorn key party leaders such as the 1nernbers of HTI's 
centr;:il board before speaking to 111e. In other situations, n1en1bers were not even willing 
to be intervie\ved'. si n1pl y refeITing 1ne to pa11y leaders. I endeavored to \vork around this 
by speaking casually to HTI n1en1bers after pa1iy events and asking the1n for an interview 
32 
once they had developed a certain level of trust in tne. Often these 1ne1nbers would be 
willing to be interviewed only after several casual n1eetings. 
As a 111ale researcher, it was also difficult for tne to conduct interviews with fen1ale 
me111bers of HTI. Fetnale HTI n1e111bers are willing to tneet only in a group., which 111akes 
intervie\VS less effective. Due to the presence of another patiy 111e111ber., fetnale 111e111bers 
tended to be 1nore cautious in their responses and gave only rehearsed ans,vers on several 
key issues. Lastly, I had difficulties eliciting a response fro1n HTJ's critics about the 
n1ove1nent. Leaders of organizations like NlJ, who are known to be highly critical of 
HTI., vvere reluctant to be disparaging of HTI. Often they gave only vague ansvvers to 
questions related to HTI. 
Organization of Thesis 
This thesis is n1ainly focused on the case study of HTI at the national level but -will dra-w 
on case studies of HTI at provincial and district levels whenever necessary. Con1parisons 
with the experiences of HT chapters in other parts of the world -will al so be n1ade 
\vhenever relevant. In this first chapter, the rnain precepts of the theoretical fran1e\vork 
were discussed. The chapter also outlined the key objectives of the thesis and the ways in 
which the thesis vvill narrow the gap in literature on HT and HTI . In each of the 
subsequent chapters (except Chapter 2 and 3), a brief theoretical proposition rooted in the 
larger frmne\vork \Vill be introduced. Subsequent sections of the chapter seek t9 test the 
e111pirical validity of the theory through the case study of HTI. Thus, rather than 
presenting all elen1ents of the theoretical frarne\vork at the start, the frmne\vork \Vill be 
divided into then1es to 1nake the argun1ent n1ore n1anageable. 
Chapter 2 is an introductory chapter. The chapter is a historical narrative of the larger HT 
party as well as its ideas and beliefs. The chapter argues that HT began as a Palestinian-
centric Islan1ic 111ove111ent \Vith the ain1 of liberating Palestine through the revival of the 
caliphate within the Arab world. It was only later through the initiative of the pa.rty ;s 
chapters in the \Vestern vvorld that the party expanded to the other pm1s of the Muslin1 
world and the party began to place the revi~al of a caliphate in Arab lands as its 
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objective. The chapter begins by exan1ining the thinking and religio-political activisn1 of 
the founder of HT, Sheikh Taqi-ud-Din An-Nabhani. The chapter then proceeds to 
exan1ine the changes that the party undenvent, under the leadership of its subsequent 
leaders, Abdul Qadeern Zallourn and Ata Abu Rashta, in reshaping its goals. 
Chapter 3 is a histori ca l account of HTI. This chapter argues that the founding and initial 
gro\vth of HTI vvas the etlo1i of an individual , Abdul Rahn1an Al-Baghdadi rather than 
that of the transnational HT leadership. It further argues that it \Vas only in the n1id- l 990s 
that the party began to show interest in Indonesia, after Ata Abu Rashta took over the 
helrn of the party leadership. The chapter begins with an account of the initial founding 
of a HT chapter in Indonesia by exarnining the lives of its founder Abdul Rahman Al-
Baghdadi as \Ne ll as that of his Indonesian patron, Abdullah Bin Nuh. The chapter then 
proceeds to exarnine the developrnent of HTI frorn a student net~ork to an Indonesian-
wide r11ove111ent. The last part of the chapter will exan1ine n1ore recent developn1ents 
within the party. 
Chapter 4 exarnine the external factors that _irnpact the growth of HTI. In particular the 
chapter focuses on the irnpact of the political systen1 on the growth of social n1oven1ents 
like HTI . It argues that both institutional and non-institutional opporiunities, as ,vell as 
constraints , in1pact decisions undertaken by the party to ernerge publicly and launch 
collective action against the Indonesian state. There are three sub-sections to the chapter. 
The-first part_ of the chapter will exarnine POS present during the New Order regin1e that 
led to Al-Baghdadi to first sow the seeds for the subsequent ernergence of HTI. The 
second sub-section ,Ni l I deal with the ,vay HTI reacted to the opening up of the political 
systetn durin g the keterbukaan period. The last section will exainine the decision of HTI 
to e1nerge publicly in 2000 and the debates su1Tounding this. 
Chapter 5 exain1nes the reciuit1nent and 1nobilization strategies of HTI. The chapter 
argues that HTI's eflective resource n1obilization strategies have allowed the party to 
build a stron g organizational structure, procure funds and recruit 1ne1nbers, which have 
led to the growth of the party. How·ever, the party has been less successful in building 
social capital , which is likely to litnit the party··s future gro-vvth. The chapter cornprises 
three sub-sections. The first sub-section w·ill exan1ine the organizational structure of HTI 
<.,; 
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as well as the different recruitn1ent strategies HTl ernploys to attract different segtnents 
of Indonesian society. This section explores the 111ass recruitn1ent strategies such as the 
usage of publications., mass media and public events aitned at recruiting activists . It also 
looks at targeted recruitlnent strategies such as the pa1iy's recruitrnent of wotnen , 
students and non-Musli1ns in Papua. The second sub-section exainines the strategies used 
by HTI ai1ned at building social capital for the pa1iy. Here HTI's relationship with 
politicians, 1nilitary officers, local bureaucrats and leaders of Muslim organizations will 
be assessed. The last section of the chapter, studies the irnpact of the success and the 
I in1itations of HTI' s resource n1obi I ization strateg ies. 
Chapter 6 focuses on the extent to which ideological factors have played a role in the 
growth of HTI. It seeks to answer the question of vvhy HTI 1ne111 bers choose HTI over 
other Islan1ist groups in Indonesia. It argues that the HTI's anti-systen1ic ideology, 
together with its indoctrination n1ethods ensure that n1en1bers ren1ain con1n1itted to HTI's 
goals. En1ploying Freeden's definition of ideology, this chapter will exan1ine hovv HTI's 
use of intra-ideological con1petition has been able to counter other I slan1ist groups, such 
as PKS. 
Chapter 7 is an atte111pt to understand the rnicro aspect of HTI's gro,vth. It atten1pts to 
understand the transforn1ation of an ordinary Muslin1 to a Hizb(xvin and how it is 
achieved. Essentially, the high rate of retention that the party enjoys is due to the 
behavioural, cognitive and atiective changes that a recruit undergoes after adopting the 
Hizbi identi~y. This identity is attained only after a recruit undergoes the pro_cesses of 
cognitive opening, religious-seeking and culturing before he becon1es a n1e111ber. The 
first part of the chapter ,vill therefore rnap out the identity theories as discussed by 
Quintan Wiktoro,vitz in his study of the Al-Muhajiroun 1noven1ent in the United 
Kingdorn. The second section will discuss the experiences of HTI recrll its \Vhen they go 
through their journey, \Vithin ·the fran1e\vork of the three processes described by 
vViktoro\vitz. The last section of the chapter discusses the expression of their identity 
through the process of boundary rnarking, where rnembers undergo behavioural , 
affective and cognitive changes. 
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Chapter 8 is the concluding chapter. This chapter ,vill dravv out the theoretical and policy 
in1plications of this study. The first section of the chapter will highlight the new insights 
the thesis has brought to the study of HTI, HT and Islan1isn1 in Indonesia. In the second 
section. policy irnplications of the study ,.vill be expounded. Lastly, the chapter will try to 
chart sorne future directions that HT and HTI rnight take. The chapter will also propose 
future studies that could be unde1i.aken based on the findings and theoretical fra1ne\ivork 
of this thesis. 
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CHAPTER TWO: THE SELECTED ELITES OF A GLOBAL ISLAMIC PARTY, 
A HISTORY OF HIZB l JT-T AHRIR 
They are the selected elite of the Ununah, the beautiful mole that no eye can miss, the 
lamps of light boost in their mouths, their tongues speak of the evidences of the Book · 
(Qur'an), they are the selected elite. (Sheikh Talib Awdallah, Men1ber of HT in 
Palestine) 
Since its inception, Hizb-ut-Tahrir (HT) n1en1bers have always seen then1selves as the 
chosen ·Muslin1 elites who will ,save the Muslirn world and restore it to the glorious days. 
It is this belief that has drawn thousands of its activists around the ,vorld to ,vork tc)\vards 
its final goal of re-establi shing the caliphate. 1 HT is arguably the only Tslatnic movement 
in the Musli111 world, which spreads across five continents and yet ren1ains effectively 
under the control of a central leadership based in the Middle East. As such .. HT has been 
described as a global, cohesive 1noven1ent with a con1111on goal. Global here is not used 
to sitnply indicate the fact that the pmiy has chapters in different countries but also to 
specify that 1ne1nbers subscribe to the sa1ne ideo logy, have a co1_J1n1on political objective 
and share a corntnon identity. 2 While certain aspects of these asse1iions are true, a proper 
cornprehension ofHT's history will challenge certain understandings of how truly global 
HT is . This chapter argues that HT was established with the pd1nary airn of fi·eeing 
Palestine through the fonnation of a caliphate in an Arab country but expanded to 
becon1e a transnational Islan1ic party due to political persecution that the party faced in 
the Arab world. Nevertheless, this did not change the objective of HT's central 
leadership to establish an Arab caliphate. This chapter is divided into three sections. The 
first section discussed the religio-political thinking of its founder An-Nabhani as well as 
1 The Indonesian chapter alone counts about 30, 000 members. 
2 See Taji -Farouki, Fundamental Quest; Roy, Globalised Ls.Zam and Mandavi lle, Global Islamic Politics . 
The only scholar that challenges the notion of HT as a global movement is Kirstine Sinclair. However, she 
came to this conclusion based on the different activities organized by HT chapters in Denmark and UK. 
She does not highlight that even at the level of objective, there is a diffe1~ence in the thinking the central 
leadership of HT and local level leadership . See Kirstine Sinclair, "17,e Caliphate as a Homeland : Hizb Ut-
Tahrir in Denmark and Britain II (University of Sou them Denmark, 2010) , pp. 157-159. 
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the political context that in1pacted this thinking. It will be asserted that despite his 
rel.igious background and education, An-Nabhani subscribed to the Arab nationalist 
ideology. It \Vas . only later \Vith the failure of the coup atte1npt to ove11hrow the 
Jordanian gove1111nent and the Arab loss in the 1948 War that he staiied subscribing to a 
1nore Islarnist ideology. It vvas at this point that he began advocating the need for the 
establishn1ent of a caliphate in an Arab country to liberate Palestine. This section \Vill 
also docurnent the expansion of HT to neighboring countries. The second pat1 \Ni ll 
analyze HT under the leadership of Abdul Qadeen1 Zalloutn. This section discussed how 
HT spread beyond the Arab world due to persecutions that n1en1bers fr=iced in the region. 
This part will also di scuss the change in the party 's focus frotn e1nancipating Palestine to 
sin1ply re-establishing the caliphate in Arab lands. It will be argued that despite this 
change, the party's leadership ren1ainecl focus on reviving the caliphate in an Arab 
country. The last part of this chapter Vlill exan1ine HT under the leadership of Ata Abu 
Rashta, the third Arnir of HT. It 'vVill analyze the changes in strategies of the party as a 
result of its further expansion. This chapter is divided according to the leadership of the 
three Afnir d~1e to the key role the leaders of the party plays in shaping its strategies and 
directions. 
Sheikh Taqi-ud-din A.n-Nabhani: Ear~v Histo1y 
Sheikh Taqi-ud-din An-Nabhani (1909-1977) is a figure vvho dravvs intense reaction 
frorn his follo\vers and detractors alike. For HT rnen1bers, An-Nabhani is not just the 
founder of the party but is a true mZ-{jaddid (refonner of Islan1) . His detractors have 
described hin1 as a hypocrite, who has divided Musli111s, and accused hi111 of being an 
Arnerican agent. 3 Yet nobody can doubt that An-Nabhani played a n1ajor role in the 
politics of the Muslin1 world. Born in 1909 in the village of Ijzin1 (part of the city of 
Hebron in today' s Israel) in the then Ottornan Syria (novv Israel) , An-Nabhani hailed 
frorn a farnily of leading religious intellectuals. His father, Sheikh Ibrahin1 An-Nabhani 
was a fc1qih (Muslin1 jurist) and taught Islan1ic law in various Otton1an schools. His 
n1aternal grandfather, Sheikh Yusuf An-Nabhani (1849-1932), who had a profound 
3 An example is the Wahhabi scholar, Sheikh Abdur Rahman Dishmaqiah who accused A.n-Nabhani of 
being sponsored by the Americans. See 
http: //www.dimashqiah.com/ m1icles.aspx?id= l 83&page _id=O&page _ size= l S&Links=False. Accessed on 
the 5 ~1av 2011 . 
., 
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influence on hin1, was an official \vorking in the Otton1an judiciary. Yusuf An-Nabhani 
was a judge at several Shari 'ah courts including those in Jenin, Constantinople 
(Istanbul), Mosul (Iraq), Latakia (Syria), Jerusalen1 (Israel) and Beirut (Lebanon). He 
was also a renowned scholar of Sufisn1. The influence of Yusuf An-Nabhani on the 
younger An-Nabhani could be clearly seen in the latter's understanding of Islan1ic 
jurisprudence, ,.vhich ,vi 11 be discussed in later chapters. f-Iis grandf:1ther introduced hi 111 
to the politics of the Otto1nan caliphate and also to rnany high-ranking Ottornan 
personalities in Istanbul, Iraq, Syria, Palestine and Lebanon. Years later, s01ne of these 
figures rendered their assistance to the younger An=Nabhani when HT started its 
activities in these countries. Yusuf An-Nabhani vvas also vvell-kno,vn for his criticisn1s of 
Muslin1 reforn1ers such as the Muhan1n1ad Ibn Abdul Wahhab (leader of the Wahhabi 
n1ove1nent), Jarnal Al-Din Al=Afghani and Muhan1n1ad Abduh. 4 These figures were 
deen1ed as colloboraters of Western powers who were keen to destroy lslan1. and 
undenn ine the Otto1nan caliphate.) 
The 1nost i1nportant i1nprint that Yusuf An-Nabhani left on his grandson ,vas the 
in1portance of the caliphate. For Yusuf An=Nabhani the caliphate acted as the bastion of 
Js]an1 and sytnbolized the unity of Islatn and I\/[uslitns. To underscore this belief, he 
published several books on the importance of the caliphate.6 The collapse of the caliphate 
in 1924 had a 1najor irnpact on the An-Nabhani fa111ily. Apa1i -fro1n their fortunes , the 
fatnily lost their social status that they enjoyed under the caliphate. Yusuf An-Nabhani 
was so devastated by the developments following the collapse of the caliphate that he 
decided to leave Hebron for Beirut. The ihdelible influence of Yusuf An-Nabh0-ni on the 
younger An-Nabhani is clearly seen fron1 latter's early writings, in which he attributed 
the predicarnents of the Nlusli1n ,vorld to the collapse of the caliphate. 7 The revival of 
the caliphate thus becan1e the cornerstone of An-Nabhani ' s political ideology. 
4 For his criticism of Wahhabi's religious ideology, see Yusuf An-Nabhani, Shawahid Al-Haqq Fil-
lstighatha Bi-Saxvid Al-Khalq (the Proofs o.f Truth in the Seeking of the Intercession o.fthe Prophet.) 
(Beirut Dar al -Kutub al -'Ilmiyah, 2003). 
5 For details of the relationship between Afghani and the British, see Niyazi Berkes, The 
Developrnent ofSecularisrn.in Turkey, (Montreal: McGill University Press, 1964) . 
6 Quoted in B Abu Manneh , "Sultan Abdul Hamiel II and Shaikh Abulhucla Al -Sayyacli ," /vlidd!e Eastern 
Studies 15, no. 2 (1979), p. 153. . 
7 Taqiuddin An-Nabhani, Jngadh Filasinn (Damascus : Ibn Zaydun Press , 1950). 
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Another personality that had a strong inf1uence on An-Nabhani was the Palestinian 
preacher and nationalist Sheikh lzz Al-Din Al-Qassatn. Al-Qassarn was a tnartyr and 
national hero for the Palestinians due to the a1111ed struggle he unde1iook against the 
British which led to his death. 8 Little is kr1ovvn about how the two · 1nen first 1net. 
Nevertheless, several HT leaders speculated that An-Nabhani had attended Al-Qassatn ' s 
lectures at the Istiqlal Mosque in the city of Hebron.9 HT 1ne1nbers also believe that An-
Nabhani was instru1nental in assisting Al-Qassain in developing plans for a revolutionary 
upheaval against British rule .10 This is unlikely, given that Al-Qassam began developing 
a group of fighters for an arn1ed struggle as early as 1923, when An-Nabhani was just 
thi1ieen years of age. An-Nabhani 1night have lea111ed frotn the organizational structure 
of the Al-Qassan1 ' s n1oven1ent, the Young Muslin1 Men Association (YMMA). Sin1ilar 
to the YMMA, An-Nabhani divided HT into sn1all cells of eight to ten n1en. 11 Men1bers 
of each cell knew only n1en1bers of their respective celL This organizational structure 
vvi 11 be expounded later in the thesis. 
An-Nabhani \Vas interested in religious studies at a young age and had rnen1orized the 
Qur ' an by the age of twelve. Recognizing the interest of his grandson in religious 
lean1ing, Yusuf An-Nabhani persuaded An-Nabhani ' s parents to send their son to the 
prestigious Al-Azhar University in Cairo to pursue his te1iiary education in 1928 .12 At Al-
. Azhar. he studied Islan1ic lavv and becmne acquainted \Vith ideas of Egyptian 
intellectuals. An1ongst those he n1et \Vere lun1inaries of Islan1isn1 such as Hassan Al -
Banna. leader of the Ikhwanul Muslimin (Muslin1 Brotherhood), Sheikh Al-Akhtar 
Hussein (a prorninent scholar in Al-Azhar) and Sayyid Qutb (another leader of the 
Muslin1 brotherhood). An-Nabhani was also a regular participant at intellectual debates 
and discussions on religious and political issues in Cairo. He vvas kt10,i\111 as an ardent 
critic of the seerningly apolitical stance of the Al-Azhar ularna. An-Nabhani ~s stay in 
Cairo \Vas iTnportant 111 sensitizing hin1 to the different political orientations in the 
8 Details on Al-Qassam could be found inAbdullah Schlefier, "The Life an.d Thought oflzz Al-Din Al -
Qassam~" Islamic Culture 23, no. I ( 1980). , pp. 61-83 and Shai Lachman , "Arab Rebellion and Terrorism 
in Palestine 1929-1939: The Case of Shaykh Tzz Al -D.in Al-Qassam and His Movement'," in 2;onisnz and 
Arabism in Palestine and lsrae l, ed. Elie Kedourie and Sylvia G. Haim (London: Frank Cass, 1982). 
•~ Interview with Ismail AI-Wahwah , Member of HT in Australia, 20 October 2009 , Sydney. 
iO Hizb ut-Tahrir, "Profile of Sheik11 Ata Abu Rashta," http ://\1/W\v.hizb.org.uk/hizb/who-is-ht/prominent-
members/profile-of-sheikh-ata-abu-rashta.html. Accessed on 29 September 2009. 
11 Taji Farouki, A Fundarnental Quest , p. 30. -,, . 
- Awdallah , Beloved by Allah, p. 15 . 
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region. 13 He becan1e avvare of the larger political and religious debates taking place in the 
Arab \ivorld. HT n1en1bers would often assert. that their founder was a forn1al ly accredited 
religious cleric owing to his fon11al religious training at Al-Azhar. For n1any of thern, this 
gives added credence to his ideas and thinking. 14 They are also quick to add that other 
Muslitn refonners such as Al -Banna and Maulana Abu 1 A' la Maududi of the Jarnaat-e-
lslcuni never had such training n1~king the n1overnents they led, religiously inferior. 15 
lJpon returning fron1 Cairo, in 1932, An-Nabhani taught Islan1ic la\V in several 
governn1ent schools. His political activisrn did not end in Cairo. He rnaintained strong 
relations vvith several political n1ove1nents such as the MB and the Arab Nationalist bloc. 
Subsequently, in 1938, he becarne head cleric at the central Haifa court. Later he was 
pron1oted to the position of deputy judge and then judge of the Ran1allah Court. In 1941 
An-Nabhani and Muhan1n1ad Nin1r al-Khatib, a prorninent Islan1ic cleric, founded an 
lslatnic society in Haifa the Jam 'iyyat al-J 't isam. 16 The ai1n of this society was to fonn a 
political party to revive Islan1 as a political ideology. It is believed that in 1945 when al-
Khatib decided to 1nerge the society with the local chapter of the J\1B, An-Nabhani left 
the society and rnaintained his own independent posi tion .17 This appears to be in stark 
contrast vvith the views of several acade1nics that argue that An-Nabhani became a 
'-
tnetnber of the l\!fB . Morever, his lack of support for the MB's n1ilitary campaign against 
Israel , seetn to point to the fact that he was never a men1 ber of the :MB . 
An-Nabhani: The Arab Nationalist? 
13 Hizb ut-Tahrir Arnerica, Sheikh !vfuhmnmad Taqiuddin An-Nahhani. Accessed from http ://hi zb-
america.org/about-us/prominent-members/1 70-sheikh-muhammacl -taqiudclin -al-nabhani on 15 July 20 IO. 14 Even detractors of HT noted that An -Nabhan i's ideas tend to be closer to Islamic traditional scholarship . 
See Husain, The is'lmnists, p. 84. 
15 Interview with Burhan Haniff, 16 October 2007, London and Interview with Sheikh Abdul Aziz, Former 
:i\1ember ofHT's Central Second Committee, 12 July 2010, Amman. For details about 11aududi's political 
thought, see Seyyecl Reza Vali Nasr, The Vanguard of the Islamic Revolution: The Jmnaat-! !slmni of 
Pakistan (Berkeley University of California Press, 1994). and Seyyed Vali R eza Nasr, Mawduc/; and the 
A1aking oflslmnic Revivalisn., (New York: Oxford University Press , 1996). 16 Taji-Farouki, The Fundamental Quest, p. 2. The movement tra,nslates literally as Society of Devotion. 
Neve1theless, it is likely that the meaning here is derived from the Sufi concept of J 'fisan1 which means Devotion to God. 
17 Nimr Al-Khatib became a men1ber of the MB and lived in Jordan until his death in 20 I 0. He also wrote 
an influential book about th e Arab-Israeli confli ct. See N·imr Al -Khatib , Ahdath A/-Nakba A1-1' Nakbat Filas/in (Beirut : Dar Maktabat al-Haya, 1967). 
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The Arab-Israeli conflict following the United Nation's Resolution to partition Israel into 
Je\vish and Arab states affected An-Nabhani considerably. He was forced to flee to 
Dmnascus fol lowing the Israeli occupation of Palestine. Within the sa1ne year, An-
Nabhani returned to Jerusale1n , which had con1e under Jordanian rule to take up a 
judicial appointtnent at the Shari !ah cou1i of Jerusalein. 18 The experience of the Arab-
Israeli conflict i1npacted decisively his political thinking. An-Nabhani, like most 
Palestinians, blained Arab leaders, especially King Abdullah of Jordan, for failing to 
assist the Palestinians. As such, when Abdullah Al-Ri1nawi approached An-Nabhani, to 
assist in a plot to overthrow the King, he agreed to ,participate. 19 The plot, n1astenninded 
by Abdullah al-Tall , the goven1or of Jerusalein , involved the assassination of the King 
and a n1ilitary coup in Jordan. 20 An-Nabhani was apparently tasked by Al-Tall to contact 
Husni Al-Za ' in1 , the leader of Syria, to secure the latter's support for Al-Tall ' s coup plot. 
Al-Za' in1 overthrew the Syrian President in a coup. He was an Arab nationalist and had 
liberal policies and disdain for Islan1ic lavvs and clerics. 21 An-Nabhani' s role in gaining 
Al-Za' in1 ' s support is thus further proof of the forn1er' s Arab nationalist position. While 
the King \Vas assassinated, the coup atten1pt \Vas repelled by the Jordanian intelligence. 
The actual role that An-Nabhani played in the plot is rather hazy. -Nevertheless, it was 
likely that his role \Vas not a central one, given that he ·was not arrested despite being in 
Jerusalen1. Perhaps, the n1ost in1po1iant fact that could be deduced frorn An-Nabh·ani ' s 
> 
involven1ent is his syn1pathy for the Arab nationalist cause. This is shown by his 
readiness to suppo11 and 'vVork closely vvith secular Arab nationalists. 
In the years 1949 and I 950, An-Nabhani \vrote several treatises, vvhich revealed a shift in 
his attitude towards nationalisn1. These treatises sa\v hin1 first theorizing on the 
irnpo11ance of ideology in resolving difiiculties facing the Muslin1 vvorld. In the first 
l 8 . Awdallah, Beloved by Allah , p. 23. 
19 Abdul lah Al-Rirnawi was a prominent leader of the Ba' ath Party in Jordan. The Ba' ath was founded in 
the l 940s by Syrian intellectuals, J\1ichel Aflaq and Saleh al-Bitar, the Ba'ath Party's ideology is a fusion 
of Arab nationalism, socialism and Pan-Arabism. The pa1iy sought to unite all Arab nations within one 
state structure. The party came to power in Syria (1961) and Iraq ( 1963). The party undenvent several 
divi sions and is currently divided into two main factions (Iraqi and Syrian) with parallel structures 
throughout the Ara b world . For more details of the Ba ' ath , see Eberhard Kiele, Ba 'a.th versus Ba 'ath: The 
Cot?flict between Syria and lraq 1968-1989 (London: Tauris , 1990). 
~° For detail s of the plot, see, Nairn Sofer, "The Political Status of Jerusalem in the Hashemite Kingdom of 
Jordan 1948-1967,'11viiddle Eastern Studies 12, no. 2 (1976), pp. 73-94 . 
~
1 For details of the coup and Al-Za ' im ' s rule, see Douglas Little, "Cold War and Covert Action: The 
United States and Syria, 1945-1958," Middle East Journal 44, no. 1 (1990) , pp. 51-75. 
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treatise, entitled Saving Palestine , An-Nabhani n1ade the case for the liberation of 
Palestine through the forn1ation of a nation he called, the _ United Arab States 
encon1passing all states in the Arab vvorld. He argued that with the formation of such a 
political union, the Arab states could then focus their resources and energy to\vards 
liberating Palestine. An-Nabhani envisioned that such a political union n1ust be led by 
inspired individuals who could serve as leaders for the rest of society. To achieve this, he 
proposed a trans-Arab political party that could depose the govern1nents in Arab 
countries and unite all these countries.22 In the Risalat Al-Arab (The Message of Arabs), 
which was presented as a n1en10 at the Cultural C\H~ference of the Arab League held in 
Alexandria, Egypt, in 1950, An-Nabhani reiterated his 1nessage that the Arab leadership 
should unite to strengthen their position vis-a-vis their con1n1011 enen1y, Israel. it is 
in1portant to note that An-Nabhani ;s earlier writings ernbraced Arab nationalisn1 as an 
in1portant ideology. Notwithstanding this, his understanding of Arab nationalisrn 
enco111passes Islain as a fundamental principle. At this point, An-Nabhani did not 
advocate for the in1ple111entation of Islan1ic laws or the forn1ation of an Islan1ic political 
systetn . . More i1npo1iantly, An-Nabhani wrote little about the rest of the M.usli111 world 
and seen1ed convinced that the resurgence of the Muslin1 world lay in the revival of the 
Arabs. Suha Taji-Farouki en1phasized that despite hi s subsequent rejection of 
nationa]is1n, An-Nabhani never renounced hi s earlier vvritings. 23 This chapter in An-
-Nabhanrs life provides useful insights into the Arab-centric thinkin g of HT's leadersh ip , 
which will be discussed later in this thesis. 
The Forn1ation of Hizb-ut-Ta hrir (HT) 
By 1950, An-Nabhani had grown disenchanted with the different political groups that 
existed in Palestine and Jordan. It was at this point that he began looking at the 
possibility that the 'salvation' of Palestine hinges upon Islatn rather than national i s111. In 
1952, he n1ade son1e headway when he was working as a teacher at the lvladrasah 
lbrahimz}ya in Jerusalen1 . Together with several like-n1inded colleagues such as Abdul 
Qadeen1 Zalloun1 (later to becon1e the second leader of HT) , Sheikh As ' acl Raj ab Bayyud 
22 Davi d Commins, "Taqi Al-Din an-Nabhani and Islamic Liberation Party," The Muslin1 iwJr/d 31, no. 3 (1991),p.194-211. 
. 11 T .. F k . --1 
-· aJ1 - arou ' I, Funu.amental Quest, p. 2. 
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al-Taini1ni, Khaled Hassan and Sheikh Ah1nad Daour, he founded HT.
24 With the 
exception of Zallou1n, none of the others vvere part of the :MB. There ,vere however 
many rnernbers of a group called Move,nent 3 I 3 that became HT 1ne1nbers. The origin of 
thjs 1noven1ent is ambigious but it is known to subscribe to an idea.logy that co1nbjnes of ~ ~F 
Arab nationalism and Islarn. The group believed that the 1no1nent they attained a 
tne1nbership of 313, the way \Vould be paved to the establish1nent of an Islainic state.
25 A 
key leader of this group, Jbrahi1n Shakeel Al-Sharabaty, vvas instrun1ental in influencing 
other tnembers to join HT. 
The founders of HT felt that it was i1nportant that the group be registered \Vith the 
Jordanian authority as a political party. This, they believed, would give it legitin1acy 
within Jordanian society. The Jordanian governn1ent rejected the party 's application 
citing the reason that HT had an anti=state agenda. Subsequently, the party's atten1pt to 
register HT as a social ,velfare organization was also disn1issed. In fact, the Jordanian 
regin1e started clan1ping down on the group. They prevented HT n1en1bers fron1 
conducting public rneetings, seized its publications and closely n1onitored key HT 
n1en1bers. Notvvithstanding these difiiculties, the n1en1bership of the party grew. By 
1953. the pa11y had sta11ed branches in An1rnan, Nablus, Jericho, Jerusale1n and Kuvvait. 
Tovvards the end of 1953, An -Nabhani traveled to Syria to establish a chapter of HT.
26 
The Jordanian authorities used this opportunity to prevent An-Nabhani fron1 re-entering 
the county. As a result, An-Nabhani vvas forced to reside in Dan1ascus and the leadership 
of HT shifted to Syria. By 1954, An-Nabhani had already established chapters of the 
pai1y in both Syria and Lebanon. 
Frorn its inception , HT declared its n1mn objective as that of establishing an Islan1ic 
state, \Vith the eventual ain1 of the revival of the caliphate. Yet at the core of its objective 
is the Palestinian question. Many of its early n1en1bers felt that the 'tragedy' (nakhba) of 
. 
. 
the Palestinian people was due to the abandorunent of Islan1 by Arab rulers. It is assu1ned 
-~~ Interview with Sheikh Abdul Aziz. Former Member ofHT's Central Committee, 12 July 2010, Amman. 
_) Awdallah, Belcn-ed by Allah. p. 3 8. The rationale for this belief is based on the fact that 313 companions 
of the Prophet mio;rated from rv1ecca to i'Vledina. They were able to form an Islamic state due to their ~ . 
migration. Somehow members believed that the symbolic act of acquiring 313 members will pave to the 
way for the establishment of an Islamic state similar to the JV1edinan state fo1111ed by the Prophet. 
~
6 Amnon Cohen, Political Parties in the West Bank under the Jordanian Regilne, 1949-1967 
(lthaca : Corne! I L niversity Press. l 982L p. 210. 
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that the Palestinian problen1 ,vill be resolved once an Islarnic systen1 is 111 place. An-
Nabhani's writings evinced a preoccupation vvith liberating Palestine and surrounding 
Arab lands fron1 colonial don1ination. 27 While he believed in the need for the fonnation 
of a single caliphate, he seen1s content for this caliphate to be ,vithin the Arab wor ld. He 
had argued that the historical in1portance of the Middle East as the centre of Islan1 and 
the Arabic language (the language of the Qur' an) spoken in the region n1ade the Arab 
countries natural choices for the location of the ne,v caliphate. This ,vas clearly stated in 
his earliest ,vritings. 28 His own activisn1 was liJnityd to the Middle East and he never 
atten1pted to spread HT' s ideas to other parts of the Muslirn ,vorld unlike pan-Tslan1ist 
Niuslin1 figures like Al-Afghani. While the first Mqlahin1 (Concepts) of HT discussed the 
issue of a caliphate, its focus was about ridding Arab lands fron1 colonialisrn and 
establishing an Islan1ic systen1. It was only with the publication of A1ethodfor Reviving 
the Caliphate that the paiiy consolidated its objective of re-establishing the caliphate. 29 
Scholars such as Taji-Farouki have argued that the liberation of Palestine is not a major 
concern for the party.30 This is accurate in so far as HT's later strategy is concerned . 
. However, the historical developrnents during thi s period showed that An-Nabhani and 
HT ,vere preoccupied with the en1ancipation of Palestine. It was only in the early l 970s 
when the party ,vas forced to re-look its goals and began putting Palestine as a -secondary 
agenda of the patiy. 
Expanding the Par(v in the Arab T1Vorld 
By 1955 , ne,ver chapters of HT were established around the :rvliddl e East. This was 
n1ainly due to the activities of son1e of its n1en1bers who were traders. Several ulcuna 
frotn Iraq becarne attracted to the ideas of HT. In late 1955 , Sheikh Abdul-Aziz A 1-
Badri , the Sunni imarn of the Al-Dargh n1osque in Baghdad, and Ebraheen1 Makky, a 
lavvyer, ,vent to Dainascus to 111eet An-Nabhani and discuss the possibility of startin g a 
~:Interview with Sheikh Abdul Aziz, former Member of HT's Central Committee, 12 July 2010, Amman. 
_:-; See for instance, Taqiuddin An -Nabhani , Concepts qf Hi-::.b Ut-Tahrir (London: Al-K hilafah 
Publications, n.yr.)., p. 11 . An-Nabhani clearly stated that the primary objective of HT is to free the Arab lands not Muslim lands. 
29 Members of Hizb ut-Tahrir Britain, The .A1ethod to Re-Establish the Khilqfah and Reswne the fslmnic Way qf L(le (London: Khilafah Publications, 2002. 30 Suha Taji-Farouki, "Islamists and the Threat of Jihad: Hizb Al-Tahrir and A l~Muhajiroun on Israel and 
the Jews," Middle Eastern Studies 36, no. 4 (2000), pp.21 -46. 
· 
45 
HT chapter in Iraq. 31 The 1neeting led to Al-Badri beco1ning a 1ne1nber of the party. He 
rose to becorne an i1nportant 1ne1nber of HT until his execution in 1969 by the Ba'ath 
regi111e for his criticis1n of the regi1ne's atTest of Ayatollah Moha1n1ned Baqr Al-Sadr, a 
pro1ninent Shiite cleric. HT me1nbers like Is1nail Al-Wahwah believed that the execution 
had taken place as AI-Badri was 1naking progress in convincing Al-Sadr of HT's ideas 
and rnethodology. The authority was wo1Tied that this will result in the unity of Iraqis of 
both Sunni and Shiite backgrounds against the regi1ne. Zalloun1 ,vho stayed in Baghdad 
for several years guided the Iraqi chapter. The fact that Zallou1n , one of An-Nabhani's 
n1ost trusted lieutenants, was sent to Iraq showed that the later had placed great 
i1nportance to the country. 32 An-Nabhani hi1nself traveled to Baghdad several ti1nes and 
was reported to have 111et and atten1pted to seek support fron1 Abdul=Salan1 Arit leader 
of the Free Officers group in Iraq. Subsequently, Arif led a coup that saw the overthrow 
of the Iraqi governn1ent and was appointed President of the country. 33 The foundation 
that the pat1y built in Iraq was to beco1ne in1portant in a coup atten1pt against the Iraqi 
governn1ent in 1972. The HT leadership also sent Moosa Han1adah, an engineer fron1 
Rmnallah, to Cairo to stmi. a chapter of HT in Egypt. Together \Vith a Palestinian student, 
Mohan1111ed Badawy Al=Natsheh, who was studying at the Al-Azhar, a chapter was 
established in Egypt by 1956. HT ,vas sidelined due to the popularity of the MB, its 
traditional archrival. Sources \Vithin HT noted that Han1adah and Al-Natsheh vvere 
deported frorn Egypt due to their involven1ent \Vith HT. 
The year 1956 proved to be historic for the party. The party decided to contest the 
Jordanian elections and fielded six candidates. The candidates vvere fielded as 
independents and not fonnally under the HT's banner. Only Sheikh Ahrnad Ad-Daur 
\Von a seat in the district of Tulkarn1. Several scholars noted that this ,vin could be 
attributed to the fact that the MB supported Ad-Daur ' s candidacy. 34 HT has· vehernently 
' I 
· Awdallah, Beloved b,-v Al!ah, p. 213. 
3
:: ibid. p. 40. 
33 The Free Officer Moven1ent was a movement 111.ade up of Iraqi military officer inspired by asser. They 
incensed by the lraqi's monarchy pro-\Vestern and anti-1 asser stance. They ove11hrew the Iraqi 
government in 1958 and replaced the monarchy with a republic. For more details of the coup , see Charles 
Tripp, Hiscc)}y cf!rcrq (Cambridge: Cambridge University- Press, 2002), pp . 167-193. 
_,.:i Taji -Farouki , F11ndame1al Quest, p. 11 and Cohen, I'olifical Parties in the Wes! Bank, p. 216. Also see 
Azzam Tamimi , " Opponents of Democracy: The Religious and Political in Contemporary Islamic Debate" 
at http ://vvww.mpacuk.org/mpac/data/c6fd87b2/c6fd87b2.jsp. Accessed on 14 January 2007. 
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denied this. 35 HT n1e1nbers believed that there was a possibility that sorne mernbers of 
MB decided to suppo11 the party due to internal divisions vvithin the MB. 36 Given the 
intense con1petition betvveen the t,vo groups, it is hard to i111agine that n1ernbers of NfB 
would support a HT candidate. 37 HT's decision to contest the 1956 elections has been a 
source of criticisn1 against the party. Critics declared that HT' s conden1nation of 
den1ocracy is hypocritical given that the party participated in an election, an in1portant 
process of de1nocracy. In response to these criticisn1s, HT n1e1nbers asserted that Ad-
Daur did not stand for elections to seek po,ver but sirnply to bring the da 'c11tv crh of HT to 
the Jordanian parlian1ent. While this clain1 cannot be quantified , several of his actions 
after being elected, indicated this position. In rejecting the legitirnacy of the Jordanian 
state; Ad=Daur refused to take an oath of allegiance to the state and rnade long speeches 
about the need for the revival of the caliphate. 38 Ad=Daur also did not vote for any 
legislation, as the state's constitution was not based on Islarn and hence was considered 
illegititnate by the party. 39 By 1957, chapters of the pmiy had been established all over 
Jordan .. ln fact , son1e n1en1bers of the party felt that the party was ready to usurp power 
and establish the caliphate. 
The popularity of HT drew a severe backlash fro1n the goven11nent. In 1958, the 
Jordanian goven11nent began cracking do,vn on the pmiy by arresting its tnetnbers, 
banning civil servants frotn being 1nen1bers of HT and expelling Ad-Daur frotn 
parlia1nent. Ad-Daur was charged with sedition and was jailed for two years. Many 
leaders of the MB also viewed HT as a threat. Political cotnpetition between the t\vo 
groups often translated to street fights between activists of MB and HT. The· situation 
grew so bad that n1en1bers of MB began to report on HT to the Jordanian intelligence 
service resulting in scores of the party 's activists oe be detained. 40 The episode with NLB 
was to n1ark the beginning of a long drawn conflict between the two groups, which · 
extended to Europe, No1ih Atnerica and Asia. 
35 Awdallah, Beloved by Allah, p. 216. 36 Interview with Dr Irnran Waheed, 29 October 2007, London. 37 Taji-Farouki noted that the schism between MB and HT is so inten se that members of each group had f.
5
egun reporting on the activities of the adversary group . See Taji -Farouki , Funda,neia/ Quest, p. 14- 15. Awdallah, Beloved b_v Allah, p. l 04. · 39 ibid, p. 105 . 
40 
Interview with Ismail Al-Wahwah, 1 July 2010 , Sydne/ and Interv iew with Sheikh Abdul Aziz, former Member ofHT's Central Committee, 12 July 2010, Amman. 
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Under pressure fro1n the Jordanian goven11nent, the Syrian gove1111nent deported An-
Nabhani to Lebanon. As a result of An-Nabani's reputation as a political dissent, the 
goven11nent of Lebanon refused to allow hi1n entry.
41 It was only through the 
interference of the iVf ufti of Lebanon , Shaikh Hassan Al-Al'aya, an associate of his 
grandfather that he was pennitted entry. He received Al-Al'aya 's patronage rnaking it 
easier for hirn to operate in Beirut. 
Divisions within Party's Ranks 
Several developn1ents in 195 8 led to disagreen1ents within HT ranks. The first issue 
en1erged due to dissatisfactions an1ongst senior 111en1bers that the decision-111aking 
process \Vithin the party was too centred on An-Nabhani . . Senior 111en1bers of the party 
including founding rnen1ber, Daud Han1dan, insisted on decisions being taken 
'-- i...,.- .-
.-
'--
collectively and that all 111atters be put to a 111andatory vote.
42 An-Nabhani was against 
this arguing that collective leadership is akin to den1ocracy, which contravenes Islan1ic 
principles of goven1ance. A ·second issue en1erged on HT's activities in Syria. The 
intense persecution of n1en1bers led rnany senior n1en1bers of HT to rnove to Dan1ascus. 
These leaders had asked An -Nabhani to cease activities in Syria. This ·would allo\v the 
paiiy to use Darnascus as a base for spearheading their activities in the other Arab 
countries. An-Nabhani refusal led to rnen1bers such as As ' ad Bayyoud Tan1in1i to leave 
the party. This vvas a rnajor blovv for HT. Tan1irni had been an in1po1iant recruiter for HT 
vvho had tren1endous influence a1nongst HT rnen1bers in Jordan. An-Nabhani was greatly 
shaken by this episode. In a letter he sent to Tan1in1i that was subsequently distributed to 
n1e1nbers of HT~ he \Vrote, 
As' ad is dear to us but Islan1 is dearer, and since the betrayal of As~ ad had been proven, 
it has been decided to kick hirn out of the Hizb. May Allah bless you, 0 Abu Talat 
(Tmnirni ), you were our teacher and big sheikh, one of the pioneers in the Hizb, the 
4 1 Hizbut Tahrir Malaysia, lvfengenal Pengasas HT (Kuala Lumpur: n. p, 2005), p. 14. 
42 Awdallah , Beloved by Allah, p. 56 . . . 
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companion of Abu Ebraheem and Abu Yusuf in the Da 'cnvah and before it, you slapped 
the Hizb and its challenge in the face so badly, you let down the [hnrnah. 43 
This centralization of power in the hands of the A,nir of HT was later to beco1ne a n1ajor . 
. 
issue of contention for the HT later in 1993 and 1998, when several splits occurred 
within the party. The lack of dialogue and the consolidation of power in the hands of the 
A,nh·, continue to be a feature of the patiy to this day. Consequently, 1nany of those who 
left HT, becan1e n1en1bers of the Palestinian Liberation ()rganization (PLO) led by 
Yasser Arafat. This highlights their continued pre-occupation \Vith the Arab-Israeli 
conflict rather than the push for a global caliphate. As 'ad wenton to torn1 the Palesti17ia17 
Islamic Jihad in 1978. 
Perhaps, the n1ost in1portant developn1ent that took place in 1958 was the rise of Gan1al 
Abdul Nasser and the popularity of his ideology in the Arab world. Nasser had taken 
over power in a n1ilitary coup that saw the ren1oval of the unpopular Egyptian monarch , 
King Farouk. He positioned hin1self as the charnpion of the Arab people by introducing 
several populist 1neasures. Nasser's Egypt professed neutralis1n by signing arn1s deals 
·with the Soviet bloc states and also nationalized the Suez Canal. The nationalization of 
the Suez led to an attack on Egypt by France, Britain and Israel. A cease-fire was later 
initiated due to n1ilitary interventions of the Soviet l Jnion and United States.44 His 
constant criticisn1s of Arab kings and leaders, \Vho \Nere generally disliked by the Arab 
populace, n1ade hin1 very popular. The successful union of Syria and Egypt to tonn the 
United Arab Republic (U.AR) sealed his position as a chan1pion of the Arab world. 
Nasserite pai1ies sprung all around the Arab \Vorld. For HT, the success of Nasser 
resulted in the weakening of their position. N-otwithstanding Nasser ' s persecution of 
Islan1ic groups in Egypt son1e n1en1bers of HT becarne attracted to his ideology and saw 
111 hirn , the solution to the Arab quandary. HT' s criticisn1 of Nasser .n1ade the party 
,n ibid, p. 65, 
1 1 
, 
..,.., For details of Nasser ' s thinking and influence, see Fouad Ajami, The Arab Predicwnent: Arab Polihcal Thought and Practice Since 1967 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp. 89- 169 . 
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ex trernel y unpopular. 45 It was only in th e early 1960s that many Arabs becatne 
increasin2:lv disillusioned with Nasser and Nasserism.46 
... ~' 
Staging Islan1ic Revolutions in the Arab States 
The ] 960s tnarked a nevv era for HT. The paiiy secured its position in several countries 
and began preparing to depose the govenunents in so1ne of the Arab countries. Its 
strengthened position could be attributed to organizational changes 1nade in the patiy . In 
1959, the central con1n1ittee of HT began in1plen1enting a new systen1 of gove111ing the 
party. 4 7 A 11 urban centres \Vere divided into zones according to local de1nographic and 
geographical criteria. Each zone was assigned a zone con1111ander who was a senior 
n1en1 ber of HT. Men1 bers of HT within a zone were assigned specific tasks depending on 
their job and residence. While the party encountered difficulties in in1plen1enting the 
structure in Jordan, due to state persecution, this nevv systen1 of organization enhanced 
recruitn1ent and resulted in the party's grow1h in other paiis of the Middle East.
48 Son1e 
aspects of this organizational structure are still rnaintained by the party. 
A key ±:1ctor that savv the strengthening of the paiiy \Vas an initiative that An-Nabhani 
introduced. An-Nabhani suggested that the paiiy seek suppo1i fron1 irnpo1iant and 
po\verful groups 'Within the society. Prophet Ivluhan1111ad pu11Jortedly used this strategy 
described as thalibul nusrah (seeking the assistance of in1po1iant povver brokers) in his 
plan to establish an Islarnic state in Ivledina.49 An-Nabhani argued that the Prophet had 
first attained suppo1i fron1 in1po1iant political and n1ilitary figures in Ivledina before 
staging a coup against the ruler of Medina and establishing the first Islatnic state. Party 
n1en1bers began forging ties vvith politicians, religious clerics and n1ost in1po1iantly 
n1ilitary officers. Of these groups, n1ilitary officers \Vere viewed as being the n1ost 
-+
5 A detailed criticism of Nasser can be found in Hizb Tahrir, Partisan lvfa ~~sing (London : Khilafah 
Publications. 200 1 ). p. 50. ' 
~
6 The disillusionment with Nasser had been due to the Arab defeat in the 1967 war against Israel and his 
acceptan ce of an American peace plan \Vith Israel which Israel later reject. See James Jankowski, Nasser's 
Egypt , Arab Nationalism, and the United Arab Republic (London: Ly1111e Rienner Publishers, 2002), pp: 
162 -1 70. 
-+
7 Taj i-Farouki, Fundamental Quest, p. 21. 
-+8 'l- 'd 101. 
-+ " Details of this can be found in Hizb ut-Tahrir, Th e A1ethodologJ ofHizb ut-T·ahrirfor Change (London: 
Khilafa.h Publications , 1999). p. 12. 
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in1portant crucial. Thus, the party actively recruited 111ilitary ofiicers to achieve its final 
31111. 
By 1964, the party felt sufiiciently confident that it had prepared the Muslirn ground in 
Jordan for the establishn1ent of a caliphate. Yet, the party took several rnore years before 
launching a full-scale coup to ensure fu1iher consolidation of its position. It appeared that 
the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 convinced the party ' s leadership that the 
resulting, heightened, tension bet,veen the two superpo,vers ,vould bring about a 
conducive environn1ent for the establishn1ent of a caliphate which will could act as a 
third force. 50 In 1968, several HT chapters staged its first coup atten1pt after securing 
support fron1 a section of the Jordanian n1ilitary. HT had also acquired suppo1i fron1 
pockets of the Syrian and Iraqi n1ilitaries for sin1ultaneous coup atten1pts to be staged in 
both countries. The Jordanian governn1ent foiled the coup atternpt after a rnen1ber lost 
his nerve and reported the plan to the authorities. The Jordanians notified the Syrian and 
Iraqi governrnents about the conspiracy, resulting in arrests of n1ernbers in both 
countries. 51 In 1969, another atte1npt was 111ade at staging a coup, ,vhich was again 
thwmied by the Jordanian intelligence service. The failures of the t,vo coup atten1pts 
dealt a tetTib]e blow for the party's leadership. HT men1bers in Jordan were anested and 
· in1prisoned. Many 1nore ,vere forced to flee the country. 
In 1971, H.T staged one tbe tnost itnportant of its coup atternpts in Jordan. This plan was 
kept a secret fro1n even so1ne activists of the party and had the suppoti of senior officers 
in the Jordanian 111ilitary. The leadership was so confident of the success of this ·coup that 
they had prepared a n1edia release to be distributed to the press following the coup, 
declaring the establishrnent of a caliphate in Jordan. 52 The failure of this coup atternpt 
was a major setback for the leadership and significantly in1pacted its future strategies. ln 
l 972 , HT organized one of its tnost significant coup atte1npts in Iraq . . HT mernbers had 
infiltrated the Iraqi arn1y and atten1pted a coup in Southern Iraq. Led by Salih Sirriya a 
Palestinian HT n1en1ber, the plot was discovered and exposed by the Iraqi governn1ent. 
50 T .. F I . 1 - . 
. a.11- arou (L Fwuwmental Quest, p. 27. 
) I Interview with lsmail Al-vVahwah, 20 October 2009, Sydn ey . 5
' T .. F k. F ' 
· - aJ1 arou ' l, unamnenlal Quest, p. 29. 
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SiITiya escaped unscathed and fled to Egypt. 53 Later, Salih Sirriya led another coup 
attempt in April 1974 along with approximately a hundred 1ne1nbers of HT. They 
stonned th e Technical Mi I itary Acadetny in Heliopolis , where they attacked the annory 
and procured weapons. They were to use the weapons to assassinate President Anwar 
Sadat and take over the Egyptian gove1111nent. 54 SiiTiya \Vas tried, convicted and 
executed in Nove1nber 1976. It is notevvo1ihy that all the coup atte1npts had the support 
of the military . The strategy of infiltrating the tnilitary became an j1npo1iant aspect of its 
modus operandi. These coup attetnpts also showed that HT has no problen1 using 
violence to attain its final goal of the caliphate. These issues will be discussed in greater 
details in th e later parts of this thesis. The failure of the last coup in Jordan affected An-
Nabhani significantly. In one of his latest writings, he expressed his frustration with the 
state of the Muslin1s, whose. slow thinking and actions, he felt, resulted in their state of 
despair. 55 An-Nabhani visited Iraq again in 1976 in order to assist in another coup 
atte1npt. He \Nas arrested and tortured by the Iraqis, resulting in his hands becon1ing 
paral yzed. He ,,vas then deported to Syria fron1 where he later went to Lebanon. Here, his 
health deteriorated and he finally died on 20th June 1977. His long tin1e follo,ver, Abdul 
Qadeen1 Zalloun1 , succeeded hin1. 
While, HT \Nas forn1ed as an Islan1ic party ain1ing to revive the Islan1ic ,vay of life, it 
was clear that its prin1ary concen1 ·was the en1ancipation of Palestine. An-Nabhani and its 
early leaders believed that only vvith the existence of a caliphate can the Palestinian 
problern be resolved. The establishrnent of HT chapters during this.period coincided with 
the decision of rnernbers to seek ernployn1ent abroad (such as in Kuwait), due to 
prosecution that HT rnernbers encountered in a particular country. Yet the focus of HT 
has al\vays been in countries surrounding Israel such as Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan and 
Svria. An-Nabhani started HT with the belief that its n1en1bers were the chosen elites of ,, 
God. Neve1iheless the realities of politics and repression that the party ,vas subjected to 
led to its spread to other parts of the Middle East. It was only with the death of An-
53 Shereen Khairallah, "The Islamic Liberation Party: Search for a Lost Ideal", Vision and Revision in Arab 
5/ocie(v 197.:/, (Beirut: Cenam Reports, 1975), p . 87. . 
)
4 Ivlarc Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004), 
'
17 "'8 pp .,<. -.;. . 
55 Taqiuddin 11\11- , abhani , Sur 'at Al-Badiha (Beirut, n.p. , 1976), p. 3 
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Nabhani that HT spread beyond the Levant area and began en1phasizing on its struggle 
for the caliphate. 
Forn1ing a Global Is1ar11ic Party: HT Under Abdul Qadeen1 Zalloun1 
Abdul Qadeern Zalloun1 ,vas born in the city of Al-Khaleel in 1924. Mernbers of HT 
affectionately refer to hiin as Abu Ibrahin1. He hailed fron1 a farnily of religious scholars 
who vvorked for the Otto1nan religious bureaucracy. His father Sheikh Abdul Ghat:1r 
Yunus Zalloun1, was the Mufti of Al=Khaleel in Palestine. His fan1ily also ran a n1osque, 
the Ibrahirnzrvah Mosque in the city vvhere An-Nabhani used to preach. He studied at the 
J\1adrasah al-lbrahirniyah and later at the Al-Azhar University ,vhere he graduated ,vith a 
Post=Graduate Diplon1a in Law and Education. In Cairo, he was deeply influenced by the 
teachings of Hassan Al=Banna, the leader of the MB and had becorne a n1e111ber of the 
group. Upon retun1ing to Palestine, he was appointed a religious teacher at the Madrasah 
Usamah bin .A1unqidz . He continued being an active 1ne1nber of MB in Jordan. In 1952, 
he tnet An-Nabhani, ,vho convinced hi1n of the flaws in N(B's ideo logy and the need for . 
~. 
another political vehicle to be forn1ed . Zallourn was one of the pa1iy' s founders. He 
contested the Jordanian elections of 1952 and 1958 in the Al -Khaleel constituency but 
was unsuccessfu l in securing the seat. 56 Zalloutn ,vas an itnpo1iant inten1ational recruiter 
for HT and vvas assigned to set-up HT chapters in several countries including Iraq, Syria 
and Lebanon. Prior to An-Nabhani 's visit, Zalloutn would tnake trips to assess the 
political and religious landscapes of these countries. 
I-Ie ,vas also known for his loyalty to An-Nabhani and rose to becon1e An-Nabhani 's 
closest aide. Their closeness was such that An--Nabhani \\fill ed hi s personal papers and 
letters to Zalloun1. 57 Zalloun1 's appointn1ent as A1nir of HT was uncontested. Under his 
leadership, the paiiy expanded to other parts of the vvorld including Europe, the l Jnited 
States, Africa, Asia and Australia. Nevertheless, the proliferation of HT chapters is not 
due to a systen1atic policy that HT had undertaken to spread its ideology. The party 
ren1ained Palestinian and Arab-centric. Rather, n1any of the HT activists decided to 
n1igrate fron1 their hon1e countries in search of en1ployn1ent. More in1portantly, the Arab 
~
6 Interview with Sheikh Abdul Aziz, 12 July 20] 0, Am man. 
)
7 Interview with Ismail Al - Wahwah, 1 July 2010 , Sydney . 
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regi1nes in the Middle East increased their suppression of HT 1ne1nbers, forcing 1nany to 
seek political asylutn in Westen1 countries. It was only with the spreading of 1ne1nbers to 
other parts of the vvorld that the HT leadership sta1ied recognizing the need for the party 
to be more global in its approach. Beyond the rnove1nent of n1e1nbers, several political 
developments in the Muslin1 world also encouraged this reassess1nent. 
Political Developn1ents in the Muslbn World 
The first significant event that took place after Zalloun1' s taking over of HT' s leadership 
was the Iranian Revolution. Prior to the return of Ayatollah Ruhollah KJ1omeini to Iran, 
HT leaders were convinced that Khon1eini ' s followers would topple the regin1e of the 
Shah of Iran. Men1bers of HT in Europe and Lebanon were assigned to n1eet Khon1eini 
in Paris. Subsequently, a delegation led by Sheikh Ad=Daur was sent to Teheran to n1eet 
Khorneini and his foreign 1ninister Ibrahil-n Y azdi. Another pron1inent n1en1ber of the 
delegation is HT's current central n1edia representative, Osn1an Bakhash. The inclusion 
of Bakhash is significant given that he ,vas one of the fe,v leaders of HT fron1 a Shiite 
background. Khon1eini and Yazdi were presented with HT's proposed constitution for 
the caliphate. The delegation also urged Khorneini to purge Iran of any foreign 
influences and declare the forn1ation of a caliphate ,vith Khon1eini hin1self as the caliph. 
Latec another n1en10 ,vas sent to KJ1on1eini questioning 1-iis lack of action towards 
irnplernenting HT's constitution.58 Out ·of frustration for Khon1eini ' s lackluster response, 
HT declared that Khon1eini \t\ias an agent of the -United States. The KJ·1on1eini episode 
clearly highlighted HT ' s ,villingness to overcorne sectarian di±lerences reflected in their 
willingness to appoint a Shiite caliph. It is also i111portant to note that the party is 
uncon1pron1ising and clearly un,villing to adopt any other forn1 of Islan1ic systen1 except 
that prescribed by the party ' s ideology. Most in1portantly, it den1onstrated the political 
naivety of HT leaders that a Shiite cleric vvould be willing to in1plen1ent its constitution. 
It also rnarked the first recognition that the caliphate can b~ revived outside the Arab 
,vorld. It n1ust be noted here that Iran ,vas an exception to HT)s strategy. After the 
Iranian experience. HT ~s leadership continued to focus its attention on the Arab countries 
as the location for a fu ture caliphate. 
:,S Intervi ew with Osman Bakhash, Central J\l[edia Representative of HT, 19 July 2010, Beirut. 
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In August 1978, HT sent a party delegation to rneet Colonel Muan1nlar Gaddafi. Gaddafi 
had earlier raised his objections to the use of the Hadith in deterrnining Islamic rulings. 
1-Ie expressed these vievvs at several talks that he delivered in Libya. The HT chapter in 
London contacted the Libyan ernbassy requesting to rneet Gaddafi to discuss this issue. 
Gaddafi agreed to 1neet HT 111en1bers in Tripoli. During the rneeting, ,vhich lasted four 
hours, HT 111en1bers refuted Gaddafi's view on this issue. Subsequently, HT sent a 
co1111nunique to Gaddafi refuting his vievvs on the Hadith. HT went further to urge 
Gaddafi to hand over power to HT so that a caliphate can be established in Libya. This is 
again a reflection of novice political behaviour. Later, 1-IT circulated the con1n1tmique to 
serve as an exan1ple of how HT is \Vil ling to speak up for lslan1 even in facin g a ruthless 
dictator. This was a calculated rnove started to strengthen the position of HT in the eyes 
of the Muslin1 populace. While the con1111unique did not receive the anticipated result, its 
circulation incensed Gaddafi. In retaliation, Gaddafi ordered the public hanging of 
n1en1bers of HT in a Libyan university. He also ordered the killing of Mohan1ed Mustafa 
Rmnadat\ a n1e1nber of the HT delegation to Libya. He was shot by an officer of the 
Libya11 intelligence service outside the Regent's Park Mosque in London. 
The 1980s proved to be a lull period for the party. The party fanned new chapters in 
Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, Morocco, Libya, Britain, Gennany, Netherlands, Indonesia and 
Austria. Yet, despite this expansion, the party's presence was largely unfelt in 1nany of 
these countries . The leadership 's posture during this period is re1niniscent of that during 
the height of 1'Jasseris1n . Several inten1ational developrnents and HT's own positions on 
son1e issues could explain its lack of popularity. The Iranian Revolution led n1any 
M~uslin1s to look to Iran as a 1nodel for an lslarnic state. To counter the influence of the 
Iranians, Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf states began funding lslan1ist groups such as 
the MB, fiVahhabi and Salafi groups. This fundjng proved i1npo1iant for these groups in 
their etlorts to galvanize popular support against the governn1ent. For instance, MB 
began using these funds to provide free education and social services for the Musi irn 
populace in Jordan , Egypt and Syria. These initiatives 111ade MB extren1ely popular. In 
son1e cases, this popularity came at the expense of HT. HT ' s refu sal to support the war in 
Afghanistan and Palestine also n1ade the party unpopular. HT 's belief that struggles 
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against the Russians and Israelis will be of no avail if the caliphate is not first revived 
resulted in the party being ostracized by Muslims in the Middle East. 
The intensity of th e persecution · it faced resulted in the pa11y 's leadership going '-' '-' 
underground. With the exception of its key leaders , HT me1nbers did not even knovv the 
whereabouts of Za1lou1n or his actual country of residence. The culture of secrecy within 
HT 1nade potential recruits suspicious of the pa1iy . This, in tun1 affected HT' s ability to 
attract new 1ne1nbers and even 1nore difficult for it to expand its operations. The Iranian 
revolution and the expansion of the party beyond the Levant countries and Egypt led to 
party reviewin g some of its approaches. The party began re-shaping sotne of its policies 
and stated the rev ival of the caliphate as its n1ain objective while the Palestinian issue 
becan1e a secondarv focus for the n1oven1ent. . ., 
Splits within HT 
The leadership of Zalloun1 was n1arred by several splits that occurred in the party. 
Men1bers of HT felt that Zalloun1 was an inetiective leader. Zalloun1 had difiiculties 
understanding and coping \rvith the rapid expansion of HT. For instance, Abdurrahn1an 
Al -B aghdadi felt that he did not get any support in his effo1i to start a chapter in 
Indonesia because Zalloun1 ,vas too Arab-centric in his focus. There ,vas still a strong _ 
vievv that the first caliphate rnust be established in the Middle East and not in the 
peripheral IVIuslin1 regions. Others felt that Zalloun1 ,vas too paranoid about his safety 
resulting in an excessive culture of fear. Al-Baghdadi recalled a n1eeting that vvas to be 
held with Pakistani leaders in 1999 ,vhen Pakistan tested its first nuclear bornb. Zalloun1 
had assigned Al -B aghdadi and another HT leader to attend the n1eeting due to this 
paranoia. Al-Baghdadi felt that it would have been good for HT to be represented by its 
1 d 59 ea er. 
The first n1ajor split occurred in 1983 when Abu Rarni, one of the HT leaders in the 
central cor11n1ittee of HT in Jordan, tried to oust Zalloun1. Abu Ran1i ' s group, referred to 
as · The Renegades by HT rnernbers, established another organization \Vith a parallel 
59 1nterviev,' \vith Abdul Rahman AI -Baghdadi, l 0 August 2009, Bogor and Interview with Sheikh Abdul 
Aziz. 12 July 2010 , An1man. 
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structure to the n1ain HT and retaining the use of the nan1e HT. This group is still in 
existence today and is believed to have a strong presence in Jordan. 60 This split occurred 
due to personal ditierences betvveen Zallourn and Abu Rmni. 61 Today, Abu Rmni 's HT 
group is largely dorn1ant and has a very srnall follo,ving . Sarne 1ne1nbers of this group 
have also retun1ed to the HT fold. 
Several splits took place within HT again in the 1990s resulting in the fonnation of 
several groups, including Hizb VVaed (Party of Prornise) and Al-A1uht{.jiroun. tvluhan1n1ad 
Shcnvkeiri fonned Hizb JiVaed due to ideological differences with Zalloun1. He did not 
attain rnuch success and the organization is no,v defunct. Al-Muhqjiroun ,vas fonned as 
an otishoot of HT. Led by charisn1atic preacher, On1ar Bakri Moha111ed , who ,vas 
dubbed as the "Tottenhan1 Ayatollah", the 111ove1nent was fonned after he was sacked 
fro111 HT due to disagreen1ents between hi111 and the central HT leadership. 62 In essence, 
tbe HT leadership felt that Moha1ned vvas inciting violence, which runs counter to the 
party 's n1ethodology of reviving the caliphate. While Al-1,1uhc4iroun clain1s an 
international following and 1ne111bership, there is little evidence to show for this clairn. It 
was perhaps the confrontational attitude of HT rnen1bers towards the British governrnent 
and 1nainstreat11 Islatnic organizations that led to the split. Azzatn Tarnirni , a leader of 
the Muslin1 Association of Britain recalled that HT 111e1nbers attended and disrupted his 
talks due to Tmnitni's stance that Islmn is cornpatible with den1oc.racy. 63 
Perhaps, the 111ost important split that took place was m 1997. Several leaders of HT 
objected to what they dee1ned to be the authoritarian leadership of Zal loU111 that was 
atlecting the party ' s goals. At the wilaJ,!ah (provincial) leve l, Dr Tawfiq Mustafa (HT 
Gennany), Iyad Hilal (HT A111erica), Is111ail Al-Wahwah (HT Australia) and Abdul 
Rahn1an Al-Baghdadi (HT Indonesia), to naine only. a few, had called for the reforn1ation 
of the party. These leaders believed that the patiy had lost its direction and the leadership 
was too focused on its nusrah strategy, rather than engaging the Mus lin1 public. A 
60 lVlahin Abedin, " Interview \Vith Omar Bakri Mohamed" Jamestown Foundation 61 The Abu Rami's HT continue to use the same texts used by the mainstream HT and even borrows from 
the multimedia materials produced by the mainstream HT. For more details of the Abu Rami group, see 
http: //w,vw.hizbuttahrir.info . 
62 Interview with Burhan Hanitt Member ofHizb ut-Tahrir Britain , 15 June 2007. 63 Interview with Dr Azzarn Tarn.imi , Director of the Institute of the International Islamic 
Thought, 16 June 2007. 
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cotnplain was also registered about the party ' s failure to supp01i its chapters outside the 
Middle East. In a letter responding to these conce1ns, Zallou1n acknowledged the poor 
response the party received fro1n the Muslirn masses but continued to affi1m his belief 
that it is 1nore impo1iant for the party to engage the power brokers in M11sliln countries. 
Zallou1n also prornised to extend 1nore support for the pmiy's chapters outside the 
IVfiddle East . After several years of assessing the party ' s leadership , a 1neeting of leaders 
opposed to Zal lou1n was held in Gern1any in 2000 and Australia in 2002.
64 In Australia, a 
decision \Vas made to fonn a separate organization, called the Reformers (~l Hizb ut-
Tahrir. Upon discovering this n1ove, Zalloun1 sacked those involved . . Subsequently, 
Is1nai] Al- vVahwah was persuaded by his wife, -vvho retnained a 1ne1nber of HT, to retu111 
to the fold of the 111ain HT organization. The other leaders are still outs ide the 111oven1ent. 
It is interesting to note that despite these splits in HT, the organization has ren1ained • 
largely intact. When On1ar Bakri decided to forn1 Al-lvfuhajiroun, only a s1nall nun1ber of 
HT n1en1bers in the UK decided to leave HT. Many of those who were personally close 
to On1ar Bakri decided to ren1ain in the organization. This could also be seen in the 
exan1ple of the 2002 leadership split where n1en1bers of HTI chose to ren1ain with the 
organization rather than follovv Al -Baghdadi. This decision vvill be expounded in greater 
detail in the later pa1i of this chapter. The ability of HT to sustain itself in the face of 
n1ajor issues like this is reflective of the e±lectiveness of its 'culturing' progrmn. It seerns 
that rnany rnernbers ren1ain closely attached to the organization's ideo logy rather than to 
leaders of the organizatio1~. This vvill be discussed in Chapter 6. 
Inviting the Taliban to fonn the Caliphate 
In 1996, HT atternpted to convince the new rulers of Afghanistan, the Taliban about the 
need to establish a caliphate. The Taliban (Moven1ent of Religious Students), a relatively 
unknown Afghan Islamist group swept to power in a war-:-torn Afghanistan in 1996. 
Under the leadership of Mullah Muhai11rnd Ornar, the Taliban declared the fon11ation of 
an lslan1ic er11irate in Afghanistan. The HT leadership saw this as an opportunity for a 
caliphate to be forn1ed. HT leaders felt that the Taliban was sincere about establishing an 
r_, ~ Interv iew with Abdul Rahman AI-Baghdadi, IO August 2009 Bogar, and Interview with Muhammad Al-~ . .__ -· 
hhaththath , l O March 2009 , Jakarta. 
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Tslainic state. The :HT leadership sent a delegation of HT leaders frorn Britain to rneet 
Mullah On1ar. In this n1eeting, Mullah On1ar \Vas asked by HT leaders to declare the 
fonnation of a caliphate with hirn as the caliph. Mullah O111ar apparently rej ected this 
o±Ter, preferring to focus on developing a puritanical Islan1ic state in Afghanistan. One 
HT leader in Central Asia noted that 
The difference bet\veen us (HT and the Taliban) is that Hizb ut-Tahrir wants a modern 
life here on ea1ih, to create a heaven on earth and al so to prepare people to go to heaven 
in the afterlife. The Taliban want a life of poverty and all their preparation is onl y to 
enable thern to reach heaven. Hizb-e Tahrir wants heaven both here and in the afterlife.65 
It is perhaps sin1plistic and even denigratory of HT leaders to assun1e that the Taliban 
chose to have a society that was poor and undeveloped. The di sagreernent betvveen the 
Taliban and HT is at the ideological level. The Taliban dravvs its ideology fron1 the So!c:!f,· 
school of thought . Many Sah~fi scholars consider HT a deviant rnoven1ent and it is thus 
not surpris ing that the Taliban rebuffed HT's gesture .66 f\1fore impotiantly. the episode 
reflects aga in~ po litical naivety on the part of HT to assun,e that the Ta liban, a group that 
dravvs its ideology fro n1 a group that has historically been opposed to FIT' s ideology. The 
experiences of I-TT in engaging the Taliban as \iVe 11 as the Irani ans and Gaddafi in Libya 
are reflections of its leadersh ip;s inab il ity to con1prehend larger-political dyna1nics. In all 
these cases, HT did not have a strong presence in the country and failed to understand the 
co1nplexit ies of the national po litical contexts. This proble1n continued to affect HT 
today. 
The New Arena o.f Da ·'awah: HT in Europe 
The l 990s also saw HT' s expansion in Europe. As discussed earli er_ HT n1en1bers in the 
Middle East began seeking refuge in Western co untri es to escape persec uti on as they 
v1ere facing fro111 their respective governn1ents. Paradoxicall y, it is the \Vestern 
65 Ahmed Rashid, "Interview with Leader ofHizb-e Tahrir," Central Asia Caucasus Analyst: Bhveek~v 
Briej1.ng, http ://www.cacianalyst.org/November 22 2000/Interview.htm, Accessed on 2 December 2005. 66 For instance the prominent Sala/1 scholar, Sh~k.11-M uhammacl N ashiruclclin Albani was quoted as say in g 
that HT is a deviant group . See Sheikh Muhammad N ashfruddin Albani , Hizbut Tahrir Mu 'ta:::J/ah Gaya Baru (Kuala Lumpur: Cahaya Tau hid Press, 1998), pp . 1- 17. 
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countries, which were often criticized for an anti-Isla1nic agenda as they provided HT the 
space and freedom to expand its agenda. It is believed that HT 1ne1nbers also tded to 
prornote th e ideas of HT in the fonner Easten1 bloc countries. According to Taji-Farouki, 
tnetnbers of the pmiy were atTested and tortured in Ro1nania and the former Yugoslavia 
as early as l 983.67 Al-Wahwah repo1ied conducting halaqah in a cafe in East Berlin 
durin g this period and confinned that so1ne 1ne1nbers \Vere actively spreading the ideas in 
the Eastern bloc countri es. 68 While it is not the aim of HT to establish the caliphate in 
non-Musli1n countries, it sees its role in Europe and the Western world as preparing 
Muslin1s for the eventual return of the caliphate. 
Several international developn1ents provided HT with the political opportunity to 
enhance its position an1ongst European Muslin1s. HT leaders in Europe positioned 
then1selves as the defenders of Islan1 when the Gulf War (1991) and Balkan Wars broke 
, 
out (1995). HT Britain had called on l\lluslirns in the country to support Iraq in the ,var. 
They also 111ade a subn1ission to the Iraqi en1bassy in London den1anding Saddan1 
Hussein to declare a caliphate in Iraq. 69 Since n1ost of the Musli111 ,vorld ,vas against the 
An1erican intervention in Iraq, the HT ideology becaine n1ore attractive for n1any young 
European Muslirns. On1ar Bakri even called for the assassination of John Major, the then 
Prirne Minister of Britain. Another issue that propelled HT i_nto the lin1elight vvas the 
Balkan Wars. HT 's position on the issue posited the issue as that the Western countries 
had deliberately allovved the genocide of Muslilns in Bosnia so as to ensure that there 
vvoLtld not be a l\lluslin1 n1ajority state in Central Europe. HT had also called for Nluslirns 
to forn1 an Islan1ic state so that the Islarnic anny can fight for the Bosnians. The hard line 
stance taken by HT in relation to Bosnia, strengthened its position an1ongst n1any 
Nluslin1 youths in Britain. 70 
HT Britain also serves an in1portant role ,vithin the larger HT organization. Owing to the 
influx of fcireign workers . and students fro1n Muslin1 countries into Britain, the HT 
leadership ensures that son1e of these foreign Muslirns are influenced and indoctrinated 
by HT's ideology, so that HT can grow in r11ore Muslin1 countries. Several chapters of 
67 Taji-Farouki, Fundanzental Quest, p. 170. 
68 Interview with Ismail Al-Wahwah, 20 September 2007, Sydney. 
69 ibid, p. 178 , HT had organized demonstrations in other paiis of Europe declaring suppo1t for Iraq. 
70 Husain , The Islamist , pp. 79-81 . 
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HT, including those in Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Malaysia, Singapore and BruneL had their 
roots in students recruited by HT n1e1nbers in Britain.7 1 Men1bers of HT Britain have also 
traveled to India and Pakistan to start chapters of the party in these countries. 72 The 
radical positions posited by HT on rnany issues have also resulted in a backlash against 
the organization in several European countries. In particular, the tough stance it has taken 
against the state of Israel and anti-Sen1itic views have resulted in tough actions taken 
against the party in Gern1any and Denrnark . Tn January 2003. the Gennan govennnent 
. disallovved the paiiy fron1 organizing public activities due to anti-Sen1itisn1 and inciting 
the use of violence against the state. 73 HT leaders clairned that r11en1bershi p of the pa1iy 
is not illegal and the party itself is not banned. 74 Neve1iheless, the ban on party activities 
seen1s to have paralyzed its operations in Gern1any. ·Many of its key leaders in Gerrnany 
have left and the party seen1s to have ceased activities in Gern1any. In Denn1ark, the 
party ' s spokesrnan, Fadi Abdel Latif was jailed for distributing pan1phlets, which 
indirectly called for the killing of Jews. 75 The pmiy has retnained legal in Den1nark . ln 
the UK, the governrnent has also atternpted to ban the party since the 7 /7 London 
botnbings but have failed to find a legal basis to do so. 
Beyond Britain , Dentnark and Gennany, HT has extended its presence to other European 
countries including Spain , Sweden and the -Netherlands. 76 More recently , HT has begun 
organizing activities in the fonner Eastern bloc. The party claitn-ed a presence in Poland, 
Ukraine and Russia. Party 1ne1nbers have been arrested and tortured in Russia as earl y as 
2003. 77 The party has sbown increased resilience to survive in these difficult 
circurnstances and seerns to have been able to extend its reach to newer areas within 
71 The chapters in Brunei and Singapore have been shut down by the intelligence services in both 
coun.tries . Details about the chapters in Singapore and Malaysia can be found in Osman , "Reviving the Caliphate in .Malaysia",pp. 646-664. 
72 Two members of HT Britain, Abdul Hamid and ~1oi en Ibrahim had traveled to India in 2005 to 
start a chapter of HT in India. Interview with Moien Tbrahim , London , 2 Jul y 2006 . Maajicl Nawaz and 
Abdul Haq had traveled to Pakistan immediately after Pakistan tested the nu clear bombs in 1999. 
Interview with ~1aajid Nawaz, London, 29 October 2007. 
73 
"Germany Bans Islamist Group It Says in Anti-Semitic" Reuters Nev,Js , 15 January 2003 . 74 Interview with Jamal Hardwood, Fon11er Chairman of HT Britain, 30 June 2006, London . 75 
"Muslim Group Spokesman Gets Suspended Jail Sentence for Posting Fl yers Urgi ng Jews Killed" 
· A5·sociated Press, 14 March 2003. Chadi Freigeh , the media representative of HT Scandinavia claimed 
that the accusation was falsified. Interview with Chadi Freigeh, ·Media Representa tive of HT Scandinavia, 19 July 20 l 0, Beirut. 
76 Details about HT in Spain can be found in Athena Intelligence, "Hizb Ut-Tahri r En Espana," Atheno 
Intelligence Jo urnal 2, no. 2 (200 7), pp. 13-2 7 · 77 HT maintains a Ukrainian website . http: //www.hizb .org. ua/ 
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Europe where there is a Muslitn minority. The central leadership of HT in the Middle 
East also coordinates activities in Europe. J'v1embers of HT in Britain travel extensively 
to other European countries to assist newer chapters and ensure that the leadership of 
these chapters is fully attached to the HT ideology. Maajid Na\vaz, a fonner leader of HT 
Britain traveled to Copenhagen vveekly in the 1990s for this purpose. 78
 One of the leaders 
of HT Britain, Burhan Haniff travels extensively to Gennany, Australia and the United 
States for sin1ilar purposes. It is believed that the Westen1 chapters of HT also currently 
provide the biggest funding for the party and these funds are subsequently channeled to 
countries, such as Pakistan and Indonesia. 
Extending the Terrains of Da 'awah: HT in Central ,,4s ia 
The collapse of the Soviet l Jnion saw the forn1ation of six new Muslin1 states.
79 The HT 
leadership in Britain \Vas quick to respond to this developn1ent by urging the central 
leadership of HT to begin chapters of the party in these Muslin1 countries. Party 
n1en1bers frorn Britain and Jordan \Vere sent to these nevvly forn1ed Muslin1 countries to 
spread its ideology. 80 The party's leadership felt that these new states were fertile regions 
for HT' s activities. The goven1n1ents that can1e to -povver in these states were led by 
ofiicials of the con1n1unist paiiy vvho have novv refashioned then1selves as capitalist 
technocrats. Yet, the syste1n of authoritarian rule did not change. The goven1n1ent 
continued repressing both political opposition and Islan1ic groups. The high level of 
pove11y and repressive nature of the Central Asian regin1es also provided the right 
conditions for HT to flourish. 81 One of the advantages the paiiy possessed in Ce11tral 
Asia is the lack of both political and religious challenges in the region, ,vhich creates a 
sernblance that the paiiy is the only Islan1ic group, willing to stand up against con·upt, 
. . . 
repress1 ve reg1n1es. 
HT first ernerged in Central Asia in the 1990s. It is likely that in the fon11ative years~ HT 
focused its recruitrnent and activities in -Uzbekistan. Its success encouraged n1e111bers to 
78 Interview with Maajid Nawaz, former member ofHizb ut-Tah1ir Britain, 29 October 2007, London. 
79 These countries are Kazakhstan , Uzbekistan , Turkmenistan , Azerbaijan , Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan 
80 The movement activities in Central Asia were captured in Baran, Islam 's Political J-nsurgenc) and 
Rashid, Miiitant Islam in Central Asia, pp. 115-137. 
81 Ahmed Rashid, Descent Into Chaos: The United States and The Failure of Nation-Building in 
Pakistan, Afghanistan and Central Asia ( -ew York: Viking, 2009) , p. 339 
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spread the party ideas in southen1 Kyrgyzstan, particularly 111 the vvake of the rnass 
repression of rnernbers after 1997. 82 In 1998 Uzbek rnernbers apparently supported the 
establishn1ent of a branch in Tajikistan. 83 Since 2000, reports of activities in Kazakhstan 
have appeared as \Vell. 84 There have also been occasional reports of HT in 
Turkn1enistan 's prisons. The pmiy I in1its its activities to distributing parnph lets. holding 
halaqahs and socializing vvith potential recruits. Despite these relative srnall-scale 
activities, the party has recruited large nun1bers of 1nen1bers throughout the region. As of 
2003, the International Crisis Group estin1ates n1en1bership to be in the thousands \Vith 
rnany n1ore syn1pathizers. 85 Given the arduous circurnstances that the party is operating 
in, these nun1bers are highly in1pressive. 
The exan1ples of HT in Europe and Central Asia reflect the ditTerent styles of leadership 
and organizational structure that were adopted by Zalloun1. In contrast to An-Nabhani ' s 
HT, which .was largely based in the Middle East, HT under Zalloun1 expanded beyond 
the Middle East and reached places that were culturally and politically different frorn the 
Middle East. A 1ne1nber of the central co1n1nunhy of HT was tasked to travel and 
n1onitor its chapters around the world every three n1onths. Men1bers fron1 n1ore 
established chapters are sent to assist and guide 1ne1nbers at less developed chapters to 
propagate HT literature as well as strategies of engage1nent. Notwithstanding this~. the 
organizational suppoti is I iJnited, and ultitnately, the success - of a chapter is highly 
dependent on the ability of local leaders to run the party. Often , this 111eans that these 
chapters will need to deploy different strategies of engagetnent with the local populace . 
. 
Perhaps an i1npo1iant point to highlight is the fact that the party re111ained highly 
centralized in its organizational structure and its top leadership ren1ains largely 
Palestinian or Arab with no presentation frotn its chapters in the other parts of the world . 
With the exception of Pakistan, the targeted areas where the party be] ieved the first 
caliphate should be revived re1nains in the Middle East especially in the Levant areas 
which indicates the sentin1ental feelings of the party 's ovenvheln1ingly Palestinian 
leadership about the issue of Palestine. 
82 ICG, ''Radical Islam in Central Asia '\ p. 14 . 
83 ibid 
84 
"Kazakh Police Probe Islamic Militants After Town Leafleted" BBC J\.1onitorinr.; Services, 18 October 2000 . 
. '-· . 
85 ICG , "Radical Islam in Central Asia", p. 17. 
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The Developrnent of a Global Islarnic Partv: HT l Jnder Ata Abu Rashta 
On ] 7th March 2003 , ZalloLUn relinquished his position as the A1nir of HT due to ill 
health. He died shortly afterwards on the 29th of Aprit 2003. The period of Zallou1n 's 
leadership marked an i1npo1iant shift within the party fro1n an Arab Isla1nist 1nove1nent 
to a global Islatnist rnovetnent. His leadership also saw the issue of Palestine beco1ning a 
secondary focus for the pmiy. The gro\vth that HT experienced during the leadership of 
Zalloun1 \Vas phenon1enal. Few of the founding n1en1bers of HT, including An-Nabhani, 
could have envisioned that HT would becon1e so prominent outside the Middle East. HT 
under Zalloun1 also recognized the need for a quick response to developn1ents vvithin the 
Muslin1 .world. This could be seen fi·o111 the decision by HT to start a chapter in Pakistan 
a week after the country becan1e a nuclear state. Zalloun1' s legacy of restructuring the 
organizational structure of HT and giving substantial control of HT to its local leaders 
continue to define the organization to this dav. ~ ~ 
The transition fron1 tv1iddle East based lslan1ist party to a global Islan1ist party was not 
all srnooth. Zallourn could not cope and understand the political dynan1ics in 1nany 
countries that he \Vas not fan1iliar vvith. The fact that Zallou1n gave substantial control of 
the party to the head of its respective regions (Mu -'tcanad) did not 111ean that all decisions 
vvere to be n1ade by these lvfu -'tarnad, often key decisions re111ained the responsibility of 
the Arnir. The Arnir continues to n1onitor political developn1ents in the di±Terent areas 
through assigned envoys. This n1eant that there \Vas potential . for conflicts especially in 
areas \Vhere the Amir and others in the central leadership were not farniliar. The splits 
. \,vithin HT \Vere largely the result of Zalloun1 and the central leadership's inability to 
fom1ulate policies that took the regions outside the Middle East n1ore seriously. Its 
leaders outside the Middle East initiated three of the four splits in the party. This attested 
to a problen1 in the way the central leadership deals with chapters outside the region. A 
senior HT n1ernber referred to these episodes as ··shaking the tree to get rid of useless 
objects.'· 8h ln reality, these splits did rnar the in1age of HT as a united Islarnic party and 
86 Awdallah. Beloved by Allah,. p. 119. 
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had an i1npact on its future develop111ent. This was vievved as serious enough challenge 
that the nevv Aniir of HT began 111aking son1e structural changes \Vi thin the party. 
The cun-ent Atnir of HT, Sheikh Abu Yasin Ata Ibn Khalil Abu Rashta \Vas born in 1943 
in Hebron, Palestine. In 1948, his t:,uni ly \Vas forced to leave their hon1e and n1oved to a 
refugee can1p in Al-Favvwar after their hon1e was destroyed during the 1948 Arab-Israeli 
conflict. 87 He co111pleted his prin1ary and 111iddle schools in the refugee can1p. 
Subsequently, he furthered his studies in Hebron and Jerusale111. He vvas introduced to 
HT while in Hebron and joined the organization in the n1id~ 1950s and worked closely 
vvith An-Nabhani, and Zalloun1. 88 He \Vas active in building chapters of HT in Hebron 
and Jerusale1n. In 1962 he furthered his study in the Faculty of Engineering, Cairo 
University, in Egypt. 89 Upon co1npleting his studies, Abu Rash ta worked in several Arab 
countries including Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab En1irates as a civil 
engineer where he assisted in establishing chapters of HT. In l 980, he went to An1111an , 
Jordan, where he was appointed HT' s spokes1nan in Jordan. Abu Rashta can1e to 
pron1inence in Jordan during the Persian Gulf War when he convened press conferences, 
lectures and debates at public venues throughout the country. He ,vas designated a 
prisoner of conscience by Atnnesty International after his detention by the Jordanian 
authorities in 1998.90 After co1npleting a three-year prison sentence for an interview 
published in 1995 in the journal al-Hiwar, he was later i1npr1soned for a further six 
rnonths for 1ne1nbership of an unlicensed organization .91 
Creating a New 'Franchise' 
One of the first tasks unde1iaken by Abu Rashta upon asswning the leadership of HT is a 
re-branding of the in1age of the party. 92 Under Zalloun1, the in1age of HT is that of an 
87• 1.·::1 44 lull, p. ' . 
88 Profile of Sheikh Ata Abu Rashta at http: //www.hizb.org.uk/hizb/who-is-ht/prominent-rnen1bers/profile-
?_f-sheikh-ata-abu-rashta.html. Accessed on 29 September 2009 . 
~
9 Biography of Sheikh Ata Abu Rashta at http: //vvww.hizb-ut-
tahrir.info/arabic/inclex.php/HTAmir/nubthah. Accessed on 29 September 2009 . 90 See http ://wv\r\v .anmesty.org/en/region/jordan?page=l 0. Accessed on 29 September 2009 
•n Biography of Sheikh Ata Abu Rashta at http: //www .hizb-ut -
i~l1ri~·.info/arabic/index.php/HTAmir/nubthah. Accessed 01_1 29 September 2009. . 
-- M_obamed Nawab Mohamed Osman, Hizb ut-Tahrir in Shahram Akbarzadeh, Routlec~ge Handbook.for 
Political Islam (London and New York: Routledge, 2011), p . 101 -102 
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underground clandestine organjzation with young, extre1nist 1nembers. The HT 
leadershjp under Abu Rashta began a process of softening the i1nage of the organization. 
This process jnvolved several strategies. fjrstly, the pa11y staiied operating in an 
environment that promoted openness . Even in places where the pa11y vvas banned like 
Pakistan , official spokesn1en of the pa11y rnaintain high public profiles. While Abu 
Rashta avoided being identified publicly (his photos are no where to be found and his 
whereabouts · are unknown) , he has sta11ed a personal vvebsite vvhere his views .and 
speeches are featured. 93 Secondly, the patiy leaders of the various chapters have been 
adept at pron1oting the party and underplaying its views on jihad while en1phasizing its 
n01f-violent n1ethodology and focus on an · intellectual struggle. 94 Michael vVhine has 
~. ~~ 
pointed out that HT has exercised considerable restraint towards the Danish cartoon 
caricature issue. He noted that 
The group ' s response to the Danish carioons issue is instructive. Both in its online and 
printed materiat the party called for peaceful .de1nonstrations and diplo1natic and 
educational initiatives~ while condenming the more violent n1anifestations that incited 
. 9~ 
v10lence.· -
The pat1y 's website also avoids issuing state1nents or a11icles that see1n suppo11ive of acts 
of violence. HT has also tried to revan1p its in1age by utilizing professional looking 
publications and organizing 111ore grandiose events. HT's pub1ications often use high 
quality glossy paper for its publications.96 Often these publications bear catchy phrases 
n1eant to attract the attention of readers. In son1e cases, these publications do not bear the 
nan1e of HT. In addition, the paiiy is also beginning to forn1 n1edia tean1s in countries 
q:, ibid. p. 103 
94 See various interviews with HT leaders in Australia , Pakistan, Bangladesh and Lebanon. Intervi ew wi th 
. aveed Butt, Spokesman HT Pakistan at http: //w~'W'.youtube.com/watch?v_==5Ep dXPxinw, accessed on 
20 September 2009; Interview with ~1oinuddin i\hmed, Spokesman HT Bangladesh at 
http :/ /v,1vvvv. youtu be.comiwatch ?v= Y IU3 l qq 8rQo&feature=Play List&p=6BCF26FD69 8 3 3 9 A0&index=8, 
accessed on 20 September 2009; Interview with Ahmed AI-Qasas , Spokesman HT Lebanon at 
http ://vvww.youtube.com/ watch?v= _ulau9EYEyA&feature=PlayList&p=.6BCF26FD698339A0&index=6, 
accessed on 20 September 2009 and Interview with Waseem Douheiri, Media Representative of HT 
Australia at · 
http :/iwww.youtube.com/ watch?v=Op60dpPKo88&feature=PlayList&p=6BCF26FD698339AO&index=7, 
accessed on 20 September 2009 
·~
5 Michael \Vhine.- "ls Hizb ur-Tahrir Changing Strategy or Tactics" Centre for Eurasian Policy 
qccasiona/ Research Paper Series , No. l (July 2006), p. 2. 
9t, A.n example of this publication is the New Civilization magazine published by HT Britain. It was first 
published in Autumn 2004. An online version of the magazirfr can be found at 
http ://w~'W'. newcivilisati on.com/index.php/main/newciv/back_issues. 
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where it is allovved to operate legally. These n1edia tean1s organize talk shovvs and 
conduct intervie\VS in a style sin1ilar to that of international rnedia bureaus such as the 
CNN and BBC.97 This is ain1ed at creating an irnage of the HT as an organization that is 
wel 1 run and coordinated. 
Engaging the Media 
HT leaders have begun courting the n1edia to publicize their cause. Press conferences are 
now organized in all countries where HT is allo\ved to operate legally. These press 
conferences are often held after a rnajor HT event or to sirnply explain HT .,s position on 
several issues. Sin1ilarly, the n1edia especially in Western countries sought intervie\vs 
with HT leaders to ascertain the level of their radicalisn1. These rnedia engagernents have 
given the party an outlet to clear rnisconceptions about the group while allowing the 
patiy to air their views to the public. 98 In 20 l 0, HT organized an lnternahonal Media 
Cot?:ference in an effort to 'educate the rnedia' in the countries HT is operating in about 
HT and Jslatn. Underpinning the organization of the conference is the belief that the 
n1edia plays an i111po1iant role in influencing the 111en1bers of the public and as such was 
looking to change the 1nedia's potirayal of HT and Islatn .99 H_T chapters in several 
countries including the UK, Dentnark and Malaysia sponsored 111e111bers of the press 
fron1 their respective countries to attend the event. 100 In an -effort to showcase the 
diversity of HT, speakers at the event spoke in their respective languages. The event 
itself was a typical HT event with continuous speeches by HT leaders about conflicts in 
the Muslim world and the 'conspiracies' hatched by Western po,vers to dom•inate the 
Muslin1 vvorld . In essence, the event was a public diplon1acy exercise undertaken by HT 
to both portray its strength of HT and itnprove its relations with 111.ainstreatn media. To a 
large extent, the event was a failure and failed to attract the sort of coverage the party 
generated in 2007 for the Jakatia conference ,vith only a few Lebanese newspapers 
reporting on the event. 101 
97 ibid 
98 
For instance, see Interview with Wassim Doureihi , Spokesman of HT Australia on ABC's Lateline at 
!1_ttp: //wvvw.youtube.com/watch?v=ZHFZy0pU9YQ. Accessed on 30 August 2009. 99 Osman, " Hizb Tahrir", 2011, p. 103. 
100 
Interview with Sayuti Omar, Editor of Harakah, (The Official Newspaper of the Islmnic Party of 
l\1alaysia) and Interview with Chadi Freigeh, HT Spokesn1an in Scandinavia, Beirut , 10 September 2010 . 101 Osman, "Hizb Tahrir" , 2011,p. 102. 
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Expanding the Frontier of Da'awah 
Unlike the leadership of Zalloum, the pmiy under Abu Rashta has suppotied the 
expansion of the tnovetnent. The party planned initiatives to introduce new chapters in 
patis of Asia, Africa and Notih Atnerica. These initiatives could be seen frotn the 
developtnent of new chapters in several countries and the · upgrade ' of other chapters to a 
new level of engagement. 102 Several new chapters were developed in Kenya, Tanzania 
and Mauritius. These chapters were developed by n1en1bers of HT who are i-1atives of 
these countries. Many of these 1ne1nbers had been recruited vvhile they studied in Britain 
and other European countries. A case in point is Mahn1ud Atchay. A British born 
Mauritian , he began activities in Mauritius as early as 2004 by engaging young Muslin1 
professionals in the country. 103 By July 2009,' the Mauritian chapter of HT was able to 
develop into a functioning unit that organize its first public conference. 104 Several 
chapters of HT, nan1ely HT An1erica and HT Canada, that were established in the 1990s 
also started engaging the society (stage 2 of HT's n1ethodology to attain povver) by 
organizing public conferences in 2009. 105 Abu Rashta' s leadership also saw the 
expansion of resource sharing between the different HT chapters. This resource sharing 
\Vas established by the central HT leadership as the lvfu 'tarnad in each chapter is not 
allowed to cornrnunicate vvith one another \,yithout the pennission of the central 
leadership. Since 2003 , HT Indonesia has established a distribution centre for its 
111agazine, Al-Wa 'ie, in Sydney, 111anaged by n1en1bers of HT in Australia. The 1nagazine 
is used by the HT as a recruitn1ent tool for thousands of Indonesians living in Australia 
who are rnore fluent in their native Indonesian language. 106 Sources within HT noted that 
such sharing of resources also occur in Europe vvhere the HT in Turkey assists its 
chapters in Gern1any, Austria and Netherlands who are rnore fan1iliar with the Turkish 
language. Such sharing of resources has helped to narrovv the disparities that exist in the 
activities of HT in the difierent chapters. 
10 7 .·b ·d 
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103 Interview with Muhmmad Al-Khaththath, Jaka1ia, 15 August 2007. 
104 Details of the event can be found at http: //www.hizb-ut- ~ 
ta)1rir.info/info/engli sh.php/contents_ en/entry _ 3 802 . Accessed on 21 September 2009 . 
10) See article on the event at "Islamists Denounce Capitalisn/' The l'../e1--·v Arnerican, 17 August 2009. 
106 See details of this in Osman, "Reviving the Islamic Caliphate: Hizbut Tahrir and Its :tvfobilization 
Strategy in Indones ia.". P- 6 11 _ 
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Coordinating the Activites of Different Par(v Chapters 
Taking into account the global expansion of the HT, the pmiy's leadership has 
stremnlined the activities of its organization ,vorldwide. In vie,v of this, since 2007, the 
party has been organizing synchronized conferences in diverse parts of the vvorld. The 
conferences are organized each year in the Islmnic n1onth of Rqjab , on the day the 
caliphate was destroyed by the regi111e of Mustafa Ken1al Ataturk, the founding father of 
the n1odern Turkish state. 107 They are coordinated and organized concurrently in order to 
con1n1en1orate the fall of the Ottornan caliphate. It was altnost ce1iain that the decision to 
organize these conferences was n1ade by the central leadership of HT. These conferences 
were organized to showcase HT's strength to the outside world. It is also note\vorthy that 
different HT chapters also utilize the satne fonnat in organizing these conferences. For 
instance, both the HT chapters in Lebanon as \Veil as Indonesia organized conferences 
focused on lslatnic religious scholars (ula,na) in 2009. Excerpts frotn these events were 
then cornpiled into a video, which was then posted on several websites. 108 Such videos 
are tools that HT utilize to recruit potential 1ne1nbers. HT has also a cornpilation of a list 
of its activities pe1iaining to the various chapters of the patiy. All of HT 's websites at the 
national level also cotnpile their own articles relating to the HT activities. This is a 
1neans by which tnetnbers are kept infonned about the developments in other pariy 
chapters while showcasing to potential 1ne1nbers the strength and 1nassive presence of 
the patty. 
HT has also been identifying certain countries 'vvithin the l\lfusli1n world to be regional 
centres for HT' s activities in these regions. While HT Britain has played this role for HT 
in Europe., newer countries have been identified for this role. The level of freedotn that 
HT enjoys in these countries ~ottlcl decide vvhich country is selected. 109 These hub 
centres are to forn1 in1portant centres for transn1ission of HT's activities in an area. In the 
107 A more detailed description ofHT' s understanding of the abolishment of the caliphate can be found in 
Zalloum, Hmv Khilafah Was Destroyed, 2000. 
108 See videos titled ·call of the Hou~ (Global Wrap-Up 2007) and Call of the Hour (Global vVrap-Up 2008) 
at http ://www.youtube.com/results?search_query=call +for+khilafah&search_type=&aq=f. Accessed on 21 September 2009 . 
· 
I 09 u- . "H" t T } . " 1 - ,-, sman, 1z 1 a 1nr , p. 0.:i . 
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Levant area of th e Middle East, Lebanon has been identified as the new hub centre. 
Sudan seems to be playing this role in Africa, Pakistan in South Asia, Ye1nen in the 
Arabian Penin sula, Uzbekistan in Central Asia (and Caucasu?) and Indonesia in the Asia 
Padfic. The role of Indonesia is regarded as especially itnportant. Since 2007 , HT 
Indonesia has been taking a 1nore important role \Vithin the patiy. Besides organizing the 
largest ever HT event held in 2007 , the Indonesian chapter has been an i1npo1iant anchor 
for transrnittin g HT 's ideology to other patis of the region. 11 0 In Europe, the patiy 
divided the region into four areas (vvilayahs) , Britain and Ireland; Scandinavia:, Benelux 
and Gern1any and Austria. This division was probably done along linguistic lines to 
better facilitate activities of HT in these regions. The author observed in 2010 that 
leaders of HT in Europe had several sn1aller n1eetings at the side of the Lebanese n1edia 
conference where strategies and coordination efforts between the chapters were probably 
discussed. 111 At a n1ore i1nportant level , the coordination of its chapters n1eant that the 
pmiy could better mikulate a consistent position vvithin the party. 
The leadership of Ata Abu Rashta savv the consolidation of HT ' s position as a global 
Islan1ic party. He seen1s to be n1ore willing to invest in its chapters outside the Middle 
East such as Pakistan~ Uzbekistan and Indonesia. 11 2 In line 'With its efforts to soften the 
irnage of the party, they have also played dovvn son1e of the n1ore radical strategies that 
brought notoriety to the party in the 1990s. Neve11heless, the pai1y ' s leadership ren1ains 
largely Palestinian~ based in the Middle East and are not m.vare of the political conditions 
in regions outside the IVliddle East. The envoy fron1 the Anzir visits these areas three to 
four tin1es a year \Vhile in sorne countries in the Central Asia, the envoy are not even sent 
to n1onitor the region. This n1akes it difficult for the party to effectively fon11ulate 
policies and a global strategy to propound the position of the party. Despite the new 
approach to leadership, the party is still very n1uch focus on reviving an Arab caliphate 
sho\vn by several decisions that the patiy rnade in relation to its chapter outside the 
Middle East. At a rnore basic level , the party ' s Arab-centric leadership is likely to be a 
hurdle to the growth of the party in the long run. 
11
° For details about HT Indonesia ' s role as the hub for HT in Asia Pacific, see Mohamed ~ awab 
~1ohamed Osman , ''Transnational Activism of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia," Southeast Asia Research 18, no. 4 
(2010). 
111 Personal Observation of Author at the HT 1edia Conference, Beirut, 5-9 July 20 l 0. 
11 ~ Osman: '·Hizb Tahrir" , p. 104. 
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Conclusion 
The chapter highlighted the evolution of HT fron1 a Palestine-centric Islan1ic group to a 
global Islan1ic 111oven1ent. It noted that HT was established \Vith the ain1 of freeing 
Palestine through the formation of an Arab caliphate but expanded to becorne a global 
.fslarnic pmiy. The chapter began by discussing An-Nabhani's religio-political thoughts 
and the political context surrounding its evolven1ent. It was noted that An-Nabhani \Vas 
an Arab nationalist who becarne an Islan1ist after the Arab=Israeli war in 1948 and the 
failed coup atten1pt to overthrow the Jordanian king. This section also discussed ho\v 
and why the Palestinian issue becan1e a secondary objective of the party. The second part 
of the chapter exan1ined HT under the leadership of Zalloun1 . This section discussed ho\v 
the pa1iy 's spread to beyond the Arab world and saw the change in the party's focus to 
concentrate its efforts on reviving the caliphate to acco1nmodate its 1nore global 
structure. Problen1s related to this transitional phase such as the failure of the Amir to 
understand political dynatnics in the newer areas the party vvas operating in, resulted in 
splits within its leadership. The last part exan1ined HT under the leadership of Ata Abu 
Rashta. It analyzed the strategies etnployed by the party as a global Tslmnic pa1iy. These 
strategies include the 1nore moderate stance adopted by patiy leaders, coordination of 
party activities in different regions and engagement with mainstream tnedia. 
Nevertheless, co1nplex.ities sutTunding the Arab centric nature of its leadership and a 
failure to understand the local political contexts in areas outside the Middle East continue 
to itnpact the patty negatively. In essence while the patty has expanded sig11ificantly 
fron1 being a Palestinian led, M'icldle East based political party to a n1ore global Islan1ic 
patiy, the party still suffers frotn the fact that its leadership retnained Arab-centric and 
authoritarian n1aking it difficult for the party to gro\\7 in son1e parts of the world. 
Indonesia is an exa1nple of this. The next chapter of the thesis \vill discuss how 
developn1ents within the larger HT shaped the historical developn1ent of HT in 
Indonesia. 
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CHAPTER THREE: UNRA YELLING THE HISTORY OF HIZBUT TAHRIR 
INDONESIA 
Our success in Indonesia was a true 111iracle. A 111iracle, which was blessed by Allah. 
Who would have thought that the seeds of the party were sown by a 111an who did not 
understand Bahasa Indonesia and who did not truly understand the principles of HT. 
(Hafidz A bduffah1nan, Fonner Chairn1an of HTI) 
The emergence of HT in Indonesia was a 1niracle for 1nany HT leaders. In his writings, 
An-Nabhani did not show any understanding of Islan1 and Muslin1s in Southeast Asia. As 
highlighted in the previous chapter, he was solely interested in an Arab caliphate. For HT 
leaders, Southeast Asian Muslin1s are in the periphery of the Muslin1 world and are thus 
not in1portant in its larger agenda to revive the caliphate. As highlighted in the previous 
chapter, party n1en1bers residing in Viestern countries initiated the growth of HT beyond 
the Middle East. In Indonesia, the spread of the party was the result of an individual , 
Abdul Rahn1an Al-Baghdadi, a n1en1ber of HT fron1 Australia. The transitioning of HTI 
fi.·0111 a can1pus based student n1oven1ent to one of the n1ore pron1inent radical Islan1ist 
groups in Indonesia will be explored in this chapter. The argun1ent that the founding and 
initial growth of HTI was the efiort of an individual rather than that of the transnational 
HT leadership 'vVill also be exan1ined. It is necessary to take into consideration that it \Vas 
not until the n1id-l 990s that the party began to show interest in Indonesia. Furthern1ore, it 
\vas only as recently as 2003 \vhen Ata Abu Rashta took over the heln1 of party 
leadership that the party began vievving the Indonesian chapter as a n1ore irnpo1iant 
con1ponent of the paiiy. There are three sections in this chapter. The role played by 
Abdul Rahn1an Al-Baghdadi in sovving the seeds of HT in Indonesia vvill be exan1ined in 
the first section. This section will highlight ho\v Al-Baghdadi used an Islan1ic boarding 
school (pesantren) run by a prorninent ularna in Bogor, Abdullah Bin Nuh as the n1ain 
base for his activisn1. Al-Baghdadi 's activities an1ongst students in the Institute 
Pertanian Bogor (Bogor Agricultural Institute, IPB) ,vill also be highlighted. The period, 
during vvhich HTI can1e officially under the control of the larger HT leadership, will be 
analyzed in the second section of the chapter. Several in1portant developn1ents including 
the decision of the party to abandon its activities on can1pus so as to focus on the 
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recruitment of young Musli1n professionals, the decision of Al-Bagbdadi to leave the 
party and changes in its leadership will also be exan1ined. Developn1ents within HTI 
since 2003 when a nevv HT A,nir vvas appointed ,vill be studied in the final section of this 
chapter. This section will also exan1ine the changing attitudes of the larger HT leadership 
towards its Indonesian chapter and the impact of this change. 
HTI: The Beginnings 
The history of HTI n1ay be traced to Abdul Rahn1an Al-Baghdadi , n1en1ber of HT fron1 
Australia. Prior to discussing the history of HTI.'s etnergence, it is perhaps useful to 
briefly highlight Al-Baghdadi's life to provide a context to the later discussions of his 
political thoughts. AI-Baghdadi was born in 1952 in the city of Sidon. His ancestors 
hailed fron1 Baghdad, Iraq and had settled in Lebanon for several generations. 1 His 
fan1ily n1en1bers were active n1en1bers of HT since the early founding of the party. As 
HT was viewed as a threat to the Lebanese governn1ent, the Al-Baghdadi fan1ily -was 
constantly targeted and several fan1ily n1en1bers had to endure torture fron1 the 
authorities. Al-Baghdadi had becon1e a n1en1ber of HT at the age of fourteen and by 
1967; Baghdadi hin1self was atTested and tortured. To escape the continuous harassn1ent, 
the Al-Baghdadi fan1ily escaped to Australia vvhere they vvere granted asylun1 . His eldest 
brother had done this in 1965 while the rest of the fan1ily folfowed suit in 1968.2 By 
1968, the Al-Baghdadi fan1ily had settled in Sydney. The story of the Al-Baghdadi 
fan1ily is not unique. Many n1en1bers of HT in the Middle East were forced to 111 igrate to 
different parts of the Western vvorld. Most of these 1nen1bers escaped to European 
countries ,vhile a sn1aller group rnoved to Australia and the United States. 
In 1979, after getting acquainted with Bin Nuh, Al-Baghdadi visited Indonesia. After 
several visits, he decided to stay in the country. Within a year ofstaying in Bogar, he had 
n1arried an Indonesian wo1nan of Arab origin. By 1982, Al-Baghdadi had begun actively 
building a chapter of -HT in Indonesia. During this period, AI-Baghdadi also taught at the 
Pesantren Al-Ghazal( the Centre for Arabic Language (Len1baga Pendidikan Bahasa 
1 Al-Baghcladi had inforn1ed me about this but refused to elaborate about the exact tim e the family shifted !o Lebanon. Interview with Abdul Rahman AI-Baghdadi, io August 2009, Bogor. 
- ibid. 
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Arab) LP BA) , [lniversitas Ibnu Khaldun and the Universitas of Ath-Thohiriyah, a private 
Islan1ic university. 3 Beyond teaching, Al-Baghdadi also published extensively. His 
\Vritings expounded on the ideas of HTI. Neve1iheless, he ensured that no references 
were n1ade to HTI. His books touched on a \Viele range of issues frorn the pern1issibility 
of pi g rearing in a Muslin1 country to the future of the Musliln \Vorld.4 In 1999, due to 
di sagreements \vith the party leadership, he quit HT. Details of this disagreen1ent vvill be 
discussed later in the chapter. Since 1999, Al-Baghdadi had been a freelance preacher. 
Despite being in Indonesia for nearly three decades, he and his three children ren1ain 
Australian citizen. Al-Baghdadi con1plained that he had 111ajor financial issues and had 
faced challenges in getting his visa rene\ved in the last ten years. 5 Al -Baghdadi is today 
living in Bogor and preaches at several rnosques in Bogor and Jakarta. Little is known 
about ·whether his farnil v n1e111bers in Australia are n1e111bers of HT. Nevertheless, Al-
. .,I •. 
Baghdadi ~ s parents are still living in Sydney and he visits thern once every three years. 
A.nother key fi gure in the historical develop1nent of HTI is Kiyai Abdullah Bin Nuh, a 
pron1inent scholar of Islan1 with a following a1nongst rnany tertiary students in Bogor 
and Jakarta. Born on 30th June 1905 in Cianjur, he hailed fron1 a fan1il y of Muslirn 
scholars. His father , Ki yai Haji Raden Nuh was a religious teacher and a hqfiz (one who 
has rn e1nor1zed the Koran) who also runs his o,vn ,nadrasah (Islarnic school) , the 
l1.fadrasah A l-I 'anat Talibil Afuslirnin.6 Bin Nuh received his early education fron1 this 
school. He 1nastered the Arabic language by the age of eight. In 1918, Bin Nuh was sent 
to Serna.rang in Centra l Java to study at the A1adrasah Arabiyyah ,~vcnnutlul Huda under 
3 LPBA was the precursor to the Indonesian Institute for Arabic and Islamic Knowledge (LIPIA, Lembaga 
Pen r;z,etahuaan Islam dan Arab). a branch of Al-Imam Yiuhammad bin Saud Universitv in <....: •. .,, 
R iyadh. Established in 1980, it provides courses in both Arabic and Islamic studies for Indonesian students, 
the most successful of whom can gain scholarships for postgraduate study at Al -Imam University. See 
Greg Fealy and Anthony Bubalo, "Bet,veen the Global and the Local : Islamism, The Middle East and 
Indonesia" The Brookings Project on US Policy Tmvards Islam, Saban Centre fo r Middle East Studies, 
A nalys is Paper,. ·o. 9 (October 2005), p. 21. 
4 For a sampl e of these read in gs see Abdul Rahm an AI -Baghdadi , Babi Haran, Babi Halal (Jakarta: Genrn 
Insa ni Press , 1992); Abdul Rahman Al-Baghdadi , Ulama dan Penguasa (Jakarta: Gema Insani Press , 
I 988 ): Abdul Rah man AI -B aghdadi , Do 'cn·vah Islam don /vfosa Depan Umnw t (Jakarta: A I-Izzah Press , 
1997). 
5 In one instance, his fami ly had overs tayed in Indonesia for nearly two months and was forced to take a 
loan to pay the penalty imposed by the Indonesian state for overstaying. Interview with Abdul Rahman Al -
Baghdadi. 
6 Ahmad Za ini Dahl an, Al-HUrah Afin Allah illa Allah (Bogar,: Al-Il1ya, 1987), p .1. 
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the stewardship of Syed J\!lohmned Hasyitn Al-Haddad. 7 In 1922, he 111oved to Surabaya 
when Al-Haddad decided to start a schooL the Hadhra1naut School in the city. At the 
school, Bin Nuh ]earned several languages includin g French , Dutch and Gnglish. Tn 
1926, Bin Nuh furthered his study in Cairo at the Al-A=har University. He developed an 
interest in Arabic literature and had a flair for co111posing poetry in the language . Tn late 
l 927, he returned back to Cianjur, Indonesia. Within a year, he shifted to Setnarang and 
then to Cianjur where he taught at his alma 1nater, Madrasah Al J'anah .8 In 1934, Bin 
Nuh rnoved to Bogor where he taught at the Madrasah l~la,niyyah and Madrasah Al-
Jh~va. In addition to this, Bin Nub also built an organization the Penolong Sekolah Agarna 
CNetwork for Assisting Religious Schools). 9 He shuttled between Cianjur.. Jakarta and 
Bogar for n1any years. He subsequently forn1ed an in1portant Islan1ic center of learning, 
the Pesantren Al-Ci-hazali in Bogor. In ] 970 that he finally 1noved his \Vhole family to 
Bogor. This Islan1ic centre con1prises a pre-school, two 111adrasahs, a prin1ary school 
(SD), a high school (SMP) and a senior high school (SMA). 10 In his personal life, Bin 
Nub was n1arried twi_ce and had eleven children in total (six fron1 hi s first vvife and five 
fron1 his second wife). Bin Nub also took up several acaden1ic jobs in universities such 
as [.lniversita5· Indonesia (UI) and [!r1iversita5,· Ciadjah A1adah (UGM) due to his 
expertise in the Arabic language. 
Beyond his involven1ent in religious studies, Bin Nub was also k11own for his strong anti-
colonial stance. He ,:vas involved vvith a 111yriad of anti-colonial arn1ed groups such as the 
Pernbela Tanah Air (PETA, Protectors of the Fatherland) and Barisan Hizbullah 
(Hizbullah Front). 11 He ,vas the Conunander of PET A in Cianjur. Bin Nuh also assisted 
in the setting up of the Radio Republik Indonesia (The Indonesian Republic Radio, RRI) 
station in Cianjur. 12 When Indonesia achieved its independence in 1949, Bin Nuh shifted 
to Jakarta and was responsible for the Arabic transn1ission of the RRI. It ,:vas during th is 
7 Iskandar Engku, "Konsep Ukhuwah Is-lamiyyah Menurut K.H. Raden Abdullah Bi Nuh" (IATN Syarif 
Hiclayatullah , 2001). p.22 . . 
8 Interview with Mustafa Bin Nub, Son of Abdullah Bin Nub and Administrator of the Pesanlren A.I-
Gha::ali, 10 August 2009. q . ,,.. '-· 
· Iskandar, !<..onsep Ukhuwah, p. 23 , 
10 Majlis Al -lhya, AI-Jhya Guide Book, (Bogor: AI -fhya, 1991 ), p. 2. . 11 PETA was an auxiliary guerilla force formed by the Japanese administration during the Second world 
War to resist an Allied invasion. Barisan Hizbullah was the military wing of the Islamic party !vfa.syumi. 
s,ee i\!f. C. Ricklefs , A Histaty oflndonesia Since C. I 200 (London: Palgrave, 2001 ), pp . 255-25 9 . 
L Mansur }.1enas Abdurahman, "Sejarah Singkat K. H. Abdullah Bin Nub," Afqjalah Suara lvlasjid, Jan 
1989, p. 50. 
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period that Bin Nuh started the Arabian Press Board, a body responsible for pu_blishing in 
Arabic and aided in the forn1ation of an Arabic Literature Depart1nent at UI. 13 
Bin Nuh's expe11ise in the Arabic language and literature dre\v n1any enthusiasts of the 
language to hirn. He becarne \veil kno,vn ,vithin the circles of Middle Eastern diplon1ats 
who enjoyed listening to his flovvery Arabic language and poen1s. He becan1e close to the 
an1bassadors of Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Iran. He n1ade several visits to these countries. 
It was during one of these trips that he chanced upon, a book \vritten by An-Nabhani, The 
S_vstern c~f lslan1 (Hadharah Islarniyyah) in Jordan. In 1978, Bin Nuh wrote several pieces 
of prose in praise of the late King Faisal Ibn Saud, the ruler of Saudi Arabia. King Faisal 
was so irnpressed by the poetry that he invited Bin Nub to the kingdom as his guest. 14 In 
l 979, Bin Nuh ,vent to Saudi Arabia to perforrn the n1andatory ·hcyj pilgrirnage and visit 
the King. During this trip, he was introduced to the Cro,vn Prince of Jordan, Prince 
Hassan ,vho was so a,ved by his Arabic literary skills that he was invited to Jordan. In the 
sarne year, Prince Hassan arranged for Bin Nuh's son Mustafa Bin Nuh to be awarded a 
scholarship to study in Ar11111an as a guest of the royal fan1ily. 15 It is thus pertinent to note 
that despite Bin Nub's role in assisting the growth of HTI, he did not share all of their 
vie,vs. For instance, HTI is critical of n1any of the Muslin1 governn1ents while Bin Nuh 
had no qualrns about n1aintaining strong relationships vvith the1n. In so1ne cases such as 
that of King Faisal of Saudi, Bin Nuh rnade efforts to i1npress the king through his 
nu1nerous poe1ns. It is clear that he did not share HT 's disdain for Musli1n rulers. 
It is perhaps appropriate at this juncture to discuss an j1npo1iant religious the1ne that vvas 
often discussed and advocated by Bin Nuh in both his ,vritings and speeches. His views 
about the therne of Strengthening Brotherhood Arnongst 1\lfuslims could explain his 
attraction to the ideas of An-Nabhani and HT. In paiiicular, tvvo of his ,vorks, Fii Dhilal 
Al-Ka'bah Al-Baiti Al-Harcnn (In the Shade of the Ka'abah and Baitul Haratn) and Laa 
Tc1h(.!1xvata Fill Al-lsla,n (There is No Sectarianis1n in !slain) outline his views about the 
need for I'v1uslin1s to be united. Bin Nuh argued that the brotherhood of Muslin1s was 
13 Tnterview with Mustafa Bin 1 -uh , 10 August 2009, Bmwr 
i -i l read a copy of the poetry during his int~rview with 1ustafa Bin 1 uh. The poem basically described the 
king as a just ruler whose humility and religiosity should be emulated by other Muslims rulers . King Faisal 
\~as also described as the custodian of the two most important mosgues of Islam. 
1) Interview with 1\1ustafa Bin Nuh, 10 August 2009, Bogor. 
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created since the titne the Prophet tnigrated frorn Mecca to Medina. It was here that this 
sense of brotherhood was created between the Ansar (the ori ginal residents of Medina) 
and 1\lluhajiroun (those fro1n ~1ecca who tnigrated to Medina) .16 He noted that the act of 
perfonning the pilgrin1age is another 111anifestation of this unity in lslarn. He further 
atiiculated the view that in order for true Brotherhood to exist , Musli1ns 1nust be tolerant 
of differences in religious opinions as long as these opinions were based on the Koran 
and Hadith of the Prophet. 17 It was this belief in tolerance that savv Bin Nuh rnaintaining 
close relationships with all Islatnic groups in Indonesia. Mustafa Bin N uh noted that his 
father had con1e to the defence of many Islan1ic groups such as the Tablighi Jcunaat , the 
Shhte and followers of other Islarnic groups. 18 lt is thi s defence of Shhte ~Juslims and his 
close relationship vvith the Iranian an1bassador that led son1e Indonesian religious 
scholars accusing hi1n of being a Shhte Musli1n. This protnpted hin1 to write a book titled 
Ana Jvfu5;/irn Sunnzyvun Shqfiiyvun (I an1 a Sunni Shc{/1 ·e Muslin1) .19 In this book, Bin 
Nuh categorically stated his own religious orientation as a Sunni Muslin1 believing in the 
Shq/1 'e school of jurisprudence but ,vent on to argue that it is incorrect for Sunni Muslin1 
scholars to label Shiites as heretics. In analyzing Bin Nuh ' s views on the unity Df 
Muslin1s, he did not advocate for the revival of the caliphate or the forn1ation of a single 
political unit con1prising all Muslin1 countries. Nevertheless, he sees it as the duty of 
Muslin1s to protect Muslin1 groups that vvere trying to revive the practiced Islan1 
regardless of their orientation of political views. 
Bin Nub 's reputation as a religious scholar gre-w over tin1e. By the late 1970s. Bin Nuh 
had beco1ne an influential religious figure in Bogor ,vhose advice ,vas sought after by 
1nany Islmnic groups. 20 While he was generally syrnpathetic to Islarnic 1noven1ents and 
groups, Bin Nuh had refused join any of these n1oven1ents. Due to his religious stature, 
he had a large nun1ber of students studying at the IPB attending his pengc{jiaan (religious 
class). 21 
16 Abdullah Bin Nuh, Al-Ka 'bah Al-Baiti Al-Haran, (Bogor: n.p ., 1978), p. 1. 17 Abdullah Bin Nuh, Laa Tahifi)yata Fill Al-lslmn (Bogor: n.p ., 1980), p. 3 18 Interview with Mustafa Bin Nuh, 10 August 2009 , Bogor. Lies Marcos who met Bin Nuh noted in her • I.,_,. • 
-
report that Bin Nuh was committed to achieving unity amongst Muslims and sought to maintain good 
relations with all Muslim groups See Lies Marcos , Fieldwork Report on Abdullah Bin Nuh , p. 5. 
:
9 Abdullah Bin Nuh, Ana Nfuslirn S1,mnixvw1 ShqfziJyun (Bogor: n.p. , 1982) 
~u Iskandar Engku, Konsep Ukfnnvah Jslmniyvah, p. 19. · 
~
1 Interview with Mustafq Bin Nuh 10 August 2009 , Bogor. 
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... -·------
Bin Nuh, AI-Baghdadi and HTT 
Bin Nuh had becorne acquainted with Al-Baghdadi during his trip to Sydney in 1978. He 
\Vas in Sydney to visit his son, Raden Faisal Bin Nuh who ran an architecture firn1 in 
Sydney. During his stay in Sydney, Bin Nuh becan1e knovvn to the Australian Lebanese 
cornrnunity as a respected religious scholar. His con1n1and of classical Arabic and the 
depth of his religious kno\,vledge rnade hirn a popular speaker .vvithin the cornn1unity. 
Naturally, he vvas invited to deliver sennons at several n1osques and conduct religious 
talks in the hoines of sorne n1ernbers of the cornrnunitv. One of these fainilies was the .,, 
Al-Baghdadi [1rnily. Given the t:1n1ily's strong afiiliation to HT, it is highly plausible 
that they had · intentions of trying to recruit Bin Nuh to their cause. During these 
interactions, the young Al-Baghdadi becan1e attached to Bin Nuh. He began attending 
Bin Nuh 's sennons and classes. Bin Nuh hin1self had . developed a fondness for Al-
Baghdadi and the t,vo rnen had intense intellectual discussions on the predicarnent of the 
Muslin1 world . Even after Bin Nuh left Sydney after six rnonths, the two rnen continued 
to correspond via letters. 
In 1979, Baghdadi decided to visit Bin Nuh in Bogor. He took a liking for Indonesia and 
after several visits between 1979 and ] 98 l , Al-Baghdadi decided to tnigrate to Indonesia. 
It is perhaps irnportant at this juncture to correct an irnportant rnisconception that is 
co1nn-1on in wdtings on HTI. It is assu1ned that Bin Nuh had invited Baghdadi to stay in 
Indonesia so that the latter could start a chapter of HT in the country.22 This view is 
etToneous. A l-Baghdadi explained that he had 1nade a decision to co1ne to Indonesia 
because of his intellectual attraction to Bin Nuh and his decision had little to do with an 
attempt to start a HT chapter. It \Vas only later that he changed his 1nind upon seeing the 
possibility of a chapter :flourishing in Indonesia.23 Martin Van Bruinessan, one of the few 
foreign scholars to have rnet Abdullah Bin Nub is of the vie\v that Bin Nub \Vas probably 
intei·ested in Al-Baghdadi due to his proficiency in Arabic and the lack of Arabic 
teachers in his pesantren. While this view 111ight seen1 overly pessin1istic, this factor 
21 Salim. '·The Rise of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia '', p. 90; Imdadun Rahmat, Arus baru Islam Radikal 
(Jakarta : Erlangga, 2005 ), pp. 97-8 and Ken Ward," on-Violent Extremists ' ' , p . 150. 
=
3 Both \1ustafa Bin Nuh and Abdul Rahman AI -Baghdadi confim1ed this .' Interview with ]Vlustafa Bin 
>i uh. 10 August 200 9, Bogor and Abdul Rahman Al-Baghdadi _, 10 August 2009,.Bogor. 
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· 24 could probably be the rnost i111po1iant reason for Bin Nuh 's interest in Al -Baghdad1. 
Upon n1oving to Indonesia, Al=Baghdadi lived ,vi th Bin N uh' s farnily and started 
teaching A.rabic at Bin Nub' s pesantren. Although suppotiive of Al-Baghdadi whotn he 
regarded as his adopted son, Bin Nuh never becaine a tnetnber of HT.25 There is also 
rnuch confusion about the role of Bin Nuh and Al-Baghdadi in the fonnation of HT in 
Indonesia. The prevailing view about HTJ's leadership is that Bin Nuh was the first 
leader of HTI. 26 It was pmi of HTI's early strategy to link Bin Nuh directly to HT to give 
credibility to the new organization. Early leaders of HTI such as AI -Khaththath had 
deliberately given the in1pression that Bin Nuh was involved in HTI for this reason. In 
reality, Bin Nuh was tnore a patron to Al-Baghdadi. While he was never a tnernber of 
HTI, he protected the HTI activists. Mustafa Bin Nuh noted that Bin Nub was also 
supportive of other Islatnic groups such as the Tablighi Jan-,aat (TJ) who also met Bin 
Nub on a regular basis. Bin Nuh was also supportive of his son , Mustat:1 Bin Nub being 
involved in HTI. Mustafa Bin Nuh had been acquainted with the ideas of HTI first by 
reading An-Nabhani ' s Systen1 of Islan1 in Bogor. In An1n1an , he n1et activists of HT and 
joined a halaqah of the party. He had · also followed several study circles led by the 
fan1ous HT leader Ahn1ad Ad-Daur. Mustafa Bin Nuh noted that HT was an underground 
n1oven1ent in Jordan and he n1anaged to evade arrest because he was a guest of the 
Jordanian govenunent. In 1982, Mustafa returned to Jakarta during the · university' s 
winter break. He assisted AI-Baghdadi ,.vho could not speak Bahasa Indonesia to 
translate his sennons and religious discussions. 27 
24 Conversation with Martin Van Bruinessan , 1 June 2011 , Singapore. 25 The relati onship between th e two men was al so confirmed an academi c wh o met both men in 1985. He 
noted that Bin Nuh a.cted like a father to AI -Baghdadi. Conversa ti on with Martin van Bruneissen, 20 November 2009 , Singapore. 
26 Eli zabeth fuller Collins first propounded thi s view in a conference paper. Subsequentl y, nrnny of the 
other works on HTI began assuming this to be a fact. See Elizabeth Full er Collins, "Da ' awah and Democracy: The Significance of Patiai Keadi Ian and Hizbut Tahhr" International Se ,ninar on Jslarnic Jvfilitan t Nlovernents in Southeast Asia, Hotel Mulia, Jakarta, 22-23 July 2003. Also see Salim , The Ri se of 
"The Rise of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia"; Rihlah Nur Aulia, "Fundamentalisme Islam Indonesia: Studi Atas Gerakan Dan Pernikiran Hizbut Tahrir" (IAIN SyarifHidyatullah University, 2004) and Zaki iV1ubarak, 
"Islam Fundamentalis Radikal Dan Kepolitikan Di Indonesia: Gerakan Dan Pemikiran Front Pembela Islam(FPI), l\1ajelis Mujahidin , Laskar Jihad Dan Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia Tahun 1998-2003" (University of Indonesia, 2003) . 
· 27 Interview with Mustafa Bin Nuh , l 0 August 2009 , Bogor. 
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Building the Foundation o.f HTT 
The initial recruits of HTI ,vere students at the IPB. Many of these students becan1e 
fan1iliar ,vith Al -Baghdadi, as rnany had attended part-tirne religious classes conducted at 
the Pesantren Al-Ghazali and Maj/is Al-Ihya. Many of the initial syn1pathizers of HTI 
can1e frorn this group of students. Al-Baghdadi tapped into the network of Bin-Nub's 
students to forn1 the first group of HTI ' s cadres. Many of these students ,vere n1en1bers 
of the Badan Kerohaniari !shun Mahasisvva (Muslirn Students Association for the 
Developn1ent of Islan1ic Spirituality BKJ.A1) and the Lernbaga Dalnvah R:__an1pus (LDK). 
The organization ,vas fon11ed in 1978 following the abolition of Dewan Mahasiswa 
(Board of Students) in the aftern1ath of the issuance of the Norn1alisasi Kehidupan 
Ka111pus (Nor111alization of Can1pus Life bill, NKKJBKK), vvhich sa,v the Suharto regi111e 
curbing student political activities.28 Many of these students were struck by Al-
Baghdadi ' s looks. He was a tall , stout n1an \Vith a big beard and sharp eyes that 
con1n1c.u1ded the attention of anyone who was in his presence. 29 Despite his inability to 
speak Bahasa Indonesia, he ,vas charisrnatic and a fiery orator. For n1any of these 
students, Al-Baghdadi ' s Australian-Lebanese background 1nade thern curious about hin1. 
Due to his looks, background and personality, Al-Baghdadi quickly becan1e a popular 
reUgious figure atnongst Musli111 teriiary students at the IPB. While Mustafa Bin Nuh 
\Vas in Indonesia, he played an in1portant role in linking Al-Baghdadi to the students. 
When he left to retun1 to Jordan , tvvo graduates fro1n the University of Medina, Abu Aula 
and Abdul Hannan replaced his role as translator for Al-Baghdadi. 30 This is another 
peculiar feature of the etnergence of HTI. Both these figures had a PVahhabi orientation 
but were personally attracted to the ideas of Al-Baghdadi. Nevetiheless, they never 
became 1ne1nbers of HTI and subsequently 1naintained their distance from HTI. It is 
· interesting to note that 1nost of the initial recruits of HTI have ceased to be 1ne1nbers of 
the gro up . Nonetheless, they remain active in other Islamic groups and parties. These 
1nen1bers include FathuI Hidayat (1ne1nber of the Crescent IVloon Patiy, Partai Bulan 
Bintang, PBB), Hassan Rifr1 'i Al-Faridy (Shari 'ah Advisor to Dornpet Dhuc~fa . 
Republika) , Adian Husaini (freelance Islainic Studies Lecturer and deputy chairman of 
::- s lntervi evv with Ismail Yusanto, 7 ~1.arch 2008 , Jakarta 
29 Interview with Abu Fuad, 16 August 2007, Bogor 
30 Interview with Mustafa Bin ( :- uh, 10 August 2009, Bogor. 
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the De1t1,,an Dak:wah ls·la1n Indonesia , DDII) and Saifuddin Asip .31 Only Saifuddin Asip 
(better known as Abu Fuad) rernained in HTI. 
Al-Baghdadi was extren1ely careful in propagating the ideas of HTT. During his classes, 
Al-Baghdadi did not tnention his affiliation to HT. This was also a fonn of strategy to 
recruit metnbers of other Islatnic organizations who otherwise tnight be put off to join 
the tnovement. It was not until 1983 that several key students (tnentioned above) were 
infonned about HT. These students becaine the nucleus of HTI. Interestingly., none of 
these students were inducted as full n1en1bers of the party. Besides the Pesantren Al-
Ghazali and Al-Ihya, Baghdadi also utilized the Al-Gh{fari 1nosque in Bogor as his base 
to spread the ideas of HT to other parts of the country. It was here that HTI began to 
grow rapidly. Utilizing the syste1n of halaqah which are conducted at the Pesantren Al-
Ghazali or in the hon1es of students, potential HTI 111en1bers began reading and analyzing 
several key texts of HT such as the s:vsterns of Islam and Political s:vstem qf lslcnn. 
Students were also taught Arabic so they could then read son1e of these 1naterials 
then1selves. The n1ain recruitn1ent strategy that HTI uti 1 ized vv"as that of personal 
networking. Through these networks, HTI began recruiting a second layer of potential 
111en1bers. By 1984, a second layer of leadership was already forn1ed . One of the key 
leaders of HTI that \Vas recruited during this tin1e \Vas IVIuharnrnad AI-Khaththath. AI-
I(haththath noted that there was a strong clin1ate of fear. Students often attended the 
halaqah sessions secretly. They \vould attend and leave the sessions individually and 
would often n1ake a point to not leave their shoes outside the location of the halaqah. 32 
Al-Baghdadi's students were also active in the Isla111ic student body la10,vn as the LDK 
at the IPB. Students of Al-Baghdadi also began don1inating the LDK in other universities 
such as Universitas Pa({j({jaran in Bandung and the Universitas A irlangga in Surabaya. 
31 ibid and Interview with Muhammad Al-Khaththath, ] 2 August 2009, Jakarta. Also see Adi an Husaini ' s personal website where he stated that he had studied with several scholars incl udin g AI -Baghdadi. 
Nonetheless , he did not explicitly state his affiliation to HTJ. See Adian Husaini , "Profile of Adian Husaini," 
http ://www.adianhusaini.com/ index. php?opti on=com_ content& view=arti cle& id= I 14& Item ic.!=60 . 
. Accessed on 20 September 2009. 
· 
:,
2 Interview with Muharnn1ad AI-Khaththath, l 0 July 2009. Jakarta . 
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Fornting and [!tilizing the Forunt Silaturaluni Len1baga Dakwah Kampus (FSLDK) 
By 1986~ leaders of various LDKs rnooted the idea of forn1jng an urnbrella group for the 
Muslin1 student body to expand its netvvork and support. The rationale for the fonY1ation 
of this body \Vas to coordinate the activities of Islan1ic student groups in son1e Indonesian 
carnpuses. 33 Elizabeth Collins afiin11ed that HTI n1en1bers initiated the fon11ation of this 
urnbrella organization.34 The rationale for such an organization was for HTI to expand its 
n1en1bership and enhance its recrujtrnent process. The different LDKs \Vere controlled by 
ditTerent lslan1ic student groups such as the JT and Jamaah Sholahuddin and HTI. 35 The 
LDKs held the first national conference of the Forurn for Coordination of Carnpus 
Predication, (Forunz Silaturah1ni Lenzbaga Dafo,vah Ka,npus, FSLDK). 36 This forun1 was 
held to coordinate and unify Islan1ic proselytizing activities at universities around 
lndonesia.37 In actuality the FSLDK becarne a platforn1 for HTI to expand its 
111en1bership to carnpuses in other parts of Indonesia. One of the rnajor coups that HTI 
achieved was \Vhen HTI rnernbers, secretly recruited Isn1ail Yusanto, then a leader of 
Jcnnaah Sholahuddin. Yusanto represented the MB inspired groups in the cornn1ittee of 
the FSLDK and secretly allov1ed the introduction of HT ideas within the FSLDK. 
The FSLDK proved to be an i1npo1iant and effective platfonn for HT's recruit1nent. 
Through this network, HTI expanded its activities to other carnpuses in Indonesia and 
began to have a presence in Yogyaka1ia, Makassar and Banjannasin. 38 The first recruits 
were forn1ally inducted into HTI around 1988, though the organization ren1ained 
·underground· and n1e1nbers \Vere wa111ed against openly discussing HT's existence in 
Indonesia. 39 At this tirne, HTI did not constitute an integral paii of HT's organizational 
JJ Interview with Ismail Yusanto, 10 March 2009, Jakarta. PKS leaders, Zulkieflimansyah and Fahri 
Hamzah who \Vere leaders of JT confirmed this. Interview with Zulkieflimansyah, Jakar1a, 20 October 
2007 and lnterview with Fahri Hamzah , Jakarta, 15 May 2011 . 
3
-f Elizabeth Fuller Collins, "Islam ls the Solution: Dakwah and Democracv in Indonesia.'' Kultur: 
- , 
lndonesian Journa!for Aius!iln Cultures 3, no. I (2003), p. 182. _ 
35 The .Jomoah Solahuddin was a group which shares simi lar views as JT and MB. 
36 Jamaah Tarbiyah was an Tndonesian Islamic group inspired by the teachings of MB leader, Hasan A1 -
Banna . Today the group has evolved into a political par1y, the PKS and continues to maintain ties with the 
larger ?\1D international network. Yon tv1achmudi , Jslamising Jndonesia: The Rise of the Jemaah Tarbiy ah 
and the Pro:)perous Justice Party (PKS), (Canberra: Australian r ationa] University Press, 2005), p. 119. 
37 Rifki Rosyad, 11 A Quest for True Islam: A Study of the Islamic Resurg~nce fovements among the 
Youth in Bandung, Indonesia" (Canberra: Australian Tational University, 1995), p. 56. 
38 Intel'view with 11uhammad AJ-Khaththath, 20 11arch 2009, Jakarta -
39 Salim, "The Rise ofHizbut Tahrir Indonesia", pp. 130-131. 
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structure. This tneans HTI activists were technically not 'official 1ne1nbers' of the larger 
HT yet. Son1e of the leaders of HTI such as Yusanto and Abdurrahn1an also n1oved to 
Bogor upon graduation to assist in ad1ninistering HTI. Being aware that the party was 
becorning n1ore susceptible to inte ll igence infiltration, HTI leaders decided to allow only 
the most senior leaders of HTI to rnaintain contact with A 1-Baghdadi. 
The HTI leaders also introduced the ideas of HT in an indirect fashion . Several texts, 
which incorporated the ideas of HT, were cotnpiled to introduce the ideas of HT. The 
n1ost in1portant of these texts was the Aiqfahin1 Da ·av1 1ah Islam (The Methodology of 
lslamic Propagation). 40 This text bo1Towed heavily fro1n the works of An-Nabhani 
especially the Systern of 1s1cnn , Political c~ystetn qf 1s1a,n and the Jvfethodolo(s1}1 c~f Hizbut 
Tahrir. Readers were first introduced to the problerns facing the J\1uslim world and told 
that the only way for its revival is through the restoration of the caliphate. Interestingly, 
in its list of bibliography, the text listed the works of MB 's leader Muhan1n1ad Qutb, 
Syed Hassan Ali Nadwi (_Nadwa-ul-lslarn in India) and Muhan1n1ad Natsir. 41 The 
introduction of these works is ain1ed at assuaging the fears of JT n1en1bers that the 
FSLDI( ,vas don1inated by HTI. Besides the activities of FSLDK, HTI continued to 
n1aintain its separate halaqah. The rationale for this separate halaqah is to ensure that 
HT 1ne111bers \Vere properly trained in its O\Vn ideology. Nevv recruits vvho were 
introduced to HT's ideas through the FSLDI< were also channeled to these halaqahs so 
that they understood the ideas of the party in an in depth n1anner. It can thus be 
concluded that the forn1ation of the FSLDI( was ain1ed at enhancing HTT's n1en1bership 
rather than \Vith a real desire for a neutral platfonn to be fonned for Islarnic groups of 
different orientations. 
By the third n1eeting of the FSLDK held at the [!niversitas Sebelas A1aret in Solo, HTI 
devised a plan to control the FSLDK. Yusanto, Adian Husaini and AI -Khaththath 
initiated a strategy to disserninate the ideas of HTI through the net\vork by proposing the 
developn1ent of a khittah (guiding principles) and 1nqfahin1 (ideology) for the FSLDK. 
The attendees vvarn1ly received the idea. This initial enthusiasn1 din1inished vvhen it 
becarne clear following the drafting of the khittah and rnafahin1 that n1ost of its texts 
40 See Lembaga Da ' awah Kampus, !11afahirn Da'awah Isla~n (n.l: n. p, 1988). 41 ibid, p. 140. These figures are seen to be ideologically close to JT. 
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borro,ved heavily fron1 the ideas of An-Nabhani and HTI. A booklet of these ideas was 
subsequently published by FSLDK. A section of this booklet bonowed heavily fron1 An-
Nabhani1s Political ,S),stem of Islan1 in ,vhich the authors drevv a con1parison of the 
context of da ·owah in Indonesia and that during the tin1e of Prophet Muhan1rnad.42 JT 
activists sa,v this as a betrayal. These activists vvere not a,vare of Yusanto1s svvitch to HTI 
and had appointed Yusanto as a JT representative in the drafting con1n1ittee. This was to 
n1ark the beginning of a long dra,vn conflict bet\veen HTI and JT that was to do111inate 
FSLDK. 
Leaving the FSLDK 
By 1990, in retaliation to the perceived underhanded rnethod used by HTI, Abdi Su1naiti 
(alias Abu Ridho) ,vas tasked to start a negative can1paign against HTI. The n1ost 
darnning revelation carne in the fonn of an article translated by Abu · Ridho, which 
highlighted t,velve beliefs within the HTI's religious orientation, which accused HTI of 
being a deviant group. Sarne of these beliefs highlighted include allowing the viewing of 
pornographic n1aterials and giving precedence to political activities above basic Islarnic 
rituals such as prayers. 43 A book \Vritten by Sheikh Abdullah Azzan1 (under the psuedo 
nan1e Dr Shadiq Arnin) which argued that HT is a deviant group was circu.lated an1ongst 
FS LDK circles.-+4 Subsequently, a translation of the book ,vas produced in Bahasa 
Indonesia. 45 This book described several practk.es of HT that were dee1ned as 
contravening lslarnic teachings. These included the alleged practice of HT allo\ving 
rn en1 bers its n1e1nbers to view pornography. 46 This conflk.t bet\veen the t\VO groups was 
to continue for several years before HTI decided to leave FSLDK in 1994. 
This book ,vas highl y critical of several Isla1nic 1nove1nents including HT and Tablighi , 
another 1nove1nent that vvas becorning popular amongst Indonesian students during this 
period. The conflict betvveen HTI and JT becaine so bad that HTI-JT conflicts do1ninated 
.1 ~ 
·- Lembaga Dakwah Karn pus, Jvlqfahinz Dalnvah Jslanz (Bandung: LDI<; , 1991 ), pp . 113-123. 
43 Initiall y only the chapter on HT \Vas translated. Subsequently, the whole book was translated . See 
\VAJv11 An-Nadwah AI -Alamiyah Iii Syabail Islami , Gerakan Keagamaan don Pemikiran: Akar Jde ologi 
clan Pen.vebara1-m.ht (Jakarta: Al Isiahi , 1993) 
.1.1 Shadiq Amin, Ad-Da ·awah Al-lslamiyvah Faridhah Syar "i_yyah wa Dharurah Basya6y_vah (Amman: n. 
p, 1975) . 
.is Shadiq Arn in , ivfencari Fornzat Gerakan lslan1 Ideal, (Jakarta: AJ I'thisom, 2005) . 
.1
6 ibid . p. 110. 
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tnost Indonesian cmnpuses. In betvveen 199 l and l 993, HTT continued to do1ninate the 
network of FSLDK enabling the party to expand its network to all the n1ajor can1puses in 
Indonesia. This control vvas further consolidated in 1993 vvhen the constitution of HT 
was adopted as the constitution of FSLDK. This decision was to prove detritnental for 
HTI in the long run. 
HTI leaders attetnpted to purge 1ne1nbers of JT fron1 the FSLDK at the t 11 Conference of 
the FSLDK in J\1akassar, South Sulevvesi. Besides ensuring that all the key leadership 
positions were filled by HTI n1en1bers, HTI also openly adopted A1qfahinz Hizbut Tahrir 
as a standard text to be read by activists of LDK. 47 There was a backlash fro1n JT 
activists due to this political n1aneuvering. In 1994, JT activists atten1pted to wrest 
control of FS.LDK frotn HTI. Al-Baghdadi decided at this point that HTJ should leave 
FSLDK. as the conflict between the two groups was beginning to get out of hand. Many 
HTI activists opposed this decision leading to son1e of its early leaders such as Fathul 
Hidayat and Adian Husaini to leave the organization. Even today, n1any HTI leaders feel 
that the decision to leave FSLDl( was a n1istake as HT1 was growing significantl y due to 
the FSLDl( network.48 Another developrnent that occurred during this tin1e is the 
appointn1ent of Abu Fuad as the ofiicial leader of HTI. It n1ust be noted that this was part 
of the require1nent that HT placed on all its chapters. Nevertheless, real poYver rernained 
in the hands of Al-Baghdadi. 
Setting l J p an HQfficial Branch" 
As discussed earlier, HTI was not ofiicially linked to the leadership of HT in the Middle 
East. Inevitably, the party ' s decisions were 111ade solely by Al-Baghdadi. Nevertheless~ 
Al-Baghdadi n1aintained contacts with HT leaders in Australia. In 1992, one of these 
leaders Isn1ail Al-Wahvvah atTanged for HTI to con1e directly under the contro l of the 
larger HT. Tn 1993, the A rnir of HT, Zallourn sent his envoy, Abu Zahra to Indonesia to 
officially place HTI under the control of HT (this process is referred to as tan::im). The 
t:1ct that HTI existed for rnore than a decade \Vithout the supervision of the larger HT 
47 Interview with Muhammad Al-Khaththath, 20 March 2009, Jakarta. Also see j\!fachrnudi , lslarnish1g Indonesia, p. 117 
· 48 Interviews wirth several HTI leaders such as Ismail Yusanto, Hadifz Abclurrahman and Rahmat Kurnia. 
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illustrates the lack of interest of the pa1iy ' s leadership under Zalloun1 tovvards the 
developn1ent of the party in Indonesia. While Al-Baghdadi had n1ade several atte1npts to 
establish this otTicial relationship, the party's central leadership ,vas reluctant to assist 
hin1. It \Vas only through the intervention of Al -Wah,vah~. one the party's leaders in 
Australia did the patiy agree to assist Indonesia. Yet, the assistance rendered to HTI 
pro~'ed to be lirnited and it ,vas not until a ne,v leadership ,vas established in 2003 that 
the party becarne 1nore interested in its chapter in Indonesia. 
Following its departure fron1 the FSLDK, HTI continued to focus its activities within 
Indonesian universities. Nevertheless, HTI leaders ,vere a,vare of the need for new 
platforn1s to be created outside the universities. By this ti111e, n1any of the r11ore senior 
activists had graduated and felt that the party should start recruiting young professionals 
into the party. One of the first platfonns that HTI leaders started was the Kelo1npok Studi 
lslan1 Standard Chartered (Standard Chartered lslan1ic Study Circle, KSICC). The 
KSICC vvas an Islarnic study circle held at the Wisr11a Standard Chartered (Standard 
Chartered Building) in Jakaria. One of the r11e1nbers of HTI worked at the Standard 
Chartered bank and through this n1en1ber, HTI was allowed to organize talks, study 
circles and ser11inars at the Standard Chartered building. The KSICC also started retreat 
prograins (dauroh) for key paiiicipants, held about once a 1nonth at the fainous 
Indonesian hill station in Puncak.49 The KS ICC · allo,ved HTI to expose their ideas to 
participants frotn a dit1erent background, nainely n1ature 1nid-career professionals. HTI 
also began organizing holiday training progran1s for youths known as "Dirasah lsla,n 
untuk Anak 1vfuda" (lslainic Develop1nent for Youths).50 
Perhaps the rnost in1portant contribution of the KSJCC ,vas the production of the Buletin 
Al-lrslam (Al-!S'larn Buletin) . Thi s publication was first produced in 1994 and distributed 
at tnosques in Jakarta. The Al-lslarn bulletin exposed the Musli1n co1n1nunity in Jakatia 
to the ideas of HTI. Building on this exposure, HTI began organizing sessions kno,vn as 
Tenn, Pembaca Al-1s!anz (Al-Jslcun Gathering Sessions) . These sessions were used to 
expose the Al-lsla,n audience to the KSICC and HTI. Subsequently, it ,vas used as a 
-f l) Interview with Hafidz AbduITahman , Forn1er Chaimian of HTI, 21 tfarch 2008 , Bogor. 
50 
' ·Dirasah lslam L;ntuk Anak Muda", Al ls/am, no. 185 (7-11 July 1997). .... 
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recruiting 1nechanis1n for HTI. 51 An article written by Muhan1mad al -Khaththath 
criticizing the Central Bank of Indonesia led to HTI corning under pressure fron1 the 
authorities to cease their activities at the Standard Chartered building. 52 HTI activists 
were forced to shift their strategy. 
They began utilizing the Badan VVakaf As-Sala,n (The As-Salam Wakaf Association .. 
BWAS) for their activities. The BWAS was first fonned in 1995 to respond to the 
increasing detnands from tnosques in Jakarta for HTI speakers to deliver the Friday 
sern1ons and conduct Islan1ic religious classes. BWAS acted as an official coordinating 
body that allocated speakers for these sennons and classes. 53 The body was also used to 
n1anage funds gathered during the study sessions as well as donations contributed to HTI. 
In reality, BWAS was formed to give the pmiy a setnblance of an Islan1ic organization 
that has a religious rather than a political objective. As part of revan1ping its in1age, the 
Al-Islam bulletin was renan1ed As-Salan1 bulletin. 54 Upon the collapse of the Suharto 
regin1e in 1998, BWAS organized an in1portant sen1inar, N asionalisme dan Kebangkitan 
[hnat (Nationalisn1 and the revival of [lrnrnah). This sen1inar, which was organized at a 
larger scale, was ain1ed at creating awareness about the need for Muslin1s to reject 
nationalisn1 as a political ideology. 
This period during HT1's history is reflective of the transitioii fron1 an underground 
clandestine 1nove1nent to a legal organization. By the late l 990s, the Suharto regirne \Vas 
already n1ore lax in its policies towards Islan1ic groups due to its realization of the 
grovving"draw of Islmn and the need to appeal to this group. He did this by supporting the 
forn1ation of the Ikatan Cendiakawan 1vfuslin1 Indonesia (Indonesian Association of 
Muslirn Professionals, ICMI) and drawing on the organization to give his regi1ne and 
Islan1ic outlook. 55 Reacting to the Suharto regiine's easing of political control and usage 
of Islarnic groups, the party began to posit itself as a religiou s organization that focused 
its activities on religious education and developrnent. The party also used thi s period to 
consolidate internally while recruiting nevi n1ernbers in a rnore open rnanner. Yet, the 
51 Salim, " TI1e Rise of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia' ', p. 124-. 52 Interview with Muhammad al -Khaththath , 18 March 2008, Jakaiia. 53 Interview with Rahrnat Kumia, 1 October 2009, Jaka1ia. 54 Salim, "TI1e Rise ofHizbut Tahrir Indonesia" , p. 125 . 55 Hefner, Civil !slam, pp. 128-143. 
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party was still \Vary of the political environrnent and retained a high level of secrecy 
· within the party. The party started operating openly, only after the collapse of the regin1e 
and the holding of the 1999 general elections that n1arked the beginning of dernocracy in 
Indonesia. A detailed discussion of the inten1al dynan1ics within the party will be 
discussed 111 Chapter 4. 
HTT in the Post New Order Political EnvironmerH 
The collapse of the Suharto regirne in 1998 led to a period of den1ocratization and easing 
of political control. Yet, it took about t1vvo years for HTI to react to this change. HTI 
leaders were unsure about how best to respond to this new dynmnics. Baghdadi differed 
1vvith other HTI leaders about fon11ally declaring the existence of HTI. His experience in 
the Middle East rnade hin1 wary of the p·ossibility that other elen1ents within the Nev, 
Order regin1e n1ight contest for pov1er and install a regirne \Vhich is equally repressive . 
Many activists vie\ved this as a huge tactical rnistake. They felt that the organization 
could have capitalized on the ne\v political environrnent to assert their influence in the 
public realrn. It seerns that only after the 1999 elections were held that Al-Baghdadi felt 
that the party was ready to rnove to the second stage of their struggle, the stage of 
interacting vvith the public.56 The inten1al discussions, which took place ,vithin HTI, will 
be discussed in Chapter 4. Muharnrnad Al-Khaththath took over the party~s leadership 
whereas Abu Fuad joined the advisory council of HTI, which also included Al-Baghdadi. 
There were rni sgivings that surfaced after this new leadership selection. Several n1en1bers 
of HTI vvho were not selected decided to leave the party. Although the key reason for 
then1 leaving HTI is over the leadership selection, so1ne of the leaders of the breakavvay 
faction got in touch vvith the Al-Jvfuhajh·oun group led by Omar Bakri and named their 
faction Al-1\lfuhajirun Indonesia. 57 Another faction vvithin this group broke away to fonn 
a ne\V group. Hizbul Khilc?fcih .58 
~
6 The internal debates within the movement will be discussed in Chapter 4. 
::, ? Details about this group can be found on http ://almuhajirun.net. It seems to have a presence only online 
and do not conduct any act iv ities. 
58 ibid. 
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HTI officially launched itself as a fonnal organization m June 2000. 59 As pa1i of this 
step, HTI re-launched the Al-lsla,n Bulletin in July 2000. For the first tin1e in its history 
HTI actually used the name .~yabab Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (The Brotherhood of Hjzbut 
Tahrir) as the publishers of the bulletin. The bulletin was also distributed at sorne 
mosques in Jakarta, Bogor, Bandung, Malang and Surabaya. As high lighted in Chapter 1, 
the party organized the first international Khilc?fah conference in August 2000 to 
officially propel the organization into the pub lic dornain. The conference \,vhich was held 
at the Senayan Tennis Stadiu1n drew an estin1ated two to three thousand people. 60 The 
conference received extensive coverage fi:0111 the 1nedia.61 Speakers featured at the event 
included Sheikh Is1nail al-Wahwah (Hizbut Tahrir Australia) , Dr Sharifuddin Md Zain 
(Hizbut Tahrir Malaysia) and Muhan1n1ad al-I(haththath. Men1bers of HT fron1 
Australia, Malaysia, Jordan and Britain attended this event. This event was ain1ed at 
introducing HTI and its ideas to the Indonesian public. Likewise, the event w·as intended 
to give confidence to younger n1en1bers of the group in an atten1pt to show that the party 
had a strong presence. The event drew ditierent reactions fron1 the Musli1n populace in 
Indonesia. While son1e sectors of society were critical of its ideology and ain1s, others 
were supportive of its 'ideas.62 After this event, HTI began organizing activities openly 
and started can1paigning fervently for the in1plen1entation of 5'hari 'ah laws and the 
revival of the caliphate. 
Engaging the Muslbn [lnunah in Indonesia 
In the n1onths following the conference, HTT activists began en1barking on progran11nes 
to increase its public presence. They also began to actively engage in street 
dernonstrations and other civil disobedience activities . These de1nonstrations focused on 
issues ranging fro111 fuel hikes to Israeli aggression against Palestinians.63 Yusanto~ the 
ofiicial spokesn1an for HTI also began engaging the n1edia and issued press staternents 
59Interview with Hafidz Abdurrahman, 21 March 2008, Bogor. 
~
0 Interview with Dr Sharifuddin Md Zain, Hizbut Tahrir Malaysia leader, 2 August 2006, Malacca. 
°,:For instance, see Mahladi, " Jalan Panjang Menuju Khilafah Islamiyah" Republika, 2 June 2000. 
e,_ Herry l\1ohammad and Kholis Bahtiar Bakri , ''Khilafah Is]amiyah: Ibarat Pelari l\1araton,"p . 90-91; 
Nasrullah Ali Fauzi , "Belum Apa-Apa Suclah Anticlen10krasi," p. 21 and Decli Rael , "Ahmad Muflih 
?,aefucldin: Para Kiyai Juga Harus Be1ianggung Jawab'' Republika, 11 June 2000. 0
·' See "Moslem Organization Lash at Israeli Arrogance", Asia Pulse 11 October 2002 and " Rallies Continue Against Utility Price Hikes '' Th(;.' Jakarta Post, 12 January 2003 . 
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on a range of different issues on a \Neeldy basis.64 HT activists toured the areas around 
Jakarta, Surabaya, Bogor, Bandung and Tangerang to dissen1inate their ideas. 65 HT also 
began building relationships vvith rnajor political figures and iVIus[in1 organizations. This 
\Vas done through visits to these organizations vvhere HTI leaders· vvotild present their 
ideas. Several leaders of HTI adn1it that this engagen1ent process is al~o ain1ed at 
convincing these figures and organizations about the need to revive the caliphate. 
HTI leaders also began to travel to different parts of Indonesia to forn1 chapters of the 
party at the provincial level. The party actively targeted Muslirns fron1 other parts of 
Indonesia vvho \Vere \VOrking or studying in Jakarta for recruitn1ent. This vvas seen as the 
n1ost e±Tective \Vay for chapters to develop in the provincial areas. Through these 
strategies, HTI \Nas able to fon11 chapters 111 virtually all thirty-three Indonesian 
provinces. The Al- vVa 'ie journal which was first published in June 2000 and distributed 
as part of the conference package is another rnediurn utilized by HTI n1e1nbers to engage 
the Indonesian Muslin1 public. HTI ' s political strategy during this period would prove 
extrernely in1portant in the developrnent of the party. The decision to focus on building 
relationships \Vith key public figures , enhancing its n1er11bership an1ongst youth and 
\von1en and the dissen1ination of political literatures were e±Tective in strengthening the 
political position of the paiiy. 
Departure of A/-Baghdadifrom HTI 
In 2002 , _HTI suffered a tnaJor set back when Al-Baghdadi decided to leave the 
organization. As tnentioned earlier, several leaders of HT had 1net in Gennany and 
Australia to discuss the refonnation of HT. These HT ;eaders caine to a decision to fonn 
a breakavvay faction of HT. Al-Baghdadi immediately infonned his key confidantes of 
this decision. Muhatnmad Al-Khaththath noted that only five 1ne1nbers of the HT 
leadership knew of this decision. The five rnetnbers -w~re Al- Khatbthath , Isn,aiI 
Yusanto~ Ali Murtopo, Rahn1at Ku111ia and Abu Fuad. Al=Khaththath had advised Al= 
Baghdadi not to infonn the rest of the HTI' 1ne1nbers about this decision fearing that this ...., 
64 For instance, see Ismail Yusanto , "Pemyataan Hizbut Tahrir t -1engenai Kenaikan BB11" HTI Press 
Srmement, 1 o. 1 (14 January 2002) . 
t> S Jakarta Post, 3 June 2003. 
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could lead to confusions and divisions within the party. 66 Upon hearing the decision to 
fon11 this separate organization, the leadership of HT in the ·Middle East had sent Abu 
Zohra to look into the 1natter and persuade Al-Baghdadi to stay as a n1e1nber of HT. A 1-
Baghdadi was adainant about his decision. Abu Zohra also _1net other leaders of HTI 
including AI-Khaththath, Yusanto arid Kun1ia. These leaders decided to re1nain with HT 
and abandoned Al-Baghdadi. AI-Khaththath believed that this was best for the party. 
Apparently, an atten1pt was made in late 2002 to invite Al-Baghdadi to rejoin HT. 
Zallou1n had convinced Al-Wahwah in Australia to return to the pmiy fold. Al-
Wahwah 's wife ren1ained a n1en1ber of HT and convinced her husband to return to the 
party ' s fold. Zalloun1 had then sent Al-Wahwah to 1neet AI-Baghdadi in Bogor to 
convince the latter to rejoin HT. AI-Baghdadi refused to join the party and even rebuked 
AI-Wahwah for doing so. 67 
The departure of Al-Baghdadi fi:0111 HTI was not entirely surprising. Yusanto noted that 
there were problen1s between Baghdadi and Zalloun1 over issu~s relating to HTI political 
strategies. Baghdadi had atten1pted to convince others within the party to leave as \Ve! 1 
but did not succeed in his atten1pt to do so as 1nen1bers of HTI decided to ren1ain as part 
of the global HT network. 68 This decision was rnade as n1any of then1 felt that Baghdacli 
did not guide the party in line \Vith the global vision of HT. Hafidz Abdurrahrnan 
postulated the vie\\1 that Baghdadi did not truly understanc( the n1ethodology and 
teachings of HT. It was only after his departure and visits fron1 HT leaders fro1n the 
Middle East that HTI n1en1bers fully understood HT's vision, n1ission and 
inethodology. 69 In describing his departure fro1n HT and HTL Al-Baghdadi \Vas 
particularly bitter about the t1ct that his students \Vho1n he had kno\vn for years and had 
considered like his O\Vn children had been disrespectful to\vards hin1. AI-Baghdadi 
described an incident in \vhich he savv Abu Fuad after Eid-ul-Fitir prayers in 2008. He 
said that Abu Fuad sin1ply said the salaan1 (Muslin1 greeting) to hin1 but refused to stop 
to talk to hiin. He said that even on a joyous day like the Eid, 111e1nbers had refused to 
66 Interview with Muhammad Al -Khaththath , 20 March 2009 , Jakarta. 67 · 1, · j 
. . !Oil. 
68 Up till 1998, AI-Baghclacli rernainecl a guide to HTl rnembers. In th e introduction to hi s book lslon1 ldeologi, Ismail Yusanto thanked Al-Baghdadi for editing th e book . See lsmail Y usanto, /slan1 ldeologi · Rt~f?eksi Cendiakawan J\1uda (Jakarta : Al-Izzah , 1998 ), p. x'i. 
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bury the hatchet. 70 Al-Baghdadi is highly critical of this stance of HT and noted that 
Islan1 did not teach Muslin1s to behave in this fashion. Others who left the 111oven1ent 
such tvlursalin and Abu Saad also expressed their bitterness tovvards the party.
71 This 
episode vvas also reflective of the resilience of the party. The process of indoctrination 
that n1ernbers go through plug then1 directly to the party ' s ideology and often focused on 
the need for loyalty tovvards the An1ir of the party. 1'-Jaturally, party n1en1bers continue to 
be loyal to the party even ,vhen their recruiter or the leaders of a particular chapter quit 
the paiiy. In spite of rhetorics advocated by HT leaders that the party placed significant 
in1portance to the need for unity arnongst Muslin1s, ex-n1er11bers are viewed as traitors 
and are rnarginalized by patiy rnernbers. 72 This is a reflection of the boundaries created 
by the party against those ,vho are outside the par1y, a then1e that ,vill be discussed in 
Chapter 7. 
Consolidating its Position in Indonesia 
The period bet,veen 2002 and 2009 sa,v HTI consolidating its position and increasing 
suppor1 fcir the party. The party began to capture rnore rnedia attention through major 
dernonstrations that it held against the lraq and Afghan wars. 73 The -par1y also began 
organizing se1ninars, lectures and public talks to discuss both inte111ational and domestic 
issues. The pariy also began intensifying its efforts to build strong ties and relationships 
,vith political figures in Indonesia. For instance the pa1iy 1net the then Indonesian Vice-
President to discuss details of an Anti-Terrorisn1 law, which was about to be 
prornulgated. 74 In addition '. prior to the 2004 Indonesian general elections, HTI leaders 
also n1et and discussed the implementation of Islainjc laws in Indonesia with candidates 
from Islamic parties. This was an attetnpt to influence these candidates to seriously 
endeavor to irnplen1ent these la,vs. 75 HTrs influence ainongst Musli1n religious circles 
was increasing ,vhen t,vo of the HTI leaders, Is1nail Yusanto and Muhan11nad Al-
Khaththath ,vere appointed to sit on the board of the MUI. _By 2003 , the HT leadership 
70 Interview with Abdul Rahman Al-Baghdadi , l 0 l\1arch 2010, Bogor 
71 Interview with fv1ursalin , 14 Ivfay 201 L Jakarta and Abu Saad, 13 April 201 L Jakarta. 
·
2 Interview ,vith tv1aajid 1 ·awaz, 29 October 2007, London . 
n See for instance. " Islamic Count1ies Urged to Sever Diplomatic Relations with US, Antara News 
A £:enn >, 26 lVlarch 2003. 
L -· •· 
74 
'•Bill on Terrorism Should 1 ot Create Anxiety'~ Antara News Agency, 4 l\1arch 2003 . 
75 
"Hizbut Tahrir Kunjungi Sejumlah Calet' Repu.blika~ 11 February 2004. 
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was also beginning to see Indonesia as an i1npo1iant chapter of the party. The growth in 
its rnernbership, growing religio-political influence and the relatively free political space 
Indonesia cotnpared to other parts of the Muslitn world convinced the new HT leadership 
that its Indonesian chapter tnust be supported in a tnore concrete fashion especially in 
allocating funds to HTI. 76 As a result of this gro\vth in interest, HTI vvas also able to stati 
organizing events at a larger scale. 
One of HTI' s vital strategies for consolidating its position was to push for the fonnation 
of an un1brella organization 1nade up of all the n1ajor Muslin1 organizations. HTI felt that 
due to the long history of many Mus litn organizations in the country. it is difficult for a 
relatively newer organization such as HTI to · make its n1ark or to call for these 
organizations to adopt HTI's plans. Instead, there is a need for son1e neutral platfonn to 
be forn1ed that would allow HTI to push its agenda forward in a n1ore acceptable n1anner 
to these organizations. In working towards this goal, HTI leaders began involving 
then1selves in the processes of the KongresSolidarity Urnat lslarn Indonesia (Indonesian 
Muslin1 Solidarity Congress, I(SUII). Muhan1n1ad Al-I(haththath stepped down fron1 the 
chairn1anship of HTI and was succeeded by Hafidz Abdurrahn1an in March 2005 to 
allow the forn1erto focus on strengthening HTI's position in the congress. This congress 
,vas 111ooted by the MUI and had 111et several tirnes to discuss issues affecting Muslin1s in 
Indonesia. The first such congress ,vas held in 2001. The fourth congress held fron1 19th 
to the 21 st of April 2005 at the Sa.hid Jaya Hotel becan1e one of HTI ' s crucial 
achieven1ents. 77 The congress was seen to be significant enough that both the President 
and Vice-President of Indonesia attended the event. HTT played an in1po11ant role at the 
congress influencing 111any of the congress ' proceedings. 78 One of the proposals rnade by 
HTI at the congress ,vas the signing of the "Jakarta Declaration". 79 The declaration called 
for the in1plen1entation of Islan1ic lavvs in Indonesia and urged the governrnent to do 
1nore to assist in en1ancipating Palestine. Although the congress ' resolutions itself 1night 
not be in1portant, given that the congress _organizers have little real povv~r to ensure the 
in1plen1entation of the resolutions, the decision to fonn an urnbrella organization of 
76 Interview with Muhammad AI -Khaththath, 10 March 2009, Jaka1i.a. 77 Interview with Mursalin, Committee ~1ember of FUT and HTl 25 NJarch 2008, Jakatia . 78 The influence of HTI was even acknowledged by the congress organizers . For details of HTJ' s involvement in the congress, see Tim Penyusun Buku KUIIIV, Kongres Umat Islam Indonesia JV: Proses ~~;1~ J?inarnika Pennusyawaratan (Jakarta: Badan Pekerja Kongres Umat Islam Indonesia IV, 2005), p. 3. 161d, p.5 . 
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Islarnic groups by son1e conference participants kno,vn as the Fortan [ln11nat Islcvn ,vas 
particularly significant. FUI was a significant effort on t~1e part of HTI to begin 
influencing other . Islan1ic groups to suppo1i its cause. Officially, there are thirty-one 
organizations that are part of the FUI structure. FlJI also runs a fortnightly ne\vspaper, 
the Suara lslan1 (Voice of Islarn). In tanden1 vvith the developn1ent in FlJI , HT chapters 
at the provincial level \Vere atternpting to develop chapters of the FUI at the provinces. In 
several cities such as Jviakassar and Surabaya, local chapters of FUI \Vere already fon11ed. 
GEN1A \Vas also instructed to follovv · this strategy vvhen the student _ group began 
engaging other student groups by initiating the forn1ation of For-urn lv[ahasisi,,va lslcun · 
(The Muslin1 l Jndergraduate Forun1) .in 2007. This forun1 consisted of the n1ain Islan1ic 
undergraduate organizations such as KAMMI and HMI. The ain1 of this forurn was to 
unite the Muslirn undergraduates to \VOrk for the in1plen1entation of Islmnic la\v in 
Indonesia. Privately, GE~1A leaders adrnitted that the fonnn was a platfonn for thern to 
introduce their ideas to the other student activists, ,vhon1 they failed to convince in 
joining the HTI. This \Vas of course a strategy to co-opt n1en1bers of other Islarnic groups 
secretly, a strategy that HTI has engaged during different periods in its history. 
The International Khilafah Conference 2007: Creating a Hub for the Hizbzvyin 
In August 2007 , HTI organized the largest gathering that HT has seen since its inception 
in 1953 . The participants range fro1n 1nen1bers of HTI to rhetnbers of other Isla1nic 
groups such as the FPI, MMI, Muharnn1adiyah, MUI and NU. Men1bers of HT frorn 
Europe and Asia were also present. A1nongst thetn the largest nu1nbers cmne fro1n 
Britain , Denn1ark '. Gennany and Australia. Others caine fron1 India, Lebanon, Palestine, 
~1alaysia and even Mozan1bique. The conference \,Vas organized as part of a series of 
Khilqfah conferences organized by HT in over t\,velve countries including Palestine, 
India, Malaysia, Den1nark, Britain, Sudan, Ukraine, Kuwait, Ye1nen, Pakistan and 
Netherlands. 80 These conferences vvere coordinated and organized concutTently in the 
Islan1ic 111011th of Rajab (July and August) to con1111en1orate the fall of the Otton1an 
caliphate. It was announced that the Indonesian conference would be a platfo1111 to unite 
l\!lu slin1s fron1 all around the \Norld towards the vision of reviving the caliphate. HTI 
8
° For detail s of these conferen ces, see Gl obal Call for the KJ1ilafah , An- ahda Publications, Sydney, 
Au stralia. 
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received financial suppoti from the leadership of -HT for the event. Several key leaders of 
·HT also attended the event to express their support for HTI. 
For HTI, the Jakarta conference was an attetnpt for HT to showcase their strength to the 
outside world. Most i1nportantly, HTI wanted to stress to the \Vorld that the fonnation of 
the caliphate would end the supposed dotnination of Westen1 powers in the N[uslitn 
world. 81 This was clearly reflected in the progratntne of the caliphate. Beyond rhetorical 
speeches given by HT leaders about the need for a caliphate to be re-established , son1e 
parts of the progran1 showcased a theatrical perforn1ance by HTI activists on how the 
caliphate vvould prevail against the Western powers described in Chapter 1. The event 
brought sudden international lin1elight to the organization. Participants pledged their 
support for the revival of the caliphate and the i1nple1nentation of Islatnic laws 1n 
Indonesia. The success of the conference is a reflection of HTI' s transforn1ation to 
becon1ing one of the influential Islarnist organization in Indonesia. The conference also 
propelled HTI to an in1portant position within the larger HT organization. 
For HTI itsel( the event was 'proof' to its n1en1bers that HTI was grovving in strength 
and was a truly transnational 1noven1ent. At a follow-up n1eeting held at the Sahid Jaya 
Hotel, Jakarta on the 14th of August, HT 111e1nbers frorn Australia, Denrnark and Britain 
spoke about their experiences in HT as well as about the activities of HT in their 
respective countries. One of those \Nho spoke \Nas an Australian lady \Nho had converted 
to Islan1 and is now a n1en1ber of HT. Yusanto had asked her to speak to show that J-IT 
. 
. 
has appea I even to nevv converts to Jslan1. 82 In another event hosted by the Mi i"1 ister of 
Youth and Sports, Adyaksa Dault, speakers fro111 the conference spoke to Indonesian 
students about the in1portance of the caliphate in ending the don1ination of the Western 
colonial povvers. 83 For HTI, the event benefited the organization in several \Nays. 
Yusanto propounded the view that on two fronts the conference assisted I-ITT 
significantly. Within HTI, n1e1nbers becarne rnore confident of the pariy ' s ability to 
galavanize suppo1i for its cause. Besides, HTI instantaneousl y becan1e one of the n1ore 
prorninent Isla1n ist group in Indonesia. 
8 1 Conversation with Abu Isnrnel , HT mernber from India at the Khilafah Conference, 10 July 2007 , Jakarta. Abu Ismael was originally from UK and had shifted to India to start a chapter of HT 82 Personal Observation of Author at the event in Sahid Jay·a Hotel , 19 October 2007 83 Personal Observation of Author at the event in the Ministry of Youth and Sports, 20 October 2007. 
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Recent Developn1ents In HTI 
Since early 2008, HTI and FlJI have focused on the issue of banning Ahn1adiyahs in 
Indonesia. The Ahrnadiyah is an Islarnic sect that clai1ns that Ghulan1 Ahn1ad QadianL 
an Indian fVluslin1 scholar \Vas the last Prophet after Prophet IVluhan1n1ad contravening 
the 111ainstrearn Muslirn vievvs that Prophet Muharnn1ad is the last Prophet of God. 84 As 
part of their cmnpaign, the groups sent a n1e1norandu1n to the Indonesian President 
calling for the banning of Ahn1adiyah. In retaliation to the actions of the radical groups, 
an alliance of 111oderate Muslin1 intellectuals and ieaders forn1ed the National Alliance 
for Freedorn of Religion and Belief (Aliansi Kebangsaan TJntuk Kebebasan Beragania 
darz Berke_vakirzan, AKKBB) to defend the rights of Ahrnadiyahs to practice their beliefs. 
On 1 June 2008 , the AKKBB -organized a rally pron1oting the fi:·eedon1 of religion. lt was 
an atten1pt to reject hard-line views. 85 Knowing that HTl was organizing a den1onstration 
near Monas, the AKKBB was asked to rnove their de111onstration to a traffic circle not far 
fro1n Monas. While the AKKBB agreed to do so, they continued gathering in Monas 
prior to the actual den1onstrations. Men1bers of a n1ilitia group called the Ko,nando 
Lashkar lslani (Islarnic Fighters Conunando) led by Munarn1an a fonner hun1an rights 
lawyer and H T\1 Mursalin a leader of HTI together with 1ne1nbers of the FPI had 
gathered to 'protect" the HTI dernonstrators . 86 Little is known about how the · assault 
started. FUI activists claimed that a tnan ca.ITying a revolver had proceeded towards the 
· HTl dernonstrators resulting in FP l and KLl n1ernbers attacking the AKKBB activists. 
While the police ad1nitted that AKKBB de1nonstrators had no right to gather in Monas, 
they noted that the provocateurs ,vere FPI and KLI. 87 After· investigations \Vere catTied 
out, the police arrested 1ne1nbers of FPI and KLI including Habib Rizieq Shihab and 
J\1unannan (who initially escaped and went into hiding but subsequently turned hi1nself 
over) . 
84
_ Another branch of the Ahmadiyah known as the Lahori Ahmadiyah claimed that Ghulam Ahmad was a 
Messiah rather than a Prophet. A detailed study of the A11rnadiyah in Indonesia is by Iskandar Zurkarnain . 
See lskandar Zurkanrnin, Gerakan Ahmadiyah di Indonesia (Yogyakarta: LKIS, 2005). 
35 Group, "Indonesia: Implications of the Ahmadiyah Becree." , p. 7. 
86 Interview with Mursalin, 14 I\1ay 2011, Jakarta, and Interview with Munarn1an, 8 I\1arch 2010, Jakarta. 
87 
"Hard-liners Ambush Monas Rally" Jakarta Post, 2 June 2008. 
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For the HTI leadership, the incident put HTI in an extre1nely bad li ght. vVhile HTT had 
always been viewed as a peaceful Islan1ic group, the incident led to questions about its 
actual position towards violence. This developtnent was vie\ved with such concern that 
an inten1al investigation was caffied out by the leadership of HTI. The leadership of HTT 
was of the view that Al-K11aththath as the representative of HTI in FlJI had failed to 
. · 88 • ensure that such acts of v1olence were ave1ied. · HTI leaders also clauned that the attacks 
on the AKKBB den1onstrators were pre-planned and that Al-K.haththath had approved of 
this attack. In his defence, Al-Khaththath noted that he \,vas unaware of any such plan 
n1aintaining that he was not even present during the incident. He continued to n1aintain 
that the AKK.BB was responsible for the initial attacks. This disagreetnent was brought 
to the attention of the HT central leadership. The Arnir of HT sent an envoy, Abu 
Mahtnud to look into this tnatter. This had occurred in August 2008 . Upon speaking to 
different parties involved in the issue, Abu Mahn1ud had advised Al-1(haththath to quit 
FUI. Abu Mahn1ud argued that there are Islan1ic groups in FUI such as the FPT that 
believed in vio lence, which is against HT ' s n1ethodology. Morever, HTI 's involven1ent 
in F1JI n1ay result in the dilution of its ideology given that there are bound to be 
con1pron1ises that are n1ade in such an un1brella organization. AI-I(haththath refused to 
abide by the Amir's instruction leading to his sacking fron1 HTI. The uncon1pron1ising 
stance taken by HT is not surprising given its avowedly non-violent stance and that its 
association in any violent action could in1pact the in1age of the party negatively. 
Al-I(haththath felt that the reason for HTI 's growth is due to FlJI and while FUI is an 
un1brella organization, its is obvious to the Indonesian Muslin1 public that FUI i·s a front 
for HTI given that its Secretary-General is fron1 HTI. Al-Khaththath viewed HTI's 
leaving of FlJI to be a hypocritical n1ove given that I-ITI leaders n1ooted the forn1ation of 
FlJI . AI -Khaththath believed that the real reason for his sacking \Vas due to Isrnai l 
Yusanto. He noted that Yusanto \Nas getting increasingl y edgy about AI -Khaththath 
receivi ng rnore press coverage than hin1. Yusanto had even told AI-Khaththath that all 
press staten1ents should go through the office of the spokesrnan. He ccu11e to the 
conclusion that Yusanto had convinced the HT leadership to sack hirn because of 
jealousy. This episode reflects the continuous proble111 that the party has had to encounter 
88 Interview with Hafidz Abclurrahrnan, 21 March 2008, Bogor. 
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which is the authoritarian style of leadership that is practiced in the party. Al-Khaththath 
also felt that the episode confirn1ed that the HT leadership is unaware · of the local 
political dynan1ics and Indonesia. While the party \Vas beginning to adopt a 1nore open 
stance tovvards its chapters outside the Middle East, the HT leadership is not cognizant of 
the nuances of political atiairs in Indonesia. 
The sacking of Al-Khaththath led to several rnernbers of the HTI leadership including 
Abu Saad. Donny (Chainnan of GEIVIA), Mursalin and Munar1nan to leave the 
organization. Al-Khaththath subsequently forrned the Hizbut Daf...71Vtth Indonesia 
(Indonesian Dakvvah Party, HDI). 89 HDI has also replaced HTI's position in the FlJI. 
Sin1ilar to the departure of Al-Baghdadi fron1 HTI, Al-Khaththath's sacking did not 
affect HTI significantly. Nevertheless, fron1 a strategic perspective the n1ove to leave 
FUI is affecting the position of HTI in the eyes of n1any of the other Islarnist 
organizations. Interestingly, these ex-n1ernbers of HTI seen1 to be con1ing together .- On a 
weekly basis, they attend a study circle conducted by Al-Baghdadi. While there is little 
evidence that _Al-Baghdadi will join HDI or FUI, he seen1s to be acting as a sort of 
spiritual advisor to the attendees of the study group, n1any of whon1 are influential 
r11en1bers of the Indonesian Islainist con1n1unity. Developrnents within this study circle 
and HDJ's position vvithin FUI are likely to have so1ne political impacts on HTI in future. 
Since 2008, HTI began initiating several ne,v initiatives 1n tern1s of its rnobilization 
strategy. lt organizes a 1nonthly event titled Halaqah Jsla,n dan Peradaban (Study 
Session on Islmn and Civilization) ai1ned at discussing conte1nporary issues related to 
I slatn. The key purpose of such events is to provide an opportunhy for HTI to engage 
key public figures in debates and discussions . To replace the Suara Jsla,n , which HTI 
utilized as its unofficial newspaper~ HTI began producing a fortnightly nevvspaper, 
1\ifedia [hnmat to engage the J\/f uslim con11nunity in Indon_esia. Most recently in July 
2009, HTl organized a conference attended by Muslin1 religious scholars fron1 Indonesia 
and other paiis of the Musli1n vvorld. HTI claimed that up till six thousand Musli1n 
89 Interview with Donny, Former Head of the GEM.A Penzbebasan, 11 August 2009 Jaka1ia and Interview 
vvith !\,1ursalin. 14 May 201 L Jakarta. 
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schO'lars attended the event although it is itnpossible for one to decipher between a 
religious scholar and other participants at such events. 
Conclusion 
Apart fro1n exatnining the history of HT in Indonesia, it was also argued in this chapter 
that the founding and initial developtnent of the tnovetnent was largely the effoti of A 1-
Baghdadi and has little to do with the HT central leadership. It was shovvn that the HT 
leadership did not know and was not keen to establish a chapter of HT in Indonesia, a 
country that vvas seen to be peripheral to the Muslitn vvorld and that the HT leadership 
knew little about. Yet, Al-Baghdadi persisted in his endeavor and established a chapter 
of HTI by utilizing his personal relationship ,vith Abdullah Bin Nuh . While Bin Nuh 
hin1self did not becon1e a n1en1ber of HT, he subscribed to n1any of its ideas as noted 
fron1 his writings. As highlighted above, Bin Nuh acted as an unofficial patron to AI-
Baghdadi. Through this initial etTort, Al-Baghdadi galvanized enough support an1ongst 
students in various Indonesian universities to fonn the first group of HTI fr1ture cadres. 
The initial cadres were instrun1ental in the forn1ation of cainpus based Islan1ic groups as 
well as the un1brella organization con1prising ditTerent Islan1ic student groups, the 
FSLDK. The FSLDK proved to be an in1portant 1nediun1 for HTI to recruit mernbers of 
other Islan1ic groups in to their fold. The second _part of the chapter examined the period 
vvhereby HTI carne ofiicially under the control of the larger HT leadership. The official 
inclusion of HTI into the larger HT proved to be n1ore problen1atic. Several in1portant 
developn1ents such as the decision of the party to abandon its activities in can1pus to 
focus on recruitn1ent a1nongst young Muslin, professionals and the decision of Al-
Baghdadi to leave the party were also highlighted in this section. Despite challenges 
faced by the party, it vvas still able to surfi1ce publicly. In 2003 ,vhen Ata Abu Rashta 
took over the helrn of the HT leadership the party began changing its approach to,vards 
its Indonesian chapter. Indonesia \Vas acknovvledged as a 1nore i mpot1ant chapter. Th is 
n1ust be qualified. Exan1ples of even recent developn1ents have shown the leadership's 
failure to understand the political context in Indonesia. This change is 111ainly due to the 
growth the party experienced especially when cornpared to the one in Middle East where 
the pmiy had been operating for 111ore than four ~ecades and had n1ade little headway in 
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rnernbership and influence. As highlighted in the previous chapter, this rapid grovvth 1s 
the subject of interest that the thesis will explore. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: CAPITALIZING ON OPPORTUNITIES FOR THE 
CALIPHATE 
We were ready to 1aunch HTI pub1ic1y in 1998. We were already talking to elements in 
the anny and Reforrnasi movement but Al -B aghdadi fe1t that we should wait. On 
hindsight, it was a waste. We would have been where Pl<.S is if we had se ized the 
moment (Hafidz Abdurrahn1an, Central cornrnittee Mernber of HTL 21 March 
2008, Jakaiia). 
The n1on1ent was 21 May 1998. Indonesia . ,vitnessed the den1ise of the New Order 
govern1nent led by Suharto. The end of the regi1ne led to the en1ergence of a rnyriad of 
political parties, civil society groups and social n1oven1ents of varying ideological 
orientation. The n1ost visible of these vvere lslan1ist groups. One such group was HTI. 
This chapter seeks to understand the external factors that in1pacted the en1ergence and 
grovvth of HTI. It also seeks to understand the decision n1aking process of the party's 
leadership in fonning a chapter of HT in Indonesia, expanding its n1en1bership base and 
finally en1erging publicly to launch collective actions. This chapter argues that both 
institutional and non-institutional opportunities affected the action. strategy and abi I ity of 
l-1TI in n1obilizing its n1en1bers in launching collective action. 
There are four parts to this chapter. The chapter will begin by analyzing the theoretical 
debates surrounding political opportunity . structure (POS) theory and its usefulness in 
exan1ining the gro,vth of HTI. Here, both the objectivist and subjectivist approaches to 
POS ,vill be assessed .. A case ,viii be n1ade to ,vhy the subjectivist approach is superior. 
An analysis of both the institutional and non-institutional aspects of the POS ,vi 11 also be 
undetiaken in this sectio_n. In the second part, the paper ,vi ll investigate the opportunities 
and constraints that Al -Baghdaqi encountered in trying to start a chapter of HT in 
Indonesia. While the institutional POS was largely negative, several non-institutional 
POS encouraged Al-Baghdadi to establish a chapter of HT. This section ,vill also 
exan1ine the institutional POS in the 1990s that encouraged the party to expand its 
1nernbership base. The third part of the chapter ,vill examine the POS that allo,ved HTI to 
finally en1erge publicly as a social n1ove1nent in 2000 following Suharto ' s resignation . A 
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discussion will be accorded to deten11ine vvhether the strategy to tin1e its en1ergence 111 
2000 resulted in 111issed opportunities for HTI to consolidate its position as a key Islan1ist 
n1overnent. The last part of this chapter \vill exan1ine institutional and non-institutional 
POSs, created by an open political systen1 that allovved HTI to n1obilize supporters in 
launching collective action betvveen 2000 and 2009. It vvill explore the reasons as to \vhy 
they rnoderated their political stance despite their foray into a n1ore open political 
environn1ent in Indonesia. 
Opportunities and Constraints Facing Social 1\1oven1ents 
The recent Arab Spring revolts have created a great degree of interest in trying to fathon1 
the role of collective action , through spontaneous n1obilization, in successfully 
overthrowing certain dictatorships (as in Egypt and Tunisia) and failing to do so in others 
(as in Bahrain). An understanding of POS would allow for an understanding of 
opportunities present in Egypt and Tunisia, which led to success, and constraints that 
resulted in the fa.ilures of the uprisings in Bahrain. As has been said, the POS theory 
seeks to assess the external factors that in1pact a social 111oven1ent's action, strategy and 
ability to 111obilize 111en1bers and supporters towards a certain goal. 1 Prior to discussing 
the di±Terent din1ensions of POS and its usefulness in understanding the en1ergence of · 
HTI, it is in1portant to first establish what POS n1eans. There are two variables that 
detennine vvhether a political/social/econon1ic developn1ent is a POS. First, the goals of 
. the rnovernent rnust be asce11ained. A political developn1ent becon1es POS only if it has a 
bearing on the goals of the rnoven1ent. For instance, a change in the social welfare 
budget allocation is not likel v to be a POS for an anti-nuclear n1oven1ent \Vhereas a ~ J 
change in defence budget is likely to be POS for the san1e n1oven1ent. Second, there n1ust 
be a causal relationship established betvveen a paiiicular developn1ent and its in1pact on 
the chance of the r11oven1ent attaining success. For instance, the release of political 
prisoners in an authoritarian state can becon1e a POS for pro -den1ocracy groups in the 
country. This gesture could indicate that the establishn1ent was beginning to open up the 
political systern, vvhich could provide an indirect POS for pro-den1ocracy groups. These 
1 Doug j\1cAdan,. John D. Mc.Carthy and j\1ayer -. Zald, "Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and 
Framing Processes- Toward a Synthetic, Comparative on Social 1ovements," in Doug McAdam, John D . 
11c.Ca11hy and .Mayer N. Zald (eds) Cornparative Perspectives on Social Jvlovernents: Politlcal 
Opportunities_. lvfobili::ing Structures_. and Cultural Frmnings (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1996) 
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two variables 111ust be 111et before a development is seen as a POS. Charles Tilly 
described this understanding of POS as an objectivist approach to POS. 2 Proponents of 
another approach to POS known as the subjectivist approach have advocated for the 
introduction of a third variable that 111ust be fulfil led before a developtnent becornes a 
POS. This third variable is described by Jon Elster as social 1nove1nent actor ' s reading of 
a develop1nent as POS. He noted that movetnent activists 1nay not be avvare of ce1iain 
,., opportunities, or he 1nay overesti1nate aspects of the available opportunities . .) Other 
actors 1night si111ply misread a pmticular political develop1nent as being insignificant to 
the n1oven1ent ' s goals when - in fact the developn1ent could potentially assist the 
1nove111ent in attaining its goals. Thus, the subjectivist approach refers to the perception 
of social n1oven1ent actors that a political clevelopn1ent provides incentives ·ror or 
constraints on then1 to undertake collective action. 4 For the purpose of this thesis, the 
subjectivist approach to POS will be used. The subjectivist approach is superior due to 
several reasons. Firstly, the subjectivist approach captures the actual thinking of social 
n1oven1ent actors rather than 111aking assun1ptions that certain oppo1iunities will render 
specific responses fron1 actors. This 111akes the subjectivist approach n1ore accurate. 
Secondly, the subjectivist approach allo-ws for an insight into the decision making 
process of actors whereby both POS and negative POS (constraints) wou Id be taken into 
consideration. 
Beyond the issue of hovv POS is defined, scholars of POS have also atternpted to identify 
variables that are likely to create or di111inish POS. There are two types of POS that 
scholars of SMT have cl iscussecl. The first type of POS cou Id be tenned "institutional 
POS'' . There are several vievvs that have en1erged mnongst SMT scholars about these 
din1~nsions of POS. This could be seen in McAdmn's typology in \Vhich he argued that 
POS is detennined by: (a) popular access to tl)e political systern , (b) cl ivisions \Vithin the 
elite, (c) the availability of elite allies, and (d) din1inishing state repression. 5 His 
argurnent is grounded in the belief that social 111oven1ents will tin1e their otlicial 
challenge to the state depending on the vulnerability of the state. Sidney Tarro\v 
~ Charles Tilly, Frorn Afobi!i:::ation lo Revolution (Reading, MA: Addision-Wesley, 1978). 
_; Jon Elster, Nuts and Boltsj(Jr the Social Sciences (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), p. 13 . 4 
. 
· Sidney Tarrow, Power in Movement , 1998. 5 Doug ~1c Adam , "Conceptual Origins, Current Problems ~nd Future Directions in John D. McCarth y and Mayer N. Zald Doug McAdam, Co,nparative Perspectives on Social A1uven1ent (New York: Cambridge University Press 1996), p. 24. 
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identifies three variables of POS, which included the openness of access to political 
institutions, the stability of political alignn1ents and the availability of allies and support 
groups. 6 On the other hand, Herbert Kitschelt, in a cornparative study of anti -nuclear 
rnovernents in four dernocracies~ suggests four cornponents: the capacity to n1obilize 
resources; openness of access to the public sphere and political decision rnaking; the 
presence of other social 1nove1nents also contesting the institutions of social control and 
the capacity of the political systen1 to efJectively 111eet de111ands. 7 Son1e of the variables 
proposed by TmTo,v, Kitschelt and l\1cAdan1 are in~ fact sin1ilar. 8 Based on the en1pirical 
data on HTI, four variables could be identified as being n1ost useful in in1pacting HTrs 
developn1ent. These include the openness and closedness of the political syste111, the 
presence of in1portant allies. the capacity and propensity of the .state for repression and 
the capacity of the rnovernent to rnobilize. The closed political systern in this particular 
context will be used to refer to Indonesia under the New Order regitne and an open 
political systen1 here will be used to refer to a den1ocratic Indonesia after the den1ise of 
the regitne. 
Here, several of the dirnensions of institutional POS are rejected, nan1ely elite 
fragn1entation and presence of other social rnovernents contesting the institutions of 
social control. The variable of divisions within the elite could be subsun1ed ,vithin 
discussions about the openness and closeness of the political systen1. It is highly unlikely 
that elites are fragn1ented in a closed political systern and vice versa is also true. 
· i\dditionally, the presence of other social n1ove1nents to challenge the institution of 
social control has little i1npact on the case study of HTI. HTI leaders ' decisions \Vere not 
affected by the presence of other social n1ove1nents. 
6 Sidney Tarrovv, " Struggling to 'Reform: Social ~1ovements and Policy Change during Cycles of Protest'', 
We.stern Societies Paper No. 15 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press , ] 983) and Sidney Tanow, Denwcracy 
and Dism_·der: Social Cm?flict, Protest and Politics in lta(v. 1965-1975 (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1989). 
7 Herbert P ·Kitschelt, "Political Opportunity Structures and Political Protest: Anti -Nuclear l'v1ovements in 
Four Democracies,'' British Journal of Political Science 16, no. 1 (1986); pp. 57-85 and Karen E Campbell 
Holly J McCammon, Ellen ~1 Granberg and Christine Mowery, "Hovv Movements Win: Gendered 
Opportunity Structures and U.S. \Vomen's Suffrage Movements 1866 to 1919," A,nerican Sodological 
Revie1v 66 (2001 ), pp. 49-70. 
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L Popular access to the political system; the openness of access to political institutions; openness of access 
to the public sphere and political decision and the capacity of the political system to effectively meet 
demands could all be encapsulated within a category of the "closeness or openness of the political system". 
Similarly, divisions ,vithin the elite and the stability of political alignments can be categorized as the 
"s tability of elite configuration" . 
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The second typology of variables here refers to "non=institutional POS". In essence this 
typology focuses on "broader, issue-specific conceptualisation of political opportunity" 
rather than '·narrower specification that focuses on fonnal institutional openings''.9 This 
type of POS could be found in the vvorks of scholars such as l\if cCatnrnon (et al). In their 
study of the wotnen suffrage 1nove1nent, they' found that cultural attitudes and econornic 
oppotiunities for wo1nen are the two most impotiant POS, \vhich led to the state ' s 
ratification of wo111en suffrage. 10 In this study, institutional factors such as the type of 
political .systen1 did not have any significant in1pact on the n1oven1ent. Likewise, Van 
Dyke ' s study of student groups in Arnerica concluded that threats from university 
authorities and grievances over university's policies becan1e conceptualized as elen1ents 
of political oppotiunity that led to coalition building ainongst students rather than any 
. . . l . l I 1nst1tut1ona openings. 
An analysis of HTI's developn1ent between · 1982 and 2009 points to the fact that both 
institutional and non-institutional POS in1pacted the decisions, strategies and actions of 
these n1oven1ents. During its forn1ative years , Al-Baghdadi vvas not deterred fron1 
atten1pting to torn1 a chapter of HTI in Indonesia despite the presence of negative 
institutional POS, such as the closed political systen1 and the high level of state 
repression. Non-institutional POS such as the worldwide resurgence of Islan1, Islan1ic 
student activisn1 and institutional POS such as the patronage of pro1ninent Islarnic 
scholar, Abdullah Bin Nuh, encouraged Al-Baghdadi to atten1pt the forn1ation of a 
chapter of HT in Indonesia. Changes in the governrnenf s attitude to\vards Islan1 that 
occurred during the ' keterbukaan' period provided I-ITI ,vith the POS to en1bark on 
expanding its 111en1bership ,vhile still ren1aining an underground group. 12 A non-
institutional constraint in the ±orn1 of inter-organizational conflict with JT also resulted in 
the shift in its 111e1nbership recruitn1ent. Prior to the fi1ll of Suharto and in the irnn1ed iate 
aftennath of the dernise of the New Order regin1e, HTI' s decision to ren1ai n underground 
9 David S. Meyer, "Protest and Political Oppotiunities," Annual Review of Sociology 30(2004). p. l 3 1. 10 Holly J iVfcCal771770n (et al) , "How rvrove177 ents Win ," pp. 49-70. 11 Nella Van Dyke, "Crossing l'v1ovement Boundaries : Factors That Facilitate Coalition Pro test by American College Students 1930-1990," Social Problen1 50(2003), p . 226-250 12 The keterbukaan period is described as the period of more political openness . Scholars differ on the 
exact point this started but some have cited 1989 as the year this had occurred. It marked the power 
struggle between Suhaii.o and the military led by General Murdani, which saw Suhmio working more 
closely with Islamic groups to repel the military challenge. 
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\Vas based on the n1isperception that the institutional changes taking place in the state 
were insignificant. It \Vas only after 2000, nearly two years after the fall of the regin1e, 
that HTI took advantage of its institutional POS to expand its n1en1bership and en1erged 
publicly to declare its goals and launch collective action. · 
Everv Seed You Plant in Indonesia Gro'\'vs: Forrning a HT Chapter l Jnder the New 
Order Regime 13 
The decision by A-1-Baghdadi to start a chapter of HT in 1982 n1ight seen1 strange given 
the high level of repression and closed political syste111 that existed in Indonesia. A 
cursory exan1ination of the political developr11ents during this period 111ight suggest that 
there vvere fevv institutional POS and rnany n1ore constraints applying to an 
internationalist lsla1nic 1nover11ent with a transnational objective. The Indonesian New 
Order regirne \,vas at the height of its power. There were no signs of elite fracture within 
the power hierarchy and the regin1e scored a n1assive electoral victory in the 1982 
elections ,vhen Golkar, the state-sponsored party, won over 64% of the vote. There was 
little sign that the state's propensity for repression was reduced. 14 In such a situation, 
theorists of POS would predict that it is highly unlikely that social n1ove111ent actors ,vill 
tnobilize. 15 
Yet, Al-Baghdadi thought that Indonesia was fertile ground for the establishn1ent of a HT 
· chapter. Several reasons pron1pted this decision. He felt that the political syste111 allo\ved 
enough space for · hi1n to plant the seeds for the fonnation of a HT chapter. While the 
Indonesian state repressed Islainic groups, the level of repression, to his 1nind, was less 
than in the Middle East. Al-Baghdadi ' s perception of the less repressive nature of the 
Indonesian government highlights the subjective nature of POS. Other factors also 
pron1pted A 1-Baghdadi to 1nake efforts to establish a HT chapter in Indonesia. He noted 
that the euphoria of the Iranian Revolution in 1979 led to 1nany younger Indonesian 
13 I borrowed the quote from Greg Fealy and Anthony Bubalo in their important work on the links between 
Islamist groups in the Middle East and Indonesia. See Anthony Bubalo and Greg Fealy, Joining the 
Caravan? The A-fiddle East, l.slarnisnz and Indonesia (Sydney: Lowy Insititute of International Policy, 
1 0· 0"') ··-
- ... ' p. 6) 
14 Ricklefs described this period as the peak of the New Order. See Ricklefs , Histo1y oflndonesia, pp. 366-
386 . 
15 Eisinger, ·'Protests and POS'', p . 15. 
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Musli1n activists tun1ing to I.slain as a political solution. He attributed this to the fact that 
unlike in the Arab world where there is a clear racial bias against Iranians and the Shiite 
nature of the Revolution, tnany Indonesian Musli1ns vievved the Iranian Revolution as a 
positive developtnent. 16 Al-Baghdadi · also believed that there was a certain level of 
Islamic consciousness ainongst tetiiary students ,vho attended the pengajiaan conducted 
by Bin Nuh. Fron1 his perspective, these students ,vere eager to learn and thirsty for 
knowledge. These non-institutional POS protnpted A l-Baghdadi to stati a chapter of HT 
in Indonesia. 
Resurgence of lslcun in the .Nluslin1 ~Jlorld 
Doug McAdan1 and Dieter Rucht highlighted the fact that n1oven1ents often identify 
with, are inspired by and in1itate success of other social n1oven1ents with si1nilar 
objectives. 17 They argued that the success of a social n1oven1ent could expand political 
opportunities to others regardless of national boundaries. The 1979 Iranian Revolution is 
the prin1ary exan1ple of how success in a soc ial 111oven1ent expanded opportunities for 
other Islainic groups including those in Indonesia. In Southeast Asia, 111any Musi in1 
activists began to see the Iranian n1odel of Islan1ic governance as an exarnple of 
governance that they could e1nulate. Writings of Iranian religious thinkers such as 
Khorneini and Ali Shariati flooded Indonesian J.slarnic booJ<stores. 18 The Iranian 
Revolution ,vas a n1atter of concern to n1any Muslin1 governn1ents around the world, 
\vhich feared that the Iranian influence ,vould incite their people to bring about sin1ilar 
revolutions in their O\Vn countries. Saudi Arabia ,vas one of the countries \Vhich ,vas 
1nost concerned by the Revolution. Reacting to fears that its Shiite population in its 
easten1 provinces n1ight revolt against the governn1ent, the Saudis began funding and 
supporting like-rninded groups throughout the Muslin1 world, including those in 
Southeast Asia. In this sense, the reaction to the Iranian Revolution was in the diffusion 
of a counter-idea that led to a further political opportunity for lslan1ist 111oven1ents in 
16 Intervie\v with Abdul Rahman Al -Baghdadi , l 0 August 2009, Bogor. 17 Doug TVIcAdam and Dieter Rucht, "The Cross National Diffusion of Movement Tdeas," The Annals cf the 
A_rnerican Academy of Political ahd Social Science 528, no. I ( 1993), pp. 56-74. 18 Rizal Sukma, lslcun in Indonesian Foreign Poli(v, (London: Routledge, 2003), p. 46 . and Adam 
Schwartz, A Nation in the Waiting: Indonesia's Search for Stability (Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1999), p. 
174. Ali Shariati was a prominent Iranian thinker and scholar who was a popular intellectual and 
opposition figure against the rule of the Shah of Iran. For n-iore about Shariati, see Ali Rahnema, An 
Islamic Utopian: A Political Biography qfAli Shariat! (London: l.B. Tauris , 1998). 
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Indonesia . In t~1ct the irnpact of Saudi funding \Vas \Vide-ranging. Fealy and Bubalo 
identified three organizations as having benefited fron1 it. These organizations include 
the Indonesian Islcunic Predication Council (Dewan Dakwah Islan1~yah Indones·ia, 
DDII), the Islcnnic Association for Enlightenment (Jcnniat Islan1 wal-Irsyad usually 
kno\vn as sirnply al-Irs:yad); and the Is.Zan1ic [Inion (Persatuan !slant, Persis). 19 Along 
\Vith the Saudi funds can1e the literature 1vvritten by MB (Jkhwanul lvfuslirnin, MB), a key 
all y of the Saudis in their etTorts to counter Iran. Through the net1vvork of Nluhan1rnad 
Natsir, often described as the grand old n1an of lslan1isn1 in Indonesia, the ideas of IVIB 
becan1e rnainstrearn and were especially influential an1ongst Muslin1 students 20 The 
rnain group that \Vas influenced by these ideas was JT. The 'success' of the Saudi project 
of popularizing their T,Vahhabi doctrine in Southeast Asia was largely due to the fact that 
they 1vvere given a free reign to do so. Southeast Asian goven1111ents did not see the 
Saudis as a threat in cornparison to the Iranians. 21 The resurgence of Islarn did not in1pact 
Indonesia as directly as it did Malaysia. 22 Nevertheless, the Iranian Revolution and the 
counter-ideological etTorts undertaken by the Saudi governrnent popularized ideas of 
political lslarn especially arnongst younger Muslin1s who now sa\v Islan1 as an irnportant 
political ideology. It was this reading of the ground sentin1ents that led to Al-Baghdadi 
believing that Indonesia was ready for the ideas of HT. 
lslan1ic Student Activisn-1 in Indonesian Catnpuses 
· Another non-institutional POS present during this period were the active lslan1ic student 
rnove1nents in Indonesian cmnpuses. The regirne restricted student activities vvith the aitn 
of de-politicising Indonesian can1puses. 23 This followed increasing student criticis1n of 
19 Fealy and Bubalo, Between the Local and Global, p. 59. See Asna Husin , 11 Phi1osophica1 and 
Sociological Aspects of Da ' wah. A Study of the Dev,ian Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia" (Columbia 
Universi ty, 1998) for details of the DDII. 
20 ibid: p. l 05. For details on Natsir 's life and thinking, see Deliar Noer, Parted Islam Di Penta.s Nasional 
(Jakaria: Grafiti Pers, 1987). 
21 Sukma, Jslmn in Indonesian Foreign Polic."y, p. 49. 
22 The Islamic student movement led by i\nwar Ibrahim, the former deputy Prime Minister of Malaysia 
was involved in many Saudi organizations such as WA ... MY and strongly advocated the fom1ation of an 
Islamic state in Ma laysia. For the impact of Saudi activities in Malaysia, see Shanti Nair, Islam in 
A1alaysian Foreign Policy (London: Routledge, 1997), p. 74. 
23 See Edward Aspinall , Opposing Suharto: Ccnnpromise. Resistance and Regime Change in Indonesia 
(S tanford : Stanford Universi ty Press, 200 5), p 105 . 
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the country's l.eadership.24 The government, in order to stern the tide, passed the 
infan1ous Norn1alization qf Ccnnpus L(fe Bill, (NKK/BKK) i~ April 1978 which lin1ited 
students' rights of expression, asse1nbly and association. The policy of NKK/BK.K 
effectively ended student involvetnent in political issues and severed . ti es between 
political patiies and student groups. 25 An unintended consequence of these restrictions 
was the proliferation of study circles (halaqah) and discussion groups (usrah). Students 
who 1night have joined more established lslarn ic student groups such as Hilnpunan 
MahasL)aH'a l)la,n (The Islatnic Student Association , HMI) and Persatuaan Mahasisvva 
lslcun Indonesia (Indonesian Islan1ic Student Association, PMII) were now n1ore dravvn 
to such infonnal groups as these groups were less scrutinized by the authorities. This 
practice was first introduced by MB in Egypt, whereby halaqahs ,vere convened in 
1nosques, cainpuses or even the hotnes of its 1ne111bers. An infonnal n1ove1n ent often 
referred to as the Dakvvah n1oven1ent en1erged, the activists of which had vast differences 
an1ongst groups that collectively n1ade up the n1oven1ent. 26 These incluclecl the 5'alc{fls, 
Muslin1 Brothers, Tablighi Jarnaat (TJ) and even a violent n1oven1ent such as the JVegara 
lslan1 Indonesia (NII). The ideology and objectives of these groups often difiered. Most 
students belonging to these networks were not necessarily inclined towards politics. 
Often n1any saw Islan1ic activities organized by the Dakvvah n1oven1ent as a n1eans for 
personal religious grovvth. 
For AI-Baghdadi, the existence of this net,vork by 1982 ,vas an i1npo11ant opportunity 
for HT. The HT's n1ethodology for reviving the caliphate included the forn1ation of the 
halaqah, a concept n1any students of the Dak:wah n1ove111ent were already fan1i liar ,vith. 
The nebulous nature of the net,vork also n1eant that it ,vas easier for Al-Baghdadi to 
recruit potential 1ne1nbers without being conspicuous and falling under the ,vatchful eyes 
of the Indonesian authority. The Tslarnic student network is yet another example of the 
subjective nature of POS. The proliferation of the Dak:i1vah rnovernents in fndonesian 
cmnpuses ,vas read as a POS by Al-Baghdadi ,vho ,vas convinced that in an intra-
24 For instance, the student council at IPB issued the "White Book of the Student's Struggle" in which the 
student leaders accused Suharto of deviating from the Constitution and Pancasila. See David Bouchier and Vedi Hadiz, Indonesian Politics and Society: A Reader, (London and New York: Routledge, 2003), p. 120-121 
25 Harold Crouch, "Islam and Politics in Indonesia," in Coral Bel I (eel) Politics, Diplomacy anc-/ Islam: Four Case Studies (Canberra: the Australian National University, 1986), p. 21 26 Interview with Ismail Yusanto, 15 ~1arch 2009, Jakaria; Ji1terview with-Zulkieflimansyah . 2 1 October 2007. Jakarta and Interview with Fahri Hamzah , l 5 May 201 l , Jakarta 
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Islarnisrn conflict HTI ,vot.ild emerge victorious due to the strength of its ideology and 
n1ethodology. 
The h~fluence of Abdullah Bin Nuh 
Sidney Tarrovv noted that the availability of irnportant allies is one in1portant aspect of a 
fi1vourable POS. 27 Here allies could include elite groups such as governn1ent authorities, 
povverful business interests and the Church. Prorninent elite allies could also prove to be 
irnportant for social rnovernents. The in1portance of these allies ,vas underscored by the 
support given to anti-abortion activists by individual 111en1bers of the Republican Party in 
the United States. A decision n1ade by these n1e111bers to withdraw their support for the 
cause 111 the 1990s savv the conflict between the governn1ent and anti-abortion activists 
ebbing. 28 Likewise, the support that Al-Baghdadi received fron1 Abdullah Bin Nuh \Vas 
especially in1portant in his decision to fonn HT in Indonesia. Bin Nuh was especially 
popular arnongst Muslin1 tertiary students in Bogor and Jakarta. Bin Nuh had an 
extensive network of students, rnany of whon1 were .undergraduates at the IPB. Bin Nuh 
was convinced that despite the existence of ditTerent sects within Islan1, Muslin1s were 
united in their belief in God and Prophet Muhan1n1ad, a therne that he constantly 
repeated in rnany of his vvritings. For instance, Bin Nuh ,vrote that: 
The Kaabah is a symbol of Muslin1 unity. Regardless of the differences in sects, Muslims 
,() 
are one.-
Bin N Llh focused his energy on trying to bridge differences between different Muslirn 
· groups and sects. His acceptance and respect for all Islamic move1nents 1neant that he 
attracted students frotn various Islainic 1novements including, the TJ and JT. 3° Fonner JT 
'- · 
activists spoke positively of hin1 and n1any do not seen1 to think of Bin Nub as a person 
associated with HTI. Lies Marcos, a researcher who conducted an extensive interview 
,, 7 ..,. --l T 
- S1u ney · arrow, Pmver in A1ove1nent, 1994. 
,R . . 
-" David S. Nleyer and Suzanne Staggenborg, 11 Iv1ovements , Countermovements, and the Structure of 
Political Opportunity," Anierican Journal of Sociology 101 , no . 6 (1996), p. 1643. 
29 Abdullah Bin Nuh, Fi Dhi/al al-Ka.'a.bah al-Bait al-Haram, p.6. 
30 Several ar1icles written about Bin Nuh suggested his influence amongst adherents of various groups. For 
instance see Lies Marcoes , "Field Work Notes on Interview with Abdullah Bin Nuh", Unpublished Report, 
1988. 
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\vith Bin Nuh noted the si111ilarity between Bin Nuh's ideas and that of HT. For instance, 
she noted the in1portance Bin Nuh placed on the need for Musiin1s to revive the 
caliphate. Bin Nuh's son Mustafa Bin Nuh took a tnore nuanced approach in describing 
his father's relationship with HT. Mustafa acknowledged that Bin Nuh was a stron g 
advocate for the revival of the caliphate. Nevertheless, this did not mean that Bin Nuh 
was exclusively loyal to HT. He cited an exan1ple of how Bin Nuh had given refuge to 
tne1nbers of the TJ who \Vere sought after by the Indonesian intelli gence service. 31 
Neve1iheless Mustafa noted that his father was aware of Al-Baghdadi ' s involve1nent 
with HT and agreed to assist Al-Baghdadi in his atten1pt to start a chapter of HT. 
AI-Baghdadi acknowledged that Bin Nuh's patronage was a contributing factor in his 
decision to start a HT chapter in Indonesia. He believed that Bin Nuh's stature, as a 
respected religious figure in Bogor would provide hin1 with the credence to recruit 
potential n1en1bers for HT. He was also convinced that Bin Nuh' s vast network of 
students could also be potential recruits. Most in1portantly, Bin Nuh could protect hin1 
and potential HT recruits fron1 state persecution. In this regard, Al-Baghdadi could have 
been nai've to assun1e that the Indonesian authorities will not act against him due to Bin 
Nub's patronage. In SMT tern1s, AI-Baghdadi read Bin Nub's patronage as a POS. As 
rnentioned earlier in the chapter. POS is defined subjectively, ,vhich rneans that 
regardless of whether Bin Nuh's patronage was indeed an opportimity, AI-Baghdadi saw 
it as such. 
Constraints under the Ne'\-v Order Regin1e 
The discussion above highlights the presence of ,vhat is perceived as a positive POS that 
led to the decision of Al-Baghdadi to ,vork to,vards the establ ishrnent of HT in 
Indonesia. His atte1npt to fonn HT ,vas han1pered by t'wo key obstacles. These barriers 
are state's propensity for repression and the lirnited resources that he possessed to recruit 
and n1obilize activists. 
31 Interview with Mustafa Bin Nuh, 10 August 2009, Bogor. ~ ~ 
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Repression [ lnder Suharto 
The Nevv Order regirne ahvays vievvecl political Islan1 with suspicion. The experience of 
the Darul Islarn rebellion hardened attitudes of the Indonesian n1ilitary towards political 
Islan1. This attitude can be seen in the vvay the governn1ent dealt vvith Islan1ist groups 
that \Vere deerned to be a threat to the regin1e, such as the DDII. Likewise, the regin1e 
accornrnodatecl Islarnic groups that ,vere viewed as being useful in enhancing the 
regirne's status, such as Muha1nn1adiyah. 32 Sirnilarly, social n1oven1ents \Vill often 
innovate in their dealing \Vith the governrnent. 33 This can be seen fron1 the exarnples of 
clitTerent Islarnic groups~ such as the NII, that either chose to go underground or created 
ne\v platfonns to continue with their activities. In the case of HT in Indonesia, Al-
Baghdadi rnaintained a high level of secrecy in his atten1pt to recruit the first group of 
HT activists. 
Al-Baghdadi had started teaching subjects such as Arabic and tqf';:ir (exegesis of the 
Qur ' an). These classes \Vere taught in the Pesantren Al-Ghtfari and it ,vas through these 
classes that Al-Baghdadi began establishing close relations \Vith son1e of his students. He 
had begun preaching son1e ideas of HT to these students, rnany of whon1 were 
undergraduates at the IPB. N eve1iheless, these students were not aware that Al-Baghdadi 
was a n1e1nber of HT or that his teachings stern frorn HT' s concepts. It was not until the 
n1id-l 980s that a selected group of trusted students such as Saifuddin Asip and 
Muhan1n1ad i\l-Khaththath were told about HT. It was also virtually irnpossible for HT_l 
to recruit rnen1bers fron, o·utside the student corntnunities . For Al-Baghdadi , it was about 
ensuring that the authorities will not dis1nantle the group that he was seeking to establish. 
This was his way of overco1ning the constraint of state repression. 
The Prob/enz of Resources for HTI 
The itnportance of resources 111 social 1nove1nents has been discussed at great length. 
Kitschelt argued that the ability of social n1oven1ents to procute resources is often 
32 Martin van Bruinessen , '' Indonesia's Ulama and Politics : Caught between Legitimizing the Status Quo 
~:i!1d Searching for Alternatives," Pr)sma. The Indonesian Indicator 49(1990) , pp. 52-69 
-'-' These characteristics were used by Della Porta in analyzing protest policing in Italy and Germany. See 
Don atel]a Della Porta, Social 1vfovenzents. Political Violence and the State: A Cmnparative Analysis of 
Italy and Germany (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995). 
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detennined by political institutions in the state. For instance, the greater the control of 
econo1nic resources through political institutions, the n1ore lirnited is the resources 
available \vith which to challenge policies. 34 In the case of HT in Indonesia, tnaterial 
resources were a 1najor difficulty in its atternpt to recruit rne111bers. Funding 1vvas needed 
to publish books and other printed tnaterials so that 111e111bers could learn about HT's 
ideas. As 1nentioned in Chapter 3, Al-Baghdadi did not receive support frorn the central 
leadership of HT to start a chapter in.Indonesia. In 1983, while Al-Baghdadi was back in 
Australia, he relayed his intention to stati a party chapter in Indonesi~ to the HT 
leadership. While the leadership did not reject his plan outright, they \Vere also not 
suppotiive of his idea. The Arab-centric thinking of HT leaders n1eant that the leadership 
believed that resources of the party shou lei only be al located to the party's activities in the 
l\lfiddle East. Donations fron1 the party's chapters in Western countries were used for the 
party's branches in the Middle East The effect of the investn1ent put in Middle Eastern 
countries is discernable fi:on1 the nun1ber of coup atten1pts n1ade by HT in Egypt, Syria, 
Jordan and Tunisia after 1979. HT's leaders were not willing to divert resources to what 
were considered as peripheral areas within the Muslin1 world such as Indonesia.35 
The lack of financ ial resources was the least of AI-B aghdadi ' s concern. Most of Al-
Baghdadi 's students were also not fluent in Arabic. Virtually all books \Vritten by HT 
leaders were written in Arabic n1aking it in1possible for then1 to ~understand the ideas of 
HT. Al-Baghdadi's poor grasp of Bahasa Indonesia 1nade hi1n dependent on several 
translators, son1e of whon1 were not even n1en1bers of HT, such as Mustafa Bin Nub, to 
assist hiln during halaqah. 
The decision by Al -Baghdadi to fonn a chapter of HT in Indonesia \Vas pro1npted by 
\vhat he perceived as opportunities. The POS included the irnpact of the Islmnic 
resurgence in Indonesia, the vibrant Islmnic student activis1n and the patronage of 
Abdullah Bin Nuh. This allovved Al-Baghdadi to recruit enough 1nen1bers to fonn an 
inforn1al chapter of HT in Indonesia. Nevertheless, there were several negative POS that 
han1pered the grovvth of this initial group. They included the state ' s propensity for 
violence and the lack of access to rnaterial and hurnan resources that the group 
34 Kitschelt, "Political Opporiunity Structures and Politicaf Protest" , p. 64 . 
35 Interview with Muhmnmad AI-Khaththath, 15 February 2010, Jakaria. 
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encountered. As a result of this, recruitn1ent of n1e1i1bers was lin1ited to students in IPB. 
Hov..1ever, several political developn1ents were to change this state of atiairs. 
HTI and Suharto's Overtures To\-vards Isla111 
The late 1980s sa\v the leadership shifting its attitude towards Islan1. The governn1ent 
becarne rnore tolerant of so111e Islan1ic groups, even co-opting son1e of then1 to be part of 
the goven1n1ent. 36 Several factors pron1pted this change. 37 Islan1ic resurgence in the 
1970s saw 111ore Musli111s becon1ing rnore pious in their beliefs. Even in Java where local 
custorns have historically taken precedence over Islan1, Javanese \Vere beginning to 
accept n1any rituals and practices of Islan1. 38 As Liddle noted, the gaps bet\veen 
n1odernist and traditionalist Muslin1s \Vere beginning to narrovv by the 1980s.39 The 
regirne could thus no longer ignore the increasing irnportance that lslarn \Vas beginning 
to play in the lives of rnany Indonesians. The regirne's response to this change was to 
pre-ernpt any discontent that could erupt by undertaking reforn1s. Kurt Schock had 
argued that due to the centralized nature of non-den1ocratic regi111es, there is little 
institutional access that the populace could rely on since the legislature, executive and 
judicial arrns of the state are controlled by the regin1e. 40 The only possibility for 
institutional access is if the regi1ne chooses to open up access to gain political legiti1nacy. 
The Indonesian governrnent response to increased religiosity was thus to open 
institutional access to groups that could potentially challenge the state. 
A second factor and perhaps a 1nore itnportant reason was the growing tension between 
Suha110 and the anny. One of the pillars of the New Order regi1ne was ABRI (Angkatan 
Berser?jata Republik Tndonesia, The Republic of Indonesia's Anned Forces). ABRI's 
36 
The New Order attempt to co-opt was not always successfuland met with some passive resistance. See 
Greg Barton, Abdurralunan rVahid: J\1uslirn Dernocrat, Indonesian President- a View jl·orn the Inside 
(Honolulu: Uni versi ty of Hawaii Press , 2002), pp. 10-15. 
3 7 For a detailed analysis of these factors , see Nfartin Van Bruinessen, "Islamic state or State of Islam? 
Fifty Years of State-Islam Relations in Indonesia in Ingrid Wessel (ed) lndonesien am Ende des 20. 
Jahrhunderts (Hamburg: Abera-Verlag, 1996), pp . 19-34 
38 
Robert Hefner. Political Economy q/A1ountain Javo: An Interpretive Histo,~v (Berkel ey: Universi ty of 
California Press, 1990) . 
JC/ William Liddle . '' The Islamic Tum in Indonesia: A Political Explanation,11 Journal ofAsian Studies 55, 
110 . 3 ( 1996). p. 623. 
-+ O Kurt Schock, "Peop le Power and Political Opportunities: Social Movement J\tlobilization and Outcomes 
in the Philippines and Bun11.a 11 Social Problems 46, no. 3 (1999), p. 357. 
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chief, Benny l\turdani was a Suharto's loyalist and had won the trust of the President for 
years. In spite of this, by 1988, cracks began to develop between Suharto and Murdani. 
M.urdani's criticisn1 of the excesses of Suhaiio's children and the need for a plan for 
leadership succession were seen as acts of defiance against Suharto. 41 Thi s subsequently 
led to the sacking of Murdani in 1988. Here fractures within the elite configuration 
forced the regi111e to construct a new elite structure. 42 As a way of countering the loss of 
support fron1 ele1nents of ·ABRl, Suha1io sta1ied cultivating Islainic groups. One such 
group that he encouraged ,vas ICJ\l[I led by B.J. Habibie. 43 Suharto's project to replace 
the TNI with ICMI \Vas largely successful. Muslin1 intellectuals and leaders whon1 
Hefner described as ' regin1ist Musli1ns ' becatne partners of the state.~1"1 
An objectivist approach to POS would reveal that several oppo1iunities e1nerged in the 
change of Suharto's attitude towards Islan1. These POSs were tensions within the elite 
alignn1ent and partial opening of the political systen1. Yet, a closer exan1ination of both 
POS \vill reveal that they had little or no in1pact on HTI. Suharto ' s n1ain purpose for 
providing access to son1e · 1slan1ic groups does not sten1 fron1 a desire to see a rnore 
in1portant role for lslan1 in politics but rather to buttress the position of the governn1ent. 
The n1ain benefactor for this change in policy was ICMI , vvhich the leadership sa-w as a 
useful ally. For 111any other Islan1ic groups that sought to enhance the political role of 
Islan1, the n1ove did not significantly alter their position. 
A perceived institutional POS that en1erged fron1 this episode ·was the assun1ption that 
the state ' s propensity for repressing lslan1ic groups was decreasing gradually. This ,vas 
at least the reading of Al-Baghdadi. The perception ,vas based on the authority ' s 
increasing tolerance, and in so111e cases suppo1i, for non-political Islarn. This could be 
seen in the leadership ' s vvillingness to support 1\llusli1ns in their etTort to 1ncrease 
41 Suharto's children were involved in various business projects, many of which had links to the 
govennnent. For details of this , see Robe11 Edward Elson, Suharto : A Political Biography (Carnbriclge: · Cambridge University Press , 2001 ), pp . 248 -250. 
42 Fractures between the Filipino military and the regime of Ferdinand ~1arcos were an important 
contributing factor that led th e latter 's ouster in 1983 showing th e importance of elite ali gnment David 
\y'urfel, Filipino Politics: Deve!oprnenl and Decqv (lthaca : Cornell University Press, 1988). 
,u The role of 1CM! in the political development of Indonesia is a subject of much academi c interest and 
debate. Sorne of these studies include; Hefner, Civil Islam, pp. 128-166 and Adan1 Schwarz, Indonesia: .A 
Nation in the Waiting: Indonesia in the 1990s. (Sydney: Allen & U nwin , 1994) 44 This term was coined by the eminent scholar on Indonesia, Robert Hefner. See Hefner, Civil Jslcun, p. 19 . 
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personal piety by \Vay of building n1osques and enhancing Islan1ic education. Al-
Baghdadi felt that this was a change fro1n the regin1e's previous stance that seen1ed to be 
··allergic to anything Islan1ic".45 Isn1ail Yusanto noted that as long as the group could 
n1asquerade their activities in the forn1 of enhancing knovvledge on aspects of ritualistic 
Islan1- the goven1n1ent \Vould have little issue vvith this.46 In response to this perceived 
POS~ Al-Baghdadi decided to spearhead his rnission by infiltrating don1inant lslan1ic 
student netvvorks thereby recruiting students fron1 n1any universities. In addition, Al-
Baghdadi also encouraged the fonnation of nevv front organizations to recruit 1nen1bers 
beyond the student populace. 
Enhancing Recruittnent in Indonesian Catnpuses 
In a study of the landless rnovernent in Brazil, Gabriel Ondetti contended that groups 
\vould utilize decreasing state repression to enhance recruitrnent for the n1overnent. 47 He 
further argued that the space created by the reduction of . repression would allow 
n1oven1ents to recruit beyond its traditional constituents. The perceived reduction in 
repression saw Al-Baghdadi and his students enhancing their efforts to recruit rnen1bers. 
Several of these individuals, such as Al-Khaththath, were already active 1ne1nbers of the 
LDK even before they were introduced to the ideas of HT. In this regard, the process of 
recruitment within the IPB campus was not difficult. Neve11heless, the recruittnent 
continued to be done in a secretive fashion. HTl n1en1bers such as Yusanto and Al-
Khaththath were convinced that the Indonesian gove1111nent intelligence was not avvare of 
. ~ ~ 
the existence of the HT network, since no 1ne1nber of the group was ever detained or 
itnprisoned. Nonetheless , this cannot be verified. There is a po~sibility that even if the 
authorities were aware of its existence, the group \vas too sn1all and insignificant, 
compared to the larger opposition groups, to pose any threat. 
In 1986, a non-institutional POS arose when the FSLDK was forn1ed. The organization 
provided the platfonn for student leaders frotn different Indonesian cainpuses to share 
45 Interview with Abdul Rahman Al-Baghdadi, 10 August 2009 , Bogor. 
4
r., Interv iew with Ismail Yusanto , 12 At;gust 2009, Jakarta . · ~ 
4 7 Gabriel Ondetti , "Repression, Opportunity, and Protest : Explaining the Takeoff of Brazil 's Landless 
Movement" Latin American Politics and Society 48 , no. 2 (2006), pp. 62-64. 
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ideas on how to uplift Islarnic consciousness in the cmnpuses. 48 With the exception of 
IPB, JT activists don1inated the rest of the LDKs in other institutions. Al-Khaththath was 
tasked with a rnission to recruit student activists frorn other institutions . As rnentioned in 
Chapter 3, Isn1ail Yusanto was a prorninent leader of the Jemaah Sholohuddh1 in 
Surabaya and was considered a highly able and charis111atic student activist. As 
highlighted in Chapter 3, the third 1neeting of the FSLDK in 1989 held at the Sebelas 
Maret University in Solo saw HTI do1ninating the FSLDK. This was done through the 
adoption of An -Nabhani's ideas in the khittah and mafahhn of LDK .49 JT activists were 
not aware of Yusanto's switch to HTl and had appointed Yusanto as their representative 
in the drafting ccnntnittee. JT activists felt betrayed by Yusanto ' s switch to HT and were 
indignant about the fact that Yusanto was in fact representing HT' s interest. This n1eant 
that JT \Vas not represented in the drafting co1n1nittee, \Vhich was overwhehningly 
don1inated by HT activists. 
Sidney Tarrow argues that con1petition between protest organizations drives the diffusion 
of disruptive tactics as groups seek to outbid each other. 50 This would act as a negative 
POS (constraint) for n1oven1ents in achieving their objectives. This observation is apt in 
describing the conflict between HTI and JT in the FSLDK .. JT activists started a negative 
cainpaign against HT, which included disse1ninating aiiicles and books that were critical 
of HT. The conflict between JT and HT acted as constraints for both groups in their ain1 
of pursuing their objectives. In l 99 l, several leaders of JT approached Muhanunad 
Natsir to assist in resolving the HTI-JT dispute. The choice of Natsir is interesting. 
Despite his perceived ideological affiliation to MB ~ he \Vas seen to be a t~1ther figure of 
Islmnist rnoven1ents and \Vas respected by both HTI and JT activists. In the rneeting, 
vvhich vvas held in Bogor, a debate ensued between Abu Ridho and AI-Khaththath. Natsir 
\vho presided over the discussion could not resolve the conflict. 5 1 Follovving this 
1neeting, Al -Baghdadi hin1self refuted the accusations hurled against HTI in a book 
published in 1991. In bet\veen 1991 and 1993 , HT activists continued to dorninate the 
48 Ismail Yusanto , "LDK: Antara Visi, 1\1isi dan Realitas Sejarah Perkembangannya" Accessed from 
http ://www.fsldk.20m.com/ sejarah/sejarah_ visi_misi .htrn on 20 February 2011 . 
~
9 Lembaga Da 'mvah Kampus, /11qlahhn Daki11ah Jslmn (Bandung: LDK, 1991 ), pp. 11 3- 123 . 
:,o Sidney Tarrow, Power ill A1ove,nent: Social .A1ove,nents and Contentious Politics (N ew'{ ork : 
Can1briclge University Press , 1998). 
51 Interv iew with Al-Khaththath, 15 Feb 2010 , Jakarta. Former JT leaders such as Fabri Han12ah and 
Zulkifli 1'1ansyah could not recall this meeting but noted that it is possible that such a meeting did take 
place as there were several meetings held between HTI and JT activists. 
1 17 
net\vork of FSLDK, enabling the pa11y to expand its net\vork to all the n1ajor can1puses 
in Indonesia. 52 This control was further consolidated in 1993 when the constitution of HT 
\Vas adopted by FSLDK. 
The anirnosity bet\veen JT and HT activists reached its peak by 1993. HT activists 
recalled that JT rnen1bers vvould not even pray behind HT activists in congregation 
prayers. 53 This negative atrnosphere created by this ongoing conflict prornpted Al-
Baghdadi to instruct HT activists to leave both the FSLDK and LDK fron1 - the 
universities. Al-Baghdadi ' s decision was based on the fear that the conflict bet,t\leen JT 
and HT activists vvould escalate to the level of clashes between HT and MB in Jordan in 
the l 960s.ln what ensued, MB and HT n1en1bers in Jordan, reported against each other to 
the Jordanian intelligence. In sin1ilar vein, he vvas vvorried that sorne JT activists n1ight 
start reporting against HT activists to the Indonesian intelligence services, which could 
lead to a clarnpdo,vn on the party. This was also about the tin1e that an official branch of 
HT was set up in Indonesia after a visit by a representative of the A,nir to Indonesia. The 
-
A1nir' s representative, Abu Zohra, also disapproved of HT· activists getting en1broiled to 
their detrirnent in FSLDK or LDK. 54 
In direct opposition to the stand taken by AI-Baghdadi and the central leadership of HT, 
rnany HT activists in Indonesia felt that the party could have utilized their control of the 
FSLDK to n1arginalize JT activists. HTI leaders such as Rah1nat Ku111ia believe that HT 
.__. 
could have consolidated its position as the n1ost in1portant Islarnic student group in 
Indonesia had they re1nained in FSLDK. 55 Hafidz Abdurrahman felt that Al-Baghdadi 
p ~ 
was not cognizant of the Indonesian political context and his judg1nent ,vas still clouded 
by the events of the political dynan1ics in the Middle East. This led to so'1ne of the HTI 
activists , such as Adian Husaini , leaving the party. There vvas little indication that JT 
activists woLlld have reported on HT activists , given that JT itself was an underground 
1nove1nent. Hence the criticis-1ns leveled against Al-Baghdadi ,vere reasonable, as he had 
111issed an in1portant political opportunity to elevate the position of HT in Indonesia. 
52 Rifki Rosyad, "A Quest for True Islam", p. 58. 
53 Intervi ew with Rahmat Kurnia , 20 October 20 l 0, Jakarta. 
54 ibi d 
55 Interview wi th Ismail Yusanto , 15 iv1arch 2009 and Hadifz AbduITahman, 6 :rv1arch 20 I 0, Jakarta. · 
118 
HT.rs exit fron1 the FSLDK and LOK networks becarne a political opportunity for JT, 
which consolidated their position as the rnost i111portant Islan1ic student group. They 
were thus in a better position to join the protest 1nove1nent against the governn1ent in 
1997. With the benefit of hindsight, it does see1n that Al-Baghdadi missed an i1npo1iant 
POS to consolidate HTI's position at the student level. HTI's response of enhancing 
recruitment in response to the perceived easing of political repression against Islamic 
groups \Vas thus out-vveighed by the negative POS in the fonn of the JT chal len ge. ltjust 
goes on to show that Abu Zohra vvas just not cognizant of the political situation 1n 
Indonesia. 
Targeting Young Jvfusliln Professionals 
Another way that Al-Baghdadi responded to the perceived easing of political repression 
,vas by starting to recruit activists beyond the universities. Al-Baghdadi hin1~elf joined 
LPBA as a lecturer in Arabic in 1988. The choice of LPBA is interesting given the strong 
links between LPBA and the Saudi gove111n1ent, whose ~Vahhahi ideology HT strongly 
opposed. It' was likely that Al-Baghdadi was recruited n1ainly for his proficiency in 
Arabic. Moreover, the LPBA did not know of his connections with HT, given that his 
identity as HT ' s leader in Indonesia \Vas kept a tight secret. He \Vas rernoved frorn his 
position in 1993 after the LPBA 's adrninistration di scovered his links ,vith HT following 
the recru itrnent of several students frorn LPBA. 56 He also taught at the fbnu Khaldun 
University together with Isn1ail Yusanto. These n1oves were geared tovvards attempts by 
the party to recruit students beyond the net\vorks of the FSLDK and LDK. 
HT activists created another platforn1 to begin recruiting young Muslirn professionals. As 
highlighted in Chapter 3, these activists established KSTSC in 1994 as an atternpt to 
recruit young Muslirn professionals into the group. The t:1ct that HTf could use an office 
\Vithin the Standard Chartered building to conduct discussions~ \Vithout dra,ving attention 
fro111 the Indonesian intelligence, showed the easing of restrictions on religious activities. 
As stated in the last chapter, to assist in its activities, the party also estab I ished the 
B"WAS, which acted as an Isla111ic foundation that provided Isla111ic publications as well 
56 Interview with AI -Khaththath, 18 March 2008, Jakarta 
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as preachers to rnosques for the purposes of conducting classes, talks and sen1inars. 57 By 
1997, Suharto ' s governn1ent was beginning to show signs of weakness, in the n1idst of 
grovving discontent against the regi1ne, over the state of the econon1y follo,ving the 1997 
Asian Financial Crisis. 
Transitioning To,vards Den1ocracy: HTI and the Den1ise of the New Order 
On 2 1st f'v1ay 1998 ., Suharto resigned after rnonths of unrest that followed the near 
con1plete econornic collapse that Indonesia experienced as a result of the Asian Financial 
Crisis in 1997. Prior to its dov;nfall, the regirne was already showing signs that it had 
been greatly vveakened. In the n1idst of the financial crisis, An1ien Rais, the leader of the 
ICMI ' s expert council, had spoken openly against Suharto and had even indicated his 
intention to run for the presidency. Student den1onstrations throughout the country called 
for Suharto ~s resignation. Following the 13-14 May riots targeted at the Indonesian 
Chinese , Suharto finaily resigned, prornpted by the rnilitary and the defection of his key 
suppor1ers. 
In analyzing Indonesia's transition to de1nocracy, several POS could be observed. The 
first POS ,vas the presenc.e of other social n1oven1ents to challenge the social control 
i1nposed by the state. In particular, a nevv Muslitn student association, the Kesatuan Aksi 
A1ahasisH1a A1uslin1 Indonesia (The Indonesian Muslin1 Student Action Union, KAMMI), 
fonned in 1998 , played an in1portant role during this period. The rnain force behind 
.KAMI'v1I was JT and the FSL_DK. The idea for the fonnation of KAMMI was first 
proposed in 1997 at the tenth FSLDK n1eeting in Malang. Although, FSLDK issued a 
state1nent stating that KAMMI vvas not its constituent body, it vvas clear that the 
n1ove1nent rnetribers were frotn JT and FSLDK.58 Fahri Han1zah a well-k11ovvn JT 
actjvist \Vas the first chainnan of KAMMI. 59 The second POS vvas the presence of allies 
in the fo1111 of powerful individuals like An1ien Rais to support the challenge against the 
state . An1ien Rais was part of ICMI , which was a partner of the regime. As such, hi s 
open challenge to the regin1e was significant. 
57 ibid. Also see Buletin As-Salemi, BWAS, No. 69. 
58 Mahfudz Sidiq, KAA11'41 dan Pergulatan Reformasi:Kiprah Politik Aktffis Dakwah Kampus dalam 
Pe,juangan Dernokratisasi di T'engah Gelornbang Krisis Nasional lvfultidirnensi (Solo: Era Intermedia, 
7Ql) -"'") 104' -p ~ _1, p . . ). 
59 Others in the leadership ofKM1MI were also active in JT. Interview with Fahri Hamzah, 15 :tvfay 2011. 
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A n1a.1or constraint that still existed during this period was the state's propensity for 
repression and violence. In the 1nidst of its weakening power base, elen1ents \Vithin the 
country's leadership stat.ied a violent crackdown on the opposition forces. Forces linked 
to General Probowo Subianto, Suharto's son-in-law, were apparently responsible for the 
killings of four students at the [lniversUas Trisakti who were rnarching and urging the 
governrnent to step dovvn. 60 Prabowo also purpotiedly worked with the Ko,nite Indonesia 
[lntuk Solidaritas Dunia 1s·la,n (The Indonesian Cotnmittee for the Solidarity of the 
Muslin1 world, K.ISDI) to spread anti-Zionist and anti-Christian sentin1ents by clain1ing 
that these eletnents sought to undennine the Indonesjan state. As a result, riots broke out, ~ 
. 
. 
leading to n1ore than a thousand dead on the 13 and 14 of May 1998. Noticeably, there 
was an alleged governtnent hand in the riots , indicating clearly the governrnenfs 
_propensity for repression. The den1ise of the regin1e, and the succession of B .J Habibie as 
the new president of Indonesia, sa,v a considerable reduction in the violence. A new 
political systen1, ,vhich was n1ore open, was e1nerging. 
llfissed Opportuni(v or Calculated Political Move: HT/ and the Collapse o.f the New 
Order Regbne 
ln a pioneering study of the etlect of 1nissed opportunities on women ' s rights groups in 
Arnerica, Savvyers and Meyer argued that the failure of ,vo1nen ' s groups to exploit POS 
led to the 1narginalization, co-optation and de-politicisation of actors within these 
groups. 61 HTI's response to the vveakening of the New Order regin1e has been a subject 
of debate vvithin the party ,vith son1e arguing that HTI's decision to stay on the sidelines 
of the protest n1oven1ent led to the party's rnarginalization . HTI leaders ,vere already 
discussing the strategies the party should undertake m responding to Suharto ' s 
,veakening grip on po\ver. A decision vvas n1ade for sorne HTT leaders to rneet 
Indonesian n1ilitary leaders in 1_998 to gain better insights into the political dynmnics. A 
HTI delegatioi1, led by Al-Khaththath, n1et General Wiranto , the then coriln1ander in 
60 Michael R.J. Vatikiotis, Indonesian Politics under Suharto : The Rise and Fall of the New Order (London; New York: Routledge, 1998), p. 224. 
61 Here co-option means that actors or the social 1novement itself choose to be part of the system 
by forming political parties to contest in elections while de-politicisation means that men,bers leave th e. 
movernent as they believe their goals have been achieved. Traci M. Sav.ryers and David S. , .1{eyer, "Mi ssed 
Opporiunities : Social Movement Abeyance and Public Policy, " Social Problems 46 , 110 . 2 ( ] 099) ., p. 193. 
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chief of ABRI, through the auspices of Adyaksa Dault, vvho \Vas a fon11er LDK activist.62 
Another n1ilitary leader that HTI n1et was Tyasno Sudarto, the then arn1y chief. 
In the aftennath of the n1eetings, HTI leaders debated their next course of action. While 
so1ne such as Saifuddin Asip, the then chain11an of HTI felt that they should en1erge 
publicly and join the den1onstrations to call on Suharto to step down, Al-Baghdadi 
re1nained adarnant that HTI should ren1ain underground as he vvas convinced the 
governn1ent \Vill survive .. Al-Baghdadi's political calculations \Vere based on . his 
experience in the Middle East. The exan1ples of the Han1a rebellion in Syria and various 
atte1npts to ove1ihro\v the Jordanian govenunent, \ivhich failed goven1ed his decision. He 
felt that the Suhario governrnent could very well survive the protests and den1onstrations 
since, to his 111ind, they \Vere 111uch sn1aller than the uprisings in the 11iddle East. He 
observed that I-IT in Syria and Jordan were virtually obliterated as a result of these 
. -~ 
rniscalculations and conveyed this to the HTI leaders. 6-1 More irnportantly .. he noted that 
the regin1es propensity for violent actions have yet to decrease with elen1ents of the 
n1ilitary continuing to repress opposition to the regirne. He felt that it is politically 
expedient :for the party to rernain under6rround and assess the political situation before 
en1barking on any action. VVhile rnany of the HTI leaders felt sceptical of Al-Baghdadi ' s 
decision, they accepted it. 
A second debate ensued follo\ving - Suharto ' s actual dovvnfall. AI-Ba12:hdadi was 
. ~ ~ 
apparently surprised by this developn1ent. HTI leaders vvelcorned Suharto ' s resignation 
and viewed the developn1ent as an irnportant opportunity for the party. Hovvever, there 
were at least two schools of thought \Vi thin HTI over the next course of action. Most HTI 
. ._, 
leaders \Vere keen to launch HTI publicly. Al-Baghdadi vvas still hesitant, but his fears 
and wo1Ties \Vere assuaged by the other HTI leaders ,vho convinced hi111 that the 
advantages of launching HTI publicly far out,veighed the risk of the paiiy being banned 
and n1en1bers persecuted. 
62 Interview with ~1uhammad Al-Khaththath, 15 October 2009, Bogor. Adyaksa Dault was Wiranto's 
tiephe,v and was to become a leader of the PKS. It is highly probable that Adyaksa did j·oin HTI halaqah 
while he was a student at the University of Indonesia. 
63 lnterview with Abdul Rahman Al-Baghdadi, 10 August 2009, Bogor. 
- . - . .._ 
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The decision 1nade by HTI's leadership was overtun1ed by the central leadership of HT. 
The Aniir of HT rejected the decision n1ade by HTI leaders to en1erge publicly. Several 
reasons could have led to this decision. 64 Firstly, HT leadershjp continued at this point to 
be focused on the Middle East and 1night not have seen the need for funds'to be diverted 
to da 'awah effo1is in Indonesia, a country they viewed as being on the periphery of the 
Muslitn world. Secondly, the central leadership of HT failed to understand the political 
situation in Indonesia. The A,nh-· had once again extrapolated frotn his experiences of the 
N[iddle East where the overthrow of a dictatorship often led to the ascent of a rnore brutal 
reginie.65 Al-K.haththath felt that the Arnir's decision resulted in a n1issed opportunity for 
HTT. Tn his view, HTT could have defined the Tslarni st agenda if th e party had emerged 
in1n1ediately after the fall of the regin1e. 66 
In analysing HTI's response to the weakening of the governn1ent and its subsequent 
collapse, it is useful to once again draw on Sawyer and Meyer's work. A n1issed 
opportunity would result 111 n1arginaHsation, co-option of n1en1bers and/or de-
politicisation of n1en1bers. While n1en1bers of HTI were unhappy with the decisions 
n1ade by Al-Baghdadi and later the HT leadership, there \Vas no exodus of n1en1bers fron1 
the party, vvhich n1eant that n1en1bers vvere neither co-opted nor depoliticised. 
Nonetheless, there \Vas a perception an1ong so111e rnernbers that the party 's t:1ilure to act, 
led to it being n1arginalized. These 1nen1bers felt that HTI dicr not contest the political 
vacuu1n filled by JT activists, thereby allovving JT to be the sole voice of lslmnist 
opposition to the regin1e. 
In contrast to the critical vievvs of his HTI activists, the decision rnade by AI-Baghdadi to 
remain underground prior to Suha11o's resignation could \Veil have been a calculated 
political decision rather than a 1nissed oppo11unity. While the regirne \Vas s110\ving signs 
of vveakness, its propensity for repression did not decrease significantly. The Trisakti 
killings were a clear n1anifestation of this. There was a likelihood of Indonesian 
authorities clainping down 011 HTI given- the fact that it was part of a transnational party 
64 Interview with Hafidz Abdurrahman, 12 October 2009, Jakaria. 
65 These exan1ples include the overthrow of the Libyan king in 1969 which saw the rise of Muammar 
Gacldafi who ruthlessly prosecuted all opposition to his regime. Similar examples can be seen in Iraq, Syria 
and Egypt. Interview with Al-Khaththath, 20 July 2010, l'akarta. 
66 ibid. . 
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that sought a change of govern1nent through a revolution. This is so because very often 
the foreign agenda of political groups had been used as an excuse by the Indonesian 
authorities to persecute oppositional political groups. 67 At the smne tin1e :- HTI 's goal of 
reviving the caliphate \vould have found little resonance \Vith the Indonesian centric 
goals of other oppositional forces. Inevitably, HTI ' s ii1volven1ent in the protest 
1noven1ent vvould have caused increased factions in the fray. Last but not least, n1any of 
the irnpo1iant figures such as An1ien Rais vvould not have suppo1ied HTI' s position. In 
this regard, HTI's public en1ergence and n1obilization during this period ,votdd only have 
led to the party being rnarginalized and its n1en1bers being persecuted. 
The do\vnfall of Suharto in May 1998 did ren1ove an in1portant obstacle or negative POS 
for HTI. While it is expected that HTI leaders vvottld spend several 111onths observing 
Indonesia's transition to der11ocracy, the tirne taken for HTI to ernerge and 1nobilize 
publicly was thought to be excessively long by so1ne HTI activists. These activists 
believed that HTI could have defined the Islan1ist agenda if it e1nerged publicly earlier. 
Once again, this could in fact be a rnisreading on their part. It is true that the expanded 
public sphere allo\,ved a rnyriad of ditTerent lslan1ist political parties and rnoven1ents to 
en1erge. 
The 1999 elections savv parties with lslarnist agendas be.corning legalized for the first 
. 
tin1e since 1950.68 These pmiies included the Justice Pa1iy (Partai Keadilan , PK) and the 
PBB. In addition to Islarnic parties, several Islan1ist n1ove1nents also ernerged around this 
tin1e. One such group vvas the Front Pernbela lrslarn (Islai11ic Defender's Front, FPI). The 
FPI, led by Habib Shihab, a pron1inent tnernber of the habaib (Isla.tnic religious scholars 
of Arab descent) cotntnunitv, carried out raids against bars. discos and brothels in 
. .. .- '--' .-
atten1pt to upljft 'Islatnic 111orality ' in the public do1nain. 69 These parties and 1nove111ents 
advocated the i1nplen1entation of Islarnic Ia,vs. Neve1iheless, HTI's agenda ,vas quite 
(ii An example of this is the Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI, I11donesian Communist Patty). 
68 See Azyumardi Azra, Indonesia , Jslcmz and Democrac.y: Dynamics in a Global Context (Jakarta: 
Solastice Publications, 2006), pp . 27-37 for details on Islam and politics following the collapse of the ew 
Order regime. 
69 Irfan S. A \Vwas , Risa/ah Kongres ,\l/1dahidin dan Penegakan Syari 'ah Jslarn (Yogyakarta: Wihdah Press , 
2001 ). Also see http :/i rnajelism ujahidin .wordpress.com/2008/01 /31/profil-majelis-mujahidin/#more-4 
Accessed on 13 February 2011. · 
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different fro111 that of these r11ove1nents . HTI was perhaps the first Tslamist 111ove111ent 
that en1erged post=New Order, which sought to challenge NKRI with a caliphate. 
The decision to delay launching HT publicly also al lowed the party to gauge the response 
of the nevv authorities and the larger Indonesian M.usli111 populace towards s0111e of its 
ideas. In July 1999, HTI organized a public fonun on J\Tationalis1n and the Revival of the 
lr.;lamic Conununity. 70 At this fonnn, HTI speakers conde1nned the concept of 
nationalisn1 and pron1oted the idea that NI(RI should be replaced with a caliphate. 71 The 
event was organized B WAS. HTI also statied distributing copies of the Al-Isla,n journal 
weekly during Friday prayers at n1osques throughout Jakarta and the surrounding areas . 
. Thetnes about the revival of the caliphate were discussed in the articles featured in the 
bulletin, which bears the nan1e of l(SICC. Once the party was sufficiently convinced that 
the political systen1 had beco1ne truly open, HTI leaders n1ade another appeal for HTI to 
be otiicially launched to the An1ir. The Amir sent an envoy to assess the political 
situation in Indonesia . Pern1ission for public en1ergence of HTI was finall y granted in 
early 2000 . The weakening of the Indonesian governn1ent and its subsequent downfall 
showed that the presence of POS alone n1ight not t~1c ilitate the public en1ergence of the 
1nove111ent. Constraints on the 1nove1nent and the availability of resources cou Id irnpact 
the final decision of the n1oven1ent. The next section of the chapter wil 1 discuss how HTI 
utilised the opening of the political syste111 to expand its 111.ernbership and n1obi li ze 
1ne1nbers towards collective action against the state. 
Launching the Struggle for a Caliphate: HTI behveen 2000~2009 
On 28th May 2000, HTI transforn1ed itself fron1 an underground 1novernent to an otTicial 
political party vvhen it convened a conference at the Senayan Tennis Stadiun1 in Jakarta. 
The conference \Vas attended by about t\VO thousand of its n1en1bers and supporters. It 
also 111arked a ne\V phase in HTrs engagernent \Vith the Indonesian public. Conventional 
understanding of POS argues that an open political systen1 is likely to herald greater 
political space for social rnovernents to launch collective act io ns, recrui t. rnobilize and 
conso lidate their position within the state. The party's leadership has ut ilized the n1ore 
open political systen1 to do exactly this. 
70 Salirn,"The Rise of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia" , p. 143. 
71 Interview with Farid Wajicli , 10 June 2009, Jakarta. 
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A scan of the activities of HTI betvveen 2000 and 2009 revealed an increase in the 
nurnber of collective actions unde1iaken by HTI. Collective action is understood as 
de1nonstrations. the issuance of ofiicial staten1ents, n1arches, conferences, as vvell as 
visits to governrnent offices. A scrutiny of nevvspaper repotis on HTI also reveals a 
substantial increase in the nun1ber of de1nonstrations bet\Neen 2004 and 2909.72 During 
this period. Is1nail Yusanto being the spokes1nan of the · party issued sixty-t\vo press 
state1nents (an average of one press staten1ent per 111011th) addressing issues in1pacting 
Indonesia and the Muslirn world. 73 The collective actions are airned at achieving several 
'-' 
goals. Firstly the pmiy' s leadership ,vanted to gain recognition for HTI as vvell as its 
objectives in the rninds of the Indonesian public. Isrnail Yusanto cornplained that few 
Indonesians kne\N about the party \Nhen it first ernerged in 2000. Hovvever, due the large 
nurnber of collective actions that the party held, rnore Indonesians are now a,vare of HTl 
and its objective of reviving the caliphate. Secondly, HTI sought to establish the party as 
the n1ost prorninent radical Islan1ist group in Indonesia. vVhile it is difficult to ascertain 
whether it has succeeded in doing so, HTI' s views on issues are often cited by local and 
international n1edia to be representative of radical Islarn. 74 
I\1eyer and Staggenborg profetTed that political openness ,voLdd also enhance the 
prospects for n1obilization.75 This is true in the case of HTI. The open political systern 
allo,ved the party to expand its resourc.es and rnobilization capabilities. This included the 
establishrnent of publishing houses to churn out books, parnphlets and nevvspapers and 
the production of audio-visual rnaterial airned at espousing its ideas. the pariy is now 
able to devise strategies tatgeting different segn1ents of the Indonesian Musli1n populace 
for recruitrnent. The open political syste1T1 in Indonesia also allows the party to organize 
international HT events in Jakarta. HTr s resource tnobi I ization strategies wi 11 be 
cl iscussed in greater detail in Chapter 5. 
7 2 See News Reports from Republika, Tempo and Jakarta Post. Republika tend to carry more news about 
HTT than other newspapers. 
73 HTl Press Releases Between 2004-2009 courtesy of Ismail Yusanto. . 
74 The Indonesian English daily, Jakarta Post ·would often cite HTI leaders whenever the newspaper 
requires a conservati ve take on issues. 
75 Staggenborg, "Iv1ovements , Counte1111ovements, and the Structure of Political Opportunity. ", p. 1634. 
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The tnost i111po1iant itnpact of the open political system was the ability of the HTl to now 
en1bark on building social capital in Indonesia. Prior to the fall of the regin1e, HTI was an 
underground n1ove1nent and thus could not build relationships with individuals and 
organizations that were dee1ned to be politically and socially influential. Nonetheless, the 
open political syste1n has 1nade this possible. HTI began establishing relations with 
1nilitary figures , politicians and religious leaders. HTI leaders such as A 1-Khaththath and 
-Yusanto were even invited to sit on the board of the MUT. This is by no rr1eans an easy 
feat given HTrs reputation as an extren1ist organization. ~HTI played an impo1iant role in 
forn1ing an in1portant un1brella organization con1prising 40 Muslim organizations, the 
FUI in 2005 
Whv is HTI not Moderating its Den1ands? 
Theorists of the POS strand vvithin SMT have den1onstrated that an open political systen1 
often leads to social n1oven1ents n1oderating their stance and \vorking vvithin the systen1 
to achieve their goals. Often in the process, the den1ands of these n1oven1ents will be 
n1oderated. On the other hand, a closed political systen1 tends to produce underground 
n1ove1nents that are confrontational, seeking to undern1ine the state and n1ight even resort 
to violence. In his analysis of violence in Pakistan, Hafez argued that the jihad culture in 
Pakistan which prevailed under the Zia-ul-Haq's regin1e led -to the proliferation and 
strengthening of violent Islamist rnovements despite the opening up of the political 
system and the inclusion of lslarnists \Vithin the governn1ent. 76 Arguably, this jihad 
culture 1s not prevalent in Indonesia. While sorne elen1ents vvithin the rnilitary have 
suppo1ied Islmnist groups in the past, there is little evidence to suggest that there is an 
ofiicial support of extren1ist elen1ents vvithin Indonesia. Yet HTI has tin1e and again 
chosen to \Vork outside the systen1 and refused to participate in the electoral systern. 77 
Whi le HTI has rernained avovvedly non-violent in its approach , the extent to \Vhich HTI 
has evolved itself \Vithin the systen1 is to sirnply recruit rnernbers, convincing elites about 
the need to revive the caliphate and creating avenues for itself to subsequently overthrow 
76 Hafez, Why J\;fushms Rebel, pp. 60-61 
77 HTI leaders have indicated the possibility of contesting elections at several juncture. Neve1iheless it 
seems that these statements were more rhetorical since the party has yet to make any serious atternpts to 
register itself as a political pa1i. See "Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia: Demokrasi No, Pemilu?" Sabili, No 5 (20 
September 2007), pp. 17-21 and 11Hizbut Tahrir Masuk P'arlemen, Mengapa Tidak, Suara HidaJ'atullah 
(April 2005), pp. 39-45 
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the goven1n1ent. There are perhaps tvvo fi1ctors that best explain the reasons for HTI's 
refusal to work within the systen1. Firstly, as a transnational party controlled by a 
leadership in the Middle East, its leaders there 111akes the final decisions. It is highly 
unlikely that the party's leadership \Vill tolerate any atten1pt by any of its chapters to 
\Vork \vithin the systern. More in1portantly, at the ideological level, HTI represents a 
fonn of Islarnisn1, vvhich is puritan and uncornprornising. This rneans that its focus lies 
rnainly in ensuring that the caliphate is revived and do not see any other outcon1e as a 
success. The irnpotiance of ideology \Nill be further ·explored in Chapter 6. 
Conclusion 
This chapter sought to understand the external factors that in1pacted the en1ergence and 
growth of HTI as well as the decision rnaking process within HTI. It argued that both 
institutional and non-institutional POS are equally irnportant in detennining decisions 
n1ade by HT leaders . It is further argued that these factors were crucial in detern1ining 
Al '." Baghdadi ' s decision to forn1 a chapter of HT in Indonesia, his recruitn1ent and 
rnobilization strategies as well as the tin1ing for the party to en1erge publicly. The chapter 
began by exarnining both the objectivist and subjectivist approaches to POS. It is argued 
that the subjectivist approach is 1nore accurate in detennining a POS . It was further 
explained that institutional factors alone cannot explain decisions taken by Al-Baghdadi 
and HTI leaders. Non-institutional frlctors are equally i111portant in doing so. During its 
fon11ati ve years, A..1-Baghdadi was not deterred fron1 fonning a chapter of HT despite the 
presence of negative POS, such as a closed political system, and the high level of state 
repression . Non-institutional POS such as the vvorldvvide resurgence of Jslan1, Isla1nic 
student activis111 and institutional POS such as the patronage of pro1ninent IsJainic 
scholar, Abdullah Bin Nub encouraged Al-Baghdadi to atte1npt the fonnation of a 
chapter of HT in Indonesia. The chapter then proceeded to exa1nine the changes in the 
goven1rnent's attitude to\;vanfs Islmn that occurred during the 'keterbukaan' period. Thjs 
decreased state repression and the changing attitude towards Islan1 provided HTI with 
opportunities to e1nbark on expanding its 1ne1nbership while still re1naining an 
underground groLip. A non-institutional constraint . in the fo1111 of inter-organizational 
conflict with JT also resulted in the shift in its 1nen:1bership recruit1nent. 
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The chapter also discussed whether HTrs delay in its public en1ergence prior to the fall 
of Suharto and in the irnrnediate aftern1ath of the dernise of the Nev; Order regin1e 
resulted in a 1nissed opportunity for the party to establish itself as a key opponent of the 
regitne and also as an i1nportant Islmnist group. In conclusion, it was felt that the 
decision taken by the pmiy was a calculated political decision that salvaged the patiy 
frotn potentially being politically obliterated. In the last section of the chapter, it was 
shown that the new open political system resulted in the patiy 's ability to launch 
collective action , en1bark on new rnobilization strategies and build social capital for the 
party. This section also explained that unlike n1any other social n1oven1ents that tend to 
1noderate their position in an open political systetn HTI did not do so O\Ving to its 
unswerving foreign leadership and anti-systen1ic ideology. The next chapter will discuss 
in details the resource n1obilization strategy of HTI. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: PROCURING RESOURCES FOR THE PARTY 
In every co untry about 100-200 elites control the whole country. These elites c01nprise 
the military, political and business elites. You convince these elites about the need to 
revive the caliphate and the caUphate will be bon1 The Co1n1nL1nist Revolution happen 
because a snrnll group of Russian elites believed that a con1n1unist state is the best option 
for the country. We are \Vorking tov.rards this goal. A large n1ernbership is not in1portant. 
We need members to convince these elites and prepare the nrnsses for the eventual return 
of the caliphate (Fahn1i A1nhar, Leader of HTI) 
Social move1n ent theorists have assun1ed that the availability of resources enhances the 
likelihood of collective action. They see hun1an resources , social-organizational 
resources and 1nateriaI resources as being significant to the rise of social-1nove1nents. In ._ ...., 
this reg·ard , f ahn1i Arnhar ' s clain1 that HTI \Vas less interested in a large 111en1bership 
n1ight seen1 surprising to n1any SMT theorists. Nevertheless, a closer exan1ination of the 
n1oven1ent \Nill reveal that HTl has clearly in1plen1ented successful resource n1obilization 
strategies, especiall y in securing n1anpower and n1aterial resources, for the 111ove111ent. 
This chapter argues that HTI has e±Iectively built a strong organizational structure, by 
recruiting 111e111bers and procuring funds, leading to its growth in Indonesia. However, it 
has been less successful in building social capital. The developn1ent of the argurnent \Nill 
closely adhere to the resource-n1obilization strand of SMT as its tern1s of reference. 
There are four sections to the chapter. The first section will briefly touch on the 
theoretical underpinnings of the resource rnobilization strand of SMT. The relationship 
bet\veen the organizational structure of social 111oven1ents and its resource n1obilization ~ 
. 
strategies \Nill be explored. I \Nill discuss how the success of a SMT' s resource 
n10 bi I izati on strategies can be assessed. The second section of this chapter 'Nill also 
exarnine the organizational structure of HTI. This section \Nill also exan1ine the difierent 
'-· 
rec ruitn1ent strategies that HTI en1ploys to attract difierent segn1ents of Indonesian 
society. A con1parison \Ni ll be n1ade betv1een the recruitn1ent strategies ernployed by the 
party during and after the Ne\N Order period. It also explores the n1ass recruitn1ent 
strategies such as the usage of publications, n1ass rnedia, public events and rnosques for 
the furtherance of their goals. It is to be noted that all these rnass recruitn1ent strategies 
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are largely ai1ned at recruiting sytnpathizers for the party. Moreover, we will also review 
the targeted approaches undertaken by the party to recruit potential n1er11bers through the 
usage of fonnal organizations such as J\1uslirnah Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia and GEMA. In 
the third section, we exmnine HTI's attempts at building social capital. The likelihood of 
HTI using violence as a rnobilization strategy will also be addressed. Finally, the last 
section assesses the success and litnitations of HTJ's resource mobilization strategies on 
the patiy's gro\vth in Indonesia. 
Procuring and Mobilizing Resources in SMT 
In her sen1inal work on Islan1ist-afiiliated charities in Jordan, Egypt and Yen1en, Janine 
Clark noted the in1portance of these institutions in the grovvth and developtnent of 
lslan1ist n1oven1ents in these countries. 1 Social institutions are just one of the n1any 
resources procured and utilized by Islan1ist n1oven1ents to serve as in1portant platforn,s 
for recruitn1ent. Such a trend is observable in the developn1ent and growth stages of 
n1any earlier social n1oven1ents. In trying to understand these trends, early theorists of 
SMT developed a variant of the theory, known as resource tnobili zation theory (RMT). 
According to RMT, social n1oven1ents n1ust be able to procure and n1obilize key 
resources as an irnportant factor in their development. RMT further exp la ins that social 
movements are not likely to emerge successfu ll y and n1ake any headvvay \vithout 
i1npo1iant resources. These rnay take such forn1s as l1un1a11 resources (rnernbers and 
syn1pathizers), social organizational resources (forn1al institutions and inforn1al 
netvvorks) and 111aterial resources (funds). The theory further explains that these 
resources 111ust be allocated for the explicit purpose of pursuing the group's interests 
through collective action . Charles Tilly argues that a group is unljkely to be able to 
contend for po\ver \Vithout appropriating rnobilized resources to influence other groups 
to\vards its objectives.2 The evidence frorn the ernpirical data in this thesis points to the 
irnportance of HTI's organizational structure (social-organizational resource) in its 
etTorts to procure other resources such as n1e111bers and funds. 
1 Clark, Jslarn , Charitv, and Activism, 2004. 
2 Ti I ly, From !vfobili::.~:ttion to Revo lution , p. 78 
l 3 1 
Studies on Islan1ic social n1oven1ents have cited the 111osque, professionals, student 
organizations and Jslan1ic Non-Governn1ental Organizations (NGOs) as in1portant 
organizational resources that such rnoven1ents utilize to dravv potential recruits and 
n1obilize activists. 3 Others have noted the in1portance of using inforn1al net\vorks in not 
only recruiting ne,v 1ne1nbers, but also influencing others outside the 1nove111ent to_ assist 
in its goals. Ziad l\!Iuhson in his irnportant study of the Muslin1 Brotherhood in Egypt 
also alluded to the in1portance of organizational structure in ensuring the long tin1e 
survival of the Brotherhood.4 Recruitn1ent of 111e111bers is perhaps one of the n1ost 
in1portant tasks that social n1overnents n1ust undertake, to ensure that there is necessary 
n1anpo,ver that they can utilize when needed. David Sno,v argues that direct contact 'With 
an agent of the rnovernent is essential in the process of recruitn1ent. ) This is basically an 
irnrnersion progrmn vvhereby the potential recruit is systen1atically introduced to the 
n1overnent. 6 Often rnovernents develop a variety of recruitn1ent strategies to . target 
different groups. Garner argues that these strategies usually en1anate fron1 the ideology of 
the n1overnent. 7 Snow suggests that the recruitn1ent strategy could also be influenced by 
a rnovernent's organizational structure. He notes that 1noven1ents with · n1ore exclusive 
structures tend to depend on interpersonal networks while those with a rnore inclusive 
structure tend to recruit in public places.8 While the organizational structure of a social 
tnovetnent is in1po1iant, the inclusive and exclusive aspects might not necessarHy apply 
to all social n1oven1ents. In the case of HTI, the organizational structure could best be 
described as a group of concentric circles, vvith the recruit1nent strategies of the pmiy 
devised with a clear intent of placing its actors within successive pairs of concentric 
circles radiatin g outwards fron1 the centre of the pany nucleus. 
3 See Wickham, A1obilizing Islarn , 2002; Clark, Islarn, Charity, and Activisrn and Clement M. Henry and 
~odney \1/ilson (eds) , The Politics oflslmnic Finance (Edinburgh: Edin.burgh University Press , 2004). 
~ Ziad t-.1uhson , ''Islamic Mobilization: Smt and Egyptian 11uslim Brotherhood," The Sociological 
Quarterly 42, no.4 (20 01).pp. 487-510 . 
5 L. Zurcher, David Snow and S. Ekland-Olson , ''Social Networks aryd So~ial Movements: A 
Microstructural Approach to Differential Recruitment," Anzerican Sociological Review 45, no. 5 (1980) , p. 
787. 
6 ibid. p. 789 . 
7 R. Ash Garner, Soda! l\11ovements in An1erica (Chicago: r-.1arkhan1 Publishing Company, 1972); Jo 
Freeman, "On the Origins of Social Movements," in Jo Freeman's (ed) Social 111/ovemen!s of the Sixties and 
Seventies, (N e"v York: Longman, 1983), pp. 8-30 and John Wilson, Introduction ofSocial Movernents 
(Lond on: Basi c Books, 1973). 
8 Sno\v~ Zurcher and Olson, " Social Networks", p. 796. 
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Organizing the Hizbiyyin 
In trying to understand the organizational structure of HTI, it is perhaps useful for 
current tnodels proposed by S.MT theori sts to be exatnined. The two structures most 
commonly used are those referred to as inclusive and exclusive. ZaJcl and Garner defined 
an inclusive organization as one with relatively unrestricted 1ne1nbership and requiring 
1nini1nal level of initial com1nit1nent. In contrast, an exclusive organization is one, which 
requires a higher level of con11nit1nent from rnetnbers who share a set of beliefs and 1neet 
a den1ancling standard of conduct. Often, the exclusive organization's activities penneate 
every aspect of a tnernber's life. 9 I\1embers are expected to pay dues ., spend their ,vhole 
life in activities related to the n1oven1ent and in son1e cases adopt assumed names. In a 
study of Gennan terrori stn ., it was noted that the rni litants' total dependence on the group, 
internal assignn1ent of roles and division of labour led to the loss of identity. '0 While 
aspects of these n1odels are useful in trying to understand HTI, there are several 
lin1itations in the two n1odels in studying a n1oven1ent like HTI. Firstly, its organizational 
structure has both features of exclusive and inclusive n1odels, and as such, the dichotorny 
dravvn between the two n1odels is not necessarily clear. Secondly, these n1odels do not 
factor in the role of allies who n1ight actually contribute n1ore to the n1oven1ent than 
sy1npathizers and supporters. This 111eans that its concentric circles 1nodel could better 
exp lain son1e of the strategies of HTI. 
The concentric circles n1oclel con1prises three successive layers of radiating rings fron1 
the centre. At the first layer are the 111en1bers of HTI. The second layer are rnade up of 
the darts (students) of the pmiy~ \virile in the last layer are allies of the party. I\1ernbers 
,vho fonn the concentric circle are regarded as junior rnernbers of HTI. They rnust first 
dernonstrate la1ovvledge of the pmiy through in-depth study of HT ' s texts. The process of 
beco1ning a rnernber could take anything between two to six years. Potential 1nen1bers 
are required to take an oath of allegiance (bai 'ah). Other Isla1nist 1novements including 
9 Donatella Della Porta, "Left \.Ving TeITorism in Italy" in .t\1artha Crenshaw's (ed) Ten ·or)sm in Conte.xi (Univers ity Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995 ), p. l 07. 
1
° Klaus Wasmund, "The Political Socialization of West German Terrori sts," in Peter H Merkl (eel), 
Political Violence and Terror: !vfotifs and lvfotivations (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986), p. 
214. 
· 
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the Muslin1 Brotherhood and Al-Qaeda often adopt this practice. 11 Bai •'ah is an in1portant 
con1ponent of HTI's ideology. Men1bers vow to be loyal to HT's constitution and its 
leadership. Bai ' ah also serves an irnportant function of being a binding agent. The 
practice of bai'ah can be traced back to the Prophet hirnself. It is believed that Prophet 
Muharnrnacl had received bai 'ah fron1 the I\1uslin1s of IYiedina after he 111igrated fron1 
IYlecca, effectively n1aking hiln the nevv leader of Medina. Bai ' ah is therefore a social 
contract bet\veen the leader of an Islan1ic group and the people wherein the leader 
prornises to obey Islarnic la\v and the people in exchange for the pron1ise of their 
allegiance . 12 This practice in essence requires n1en1bers to . hold their allegiance to HT, 
failing vvhich they \Vill be seen to contravene Islan1ic la\vs . It is also seen as a pron1ise to 
God that a Muslin1 rnakes. In spite of this, unlike sorne Islarnist organizations, HTI falls 
short of declaring ex-rne111bers infidels. ,__. 
Men1bers are often tasked with the role of leading a study cell referred to as a halaqah 
and are usually tested for several rnonths before being given a rnore irnportant task. In 
son1e parts of Indonesia, such as Bali and Aceh, where n1en1bership of HTI is srnalL 
these n1ernbers could even sit in HTl's district leadership, kno\vn as the Dewan Phnpinan 
Daerah (District Executive Con1rnittee, DPD). This structure is extren1ely hierarchical 
starting at the lo \Vest level of the DPD follo\ved by the Devvan Pilnpinan FVilayah 
(Provincial Executive Cor11n1ittee~ D_PW); a con1rnittee that is in-charge of the 
1nove1nent's activities in each of Indonesia's thirty-three provinces. The DPD is headed 
by a local chair known as naqib and the DPW is led by a A1a 'sul. 13 The naqib is 
essentially tasked with the 1nanaging a fevv study circles within the locality while the 
f\,fa ·sul (mayor) rnanages the different districts operating \Vithin the province. In the 
Indonesian context, a wilayah co1n1nittee known as the Dewan Pilnpinan Pusat (Central 
Executive Cotntnittee, _DPP) led by a Mu 'ta,nad oversees all the activities of HTI. The 
first such cotntnittee vvas fanned under the leadership of Al-Baghdadi in 1993 .14 It was 
around this ti1ne that HTI becmne pa1i of the global structure of HT. Indonesia becmne 
one of the wilayahs (provinces) of HT. The Ketua [!rnurn (Chairn1an) of HTI is Rokhn1at 
11 Ziad Muhson , "Muslin, Brotherhood'', p. 50. 
12 J avid lqbal , ·'The Concept of State in lslam in i\t1umtaz Ahmed's (ed) State, Politics and Jsla,n 
(Indianapolis: American Trust Publications, 1986), p. 38. 
13For more on the I eadersh ip structure of HT, see Taj i-Farouki , A Fundamental Quest, p.116. 
,'1 lntervievv with Abdul Rahman Al-Baghdadi, 19 March 2009, Bogor. -
- • • <.,_.: 
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S Labib. A !though Labib is the official chainnan, he rnight not have been the J\1u 'tarnad, 
the identity of who111 is kept a secret. The A1u 'tcunad is expected to take orders fron1 the 
A1nir and_ the central leadership of HT, currently believed to be based in Amman. ln the 
event that the leaders of a particular chapter of HT are arrested, its operations can b~ 
tnanaged by the Mu 'ta,nad of HT in another chapter. For instance the HT Mu 'tamad in 
India is currently managing the affairs of its chapter in Bangladesh, follovving the arrests 
of central co1n111ittee 1ne1nbers of HT Bangladesh. 
Sin1ilar to the chapters of HT in other countries, HTI closely guards the hierarchy of i_ts 
leadership . While metnbers of the OPP are known , they are careful not to di sclose who 
an1ongst these n1en1bers are the Jvfu 'tarnad and naqib. Only n1en1bers of the OPP \Vi 11 
know who the actual Mu 'ta,nad is. Seven depart1nents k11ovvn as lajnah (co1n1nittees) 
also exist within the DPP, DPW, and DPD. These departn1ents oversee politics, Islan1ic 
law, econon1ics, external networking and funds. Two autonon1ous bodies also exist 
within the HTT organizational structure, the A1uslilnah Hizbut Tahrir (MHTf, Hizbut 
Tahrir Won1en's Wing) and c;erakan Pe,nbebasan A1ahasi.\·1-i:a (The Undergraduate 
En1ancipation Movement, GEMA). 15 There is a high degree of cornn1itn1ent expected 
fron1 these n1en1bers. They provide the nece.ssary n1anpovver and funds for the 
n1oven1ent. These 111en1bers often devote their entire lives to HTI. Me1nbers also enjoy 
certain privileges within the party. As a stakeholder within the r,arty, they have the right 
to question the Mu 'taniad and even the An1ir of HT on decisions that are rnade within the 
party. They can also register their concerns about n1isn1anagen1ent within the party 
chapter to the A niir direct I y. 16 
Syrnpathizers or daris of HTI fonn the second ring of the concentric layer of HTI"s 
organizational structure. These syn1pathizers often belong to a halaqah and are daris 
(student) of the party but not adequately indoctrinated to beco1ne full 1nen1bers. They are 
often grouped together vvithin a study cell referred to as a halaqah. Each halaqah 
cornprises five to seven HTI activists and syrnpathizers. The dari.s have to go through a 
dernand ing study progran1 if they are to becorne rnernbers. On average, daris \Vi 11 take 
15 Interview with Agung Wisnuwardana, Central Committee l\!1ember ofHTI in charge or-Yo uth Affairs, 
24 March 2008, Jakarta 
· · 
16 Sources within HTI claims that members can send emails to the Aniir. 
135 
between t\,yo to seven years before they eventually beco111e n1en1bers. It is interesting to 
note that son1e daris consider then1selves as full cadres of the party. 17 The decision to 
upgrade a daris to a fuU n1en1ber is n1ade by the naqib after receiving feedback fro111 the 
respective head of the halaqah. One prorninent leader of HTI noted that about one-third 
of those \Vho are daris continue to be rnernbers \,yhile the rest rernain as daris \Vithin the 
party structure. 18 The key di±Terence betvveen the first and second layers of HTI ' s 
organizational structure lies in the co1nr11itn1ent level expected fron1 the daris and 
n1e111bers. Unlike 111en1bers, daris do not hold any position within the party's hierarchy. 
They are also not expected to contribute a portion of their incorne to the party although 
. ' 
they are encouraged to rnake donations to the party which are are not fixed or regular. 
The third layer of the concentric circles n1ode1 of the party refers to the allies of the 
party. These are people. who are 111en1bers of other Islan1ic groups, n1oven1ents and 
parties but are deen1ed to share son1e con1111on goals vvith HTI. As rnentioned in Chapter 
3~ HTI envisaged a three step process in its airn to revive the caliphate. At the second 
stage; is a process known as nusrah whereby the party is allowed to seek assistance fron1 
in1portant elites in the country such as politicians, the 111ilitary and business con1111unity. 
To this end, HTI leaders and activists devise nun1erous strategies to build strong social 
relationships vvith individuals that are deerned irnportant for its cause. Allies of the party 
could also be individuals \,yho are not potential nusrah partners bt1t ,vho suppo1i the idea 
of reviving the Islan1ic caliphate. Hafidz Abdunahrnan surn1ised that the percentage of 
those vvho vvill be HTI' s syn1phatizers ,vill be less than 1 % of the population and its 
111er11bers are going to be an even s111aller nun1ber. Notwithstanding this, HTI is working 
to\vards its target of ensuring that at least half of the rest of the Indonesian Muslin1s ,vill 
support the revival of the caliphate. 
17 This is a common problem not unique to HTI, HT chapters in other parts of the world often have to deal 
with bad publicity about former members who tum to violence or even denounce HT. Many of these 
individuals are daris i·ather than full members of HT. Some prominent examples of these daris included Ed 
Husain and Shiraz iv1aher, both of whom are critical of HT. In the case of Indonesia, several prominent 
former HTI members included ~1unarman, the infamous lawyer involved in acts of violence at }donas 
commonl y refeJTed to as the Jvfonas Tragedy . · 
18 lntervievv with Farid Wajidi , 10 June 2009, Jakarta. 
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Controlling the Par(p in Indonesia 
HTI's organizational structure provides an i1npo1iant control 1nechanisn1 for its 
leadership. Mernbers at ditTerent levels kno\,v only those vvhon1 they report to and several 
of the key leaders. Sarne n1en1bers are not avvare of all those vvho sit in the D PP. 
Nevertheless, the naqib often rnaintains a personal relationship \Vith 1nen1bers of the 
respective halaqahs that repo1i to hin1. Sin1ilarly, the Mu 'tarnad in Indonesia is often 
personally in touch with the n1a'sul in each province. A representative fron1 the An1ir in 
Beirut is sent to Indonesia at least four ti1nes a year to observe the developrnent of the 
chapter in Indonesia or whenever a chapter is undergo ing a crisis. Thi s representative, 
one Abu Zohra first started visiting Indonesia in 1993. In 2002, another representative, 
Abu Mahrnud was sent to rnonitor activities of HTI. In each of these visits, the Aniir's 
representative will rneet rnen1bers of the DPP, a few n1en1bers of the DPW and DPD as 
well as n1en1bers of the won1en and student chapters. Such rneetings are held in srnall 
groups or even individually (not in the case of worn en). The purpose of such visits is to 
ensure that n1en1bers are well connected with the larger HT leadership and reduce the 
chance of breakaway factions within HTT. While the structure in place has been largely 
successful, both Al-K_haththath and Al-Baghdadi have noted that there are severe fla\vs 
within the syste1n. In part, the cutTent syste111 ensures that power rests finn ly in the hands 
of the A1nir and his central co1n1nittee with little roon1 for any differences in opinion to 
ernerge. At the saine ti1ne, the }Vfu 'tamad can easily try to S\vay the Amh·'s representative 
to meet rnernbers who are deerned to be supportive of the country's leadership and as 
such the central leadership n1ight not be aware of problen1s within a particular chapter. It 
is pe1iinent to note that these different level s of n1en,bership \Vithin HTI inevitab ly lead 
to a diversity of ideas and co1nn1itn1ent levels within HTI. At the san1e tin1e, it al lows for 
those who are interested to study the group to do so in a 1neticulous way \Vhi le leaving 
then1 out fron1 in1portant decision n1aking positions. As \Vill be den1onstrated in the next 
section, HTI 's organizational structure also in1pacts the party's strategies in procuring 
other resources such as hun1an and n1aterial resources. 
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Understariding the Recruitn1ent Strategies of HTI 
Bert Klandersrnan proposed that n1obilization of hu111an resources within social 
n1overnents occurred in t\vo stag~s, by consensus and action rnobilization. Consensus 
tnobi I ization refers to the di ssen1ination of views of the 1nove1nent. Action n1obilization 
refers to the transforn1ation of those who are likely- to be rnore predisposed to the vie\VS 
of the 1nove1nent into participants. 19 At the level of consensus 1nobilization, the focus of 
the rnovernent is on educating the rnasses about the ideas of HTI. 20 The rnajority of these 
rnasses wi 11 not end up being associated vvith HTI. Consensus 1nobilization is ai1ned at 
creating al lies for HTl. Only a small ·percentage of those that HTI engage \vithin this 
group will move on to becorne daris or syn1pathizers thus forn1ing the second layer of 
concentric circles of HTI and an even s1naller group \Vill beco1ne 1ne1nbers. Few of the 
core 1ne1nbers of HTI tend to be recruited through these strategies. Such strategies could 
• (.,,,.., ........ I..,,., 
involve the use of publications and the Inten1et, organizing public events and the usage 
of n1osques. Consensus n1obilization also involves the fon11ation of an array of un1brella 
groups and netvvorks ain1ed at targeting i1npo1iant allies for the paiiy ai1ned at building 
social capital for the party. At the level of active n1obilization, HTI targets specific 
groups that fonn the bulk of its first concentric circle. The key target groups for active 
111obilization are professionals and students. Due to the active contributory historical role 
that studenrs , young professionals and won1en have played-in the party, these groups are 
often targeted at the level of active 1110.bilization. They are often recruited through the use 
of afiiliated organizations such as student and won1en ' s groups, as well as inforn1al 
net,vorks . A.ctive 111obilization 111av also involve infiltrating an existing organization or 
~ _ C 0 C 
network vvith the ain1 of recruiting 111en1bers for HTI. This strategy has proved to be 
especially irnpo1iant during the Ne,v Order period. 
19 Bert Klanclersman, "iv1obilization and Participation: Social Psychological Expansions of Resource 
i\t1obilization Theory" A.1nerican Sociological Review 49, ( 1984), pp. 583-584. 
:o Donatella Della Porta and ~1ario Di oni, Social lv.foven1ents: An Introduction (Oxford : Blackwell 
Publications. 1995 ). p. 107. 
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Recruiting lTnder the New Order Regime: Creating an Organization and For1ning 
the Core Group of HTI Leaders 
vVithin SMT, the fonnation of an organization is seen to be the 1nost itnpo1iant resource 
for a n1oven1ent, because it can be used to secure other resources, such as human and 
1naterial resources. The architects of a social 1nove1nent 1nake a variety of strategic 
V (.,_, 
choices about the goals, structure and fonns of collective actions that the 1nove111ent will 
undeiiake. 21 Unlike 1nany other social 1novements in Indonesia, ·HTI being part of global 
lslan1ic party already has a ready ten1plate engendering its goals and organizational 
structure. HTI can only decide on the kind of collective action to be undetiaken which is 
governed by principles of non-violence. Within the organizational ten1plate that HT 
provides for HTI, the tnost i1npo1iant ai111 of building the moven1ent is the recruit1nent of 
capable leaders for the party. This is essentially a forn1 of action n1obilization. 
-Within the context of a repressive regime, the organization tends to be underground and 
initial recruitn1ent would take place through inforn1al networks.22 As n1entioned in the 
previous chapter, n1any organizations forn1ed during the Suharto regin1e were built in a 
sin1ilar way. For HTI, this period is seen as a phase of consolidation and building a 
strong ideological base. 23 A researcher vvho tried studying the structure of the pmiy in the 
early 1990s noted that it ·was virtually in1possible to understand or even atten1pt to 
establish the leaders of HTI during this period.24 Nevertheless, HTI leaders saw· this as an 
in1portant step in its struggle, which An-Nabhani noted , is the first step in the da 'a-i,vah of 
the Prophet ,vhere he focused on propagating his 1nessage to his close farni ly 1ne1nbers. 
Due to the authoritarian political systen1, there vvas a strong culture of secrecy \Vithin the 
1noven1ent. Men1bers were not willing to share details about the 1novernent and its 
._., . 
leaders. During halaqah, 1ner11bers rnet in ho111es and vvere careful not to leave any trace 
2 1 
Paul Di Maggio and \\/alter Powell, 11 The Iron Cage Revisited: institutional lsomoqJholism and 
Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields ," Arnerican Sociological RevieH' 48 , no. 2 ( 1983), pp . 14 7-
160 . 
22 
Ruud Koopmans and Hanspreter Kriesi, "Institutional Structures and Prevailing Strategies" in 
Hanspreter Kriesi , Ruud Koopmans, January \Villem Duyvendak and Marco G Giugni (eds), New Social 
Movements in Western Europe: A Cornparative Analysis (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press) , p. 
46 . 
23 Interview with Rahrnat Kurnia, 10 April 2009, Jakarta. · 
24 
Interview with Muis Naharong, Lecturer, Parmnadina University, 26 August 2009, Jakarta 
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that a religio-political discussion had taken place vvithin the location. Even the reading 
111aterials used during this period had no reference to HT. Books con1piled by Al~ 
Baghdadi and several HT leaders such as the Bunga Rcunpai Petnikiran Islam 
(Introduction to Isla111ic Thought) and Materi Dasen,.. Islcun (Basic Subject on lslan1ic 
Studies) that discussed basic subjects like Aqidah (Isla111ic beliefs), Shari"'ah (Is la111ic 
la\.vs) and the caliphate had no 1nention of the party.25 Although· so1ne rnaterials used by 
the net\vork subsequently included the books \Vritten by An-Nabhani, they did not 
indicate An-Nabhani's relationship to HT. Subsequently, this network gre\.v vvhen Al -
Baghdadi's initial students started inviting their friends to attend these classes. In fact , 
n1any of the current leaders of HTI had been friends for decades even prior to becon1ing 
rnernbers of HTI. It ,vas not until several years of attending these classes that leaders of 
HTI ,vere told .that Al -Baghdadi was part of a political paiiy, HT, and that the ideas 
·taught to then1 during his classes were in fact the ideas of HT. The party also began to 
recruit beyond student net\vorks when it seerned as if the Suharto regirne ,vas beginning 
to ease political control in the n1id-l 990s. 
The recruitrnent strategy of HTl during the New Order period was ain1~d at establishing 
an organization, ,vhich acted as a resource for the party to recruit n1en1bers who would 
fonn the core group 1naking up the first concentric circle · within its organizational 
structure. The n1ain n1echanisrn used by the par1y for this recruitrnent ,vas student 
netvvorks. With the co I lapse of the New Order regirne in 1998, HTI sa\v the need to begin 
developing a n1ore concrete recruitrnent strategy ain1ed at recruiting n1en1bers and 
syn1phatizers for the party. 
Recruiting in the Post New Order Period: Expanding Membership 
The collapse of the New Order regi1ne in ] 998 provided an i1npo11ant opportunity for the 
pm1y to begin recruiting at · a larger scale. SMT theorists believe that such political 
opportunities \Vill often lead to the larger scale recruitn1ent processes .26 The early leaders 
.: s These books were used by the LDK network within Indonesia. LDK, Bunga Ranzpai). Also see Salim, 
"The Rise of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia'', p. 168 . 
.: t, r.11yra r.1arx Feree, ·'Thinking Globally, Acting Locally: Gen11an and Ati1erican Feminism in the world 
System'~ in Silke Roth and Sara Lennox (eds), Ferninst Jvfovements in a Globalizing world (Washington 
DC: American lnstitute of Contemporary Gem1an Studies), pp. 13-29. 
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of HTI began to see a need to strengthen the organizational structure of HTT \Vhile at the 
sarne tin1e creating a new pool of leaders for the party. While the party 's key recruitn1ent 
strategy during the New Order period was aitnecl at active tnobilization , the post New 
Order period saw the party beginning to en1bark on both consensual and active 
n1obilizations. These strategies include the use of publications., public talks., on line n1edia 
and rnosque gatherings. 
Websites and Digit(i/ Resources 
The use of on line and digital resources is an important way the patiy etn barks on its 
consensus n1obi lizati on strategy \Nith the ain1 of reaching out to Indonesian Musi i 111 
tnasses. The use of these resources is aimed at reaching the younger seg1nent of the 
Indonesian Muslin1 population. One of the key on line resources the party en1ploys is the 
party ' s vvebsite (http:/ /www.h izbut-tahrir.or. i cl/). The \Vebsite features a daily reporting 
of various types of clon1estic and international news relating to the Muslin1 w·orld. These 
articles are often followed by con1111entaries about the articles fron1 111e111 bers of HTI. 27 
At the san1e tin1e, visitors to the website can download past issues of the Al-Jslcnn 
bulletin and Af-T,Va 'ie for up till three years back. A section called Fron, the Spokesnu,n ·s 
qf11ce features all press staternents issued by HTI. Sorne of the key texts of HT ,vhich 
have been translated can also be found on the vvebsite. The w·ebsite also provides links to 
the ·website of other chapters of HT as ,ve il as features photographs and videos · about 
developn1ents within HT vvorldwide.28 Visitors to the website can also provide feedback 
and con1111ents to HTI and infon11 their friends about the website through an autornated 
online systen1. Sections ,vithin the ,vebsite feature articles in Arabic and English. HTI 
often utilize videos to spread their rnessage. They ernploy a tearn of professionally 
trained video producers and editors to videotape their functions. The n1ost in1portant of 
these videos is the video of the International Khilqlah Conference organized by HTT in 
2007. This video vvas profess_ionally done, vvith con1n1ents by forun1 participants, 
organizers, and excerpts fron1 speeches given by HT leaders in other parts of the \Norld 
about the conference. The HTI video cre,v is also responsible for capturing the HTJ 
events, including sen1inars, den1onstrations, and conferences on video. ln essence, the 
party 's vvebsite is used to transrnit its ideology and objectives to the young Indonesian 
27 Osman, "Hizbut Tahrir and Its Mobilization Strategy", p. 608 . 
28 Ibid. 
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Muslin1s \Vith the final ain1 of rnaking the1n allies of HTI, or encouraging then1 to take 
the next step forward ofj oining the party as daris. 
Beyond utilizing forn1al n1eans, rnen1bers of HTI also utilize infon11al online sources to 
spread their goals. Many HTI n1en1bers are active contributors to nun1erous Niuslin1 
online fon1n1s, often utilizing these platforn1s to introduce HT ideas and pron1ote events 
organized by HTI. 29 A popular rnedia platfonn created by the party 1s 
Dak\vahKa1npus.con1, \Vhich served to spread its ideology and act as a platfon11 for 
n1en1bers to engage in intellectual discources with other Islarnic groups. 30 ln addition, 
several HTI n1e1nbers are also beginning to utilize the increasingly popular net\ivorking 
sites, FaceBook and T\vitter, to encourage their friends to attend HTI functions. Son1e of 
HTI rnernbers are also paii of diverse groups, which forn1 part of the FaceBook Online 
groups such as the Hizb ut-Tahrir group, the Revival of the Khilafah group, and the 
International Khilqfah Conference 2007 group. 31 The key difference between fonnal and 
inforn1al online platfonns is that -HTI activists utilizing the inforrnal online platforn1s 
would not highlight their links to HTl or HT explicitly. Even when key HT leaders write 
articles, which are posted, on these platfon11s, they do not identify their links to HTI. 
Activists of other Islan1ic groups are also allowed to post articles and views on these 
platf onns, so as to of create spaces for intellectual engage1nents to take place. The main 
reason for this is to allow the party to reach out to a larger segn1ent of Indonesian 
l\1uslin, youths. especially those belonging to other Islarnic groups. The use of online 
n1edia outlets is airned at creating allies and daris for the party and can be useful for both 
consensus and active mobilizations. 
Printed A-faterials: Pa1t1phlets, Journals and Books 
The use ofpublications is one of the key ways that HTI uses to dissen1inate its ideas. HTI 
produces a vveekly pan1phlet, the Al-Jslarn bulletin, ,vhich HTI activists throughout the 
] S' For examples of these postings, see 
http :/ /w vV\v. g eoc it i es. co ml u mm ah on Ii n e/ s u rat pem b a ca/ s u ra tpem ba ca O 5 . htm and 
http :i/wvv,v.melayu.com/v2/sembang2/mesej .php?thread= 15184, accessed on 30 December 2007 : 
30 An excellent article describing the DahvahKmnpus.conz is Claudia Nef Saluz, DakvVahkampus.com as 
Infomrnl Student Web Portal of Hizbut Tah1ir Indonesia in Nadja Christina Schneider and Bettina Graf 
(eds) Social Dynmnics 2.0: Researching Change in Tirnes of Social lYledia and Convergence (Berlin: Frank 
and Timme, 2011), pp . 67-84. · 
31 Personal observation of author on the Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia' s FaceBook website. Ibid. 
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country circulate every Friday, before the vveekly Friday prayers. Members of HTI will 
distribute copies of the bulletin before worshippers enter the n1ain prayer hall. Extra 
copies of the Al-l~la,n are often left beside donation boxes in rnosques. 32 Many 
\vorshippers, especially ainongst the youth, read the bu! letin as n1an y of its articles 
address conte1nporary issues and are thus 1nore interesting than the dry sen11ons 
delivered by the prayer leader. 33 Al-l~lam features HTI's views about conternporary 
issues affecting Muslitns in Indonesia and other parts of the world and publicizes 
upcoining events and activities organized by HTI. Al-l~lam is tneant for the Indonesian 
n1asses and its language is sin1ple and is very accessible. HTI sees this as part of its 
culturing process, whereby it introduces its ideas in an interesting manner to to the 
Indonesian public. 
Besides Al-Jslarn, HTI also publishes a 1nonthly journal , Al fiVa 'ie (The Reality). Al-
Wa 'ie ·was first published in 2000 just before the first caliphate conference. The journal 
was launched at the conference. 34 Unlike Al-1.slarn, Al-Wai'e has a n1ore esoteric content 
and is targeted at educated intellectuals. Articles by HTI n1en1bers or special coverage of 
don1estic or international issues relating to the Muslin, world fill up the colun1ns of the 
journal. Its popularity an1ong young professionals and the student elite can be gauged 
fron1 the fi1ct that about a hundred thousand copies of Al FVa 'ie are printed and sold 
n1onthly. Of this, at least 10% to 20% are given to politicia1is, religious leaders and 
n1edia personalities. I have been given copies of Al-Wa 'ie during visits to the HTI office. 
Not ,vithstanding this, given the cost of Al Wa 'ie (Rp 10, 000) , Al- Hla 'ie sales could be 
considered to be reasonable. The journal is currently distributed to more than ninety 
agents in all the Indonesian provinces as \Veil as in Sydney, Australia. In September 
2005, HTT began translating Khilq/c7h rnagazine produced by HT Britain frorn English to 
Indonesia. The 1nagazine has ceased publication due to poor sales and the decision taken 
· by HTI leaders to focus 1nore on Al-Wa 'ie. In any case, it is a reflection of the lilnited 
range of HTI' s 111arket for news outside of Indonesia. More in1portantly, the heavier 
focus of the J(hilt((ah n1agazine on international news has also not qt1ite appealed to n1ost 
31 Personal observation of author in several mosques in Jakaria and Bogor between March 2009 and 
pecernber 2010. Also see Osman, "Hizbut Tahrir and Its Mobilization Strategies", p. 6 l 4. 
·'
3 l noticed that more than half of worshipers read the bulletin at Friday prayer sess ions in mosqu es around 
Jakaria during my fieldwork between 2008 and 20 l 0. ibid ; p. 616. 34 Interview with Muhammad al -Khaththath , 20 March 2009 , Jakaiia. Ibid, p. 611. 
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Indonesians, \vho are 111ore interested in the local issues that Al-Wa •'ie covers. The latest 
addition to HTI's publication is the A1edia Umnzat_, a tabloid styled newspaper, which is , 
produced once a fo1ihnight. The ne\vspaper is targeted at the n1ass Indonesian rnarket and 
about 50J)00 copies are being printed. Beyo nd 111agazines, HTI also ·translates books 
produced by HT into Bahasa Indonesia. HTI n1en1bers own several publishing houses in 
Bogor, a to\vn in the outski1is of Jakarta, the capital city of Indonesia. These publishing 
houses include Pustaka Thariqul Izzah, and Al-Izzah Press. 35 These publishing houses 
also publish books authored by HTI leaders and activists since the 1990s. 
The usage of publications as a recruitn1ent strategy is not unique to HTI. A con1111on 
strategy of social rnovernents is to utilize publications to educate the public about the 
causes upheld by then1, thereby increasing the level of suppo1i for the n1oven1ent. 36 
Publications are essentially used as a platfon11 for consensus rnobilization. HTI ' s usage 
' 
of ptrblications is segrnented for both consensus and action n1obilizations. The Al-lslcrm 
and Al- fVa 'ie are utilized as tools for consensus n1obilization. Rahrnat Kurnia notes that 
fe\v of the HTI rnernbers joined the pai1y upon reading Al-lslani or Al-Wa 'ie. 37 The 
purpose of the publications \Vas sirnply to influence the public to accept the caliphate as 
an obligation for Nluslin1s in order that they could be allies to HTl. Ultirnately, the books 
by HT'·s ideolo12:ues and HTI leaders are essentiaIIv to serve as tools that are utilized for 
'!" ~ .- • • • .I . - . . -
active rnobilization. i\1any party rnernbers have spoken about the in1po1iance of HTI 
books in influencing thetn to becon1e -daris of HTI. One HTI metnber, Budi, notes that 
the books \Vritten by An-Nabhani are the only works that cornprehensively describe the 
Islan1ic political, econo1nic and social syste1ns. 38 It ,vas this that attracted hirn to lea111 the 
ideas of HTI by being one of its daris . 
Public Discourses 
HTI also engages the Muslirn public through sern1nars, talks, and conferences. The 
serninars and talks are held daily in difierent parts of the country. Larger serninars tend to 
3 5 T visited these publishing houses in Bogor in J\1arch 2008 . One such publishing house is located adjacent 
to the house of HTI's fo1111er Chain1rnn Hafidz Abdurrahman. Ibid, p. 607. 
36 Edward and 1vlc Carthy," Resources and Social :Movement", p. 140. 
37 lnterview with Rahmat Kumia, l October 2009, Jakarta 
38 interview with Budi . 20 August 2009. J aka1ta 
, ..._ - ·' -
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be organized in Jakarta. Participants at these sen1inars are often not charged .. although 
they are expected to leave their nan1es and contact nun1bers at the registrati on desk. 
Presurnabl y, thi s allows for the building of a database of potential recruits. In such 
setninars , HTI leaders would speak in a panel consisting of two to three speakers. After 
the speakers have spoken for about 15-20 1ninutes each, the discussion is than open to the 
floor for questions and debates. The other speakers could be frotn a vadety of 
backgrounds including figures frotn liberal Islatnic groups, 1ninisters, acadernics, and 
irnpotiant fi gures fron1 within Indonesian society. Arnongst the fi gures that HTI has 
engaged in the past are Sidney Jones (fron1 the ICG), and Din Syan1suddin (Head of 
Muhatnrnadi yah). 39 HTI uses the serninars to get the in vited speakers to support th eir 
position for the in1plen1entation of Shari 'ah and the revival of the caliphate in 
I d · 40 -11 ones1a. · 
HTT also invites political or religious figures that disagree with their views on religion 
and politi cs to debate with thern on these issues. The purpose of inviting these fi gures is 
two fold. firstl y, it is ain1ed at encouraging individuals, \vho n1i ght not othenvise attend 
HTI events, to do so. Presumabl y, these indi viduals ,.vould find an event in whi ch 
speakers frorn different ideological leanin gs are featured to be more acceptab le. 
Secondly, featuring such figures would allow HTI to engage in dialogue and debate in a 
detnocratic environment. In doing so, HTI leaders believe they can show the 'superiority' 
of their ideas over other contending ideas. While it is not ahvays the case that HTI 
leaders are abl e to outwit other speakers, the choice of topics, atlnosphere and question s 
posed during the open discussion, tend to favor HTI speakers. The key target au~lience of 
these serninars and talks is the rnore educated segrn ent of the Indonesian society such as 
young professionals and students. Even the choice of venue for such events is reflective 
of thi s airn . Often these events are organized in hotel bal lroorns or in lecture th eatres in 
buildings such as the Wisn1a Antara building. 
39 Jemaah Is lami yah is a terro ri st gro up oft en referred to Al-Qaeda ' s South east As ian w in g. Fo r deta il s of 
J L See Greg Barton, Jernaah lslarniyah: Radical Jslmn in Jndones ia (S ingapore: S ingapore Univers ity 
Press, 2005 ). Ibid , p. 61 . 
40 Personal observ ation of author at the Forum on Societal Research titled "Siti Fadilah Supari Melawan: 
Saatnya Indonesia berubah! " at the YTKI Building, J alan Gatot Pembicara. The speakers at th e fo rum 
were Siti Fadilah Supari, Jose Rizal (Chairman of lVIER-Clndonesia) , and Farid Wajidi (HTJ ) on 17 M arch 
2008 . ibid. 
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Since 2005 ; HTI has institutionalized these intellectual discourses by forn1ing the Forum 
Kc~jian Sosial Kema5,yarakatan (FI(SK, Forun1 for Social Research) to organize regular 
serninars on conternporary issues a±Tecting Indonesia and the Muslin1 ,vorld. In 2008, 
HTI began a rnore structured rnonthly progran1 k110,vn as the Halaqah Islan1 dan 
Peradaban (HIP Studies on Islarn and Civilization). HTI also organizes serninars ,vhere 
foreign HT 1nernbers are invited to speak. These sen1inars tend to be only for n1en1bers 
and syn1pathizers of HTI and are often held behind closed doors. Such sen1inars are 
targeted to boost n1en1bers' confidence in HTI and strengthen their bonding ,vithin the 
HT rnovernent. 41 The use of public talks and serninars as a recruitrnent vehicle can 
largely be seen as a fon11 of consensus 111obilization. Moreover, the face-to-face 
interactions bet,veen HTI 1nen1bers and participants, allows HTI to contact sorne of the 
pa11icipants at a later stage for fu11her discussions. HTI's use of these talks and serninars 
is another exarnple of its consensus n1obilization strategy. Most participants at such talks 
and serninars are not party rnen1bers. Sofne of these participants rnight becon1e allies of 
the par1y, ,vhile those who are seen to be rnore interested in HTI are contacted by HTI 
rnernbers to becon1e daris of the n1overnent. 
Prayer Halls and Nlosques 
Studies of rnany Islarnic social rnoven1ents have revealed the irnportance of 111osques in 
the recruitrnent process of Isla111ic social 111ove111ents. Nlosques assist HTI in creating and 
n1aintaining a public space for the party in the ideological sense that they give the party 
religious virtuousness, ,vhile also insulating discussion fron1 alternative beliefs.42 HTI 
used n1osques as one of its consensus n1obilization strategies by propagating its ideas and 
expanding its rnernber~hip base beyond their traditional suppo1iers, the professionals and 
students. HTl activists have used the n1osques located near carnpuses since the l 980s. 43 
Since 2000, HTI leaders have encouraged rnen1bers to be actively involved in the 
activities of the local n1osques close to their hornes. HTI rne111bers would typically 
frequent a 111osque ,vhile not revealing their links to HTI. They are often active in 
--1i Personal observation of author at seminar organized by HTI at the Sahid Jaya Hotel, Jakarta on 13 
August 2007 where speakers from HT Britain and Sudan spoke. 
4
.: Ziad ~1uhson. "Mus] im Brotherhood", pp. 502-503. 
-n Sal irn , "The Rise of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia'", p.170 and Osman , ·'Hizbut Tahri Indonesia and its 
J'vlobilization Strategies'-, p. 610. 
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promoting 1nosque activities. Hafidz Abdurrahn1an is of the view that due to the 
enthusiasn1 shown by these activists and their tertiary educational background, HTI 
1nen1bers will be invited to sit in the Dewan Kelja Ma.~jid (Mosque Working Cotntnittee, 
DKM). He noted that these tnembers will use their position in the DKM to invite HTI 
leaders to conduct lectures within the 1nosque.44 HTI leaders such as Hafidz 
Abdurrah1nan and Hariths Abu Ulya are then invited to deliver sennons during the 
weekly Friday prayers and conduct lectures at 1nany tnosques. 45 Special talks 
commetnorating i1npo1iant Islamic events such as the birthday of the Prophet (!vlaH·lid 
_Nabi) are also organized.46 Participation in these talks, give HTI leaders an aura of 
respectability. 4 7 This is especially itnportant given that rnost HTI leaders have never 
trained as kiyais (religious scholars) in the forn1al sense. HTI activists also use the 
tnosque to organize activities such as the Pesantren Ra,nadhan (Rm11adhan Religious 
School), a progran1 that targets youth within the con1n1t111ity. The actions taken by HTI 
have been viewed by NU leaders as a torn1 of deceit and an atten1pt to take over n1osques 
built by NlJ. 
Several NU leaders including Masdar F Masudi and Hasyin1 Muzadi issued open 
warnings to the NU con1n1unity about the threat of HTI.48 Neve1iheless, the two largest 
Niusli111 organizations see111 to be divided about this. Several key leaders of NlJ and 
Muhan1n1adiyah, including As'ad Said Ali and Din Syan1sDdd in , be! ieve that the 
accusations leveled against HTI rnight have been exaggerated. 49 While most NU leaders 
and activists are knovvn to be vehen1ently opposed to HTl ' s ideas, they are otlen hard 
4
~ Osman, "Hizbut Tahrir and Its ~/fobilization Strategies", p. 61 .1. · 45 For instance, Hafidz Abdurrahman conducts weekly talks every Sunday morning at the Al-Hidayah 
mosque near his house in Bogar. Interview with Hafidz AbdmTahman, 12 August 2010, Jakarta. Ibid. 46 I attended a talk conductelby Muhammad al-Khaththath at the Darul Hidq;.,ah Mosque in Ciputat on 23 
March 2008. The attendees at the talk were mostly villagers who are blue-collar workers , a group that is 
not amongst traditional supporters of HTI. Ibid. 
47 Dvvight B. Billings and Shaunna L. Scott, 11 Religion and Political Legitimation ," Annual Revie111 ql 
Sociology 20( 1994), p. 173. 
48 See "Dianggap Sesat, Mashid-Masjid NU diambil alih " NU Online, 25 May 2006 and ''Hasy irn Muzacli: 
Khilajc1h Islamiyah bukan Gerakan Agarna tapi Gerakan Politik" NU Online, 5 September 2006. A book 
was also published by some NU and Muhammadiyah activists. The focus of the book was on the PKS but 
addressed HTI as a tbreat as well. Sources within more conservative sections of NU argued that th e book 
'--
was written to obtain more funding fi:orn Western funding agencies for the-activities of the Wahid and 
Nla'arif Institute. However, these claims cannot be verifi~d. See Abdurrahman vVahid (ed), Ilusi Nerz,ara 
. . (.__ Islam : Ekspm1s; Gerakan Islam Transnational di Indonesfr1 (Jakarta: Wahid Institute, Ma'arif Institute & 
LibforAll Foundation, 2009) . 
49 Interview with As'ad Said Ali, Deputy Chairnan ofNahalatul Ulama, 20 August 2010 Jakaria and 
Interview with Din Syamsudclin, Head of Muhammadiyah, Jakarta, 10 August 2010. 
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pressed to narne the_se rnosques. The only exmnple cited is the Ma~'jid Al Hickzyah in 
Ketintang, Surabaya. In defending its position, HTI argued that taking over of the 
n1osque has neither been a necessary or desirable act and have disn1issed the accusations 
as a plot by liberal Isla111ic groups to undern1ine its activities. 50 Isn1ail Yusanto, its 
spokesn1an, ·wrote a rebuttal of the book published on HTI ' s website. Shorter versions of 
the miicle \Vere published in several Indonesian dailies. 51 In this rebuttal , he noted that 
HTI has been involved in the rnosque by \Vay of increasing the activities in the n1osque 
or s itting as con1rnittee rnernbers but .HTI has never atten1pted to don1inate the 
n1anager11ent of the 1nosque in a systernetic fashion. It is possible that sorne HTI activists 
in sorne parts of Indonesia did atte111pt to control 1nosques afiiliated to NU. Nonetheless, 
it is n1ore likely that HTI 1ne1nbers were told to sit in the DKMs to. ensure that HTI will 
be allo\ved to conduct its activities at the 111osque. 
Harith Abu U lya is of the view that rnosques present an excellent platfonn for HTI to 
propagate its ideas to the Indonesian Musli1n n1asses. In spite of this , the nurnber of 
individuals that becorne daris of the party through interactions with HTI activists at 
different rnosques is srnall. 52 It is likely that a larger nun1ber of individuals are likely to 
becorne allies of the party. HTI ' s successful use of rnosques in its n1obilization strategy 
could be attributed to the vvillingness of even non-HTI 1nembers vvithin the DKiv1 to 
'-
\York with HTI. Many DKM n1ernbers v iew HTI rnore as a da 'awah organization than a 
po litical body due to th e fact that HTI is not invol ved jn electoral politks. 53 The profile 
of HTl activists and .tnernbers, n1anv of \Vhorn are well-educated , as well as the non-
,, y ,, . 
viol ent nature of the party, are other contributory factors that convince DKM 1ne1nbers 
that HTI n1e1nbers are wo1il1\vbile paiiners. Beyond strategies that are targeted at the 
rnasses, several of its recruit1nent strategies are targeted at specific groups. 
50 Interview wi th Rokhmat S Labib , Jakarta, 15 August 2010 · . 
51 See Ismail Y usanto, Catatan atas.Buku Il~1si N eg;ra Islam Available at http :i/hizbut-
tahrir .or.id/2009/06i3 0/catatan-atas-buku-ilusi-negara-islam Accessed on 21 July 2010. Sh01ter versions of 
th e art icl e publ ished in several Indonesian dailies. 
52 Interview with Hadth Abu U lya, 5 October 2010, Jakarta. 
53 I spoke to a member of the DKM of the Darul Hidayah mosque on 13 March 2008 who was not a 
member of HTI and was told. that he had confidence in HTI activists. "This is due to the fact that HTI is not 
a political party th at contest in electi ons. As such , t-.-1uslims are confident that they are not trying to use the 
mosque to gamer votes during elections. 
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Active Mobilization: Targeting Students, Won1en and Non-Muslin1 Papuan 
The use of fonnal · organizations as a resource for mobilization is one of the tnost 
comtnon strategies of social 1novements. It is assutned that fonnal organizations facilitate 
rnobilization. Discussions of the role of organizations have revolved around the type of 
organization fonned by social rnovernents and the factors itnpacting the choice of 
different models of organizational structure. Less focus has been devoted to the use of 
sub-organizations and front organizations as rneans of recruittnent. This section wi I l 
exan1ine their roles in HTI's recruitn1ent strategy. As pait of its active n1obilization 
strategy, HTI has been using sub-organizations such as GEMA. and PHTI for the purpose 
of recruiting daris and n1ore in1portantly leaders for the party. In Papua, the party has 
used a front organization for the purpose of conve1iing Papuans to Islam and beco1ning 
n1en1bers of HTI. Uni ike in the case of consensus rnobil ization , these organizations are 
primarily geared to\Narcls recruiting segn1ents of Indonesian society that are deemed to be 
prospective future n1en1bers and leaders of HTI. 
Muslbnah Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia: The Bulwark of the Parzv 
W 01nen ren1a1n one of the most irnportant 1nen1bership bases for HTI. The party has 
en1barked on an active n1obilization strategy for recruiting won1en into the party through 
its \VOrnen 's \Ving Muslirnah Hizbui Tahrir Indonesia (\Vornen IVIernbers of Hizbut 
Tahrir Indonesia, PHTI). The creation of this division has occurred due to a strong 
de111and by fen1ale 1nen1bers of HTI for the creation of an avenue for active patiicipation 
of vvon1en to carry out special activities targeted at won1en. Febrianti Abassuni_ a long 
tirne 111en1ber of HTI currently heads this \ving. 
Unlike many Islan1ist rnovements that shun fernale paiiicipation in politics, vvo1nen are 
vvelcon1ed into the ranks of party n1e1nbership, albeit in different roles fron1 those of 
n1en. 54 While the real nu111ber of won1en in HTI cannot be ascertained, the large nurnber 
of \Von1en attending HTI's functions and den1onstrations, \vhich son1etin1es exceed the 
nun1ber of n1en, is reflective of their in1po1iant position. It is possible that the won1en ' s 
54 • Ib1cl, p.616. · 
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111e1nbership is in fact 11.igher .than that of rnen in the rnove1nent. As a fon11 of recognition 
for its contribution, Abbasuni sits in the DPP of HTI. HTI's position on wo1nen is 
sun1n1ed up in a special booklet produced by the group titled Perernpuan clan Politik 
Dalan1 Perspekt!l !shun (Won1en and Politics fron1 an Islan1ic Perspective). Here HTI 
clearly states that both 1nen and \von1en have an equal responsibility to revive the 
caliphate. HTI goes on further to explain that 1vvon1en have the right to give bai 'ah to the 
Caliph and can also be elected into a political post, as long as the post is not that of the 
Caliph, Provincial Governor, or District Head. HTI also accord a special section of its 
website to discuss issues relating to won1en. An1ongst the topics that are addressed are 
1vvon1en and violence, gender equality, and other vv1on1en' s rights issues. 
It can be argued that the HTI has \Von son1e vvon1en over to their cause by n1eans of a 
strikingly original and etTective approach. This is through a wornen's rnagazine that the 
party published., titled The Fe,nale Reader, \Vhich has received \Vide readership since its 
inception in Novernber 2006;)) vVhile the n1agazine cannot be said to be a HTI 
publication, it is-to be i1oted that about 80% of the contributors are rnen1bers of HTI. Just 
like any other ladies n1agazine, the Fe,nale Reader features articles related to fashion, 
worn en ' s heal th, parenting, cooking, and articles related to Worn en and Islan1. The cover 
page of the 1nagazine alvvays features a stylish, good looking Musli1n lady, dressed in 
fashionable lslarnic attire. The tag line that the rnagazine uses is Be S,nart and Sharii (Be 
Sn1art and Shari 'ah Cornpliant). At the sa1ne ti1ne, every issue features several articles on 
HTI: s concepts and the notion of _the caliphate. Yet HT or HTI is hardly n1entioned to 
ensure that readers do not link the rnagazine to HTI. It is clear that the 1nagazine targets 
urban, better-educated wo1nen, who may be attracted to the fresh approach of the 
1nagazine. Consequently, the 1najority of vvo1nen vvithin HTI are also urban and te1iiary 
educated. It is currently published bi-1nonthly and has a circulation of about 20,000. 
HTr s strategy of recruiting \von1en is indeed unique for an lslainist group. Even within 
the larger net\vork of HTI, it is indeed rare to see won1en _playing such an active role. In 
interviews \,vith \VOtnen activists of HTI, several reasons \Vere elucidated for their joining 
of HTI. iv1any won1en felt that HTI is one of the few Islan1ic organizations that accord 
s5 ·t--d . J lll · , p.6l ea. . 
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wornen their clue rights as defined by Islatn. Wotnen are given the satne tasks as n1en and 
are given half of the office space at the HTT n1ain office building in Jakarta. Son1e 
wotnen also noted that HTI is less orthodox than tnost Islatnist organization about the 
roles of men and wotnen. A wotnan activist infonned tne that her husband , a n1etnber of 
HTI would look after her children whenever she needed to attend HTI activities. This is 
unlike other Islatnist organizations where the sole role of wotnen is as a hon1emaker. 
-younger wotnen in HTI felt that the pmiy provided thetn a nevv sense of identity, a 
the1ne that will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 7. J\1any wotnen within HTI do 
not seen1 to n1ind the conservative interpretation of Islan1, which restricts won1en' s rights 
such as dress codes and polygatny within HTI. They see this as a being part and parcel of 
lslan1ic laws that they n1ust abide by. The active n1obilization of won1en has assisted the 
party in its aitn to increase the nutnber of daris and metnbers within the party. 
Gerakan Nfahasiswa Pen1bebasan (GE.AJA) 
Students have always forn1ed the base of HTI's 1nen1bership. Virtually all the leaders of 
HTI were recruited through student groups. The popularity of HTI an1ong students is due 
to several reasons. Firstly, HTI presents a utopian vision for the Muslim world , -vvhich 
students being n1ore idealistic tend to be rnore vvilling to accept. Secondly, HTI is seen to 
be a highly ' intellectual ' . organization. The n1ore acaden1ic 11ature of its books and 
activities are also 1nore attractive to n1e1nbers. A tanner n1en1ber of 1-ITI noted that sorne 
students join HTI to look n1ore 'intellectual'. Thirdly, the profile of HTI leaders works to 
the advantage of HTI. HTI leaders are better educated and are often successful in their 
careers and thus serve as role n1odels for rnany students. HTI leaders are also generally 
younger and can thus relate better to students. During the Nevv Order period~ HTI 
rnernbers joined the LDK in several universities vvith a purpose to recruit. As n1entioned 
in the previous chapter, HTI was don1inant in the FSLDK. The decision rnade by the 
party to leave FSLDK in 1994 due to the po,ver tussle vvith JT n1eant that it lost one of its 
key recruitn1ent vehicles. In spite of this, HTI never totally severed its ties with the LDK 
at universities such as UGM, IPB and UI. Beyond involving the1nselves in the LDK 
network, HTI created a student con1n1ittee to propagate its ideas to students. Hc)\vever_ 
this student comrnittee is an extra-carnpus group and thus cou Id not effectively penetrate 
the Muslin1 student body in the univers ities. 
1 5 I 
In 2001 , HTI n1ade a decision to once again involve itself in student activities within . ~ 
earn pus. It did so by fanning the GEA1A Pernbebasi::rn (Cry of Freedo1n, GEMA). GEMA 
is basically a student front for HTI to recruit fron1 an1ong tertiary students. O±Ticially, 
GEI\1A does not explicitly declare its links to HTI. Such as stance could be understood 
fron1 the perspective that HTI hopes to narrovv the gap between the party and other 
student groups that 1f-iight have otherwise opposed its vision. Nevertheless, GEIVIA 's 
links to HTI is obvious as both organization advocate for a silnilar objective. At the 
beginning, GEMA was active in several cainpuses in Malang, Bogor, and Jakarta. Later 
it · expanded its presence to other Indonesian provinces including IVIakassar, Aceh, 
Kalin1antan and Papua. ln August 2004, after gaining significant strength, GEMA was 
o±Ticially inaugurated at the Japanese Stuc~y Center in UI. At the san1e tin1e, its vvebsite 
at http://vvww.ge1nape1nbebasan.or.id and a rnonthly bulletin, Bulletin Gerna 
Pen1bebasan were also launched. As in the case of HTI, GEMA also organized sen1inars, 
talks, and dernonstrations. During son1e of the talks and sen1inars, GEMA invited HTI 
leaders to address the student con1n1unities in the can1puses. The slight difference 
between sorne of its activities and that of HTI ' s was that GEMA also chan1pioned issues 
that student specific., such as hikes in tuition fees. Men1bers of GEMA often attend study 
circles, sirni lar to the HTI halaqahs and read the saine publications as HTI 1ne1nbers. 
Subsequently, rnernbers who are seen to be cornrnitted are then invited to join HTI's 
study circles. This 1neans that not all 1ne1nbers of GEMA are 1ne1nbers or even 
syrnpathizers of HTl. 
One of th e main activities of GEM_A is the forn1ation of acade1nic study groups. These 
study groups are fonned based on areas of research interest and expe1iise. For instance, 
at the TPB , one of the 1nain areas of research is global vvanning. GE11A was also behind 
the fonnation of .Farzan MahasisH-'a lsla,n (The Muslim Undergraduate Forum) in 2007. 
This fonun consisted of the rnain Islmnic undergraduate organizations such as KAMMI 
and HMI. 56 The stated ain1 of this forun1 w·as to unite the Musli1n undergraduates but 
GEMA leaders adtnitted in confidence that . the fonun was a platfonn for the1n to 
introduce their ideas to other student activists who n1ight be less inclined to join HTI. 
56 rt·d 61'1 111 , p. -· • 
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The eletnent of deceit in the fonnation of such fonnns has invited so1ne criticisms of HTI 
an1ongst its detractors. For instance, students belonging to KAMMI have often 
cornplained about the poaching of the group's rnernbers by GEMA. In its defense., Envin, 
the Secretary-General of GElVJA argued that it is only natural that the "'superiority':. of 
HTI's ideas would becotne obvious in an open forum vvhere students are able to compare 
these ideas openly. He noted that GEMA. should not be blatned if students find their 
ideas to be tnore convincing.57 The active 1nobilization strategy of recruiting students 
into HTI is indeed itnportant and GEMA serves as one of its key recruittnent conduits. 
The Special Case o.f Papua 
The least expected group that HTI had atten1pted to recruit within its active mobilization 
strategy are non-Muslin1s in Papua. HTI n1en1bers in Papua have atten1pted to convert 
non-Muslin1s and influence then1 with HTI's ideas. While 1nost Papuans identify 
the1nselves as Christians, n1any Indonesian Islan1ists believe that the Christianity 
practiced in Papua is fused with indigenous beliefs. 58 In their 111ind, the Papuan 
Christians are weak Christians and can be converted easily. The irony, however, is the 
t~1ct that n1any Papuan Muslirn converts do not adhere to Islamic practices such as 
abstaining fron1 eating pork. 59 Neve1iheless, the belief that they are vveak Christians has 
increased atte1npts by nun1erous Islan1ic groups at conve1iing non-Musl i1n Papuans. 
HTI teachings took hold in Papua due to the recruitn1ent of Mohan1ed Fadzlan 
Garen1atan, a native Papuan who had converted to Islan1. 6° Fadzlan had established an 
Islan1ic charity called Al Fatih Kac{lah Nusantara (AFI(N), \Vhich is based in Jakarta but 
has offices in several areas in Papua. The AFI(N's prin1ary role is to proselytize an1ong 
the indigenous populace in Papua. 61 Fadzlan hin1self often leads these efforts. Often the 
5-~ Interview with Erwin Al-Jundi, Secretary-General of GEMA, 2 September 2009. 
)ti For details about Papua see Peter King, FVest Papua and Indonesia since Suharto: Independence, 
Autonomy or Chaos (Sydney: UNSW Press , 2004). 
59 Charles E Farhadian, Christianit_v, Islam and Nationalis1n in Indonesia (New York: Routledgt:, 
2005), p. 81. 
60 Interview with Fadzlan Garematan, Chairn1an of AFKN and Daris of HTT, l l iVfay 2010. Also see 
International Crisis Group, "lndbnesia: Communal Tensions in Papua," in JCG Asia Report 
(Jakaria/Brussels2008), p. 17. 
61 See AFKN video , Testmnoni Dakwah Menembus Ri1nba di Pendalaman Irion .Jayo whi ch showcased 
Fadzlan Garematan 's efforts to convert people in Papua. This video was made as part of Fadzl an's efforts 
to seek assistance from Indonesian Muslims. A copy of the video was given to me by ~A uhammad al-
Khaththath 
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leaders of Papuan tribes are targeted for conversion. The logic for Fadzlan is that 
conversion of tribal leaders will lead to the n1ass conversion of the other n1en1bers in a 
tribe. 62 To achieve this ain1, AFKN also oilers scholarships to Iv1usli111 converts to fu1iher 
their studies. 63 HTI leaders have provided funds for these scholarships to AFKN. Several 
HTI leaders fron1 Makassar are also based in Papua. Their role is prin1arily to spread 
HTI ' s ideas arnongst the Iv1uslin1 trans-n1igrant population in Papua, although they have 
rendered t_heir assistance to Fadzlan vvhenever required. HTI' s ability to convert and 
recruit indigenous Papuans vvas largely due to the fact that Fadzlan was a native Papuan 
and as such was trusted by leaders of the Papuan tribes. At the san1e tirne, despite its 
anti-secessionist position, HTI had also fought for rnore equitable distribution of 
econornic resources (Copper and Gold) for the Papuans, an issue that had drawn a wedge 
bet\veen the Indonesian state and the Papuan people.64 
For HTI, the recruitn1ent of Papuan converts into the paiiy strengthens its clain1 about 
being a global Islarnic pmiy, vvhich transcends ethnic afiiliations. One HTI leader noted 
that if the Papuans of a di±Terent colour and culture can accept HTI, it n1eans that the 
party has successfully recruited Indonesian Iv1uslin1s of all backgrounds.65 Conve1ied 
Papuan Ivluslirns \Vould also be a useful springboard for HTI 's future recruitrnent. This 
being the case HTI has featured Fad zlan in nurnerous talks and senrinars held by the 
pmiy in J akaiia. For HTI, this is a 111anifestation of the grovvth of the 111oven1ent 
throughour Indonesia. The belief an1ongst HTI leaders that nevv converts 111ake the 111ost 
cornrnitted Muslin1s has also given the in1petus to HTI's 111issionary e±Torts in Papua. 
While it is difficult to assess the extent of HTrs influence in the area, n1ore than three 
hundred Papuan Musli1ns led by Fadzlan attended the HTI conference held in 2007.66 
indeed, the recruitrnent of non-Muslirns to the party is son1ething unique to Indonesia, a 
n1ove no other HT chapter has ernployed . Beyond the -active rnobilization recruitn1ent 
strategy, the party also values the building of social capital for the party. This involves 
fanning personal relationships, with irnportant n1en1bers of the elite, within Indonesian 
society. 
6
:: Interview with Fadzlan Garen1atan. 10 _Mav 20] 0. Jakarta. 
·' - ~ - . , 
63 lCC , ' ·Tensions in Papua". p. 18. 
(i-+ Ibid . 
'J:5 Intervi ew with Hafidz Abdu1Tahman , 12 October 2009 , Jakarta. 
66 lntervievv with Fadzlan Garematan, 10 wfay 20 10, Jaka11a. 
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Building the Nusrah Network: Enhancing Social Capital for the Party 
The itnportance of social capital as a resource for social move1nents to achieve success is 
an ilnpotiant thetne discussed by several theorists of SMT. Social capital here essentially 
refers to social ties , which entail sentitnents of trust and solidarity towards a co1n111on 
objective.67 In seeking to build social capital , social 111ove111ents work with individual s 
and organizations, deen1ed to be politically and socially influential, sharing son1e of their 
objectives.68 They also try to create social capital by establishing ties \Vith indi viduals 
and groups vvho n1ight not share their objectives, but can contribute to the n1oven1ent 
significantly in achieving its goals. An-Nabhani hi1nself wrote about the i1npo1iance of 
social capital. He noted that it would be extren1ely difiicult for the caliphate to be forn1ed 
without the assistance of in1portant figures within the society. Citing the exan1ple of the 
Prophet's attainn1ent of power in Medina, An-Nabhani argued that the Prophet had 
obtained thalibul 1n1srah (vow of assistance) fron1 leaders of the n1ain tribes in the city 
before attaining power in Medina. 69 In the n1odern context, An-Nabhani identified 
opinion n1akers such as politicians, n1ilitary leaders and senior bureaucrats to play the 
role of expediting the process of re-establishing the caliphate. 
HTI has been atten1pting to cultivate a nun1ber of public figures as part of this nusrah 
agenda. These figures include Muslin1 leaders, politicians, n1ilitary leaders, journalists, 
and civi I servants. There are t\vo approaches that the party can use. The first approach is 
the fonnation of an urnbrella organization cornprising different Muslin1 groups in 
Indonesia. It is assurned that rnany Musliln organizations share the smne objective of 
establishing Islan1ic la\v in Indonesia and can work vvith HTI to achieve this objective. In 
the second approach, the party can build personal relationships vv1 ith irnportant public 
personalities and involve these figures vvith its progran1s. Here the party naively assun1es 
that they can influence sorne of these figures to support its objectives. 
~
7 James Coleman, Foundations q/Social Themy (Cambridge, MA: Belknap, 1990), pp. 304- 305. 68 iVlario Diani , "Social Movements and Social Capital: A Net\vork Perspective on Movement Outcome," 
A1obilization: An International Quarterly 2, no. 2 (1997), p. 13 8. 
69 Hizb ut-Tahrir, The Methodology q/HT, 1999. 
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Nfuslin1 Groups and Personalities · 
One of HTI's rnain strategies 1s to push for the fo1111ation of networks of ~1uslin1 
organizations. HTI feels that due to the long history of n1any Muslirn organizations in the 
country. it is difficult for a relatively nevv organization such as HTI to n1ake its n1ark or 
to expect the others to adopt its plans. To this end, HTI has begun to build linkages to 
other Ivluslir-n organizations as early as the late 1990s. For instance, HTI activists have 
been actively involved in MUI ,vhen several HTI DPP n1e111bers, including Isn1ail 
Yusanto, Farid Wajidi and Rokhn1at S Labib ,vere n1en1bers of the MUI Board. HTI 
leaders have also built relations vvith 111ore conservative leaders of Muslin1 organizations 
including Ivluhan1n1adiyah, NU and hardline groups such as JAT, FPI and MMI by 
paying social visits to these leaders a nurnber of tirnes a year. 
The party· s leadership was convinced by around 2000 that n1any of the .Muslirn 
organizations vvere not keen to unite seeing that HTrs caliphate agenda was unattainable. 
Al-Khaththath devised a strategy of focusing its public ain1 on the i111ple111entation of the 
Shari 'ah \vhich rnany rnore lv1uslin1 leaders found acceptable. He also initiated the 
forn1ation of a neutral platfonn that allo,ved HTI to push its agenda forward in a rnore 
acceptable tnanner to these organizations. 70 The fonnation of such platfon11s is a 
con1n1on strategy used by social n1oven1ents in an atternpt to fonn alliances to strengthen 
their position ._ The opportunity caine when the fourth Kongres Solidarity U,nat Isla,n 
Indonesia (The Congress for the Solidarity of Indonesian Muslin1, KSlJII) was held by 
the MlJI to discuss issues affecting Muslims in Indonesia. HTI leaders attended and 
..... 
ensured that they vvere represented in the different panel co1n1nittees. 71 HTI played an 
active role in pushing for representatives fron1 forty-five Muslin1 organizations to be 
signatories to its version of the ·'Jakarta Declaration"' .72 The declaration called for the 
',.-· 
in1ni ediate irnpl en1entation of Jslan1ic la\vs in Indonesia. The Congress also decided to 
- ..... 
forrn a loose network of ~1uslin1 organizations, Fonun U1n1nat Islmn (FUI, Musli1n 
Con1111tmity Forun1). The fr1ct that Al-Khaththath was appointed the Secretary-General of 
FlJJ shows the disproportionate ainount of influence HTI held in FUI. Mashadi , a fonner 
70 Interv ie,v ,vith Rahmat Kurnia , 1 October 2009 , Jakaria. 
ii Tim Penyusun Buku KUilIV, Kongres Urnat Islan1 Indonesia I V, p. 6. 
72 
.b.d 4'; 1 1 , p. · _ . 
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PKS n1en1ber of parliament was appointed chainnan of the organization. While the 
"Jakarta Declaration'' proved to be rhetorical and was quickly forgotten, the FU I proved 
to be an i1nportant platfonn for HTI. FUI played vital roles in sotne developn1ents frorn 
2005. Several leaders of MUI such as Cholil Ridwan and Ma'aruf A1nin as well as the 
leader of FPI, Habib Rizieq becatne actively involved in FUI. However, FUI was 
effectively controlled by HTI. Fror11 the onset, HTI leaders , especially Al-Khaththath ., 
dominated FUT. lJtilizing the FUI, the party \Nas able to push to the forefront, sorne 
issues, such as those pertaining to the anti-pon1ography act and the Ahmadiyah sect. 
The success of a social 1nove1nent's building of social capital is detennined by the 
willingness of its powerful allies to identify with the 1nove1nent especially in tin1es of 
' 
crisis .73 The strength of HTI's social capital strategy was put to test in 2008 , when Al-
K.haththath was sacked fron1 HTI. Many Musli1n leaders who were involved in FUI 
chose to vvork with FlJI rather than HTl. This was proof to the lin1itations of HT I' s social 
capital strategy. It was believed that Cholil Ridwan and Ma ' aruf An1in ·who were both 
close to Al-I(haththath played an instrun1ental role in the decision of MUI to not renew 
the board nien1bership of HTI leaders. In yet another exan1ple of the lin1itations of its 
social capital strategy, the MUI Secretary-General, Ichwan San1 was reluctant to invite 
leaders of HTI to the fifth KUII in 2010. 74 It ,vas only after several rnernbers of MUI 
protested against th is decision that HTI leaders were allo·wed to attend. 75 At the congress, 
sixteen HTT leaders attended and tried once again to ensure that they don1inated the 
discussions. It ,vas obvious MUI men1bers did not appreciate this attempt and many 
vie,ved HTI leaders as irritants at the congress. 76 Even 1nore hard line groups in lndonesia 
such as FPI and MMI have largely kept their distance fron1 HTL preferring to ,vork 
instead ,vith FUI. Thus, it can be concluded that the atten1pts by HTI to build social 
capital an1ongst leaders of Muslin1 organizations in Indonesia has largely failed. 
71 D. . "S . l C . l" 14" · iarn, oc1a ap1ta , p. L. 
74 Interview with Ichwan Sam, Secretary-General of MUL 7 May 2011, Jakarta . 75 Interview with Muhan1mad Al-Khathtbath, 8 j\!Jay 20] 1·, Jakarta. · 
76 Personal Observation by Author at the KUII 20 l 0 from ''t11 to l 0th of May 20 l Oat Asrarna Pondok Gedt , 
Jakarta. 
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Political Leaders and Local Bureaucrats 
HTI' s social capital strategy also involves building relations with politicians and 
bureaucrats. Often , HTI leaders will invite politicians to speak at their events or attend 
sotne of the social functions that the group organized. After these initial contacts, HTI 
leaders will organize regular 1neetings with these politicians and begin preaching the 
ideo logy of HT to th em. One politician who is often quoted withi11 HTI circles as being 
close to the party is Adyaksa Dault, the forn1er :tv1inister of Youth and Sports Atiairs. 
HTI leaders and at least two PKS leaders clai1necl that Adyaksa was a daris of HTI. 
Adyaksa hin1self adn1itted this at a dinner organized by HTI, a day after the 2007 
conference which was held at the Sahid Jaya Hotel.77 Hovvever, the fact that he did not 
inaugurate the 2007 conference after receiving a stern wan1ing fron1 other n1en1bers of 
the Indonesian cabinet showed the lin1itations of HTI ' s ability to build social capital. 
Other in1portant politicians that HTI tried to bring to their fold are An1ien Rais (founding 
leader of the N ational ivlandate Party, PAN) , Taufik Kien1as and Health Minister Siti 
Fadilah Supari. 78 An1ongst these politicians only Siti Fadilah is known to be truly close 
to HTI. Arnien Rais has openly criticized HTI while Taufik Kie111as has refused to even 
be seen at HTI events and has rejected several invitations by HTI to attend its events.79 
The only politician \vho seerned \Villing to associate herself and even publicly support 
HTI's agenda was Siti Fadilah Supari. Sources vvithin HTI clain1 that the ivlinister \Vas 
convinced about the need to prevent Western 111edical con1panies fro111 obtaining san1ples 
of the bird flu after receiving detailed studies done by doctors linked to HTI about 
alleged plans by these con1panies to profit fron1 the endeavors. 80 Siti Fadilah also n1ade 
staternents about the svvine flu being n1an-111ade after discussions vvith these HTI liked 
77 I was present at the event held at the Sahid Java Hotel, Jakarta on 13 August 2007 . ~ . -78 In a book about Taufiq Kiemas in the eyes of 11uslim figures, Ismail Yusanto stated his belief that 
Kiemas is a N1uslim figure close to Islam . This could be contrasted with Abu Bakar Ba'asyir who stated 
categorically that Kiemas is just a cultural Muslim who does not understand Islam. See Helmi Hidayat and 
Zainun i\hmadi (eds), Tm(fiq Kiemas di 1\,fata Tokoh Islam (Jakarta: Baitul Muslimin Press , 2007). 
7
'-i Arnien Rai s openl y criticized HTI for its unrealistic goals at a forum organized by HTI in 2007. See 
http :ilhizbut-tahrir.or.id/2007/05/03/amien -rais-dan-hti / . Accessed on ] 0 January 2012. 
8
n For details of these allegati ons see John tv1cbeth, "Indonesia 's Bird Flu Batte" Straits Times, 3 May 2008 
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doctors. 81 During the height of the bird flu crisis, Siti Fadilah spoke at a sen1inar hosted 
by FPSK in Jakarta on 17th March 2008 where she took a snipe at the Western powers 
for trying to dotninate Musli1n countries and declared that Indonesia should adopt Islarn 
as an ideology. 82 While, it is likely that her statetnents ,vere ain1ed at drawing support 
fro111 the Islatnist audience in Indonesia, her suppo1i for HTJ's position has given the 
pmiy rnore legitimacy than it could ever command on its own. 
HTI' s social capital strategy has extended beyond politicians. HTI has gone out of its 
,vay to n1ake atte111pts to forge ties with figures in the Indonesian 1nilitary, such as fonner 
an11y generals. These include ex-head of anny statT, General Tyasno Sudarto vvho had 
den1onstrated alongside HTI during the Danish cartoon controversy. 83 While HTI leaders 
are not under any illusion that these Generals will becon1e n1e1nbers, they utilize these 
relationsh ips to gain access to the Indonesian n1ilitary . Through these relationships 1 HTl 
leaders have been invited to deliver religious talks and sennons organized at several ~ . ~ 
rnilitary institutions. Their intention to seek assistance frorn the rnilitary has even been 
publicly ad1nitted by Muhmnrnad al-Khaththath in a rally held at the Al-Azhar Mosque in 
Jakarta on 2nd Septetnber 2005. He had called upon the 1nilitary to assist the HTI in 
reviving the caliphate. In the region of Papua, a province that is seeking independence 
fro111 Indon es ia, HTT is given free rein to preach its ideas. For .the Indonesian military, 
HTI's ideal of ensuring that the Muslim world does not lose any of its territories is useful ...,.. ~ 
in ensuring that Papua re1nains part of Indonesia. HTI has also organized public talks and 
den1onstrations to oppose the secessionist n1ove1nent in Papua po1traying the n1oven1ent 
as a Westen, attetnpt to disintegrate Indonesia. This has rnade HTJ 111ore acceptable for 
the Indonesian n1ilitary in Papua. More i111portantly, as Marcus Mietzner noted n1il itant 
JslatT1ic groups are very popular vehicles for political 111obilization by military leaders as 
they adhere to strict hierarchies based on the authority of charisn1atic religious leaders, 
81 Interview with HTI and FUI Activists. Beyond these activists , sources within ~1uhammadiyah confirmed 
th e close relations that Supari maintains with HTI. · 
82 U tilizing its various publication channels , HTI stood up for the Health Minister and praised her for her 
defiance of Western hegemony. See HTI, "Cengkeraman Asing Lewat Lembaga Kesihatan" Al-!slwn, No. 
403 , 30 April 2008 . 
83 The former general was adorned with a white Arabic robe durin g th e dernonstration and demanded th at 
.... 
the Indonesian government act more strongly against the Danish government. See Tempo !nterakt[l 11 
February 2006. 
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which ensures a high level of rnobility, efficiency~ and secrecy. 84 He argued that these 
working relationships are distinctivel y non-ideological ; otlicers supporting radical 
lslarnic groups are rarely interested in anything else beyond their political and 
organizational functionality. 85 This n1eans that rather than convincing these n1ilitary 
ofiicers to\vards its cause, the party is in fact being used by these n1ilitary ofiicers for 
their purposes. 
The only group targeted by HTI where the party_ seen1s to have enjoyed lin1ited success 
in building its social capital strategy is local bureaucrats. Since the 1990s, HTI had been 
actively propagating its ideas at the lnstitut Pen1erintahan Da!cun Negerz· (IPDN, The 
Institute ·of Local Gove111ance), an institution focusing _ on the training of future 
bureaucrats. The institute based in Jatinangor, Sun1edang, West Java attracts students 
fron1 the ditierent Indonesian provinces and has been a fertile ground for recruitn1ent for 
HTI. 86 Often, graduates of these institutions w·ill return to their provinces and districts to 
serve as governrnent bureaucrats. At the sarne tirne, they \Nill start local chapters of HTI 
in these areas. The t:1ct that these HTI n1en1bers are locals gives added advantage to HTI. 
The otTicial backing of HTI has led to the group's strong presence in the provinces of 
Aceh and South Sula\vesi \-Vhere sorne bureaucrats are rnernbers and da,~is of HTI. 
In its strategy of building social capital, HTI has largely failed in its objectives of 
building allies ainongst those vvho1n they classify as power elites. With the exception of a 
few public personalities such as Siti Fadilah and local bureaucrats at different regions of 
Indonesia~ the party could not tnuster support of irnportant players within the Indonesian 
political systen1. As highlighted above, n1ost Indonesian politicians and power elites are 
reluctant to identify with HTI and its agenda of itnple1nenting Islmnic la\vs or reviving 
the Islan1ic caliphate. Even within hard-line groups that have n1ore in con1n1on with HTI, 
there is a stronger preference for leaders of these groups to work with FUI, which is no 
longer linked to HTI. 
S-4 ;'vlarcus N1ietzner, ·'Politics of Engagement : The Indonesian Armed Forces. Islamic Extremism and the 
. - - , 
\Var on Terror" The Brown Journal oj\vorld AJJairs 9, no . 1(2002), p. 78. 
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Funding the Movement 
Beyond 111obilizing 111anpower through recruit111ent and building social capital, the 
success of social n1ove111ents is also i111pacted by its ability to procure fund s. Studies 
have shown that ensurin g a consistent flow of finan cia l support has led to the relative 
success of social movements. 87 Funds are important for 111ovements to organize 
activities, publish 1naterials and for the pay111ent of staff working for the movement. For 
n1any social n1ove1nents, the procuren1ent of funds is nonnally done through fund-raising 
activities, \Vhich could be organized by volunteers or professional fund.raisers . 88 In this 
regard, HT and HTI are ditierent. The party observes stringent rules about the party 
being self-sufficient and would not accept fund s fro111 external so urce~. lt can be argued 
that the general success of its strategies to procure funds can be traced to the partyi s 
concentric circles organizational structure. Funds are generated fron1 within its 
organizational structure. 
For HTI, raising funds is fundan1ental to the party ' s resource n1obilization strategy. Due 
to the secretive nature of an organization like HTI , it is ditTicult to exan1ine the party ' s 
financial standing. Nevertheless, several observations could be rnade about HTT's 
resources, which indicate the strength of its financial standing. The party owns several 
otiices in Tebet, Jakarta, including a three-level office building (costing close to a 
hundred thousand dollars) at the Crown Palace office con1plex which ,vas bought by the 
party in 2008 and several ofiices used for publishing purposes in Utan Kayu , Jakarta and 
the city of Bogor. Hafidz Abdurrah1nan explained that funds for the Crovvn Palace office 
building ,vas accrued frorn 111en1bers' financial contribution.89 Several rnernbers of HTI 
are also vvorking full-tirne for the organization and thus dra,ving a pay fron1 the party. 
While their ,vages cannot be ascertained , these n1e1nbers seern to be I iving an upper 
rniddle class 1 ifestyle, in gated cqn1n1unities, and driving decent cars. 90 Since a fu 11 tin1e 
87 See J Craig Jen kin and Craig I\1 Eckeii, "Channeling Black Insurgency: Elite Patronage and 
Professional Social Movement Organizations in th e Development of the Black iVlovernenf' American 
.S~ociologica! Review 51, no. 6 (1986), pp . 816. 
8
::. Pamela E Oliver and Gerald Maxwell, "I\1obilizing Technologies for Collective Action Theory" in 
Aldon D Morris and Carol McClurg Mueller (eel) Frontiers in S.tv!T (New Haven: Yale Uni versity Press, 
1992), p. 259. 
89 Interview with Hafidz Abdurrahman, 2 1 March 2008 , Bogar. 90 Personal observation of author after visiting the horn es o(several of these HTI leaders. 
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party n1en1ber is not allovved to hold any other job or business, their \vage n1ust be 
significant enough for then1 to live such a lifestyle. The party also seen1s to have enough 
financial resources to print up to a n1illion copies of the Al-Islarn leaflets and organize 
n1onthly events in several reasonably stylish auditoriun1s in Jakarta. 
HTI leaders often describe the rnovernent as self-funded. 91 Yet, due to the partis ove11ly 
political agenda, the paiiy does not see itself as qualifying to receive zakat (con1pulsory 
alrns) from rnernbers or the larger Muslin1 con11nunity. At each level of its organizational 
structure, rnen1bers are expected to be financially- self-sufficient to organize activities. 
The core group vvithin its organizational structure contributes the n1ost to its funds. 
Fonner n1ernbers of HTI and the larger HT note that rnernbers with a strong financial 
standing contribute about 20~/o of their n1onthly incon1e. 92 These contributions knovvn as 
iJ,Ifaq are used for HTI's activities. lr~faq is also collected whenever HTI is ernbarking on 
a new project such as the purchase of the office building. By and large, ir~faq seen1s to be 
the n1ost irnportant source of incon1e for the party, especially at the provincial and local 
chapters. The naqib and rna 'sul are responsible for the n1anage111ent of these funds 
although the par1y does not pay then1. The irffctq also seerns to be divided into two 1nain 
portions. One portion of the irt/aq is also given to the party's central leadership to assist 
in national scale activities. This sho\VS that the _ pa11y.' s gro1vvth see1ns to be directly 
i111pacted by the econornic status of its recruits. For instance, in its local chapters such as 
Yogyaka11a, Surabaya, Pale1nbang and Makassar, it has experienced a higher level of 
success due to the large nun1ber of professionals involved in the rnoven1ent. On the other 
hand. the party seerns to have challenges with funding activitjes in Bali and Aceh vvhere 
its recruits tend to be sn1al l tirne businessfften and students. 93 
The daris and allies of the pai1y also contribute to the pa11y's funds. Daris are allo\:ved to 
contribute ir?faq on a voluntary basis. Unlike- the ir?faq paid by 1nembers, \Vhich is 
contrjbuted 1nonthly~ ir?faq fro1n daris is requested before the party organizes any 1najor 
event. Another source of incon1e for HTI seen1s to be through the sale of publications. 
These publications include books written by HT and HTI leaders. Me1nbers and daris are 
91 Interview with HTI leaders including Farid Wajidi , Fahrni Amhar and tv1 uhammad Al-Khaththath. · 
92 Interview 'With i'v1 uhammad Al-Khaththath; 25 July 2011 , Jakmia. 
93 Personal Observation of Author during field work in these areas. For Makassar, see Syamsul Rijal, 
11 f\.1 aking Hizbiyyin : Hizbut Tahrir in South Sulawesi 11 (Sub-Thesis, Australian j_ ational University, 2009). 
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expected to purchase some of these books that tnake up their cotnpulsory reading. HTI 
would also charge participants a non1inal ainount at son1e of their events such as the 
2007 Kh;lafah Conference to help in paying for the rental cost of the venue, 
refreshrnents , and se1ninar packages that are given to participants. HTT has also adopted 
the strategy of 1naking pro1notional paraphernalia such as T-sh itis , buttons and posters, 
which are sold at its events. The allies of the party also tend to purchase publications and 
attend events, \vhich also contribute to the patiy' s funds. 
A great deal of uncertainty continues to surround the issue of foreign funding of HT and 
HTI. HT has been accused of receiving funds from Saudi Arabia, l ran and even the 
Taliban regin1e in Afghanistan. 94 There is little evidence that any of these accusations is 
true given the fact that Wahhabi Muslims have constantly denounced HT as a deviant 
sect, HT leaders have been relentlessly . hurling criticisn1 at Iran, and the .Taliban 
then1selves are in dire need of funds, having little to spare for HT which has been critical 
of its policies .95 
Forn1er n1en1bers of the party acknowledged that the party received funding from the 
central leadership of HT.96 It is believed that the party's central leadership received 
significant contributions fron1 party n1e1nbers in the Gulf states such as the United Arab 
En1irates (lJAE) and I(u-wait as well as fron1 n1en1bers in its Western chapters such as the 
l Jnited Kingdorn and Scandinavia.97 While Baran had argued that HT received funding 
· fron1 individual businessn1en who are not party n1en1bers, this is highly unlikely given 
that the party has generally refused to accept even token donations fron1 those outside the 
patiy. 98 These funds are subsequently disbursed to party chapters in the developing \vorld 
such as Pakistan, Indonesia, Uzbekistan and Sudan. While the an1ount of these funds is 
di±licult to ascertain, a forn1er n1en1ber notes that it could an1ount to several rnillion 
94 Ahmed Rashid, "Asking for Holy War", Far Eastern Econmnic Review, 9 November, 2000; Baran , 
Islan1's Political Insurgency, p. 31 and Mateen Siddiqui , "The Doctrine ofHizb ut-Tahrir" in Zeyno Baran (eel) The Challenge <.fHi::b ut-Tahrir: Deciphering and Co,nbaOng Radical Jslmnisl ideology (Washington: Hudson Institute. 2004), p. 34 . 
95 For a critic of Wahhabis against HT, see http :// www.blogistan.co.uk/ blog/articles/story_o (_an __ ex-hizbi 
Accessed on 13 October 2010 . For a critic of the Taliban by HT, see Mahan Abedin, " An interview with 
Jalaluddin Patel , Leader of Hizb ut-Tahrir in the UK" Spotlight of Terror, Vol 8, No 2. Also available at 
~1ttp: //www.jamestown.org/single/?no _ cache=l &tx_ttnews[tt_news ]=2674. Accessed on l 3 October 20 IO . 
~
6 Interview with 11uhammad Al-Khaththath, 15 February 2010 , Jakarta. 97 Interview with Maajid Nawaz and Ed Husain, 29 October 2007, London. gg 
. 
. 
- See Baran, Islam's Political insurgency, p. 31. 
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dollars. These funds are transferred through wire services. Given the nature of these 
transfers, it is highly likely that the center for such transfers could be London or Beirut 
(\vhere there is n1ore laxity in such financial transactions). This source of incorne is used 
by HTI to rnanage large-scale events such as the Khilc.{fah Conference in 2007. One 
tanner leader of HTl noted that to scale up 1ts activities, HTl could ahvays request ±or 
n1ore assistance frorn the central leadership of HT. 99 The funding that the party receives 
frorn its leadership outside Indonesia also reveals double standards on the pm1 of its 
leadership. HTI has been the rnost vocal critic of foreign funding tor Indonesian NGOs 
calling for closer governn1ent scrutiny for such funding. Ironically the party itself is 
receiving funds fron1 outside Indonesia. Given the secretive nature of this funding, it is 
highly unlikely that the party would have declared these funds, a requiren1ent under 
Indonesian lavvs . . Frorn the analysis so far, it can be assun1ed that HTI's strategy of 
procuring funds has been largely successful. The party has been able to secure enough 
funds to carry out its activities and pay key rnen1bers. Men1bers, daris and allies of the 
party also contribute to its funds in different ways, allowing it to have substantially 
enough to pron1ote and finance its activities. 
Violence as a J\,lobilization Strategy? 
i\ny discussion on HT ~s n1obilization strategy n1ust address the question of HT's attitude 
to\vards violence and the potential use· of violence as a 1nobilization strategy due to so1ne 
accusations about the party's supposed violent tendencies. Several early sttidies of social 
tnovernents lead to the conclusion that the use of violence is likely to secure policy 
changes and access to political po\ver for a social 1nove1nent. 100 The use of violence has 
also been shown to increase activists ' co1nrnitrnent to social 1nove1nent organizations. 10 1 
This is especially for 1nove1nents with anti-syste1nic ideologies that seek an overhaul of a 
country ' s political syste1n. However due to the high risks involved in violent actions, 
social 1noven1ents 1night be less inclined to use violence. HTI is an exatnple of the kind 
99 Interview with ~1uhammad Al -Khaththath , 15 October 20 l 0, Jakarta. 
See for instance Frances Fox Piven and Richard Cloward, Poor People 1.S Movement (New York: Vintage, 
1979) and John ~-1.irowsky and Catherine Ross , "Protest Group Success: The Impact of Group 
Charactheristics, Social Control and Context ," Sociological Focus 14, no. 3 (1981 ), pp. 177-192. 
101 Verta Taylor and N ella Van Dyke, "Tactical Repertoires of Social M.ovement" in David A SnO\v, Sarah 
A Soule and Hanspreter Kriesi (eds) The Blac/o,vell Conzpanion to Social !vfovenwt1ts (Malden: Blackwell 
Publishing, 2004 ), p. 280. 
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of organization that would have nonnall y adopted violence due to its key objective of 
replacing the Indonesian political systen1 \Vith a caliphate. Yet the party has not been 
involved in violence. Neve1iheless, the party has not escaped being classified as a violent 
or potentially violent group. Several terrorism analysts and political cornrnentators 
studying HT in Europe and Central Asia have suggested that HT supports the use of 
violence to achieve its goals. The tenn "conveyor belt for terrorisn1" has been used in 
several acaden1ic vvorks to describe HT. 102 HT has also corne Llnder scrutiny for their 
alleged suppo1i for tefforism. Such views have en1erged due to HT's position on several 
terrorist attacks. HT has advocated that the 9/1 L 7 /7 London bon1bings and other n1ajor 
terror acts were perpetrated by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) as . pati of 
An1erica's plan to undern1ine the Muslin1 world. 103 While HT could be described as a 
radical group due to its anti-syste1nic ideology, there is little evidence to show that HT 
has resorted to violence to further its cause. HT leaders have clarified their stand that the 
struggle to revive the Caliphate is an intellectual struggle, as it is about convincing 
people of the in1portance of the caliphate. They hold that a violent revolution could lead 
to a nevv Islan1ic governn1ent, which can never survive, as the soc iety is not sufficiently 
lslan1ic to support the new governn1ent. 
One of the leading scholars on HT, Taji -Farouki has noted that vvhile HT n1e111bers have 
advocated jihad, HT believes that only the Caliph can call for offensive jihad. 104 Since 
there is no real Islarnic state in the vvorld in their 111ind, this fonn of jihad cannot be 
upheld. HTl has also stated its position on terrorisn1 clearly. It has categorically 
conden1ned all acts of terrorisn1 such as the 9/11 and 7/7 attacks as un-Islarnic vvhile 
rnaintaining that US and Britain ' s presence in Iraq and Afghanistan are also acts of 
terror. 105 One of the best exa111ples of its conden1nation of terrorisrn is an article 
analyzing the Madrid bornbings. The writer expounded that even in conditions \vhere 
jihad is valid, the killing of civillians is prohibited and as such terrorist acts I ike the 
102 Cohen , Hizb Tahrir and Baran , lslmn':s Political !nsurgency and Houriyah Ahmed and Hannah Stuart, 
Hizb ut-Tahrir: ideology and Structure (London: Center for Social Cohesion, 2009). 103 Ismail Yusanto, "War on Terrorism: Antara Fakta dan Propaganda" Se1ninar No,tes, 21 June 2004. 104 Taji Farouki , " lslamists and the Threat of.Jihad' , p. 29 . Another aiiicle that has conclusively rejected 
the notion that HT is a terrorist organization or a conveyor belt for terror is by Swiss scholar Francois-
11ayer. See Francois-11ayer, "Hizb ut-Tahrir- The Next Ar-Qaida'' , 2004 . 
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Madrid bornbings are un-Islarnic. 106 Interestingly, HT in Indonesia has proven its ability 
to draw individuals away fron1 violence. There had been a large nun1ber of Muslin1 
activists fonnerlyassociated \i\lith violent Musli111 organizations such as the LJ, I\1MI and 
FPI \vho have denounced violence and joined HTI. 107 These ne\i\1 111e111bers, through their 
interaction \Vith HTI , realize that the struggle for Islan1 is a co111prehensive struggle about 
winning the hearts and 1ninds of people. 
HTI ' s general non-violent position does not 111ean that the party is avowedly non-violent 
at all tin1es. The party considers it a religious obligation of Muslirns to fight when their 
lands are occupied. In this regard, HT 111en1bers are instructed to fight against 'foreign 
occupiers ~ in Iraq. A pron1inent HT leader notes that the party has sacked party 111ernbers 
vvho failed to engage in anned struggle against occupying forces in Southern Lebanon 
during the lsraeli-Hizbollah conflict in 2007 and in Iraq when the An1ericans entered the 
country in 2005 .108 HT has also stated that it is the obligation of the caliphate to \vage 
war against any Muslin1 country that refuses to corne under the sovereignty of this state. 
This rneans that the party approves the use of violence once the caliphate is born and is 
willing to use any an1"ount of violence to ensure that all Muslirn lands will be re-united 
under one caliphate. 
HTI's Resource Mobilization Strategies: Strengths and Lhnitations 
The success in social 1nove1nents has been an impo1iant the1ne that theorists of SMT 
have constantlv discussed. 109 Success within the RMT strand of SMT is 1neasured in 
.., 
tenns of the ability of rnove1nents to procure resources such as funds and manpo\ver as 
\Nell as the effectiveness of their organizational body in creating discipline an1ongst 
n1oven1ents ~ act ivists. Other theorists also ernphasize the ability to increase procuren1ent 
106 Javed A11sari, ;Madrid Bombings and the Attempts to Demonise Islam'. In Khilafah Magazine , Vol. 17, 
No. 4, April 2004, p. 10. 
107 A h ' I . . h , f ut or s nterv1ews w1t tanner members o MMI, FPI and LT who are now members ofHTI. Due to 
their fo1111er links to violent organizations, these activists preferred not to be identified. These interviews 
were conducted in .Mar 2009 . 
108 Interview with Ismail Al-Wahwah, 20 September 2009, Sydney. 
iO'° See vVi lli am Gamson , " Defining Movement 'S uccess '~' in Jeff Goodwin and James M Jasper (eds) The 
Social J\,fovements Reader: Cases and Concepts (Oxford: Blackvvell Publications, 2003), p. 350. 
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of such resources through conducting activities and ensure a continuous flow of these 
resources for the n1oven1ent. 110 Using these n1easures of success, HTI' s RMT strategies 
have been largely successful. Since the party's public e1nergence in 2000, its 
1ne1nbership and funds have increased i1n1nensely. In tenns of its 1ne1nbership, the party 
has also been successful in recruiting students, wotnen and even sorne non-Muslims. 
While the party's success in the building of social capital has been lin1ited, it has 1nade 
sorne gains in persuading 111ore of the power elite in Indonesia towards joining its cause. 
At another level , the paiiy has also been less successful in securing future resources for 
the party 
Growth in 1lfe111bership 
One of the key indicators of HTI's rapid gro\vth is the increase in its n1en1bership. While, 
HT and l-ITI have 1nade it the party's position not to reveal the exact nun1ber of its 
n1en1bership, forn1er HTI leaders have expressed the relative success of HTl on this front. 
Al-Baghdadi has noted that frs actual 111en1bership in 1982, when the party found a 
footing in Indonesia, vvas only eight key 111en1bers. 111 Since then, the party's n1en1bership 
began to expand and reached several hundred in 2000, vvhen the pmiy organized its first 
o±Ticial public event. By 2008, the party's 111en1bership had ballooned to about thirty 
thousand 111en1bers. 112 Al-Khaththath also noted that vvhile the nun1ber of actual members 
is s1nall by Indonesian standards, each of these rnen1bers has at least eight to ten contacts ... •' 
'--
,vho are party syn1pathizers or daris , n1any of vvhorn are already con1111itted to the party's 
ain1s and objectives. This rneans that the party has at least t,vo to three hundred thousand 
111en1bers and daris that it can draw upon for support. The party has increased its 
presence fron1 ten provinces in 2000 to all the thirty-three Indonesian provinces by 2008. 
This is significant in tern1s of indicating the actual reach of HTI within Indonesia. While 
rnernbership is an in1po1iant indicator of growth, other factors, such as HTI's increasing 
influence, are also irnportant in n1_easuring the success of its recruitn1ent and n1obilization 
strategies. 
ln-1portant Role in Can1puses 
110 Edwards and 11cCaiihy, ''Resources and Social Movement 1/fobilization", p. 142. 111 Interview with Abdul Rahman AI-Baghdadi, l 0 August ·2009, Jaka1ia. 112 Interview with Muhanunad AI-Khaththath , 8 April 20 I 0, Jakarta. 
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HTI's mobilization strategies have seen the group strengthening its influence 111 
Indonesian society. Despite the t~1ct that HTI is still a sn1all group in Indonesia, its real 
influence fiir outvveighs its size. In the can1puses, GEMA, its student vving, it is also novv 
an irnportant player vvithin Indonesian student n1oven1ent circles. It plays an in1portant 
role in student politics in several universities such as UI and the Bandung Technical 
Institute (Institute r ·eknikal Bandurzg, ITB). In son1e of these can1puses, GEMA has 
surpassed rnany of the n1ore traditional Islarnic student rnovernents, such as the HMI and 
KAfVlJVII .113 According to a forn1er leader of HJVII, OEIVlA and KAMl\lII student activists 
tend to be n1ore active in the carnpus n1osques and have thus superseded the traditional 
student groups both in nun1bers and influence. GEMA has yet to contest in student 
elections due to HTI's rejection of dernocracy. Its real influence cannot be rneasured 
accurately, but student leaders of other Islan1ic student groups are beginning to see 
GEMA as a real threat to their survival. 
The ltnpact of Social Capital 
HTTs strategies of building social capital with key n1en1bers of the Indonesian 
cornrnunity through engagernent with the rnilitary, police, intelligence, governrnent 
officials, and politicians have been largely unsuccessful. \rVith the exception of Siti 
Fadilah Supari who is no longer a Gabinet rnen1ber~ the pa11y cannot boast that any 
in1ponant figure supports its goals. Another group that HTI can clairn to be suppo11ive of 
its goals is lower level govern1nent bureaucrats at the provincial level. 11 4 \rVhile such 
clairns cannot be quantified, the ease at which HTI operates in Aceh points to this 
possibility. HTI has been given the task of ru1u1ing the Pesantren Kilat prograrn in all 
high schools in Banda Ac.eh by the n1ayor of Banda Ac.eh. This progran1 held in the 
month of Rarnadan is a so11 of religious course held throughout the 1nonth. Many 
politicians and 1nilitary leaders are less inclined to HTI"s goals and seetn 1noi·e interested 
to utilize HTI for their own ends rather than help it to achieve its goals. 
113 Interview with Arif i\1asyudi, fom1er chairman of I-IM:I, 20 1arch 2010, Jakarta. 
11
-+ Jnterviev,/ with members of HTI in Aceh , Iwan Doumy, 22 January 2009, Banda Aceh and Ferdiansyah, 
21 January 2009. Banda Aceh. 
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Another group that HTI clain1s to have influence over is the leaders of conservative 
Isian1ic groups such as FPL HTI ciai1ns to have approached and induced other lslan1ists, 
such as the leader of the FPI, Habib Rizieq, to e1nbrace the concept of the caliphate. In an 
article published in Suara l~lam, a publication of FUI, Habib Rizieq stated his full 
suppo1i for the Caliphate and even propounded for the fonnation of the caliphate in the 
fonn that HTJ has proposed. 11 5 This is a change frorn an earlier position that Habib 
Rizieq had adopted in which he stated his support for the Indonesian Pancasila state. 116 
Habib Rizieq gave his suppoti for the caliphate goal of HTI and also instructed the FPT 
leadership throughout Indonesia to assist HTI in its activities, prior to HTI's decision to 
leave FUI. However, Habib Rizieq has also distanced hi1nself frorn the pmiy after HTI's 
decision to leave FlJI, which he thought was a betrayal of the Islan1ic cause. The decision 
of NJUJ to not reappoint the HTl leader to its board is a rnanifestation of the limitation of 
its atten1pt to build social capital. fchvvan San1, the Secretary-General of MUI has stated 
that many MUI leaders are aware of HTf's objective of trying to control the organization 
11 d . I . 1· t~ . 11 1 anc 1ave ev1sec strategies to prevent t 11s ron1 occurring. 
J1~fluencing Gover111nent Policies 
HTI leaders have constantly focused on its role of pushing for certain la,vs sy1npathetic 
to the Islan1ic cause to be in1plen1ented by the Indonesian govern1nent. As a resu It, HTI 
has becon1e one of the n1ost influential lobbying groups in Indonesian f slan1ist circles. 
Often, HTI ,vill use different platfonns to strive for its cause. In 2006, uti I izing the FUL 
I-fTI through its for111er chainnan, Muhan11nad Al-Khaththath, organized the Aksi Sejuta 
Umn1at (The Million Muslin1 March) calling for the enactrnent of anti=pornography 
la,vs. 11 8 The March itself attracted a n1uch sn1aller crovvd but ,vas attended by pron1inent 
Isla111ic leaders in Indonesia. While the n1arch did place sorne pressure on the Indonesian 
governn1ent to enact the proposed laws, HTI clai111 as being responsible for inducing the 
policy change is highly question0ble. This is because PKS and even organizations such 
as M1J I and N[uhain1nadiyah played rnuch bigger roles in can1paigning for the laws to be 
115 Habib Rizieq Shihab, "Selamat Datang Khilqfah Islamiyyah" Suara Jslarn , 5~19 March 2010. Habib 
Rizieq also affirms his support for the caliphate in an interview with me. Interview with Habib Rizieq 
Shihab, 8 March 2010, J akartA. 
110 Andri Rosaldi , Hdam Puhh FP! (Jakarta: Kayla, 2009) . 
117 Interview with Ichwan Sam, 7 l\1ay 20 l 1, Jakarta . 
118 Osman, " Hizbut Tahrir and its Mobilization Strategy in Indones ia", p. 605 . 
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enacted. Another exarnple of HTI's supposed lobbying is the banning of Ahrnadiyah. 
HTI played an in1portant role in an1plifying the Ahn1adiyah issue and 111aking it known to 
the layrnen in Indonesia. 119 It vvorked \,vith other Islarnic groups such as the MUI and the 
Badan Koordinasi Pengarzut · Aliran Keperct1;yaan J\1as~varakat Bakorpaken1, 
(Coordinating Agency For the Overseeing of People's Beliefs) to push for the banning of 
the Ahrnadiyah. Here~ the role played by FlJI cannot be underestin1ated: IVlany of the 
can1paigns and etlorts ain1ed at Ahrnadiyah \Vere organized by FUI. As such, HTI 
clairning sole credit for the can1paign is questionable. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has sought to understand HTI ' s strategies in procuring resources for the 
party. I have argued that HTI has effectively structured the party's organization, recruited 
1ne1n bers and procured funds, leading to its grovvth in Indonesia. The pa1iy has been, 
ho\vever; less successful in its atternpt at building social capital to secure success for the 
1nove1nent. The analysis of these strategies was undertaken probing under the lens of the 
RMT strand of SMT. The chapter began by briefly discussing the theoretical 
undeqJinnings of RMT and its utility in assessing the strategies of a social 1nove1nent like 
HTI to build an organizational structure, recruit 1ne1nbers and secure funds. The chapter 
then explored the concentric circles organizational structure of HTI and examined how 
this organizational structure was useful for its leadership in controlling the party and its 
recruitrnent strategies. It \vas shown that this organizational structure allo\ved individuals · 
~ . ~ 
\vith different cornm itrnent levels to contribute to the party. The second part of the 
chapter exan1ined the · difierent recruitn1ent strategies that HTI en1ployed to attract 
different seg1nents of Indonesian society. It was e1nphasized that the New Order period 
saw the party building a core group of potential leaders while the post New Order period 
saw the party expanding n1en1bership by increasing the nun1bers of sy111phatizers and · 
allies. This section also evaluated the 111ass recruit111ent strategies such as the use of 
. v 
publicationsc rnass rnedia , public events and 1nosques, \Vhich \Vere n1ainly ain1ed at 
recruiting syn1pathizers for the party. On the other hand, the targeted approaches 
undertaken by the p~rty to recruit potential rnen1bers through the use of forn1al 
organizations, such as Muslin1ah HTI, and front organizations like GEMA and AFKN, 
119 IC'G "A· f·' d' , l D . " 1 ') 
. , i ,.ma 1_1,a,1 ec1 ee , p. -· 
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also proved to be effective The third section of the chapter exmnined HTI's atternpt at 
building social capital. Here it was argued that the party 's strategy largely failed to 
influence any i111po1iant tnilitary, political and religious figure to support its cause. A 
discussion was also accorded to the possible use of violence as HTl's mobilization 
strategy. It ,vas argued that this was unlikely given the party's reservations about 
engaging in any offensive jihad before a caliphate is fonned. The last section of the 
chapter 111ade an assess1nent of the success and I irnjtations of HTI' s resource 
1nobilization strategies on the pa1iy's grovvth in Indonesia. It took the position that 
although the party had grown in tenns of nun1bers and influence in certain segn1ents of 
Indonesian society, its political and religious clout re111ained dubious at best due to its 
inability to build social capital. Ultin1ately, HTI's current grovvth does not necessarily 
ensure that it will continue along the sarne grovvth trajectory, since it can be halted by 
dwindling n1en1bership and inadequate funds, especially if the party is unable to secure 
these future resources. The ability of HTI to retain n1en1bers and secure other resources 
are key to its survival as a n1oven1ent. A discussion will be accorded to the in1portant 
question of retention in Chapter 7. The next chapter of the thesis will look at the strength 
of HTI's ideas in con1parison to those of other Islan1ist n1oven1ents. 
171 
CHAPTER SIX: THE POWER OF IDEAS, THE IDEOLOGY OF HIZBlJT 
TAHRIR INDONESIA 
I use to wreck discos when I was with the FPL After several weeks the disco would be 
up and running again but in HTt 1 an1 changing people's minds with the strength of our 
ideas. Now I trv to change the n1ind of the disco owners and if I an1 successfuL within J ~ . 
days the discos \vill be closed and will never open again. I don't need to shed any blood 
or huri anyone. That is the power of ideas. We can change the world with ideas. (Abu 
An1111aL Fonner n1e1nber of FPI and Current Men1ber of HTI, 29 January 2011, 
Pekanbant) 
In Iv1arch "2011, Farid Waj idi , one of the leaders of HTI wrote an article titled, The War 
of· Ideologies in ·which he stated the vie\v that there is a cun·ent conflict bet\veen Islmn 
and the \Vest. He wrote: 
The rise of lslan1, the i1nplen1entation of Islainic laws and the pro1nulgation of the 
caliphate cannot be stopped by Westen1 colonial powers, world leadets who forget that 
they are facing an ideology that is originating purely fron1 God. They are facing Musli.111 
activists who are sincere, willing to sacrifice their lives to re-establish the caliphate. It is 
nearing the end for the '0.t est and thev know it. 1 
~ J 
The depiction of a struggle of ideology between Islan1 and the West is a constant the111e 
portrayed by HTI to 1nobilize its 1ne1nbers toYvards collectjve action. HTI leaders and 
n1ernbers show intense detenninatjon to revjve the caliphate etnphasjzing that this task is 
an obligation of all Jvluslirns. For mernbers of HTL it is a fardhu. ain (individual 
obligation) for lVf uslims to ensure that a caliph exists within the Muslim world to which 
his or her loyalty is shovvn. Thjs is different fro1n the vievvs of other Musli1n groups that 
see it as fardhu. k(fc1yah (co111n1unity obligation) For HTI 1ne1nbers, the revival of the 
caliphate constitutes the only way for Muslin1s to overcon1e their political upheavals and 
retun1 to the glory days of Islain. The caliphate discourse has beco1ne an i1nportant tool 
of recruitn1ent and n1obilization for HTI. 
i Farid Waj idi , "Perang Ideologi", Accessed from http: //hizbut-tahrir.or.id/2011/06/05/perang-ideologi/ on 
10 July 2011. 
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Beyond the inter-ideological conflict with the West, HTI has also etnbarked on an intra-
Islar11isn1 debate as highlighted in the staten1ent rnade by Abu An1n1ar in1plying that 
HTI's ideology is indeed superior to that of other lslamist move1nents in Indonesia. This 
chapter seeks to explain why me1nbers choose to join HTI over other lslarnist 
1nove111ents. Borrovving the concept of ideology as proposed by British political theorist, 
Michael Freeden, this chapter argues that HTI's rationalistic, anti-systernic ideology 
explains the choice of 1ne1nbers in choosing HTI over other Islainic groups. Th is is one 
of the factors accounting for the grovvth of HTI in Indonesia.2 There will be three 
sections in this chapter. The first section exan1ines the acaden1ic discussions about the 
concept of ideo logy. It examines the concept and explores ways ideology can be 
reconciled with SMT. The second discusses ideology of HT. This segn1ent \Viii apply 
Freeden 's definition of ideology in which he described as cornprising core, adjacent and 
peripheral concepts in exainining HTI's ideology. The third section will exan1ine how 
ideology has shaped n1en1bers' thinking towards HT and other 111oven1ents. It will show 
that ideology accounts for why individuals choose to join HTI over other Islan1ic 
n1oven1ents. 
The Concept of Ideology 
Ideology surfaced during a revolutionary period in world's h1story and thus carried 
evaluative and politicized connotations. Marx and Engels introduced a pejorative 
approach to the study of ideology when they referred to ideology as a class n1otivated 
deception of the bourgeoisie, which \Vas contrasted, \vith the 'correcf understanding of 
. ., 
the \Vorking class.J The Marxist understanding of ideology led to counter vievvs about 
ideology stating that it is the theories of I iberal de1nocracy and capital isn1 that are 
objective vvhile Marxisn1 is a disto1i.ed ideology. Such pejorative use of ideology has led 
to the unpopularity of the tern1. As the concept evolved, it is si1nply seen as a set of 
po'litical beliefs about ho\v society ought to be. 4 Regardless of the long tradition of the 
') 
- Rationalisti c here refers to the use of reason and logic to derive decisions related to Islamic lavvs. A sect 
that is often described as rationalistic is the lvlu 'ta::ilah. For details of the J..-1u 'ta:::.ilah, see Richard C 
Martin, Mark Woodward and D . S. Atmaja, Defenders q/Reason in Islam: Mu'ta::Jlism: Fron, /l,,1edieval School to lvfodern S)JJnbol (Oxford: Oneworld Publications, 1997). 3 Michael Freeden, ldeolog_l'-' A Very Short Introduction , p. ·6. 4 Ian Adams, Political Ideology Today (Manchester; Manchester University Press , 1993 ), p. 3. 
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pejorative use of the tenn, ideology has been used in non-pejorative ways. Ralph Turner 
and Lewis Killian n1ade an observation that: 
Ideologies are prescriptions or maps that tell the individual how to look at events and 
people, and they provide a sirnplifying perspective through which the observer can nrnke 
sense of otherwise overwhehningly con1plex phenon1ena and find definiteness in · 
otherwise vague and unce11ain in1pressions. 5 
In essence, Turner and Killian postulated ideology as a product of active social 
construction processes by which people understand their circun1stances and their _possible 
courses of action. John. Wilson's Introduction to Social 1\lfove1nents defines ideology as "a 
set of beliefs about the social world and how it operates, containing staten1ents about the 
rightness of ce1iain social arrangen1ents and vvhat action vvould be undertaken in the· light 
of those staten1ents. "6 Vlilsoi1 fu1ihers his argun1ent of ideology by introducing a 
trichoton1y of structural elernents that constitute an ideology: diagnosis (how things got 
to be hovv they are), prognosis (vvhich should be done and ,vhat the consequences will 
be). and rationale (vvho should do it and ,vhy). The approach taken by Wilson as vvell as 
Turner and Killian provided an account of reality. Ideology is seen as a static concept, 
,vhich does not change. Hovvever, this definition cannot satisfactorily explain the 
ideology of Islmnisrn. Islan1isn1, as vvill be discussed later in the chapter, is not a static 
ideology but is constantly being defin~d and re-defined. 
Another theorist that sought to n1ove a,,vay fron1 the pejorative approach to ideology is 
Karl Mannhein1. Mannheirn referred to ideology as total systen1s of thought held by 
society's ruling groups to preserve the status quo and hence their political positions. On 
the other hand, utopia is defined as total systen1s of thoughts forged by groups opposed 
to the ruling elites who are interested in the total transforn1ation of society and thus 
subscribe to a systen1 of ide_as that direct total change of society. Mannhein1 advanced 
that view· that 
5 Ralph H. Turner and Lewis M. Kill ian, Collective Behaviour, (Englevvood Cliffs, N . J: Prentice-Hall , 
1972). p. 270 
6 John Wilson. introduction to Social J\.fove1nents (New York: Basic Books, 1973), pp. 91-92. 
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A state of mind is utopian when it is incongruous with the in1111ediate situation and when 
passed onto actions, tends to shatter the order of things. 7 
A key strength of Mannhein1 's definition of ideology is that it has brought forth a new 
understanding of ideology; that ideas c,ould be generated objectively. He noted that there 
is a dirnension of relativisn1 ·within ideology, which 111eans that ideologies are not static 
concepts. Mannhei111 also believes that a group of individuals wiII break away fron1 
ideologies and arrive at a point of agreen1ent, which \vill be largely non-ideological. Such 
an assun1ption is problen1atic given that it is highly unlikely that individuals can n1ove 
avvay frorn values attached to ideologies. This is especially so if they have adhered to 
these ideals for an extended period. While acknowledging the relative nature of 
ideologies, Mannhein1 believes that to achieve objectivity, one \Viii need to rid hirnself of 
ideology. 
Building on MannheiTn' s relativist understanding of ideology, British po I itical theorist 
Michael Freeden presented a ne\v approach to understanding ideologies \vhen he urged 
scholars to observe the rnorphology of ideologies to better understand the irnpact of 
ideology within political life. He proffered that ideologies are rnade up of core, adjacent 
and peripheral concepts. 8 The core concepts vvithin an ideology are concepts that al I 
adherents of a particular ideology use, without which the ideology loses its ideational 
profile. Son1e of these core concepts such as the concept of libe1iy within liberalisn1 \VilI 
never n1igrate to an adjacent or peripheral position. 9 Each of the core concepts have a 
ditTerent n1eaning that could be better understood as adjacent and peripheral concepts 
that radiate out frorn the core concepts, forn1ing interpretative paths constituting ·ditTerent 
pattern of conceptual con1binations within the core concepts. 10 Adjacent concepts fonn a 
second layer of understanding that are also attached to the core concepts while peripheral 
concepts are concepts that are less in1portant within the ideology but nevertheless define 
certain aspects of this ideology. Concepts can change to adapt to newer political 
developn1ents and n1ight even borrow fron1 different ideologies. Freedcn propounded 
7 Karl Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia: An Introduction to the Sociolog:y ofKn0111/ed._z,e (London : 
Routledge & K Paul , 1966). p. 341. 
8 Michael Freeclen, Ideology and Political Theories : A Conceptual Approach (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1996), pp. 77-78. 
9 ibid, p. 84. 
10 Michael Freeclen , "Is Nationalism a Distinct Ideology?," Political Studies 46 , no. 4 (1998), p.752. 
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that the success of an ideology depends on its ability to in1pose the belief that its ovvn 
conceptual definitions are the n1ost accurate. Thus, de-contestation of concepts happens 
continuously in inter-ideological and intra-ideological conceptual con1petitions. 11 
Concepts that are seen to be \Veaker vvill descent and over tirne vvill din1inish in 
definitions of an ideology. An exan1ple of the int.er-ideological conceptual con1petition is 
the concept of freedon1 of expression. While this concept is hailed as an in1portant tenet 
of liberalisrn. it is rejected vv ithin Islan1isn1, vvhich argues that freedon1 of expressions 
rnust be \vithin the a1nbit of lslarnic lavvs. An exan1ple of intra-ideological conceptual 
con1petition is the differing attitudes of Islan1ists towards dernocracy. While rnany 
Islmnists such as IvIB see de111ocracy as a 111odern expression of the Isla111ic concept of 
Shura (Consultation), other Islan1ists such as the Salqfis view den1ocracy as an un-
Islarnic concept. The Scdqfzs argue that ultirnately sovereignty should be in the hands of 
God and not hun1an beings rnaking the concept run counter to Islan1. 
Freeden ·s analysis of ideology possesses a nurnber of virtues. Firstly, ideology is 
detached fron1 both the Marxist's political-econorny approach and fron1 the assurnption 
that ideologies are fonns of irrational thinking that need to be corrected. Secondly, it 
displays considerable intellectual in1agination by calling for thought-exercises designed 
to re-draw old ideological boundades and re-classify ideological syste1ns. 12 Lastly, it re-
appraises conventional classification within systen1s of ideology. 13 This rneans that a 
possibility ex ist that there will be wholesale ideological transfonnations. Thus, scholars 
n1ust be prepared to re-think, alter and substitute obsolete conceptual rnorphologies that 
do not denote the dynainics of conte1nporary political belief syste1ns. Freeden 's 
conception of ideo logy is thus a 1nore nuanced approach to understanding ideologies like 
Isla1nisn1. 
Ideology in Social Movernent Theory 
Ideology has been a largely ignored concept within SMT. This discounting of ideology 
began \Vith Snovv and colleagues who used the tenns fraining and ideology 
11 Freeden. Shorr Hist01y. p. 57 . 
i : Manfred B Steger, "Ideologies of Globalization.'' Journal cf Political Ideologies 10, no . 1 (2005), p. ] 2. 
1
~ibid. 
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interchangeably in their now fained introduction to the concept of framing. Adopting 
Wilson's conception of the three eler11ents of ideology, Snow· [ et al] n1ade a case that the 
process of frmning can be understood in sirnilar tenns and introduced the concepts of 
diagnostic, prognostic and motivational fratning. Since then, framing has largely 
replaced ideology. Several scholars of SNIT have raised disagreetnents with the fratning 
variant of SMT. 14 Patnela Olivier and Hank Johnston in their criticisn1 of fran1in g noted 
that frarnin g theorists have often used frames synonyn1ously with ideo logy and have 
failed to assess the relationship between ideology ar,d fratning . In trying to est,1blish the 
relationship betvveen fran1ing and ideology, Oliver and Johnston explained that: 
Ideology is c01nplex and deeply held. People learn the1n or are socialized into then1. 
While a fraining effort 111ay successfully persuade son1eone that a particular issue can be 
explained by an ideology, framing processes do not persuade people to adopt whole new 
ideologies . At best, they may initiate the journey. Fran1e alignn1ent theory and theories of 
ideology suggest very different accounts of the creation of ideas by moven1ent 
intellectual s and the transmission of them to those whom they recruit. ft is well 
recogni zed that intellectuals or "idea spec iali sts" in social rnovements play different roles 
from the mass of other participants. In frame alignment theory, people's belief systems 
are taken largely as givens, and n10vernent intellectuals perfonn the marketing task of 
packaging their issue so that it will be accepted by others. 15 
In essence, the fran1ing process describes the 111arketing and resonating aspects of a 
concept whereas ideology involves the process of education and thinking about the san,e 
concept. 16 They were also critical of Snow [ et al] for puq)ortedl y suggesting that 
ideology should be taken out of discussions on f:ran1ing. 
In a rejoinder to the piece by Olivier and Johnston, Snow· [et al] asserted that Olivier and 
Johnston r11isunderstood their definition of ideology and frarning. They denied calling for 
ideology to be replaced with fran1ing. They clain1ed that their rnain intent ,vas to sho,v 
ho,v certain belief systen1s constrain the usage of frmning strategies in n1obilization. 
14 Benford noted that framing is often inse,ied uncritically wherever there is a movement-related idea being 
defined or debated. Jasper argued that framing tends to reduce the ri chness of cu lture to recruitment 
strategies and Steinberg felt that framin g theory tends to be too static and hi ghli ghts the contextual 
qualities of frame. Robert Benford , "An Insider's Critique of the Social Movement Framing Perspective" 
Sociological Inquiry 67(1997), p. 409-430; Steven Hart, "The Cultural Dimension of Social 11ovements: A 
Theoretical Assessment and Literature Review," Sociology of Relig ion 57, no. 1 (1996), pp. 87- 10 L James 
i\11 Jasper, The Art ofl\1oral Protest (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997) and Ware Steinberg, 
"Tilting the Frame: Considerations on Collective Framing from a Discursive Turn ," Theory and .Society 27. 
no. 6 (1998) , pp.845-862 . 
1 · ) Oliver and Johnston "What a Good Idea", p. 37. 
ir, 'b· l 46 
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Ho\vever, they agreed that there was no atternpt on their part to explicitly ditTerentiate 
bet,veen the concept fran1es and ideology. In spite of this adn1ission, Snow [ et al] did not 
offer any nevv fran1evvork to understanding ideologies and fran1es or the ditlerences 
bet\veen then1. It was sin1ply stated that distinctions bet\veen the tvvo concepts could only 
be ascertained by a detailed en1pirical study. 17 The debate bet,veen Olivier and Johnston 
and Snovv [ et al] highlighted several points. Both ,vorks agreed about the need for 
ideology to be considered in a n1ore serious fr1shion within studies of social n1oven1ents. 
,._,,. 
These vvorks also suggest that a rnore dynan1ic understanding of ideology vvould dispel 
earlier criticisn1s of ideology as being a static and unchanging concept. Regardless of 
this, both vvorks fail to propose ho\N ideology can be brought back into SMT. This 
chapter proposed that the gap between ideology and SMT could be addressed by using 
Freeden ' s definition of ideology. 
Freeden 's rnorphological approach to ideologies focuses specifically on the 
interconnections bet,veen ideas. It allows for political concepts to be contested and de-
contested. Ideologies also tend to have a greater weight and tradition than the fran1es 
utilized by activists, since the ideological concepts have been subject to extended 
philosophical developn1ent over n1any years. 18 Freeden ' s conception of ideology 
addresses two criti cis1ns that SMT theorists have leveled against the concept. Freeden 's 
concept of ideology does not contain the pejorative attitudes that ideology is often 
associated with . In add ition , it so lves the issue of ideology being understood as a static 
and unchanging concept, ,vhich inevitably resolves the contention that the concept does 
not fit rational choice theory. 
The Ideology of HTI 
HT defines itse lf as a political party with Islan1 as its ideology. It clai1ns to li1nit its 
activities to politics and ain1s to in1plen1ent lslan1ic laws and restore the caliphate. The 
17 David Snow, "Framing Processes, Ideol~gy and Discursive Fields" in David Snow, Sarah Soule and 
Hanspeter Kriesi (eds) The Blacki,vell Companion to Social .~Jfovements (Oxford: Black.~ell Publishing, 
2004) , p. 399. 
18 Kevi n Gillan , "Understanding Nieanings in 1ovements: A Hermenuetic Approach to Frames and 
ldeologies ," Social Afo1'emenl Studies 7, no . 3 (2008), p. 263. 
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pariy believes that it is only through the revival of the caliphate that the dilemtnas 
affecting the Muslin1 world can be resolved. HT's ideology can categorised as being a 
variant of the ideology of Islainisin. 19 Upon setting up HT, An-Nabhani · outlined the 
paiiy's objectives that included the revival of the Muslitn world frotn its perceived 
decline; the liberation of Muslitns frotn the thoughts , systetns and laws of unbelievers; 
and the re-establishtnent of the caliphate. 2° For An-Nabhani, Islam is an ideology 
(mabda 'a), vvhich con1prises an idea (jikrah) and 1nethod (tareeqah) .21 This notion , for 
An-Nabhani, encapsulates the basic doctrine of Islarn as we ll as the solutions and 
regulations that en1anate fron1 it. An-Nabhani asserted that existing n1oven1ents have 
failed for several reasons. He notes that these 1nove1nents were established based on an 
in1precise idea (!Ucrah), which was vague and lacked focus. Secondly, the n1oven1ents did 
not define a 1nethod (Tareeqah) to i1nplen1ent their idea:, rather, they proceeded through 
arbitrary and tvvisted n1eans. Thirdly, the movernents relied upon individuals who lacked 
awareness and detern1ination. Lastly, individuals involved in these n1oven1ents did not 
have a correct bond an1ongst then1 and were n1erely bound by their n1en1bership, actions 
and titles. 22 To resolve these problen1s, An-Nabhani proposed that individuals n1ust 
undergo a culturing process in which they are taught an ideologically correct culture. 
Taking then1 through this culturing process requires that each one of then1 assun1es the 
role of a beginner (student), \vhose 1nind is reshaped anevv. After generating hannony 
an1ongst individual associated ·with the n1oven1ent, the next task would be to unite these 
, ,.., 
individual and the society.~-) In essence, An-Nabhani envisaged Muslin1 individuals 
whose thinking ·wi ll be shaped by HT and would carry HT's n1essage to the larger 
Muslin1 society as proponents of the party. 
Borrovving fron1 Freeden's conception of ideology, HT's ideology can be analyzed in 
ten11s of core, adjacent and peripheral concepts. Core concepts \vith in the HT ideology 
include the in1ple1nentation of Islan1ic lavvs and prornu lgation of the caliphate. These 
core concepts are further defined by adjacent concepts, \Vhich include the concept of an 
Islan1ic political systen1, an Islan1ic econon1ic systen1 and unity of the urnmah. These 
19 The concept of Islarnism is first discussed in Chapter 1. 
~o Taqiudclin An -Nabhani , lslmnic State (London: Khilafah Publishers, 1998), p. 10. 
:~ Taqiuddin AJ1-Nabhani , The Concepts cfHizb ut-Tahrir, p. 52 
:~ !~qiuddi~ An -Nabhani, The Structuring ofa Party (London: Khi la fi1h Publishers. 200 i ), p. I I. 
-- 1 bid, p. 1,_ 
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concepts explain and to a certain extent define the core concept of HT's ideology. The 
peripheral concept vvithin its ideology is the idea ofjihad. The adjacent and peripheral 
concepts are by . no n1eans exhaustive. The choice of these concepts ,vas rnade due to 
rnore attention accorded to then1 by HT. In essence, the ideology of HT can be described 
as an anti -systen1ic ideology that seeks to overturn con1pletely the Indonesian political, 
econon1ic and social systen1. 
Core Concepts 
The tvvo rnost irnpo1iant core concepts in HTI's ideology are the concepts of Islarnic lavvs 
and the caliphate. This section will analyze these concepts in greater details. 
Islamic Laws 
The in1plen1entation of lslar11ic laws has been a constant therne reiterated by aln1ost all 
lslan1ist groups in the n1odern era. For HT, it is the n1ost in1portant concept within its 
ideology. It is stated that the in1plernentation of Islan1ic laws is an obligation of all 
Muslirns. HT is of the view that it is prohibited in lslan1 for n1an to use his intellect as the 
sole source of legislation.24 An-Nabhani proposed that the source of legislation 1nust be 
the Qur'an and the Sunnah of the Prophet (the Practice of Prophet Muhan1n1ad), ~jrna · Al-
Sahabah (interpretations of laws by the Prophet's co1npanions) and qiyas (reasoning) as 
legal resources that could be used in detern1ining a ruling on a particular jurisprudence 
. ) ') issue. --
HT also accepts all rnajor lavv schools (mazhab) ,vithin both Sunni and Shhte Islain as 
long as these views do not contradict the core values of its ideas. HT espoused that a 
Muslitn should follow one mazhab in each Islainic dtuals. For instance, upon 
understanding the views of the different ,nazhab a Muslin1 can choose to follow the 
'-' 
Shqfi -'e 1nozhab in n1atters of prayers while adopting the Hanajze nzazhab in n1atters 
related to pil gritnage. Essentially, a person cannot 1nix and 1natch the vievvs of the 
2
~ rvlembers of Hizb ut-Tahrir Britain, The A1ethod to Re.__Establish the Khilafah and Reswne the Jslarnic 
H,'a_,, qlL{fe (London: Al -Khilafah Publications, 2002), p. 49. 
25 An-Na bhani~ Js/am;c State, p. 242. 
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different ,nazhab in one area of ritual. If a Muslitn decides that he is to follo\v the Shafi 'e 
1nazhab, he has to abide to this mazhab' s teachings on all 1natters related to prayers. 
Closely related to this is HT' s position on traditionalists ' rituals such as tahlilan (reciting 
versus fro1n the Koran or supplicationSat least once a week) and ,naulid (special verses 
and supp li cations to celebrate a special day). One HTI leader noted "reading verses frorn 
the Qur'an and other supplications for the dead \Viii result then1 being rewarded by 
God". 26 This rneant that in Indonesia, -HTI accepts tahhlan as a valid ritual. HTT's 
approach to tahlilan and its position on 1nazhab have n1ade it n1ore acceptable for 1nany 
traditional Muslin1s especially an1ong son1e of the 1nore conservative traditionalist ulama 
in Indonesia. In a si1nilar fashion, HT does not reject the teachings of Shiite Islam and 
has n1any n1en1bers of this sect in Iraq and Lebanon. For instance, Osn1an Bakhash , the 
HT Central Nledia representative hails fron1 a Sh;;te background . 
In a booklet produced by HTI in 2002, the party stated that Islan1ic la\vs are G.od's laws 
that \Vere sent to hun1anity through Prophet Muhan1n1ad to encotnpass every aspect of 
life fron1 personal hygiene to adn1inistration of the state. These laws are thus sacred and 
n1ust be treated with the utn1ost respect. 27 Critics of HT have leveled accusations against 
the party that its approach to Islan1ic laws as being too lax and 'rational'. The n1ost 
quoted exan1ple is the pern1issibility for HT men1bers to vie,v photos of people in the 
nude. An-Nabhani has clarified that photos are sin1ply objects and that it was only 
forbidden for Musli1ns to vievv another person in the nude if the person is physically 
present. 28 An-Nabhani also believed that it was pern1issible for a Muslin1 to handshake a 
person of the opposite sex, a practice deerned by conservative Muslin1s as contravening 
Islainic teachings. This was the otTicial position of HT until 1990 ,vhen the paiiy decided 
that the issue of pornography is too dan1aging and si1nply ,vithdrevv discussions on the 
issue fro1n any of HT 1s otlicial publications. 29 
26 See the response of Shiddiq Al-J awi, a key leader of HTI on the issue of tah!ilan at 
http ://www.khilafah1924.org/index.php?option=com_ content&task=view&id=20 5&Itemid=3 7. Accessed 
on 23 Ju ly 2011 . 
27 Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia, Selamatkan Indonesia Dengan s:yariah: Serum, Kepada Wakil Rakyat don Ununat (Jakarta: HTT Press, 2002), p. 7. 
28 The issue of pornography was discussed in UK version of the Al- Wa 'ie magazine in February 1990. Interview with a I\tfember of HT from Gern1any. Ex-members such as I\tfaajid Nawaz and Ed Husain 
confirmed this as well. Interview with I\1aajid Nawaz and Ed Husain, 29 October 2007, London . 2
ci Interview with a Member of HT fron1 Gennany and another rnernber fron1 Malaysia. 
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BT has generally taken a n1ore casual approach towards fulfilling basic Islmnic rituals. 
\Vhile An-Nabhani hin1self did not explicitly prioritize the duty of reviving the caliphate 
over there basic rituals, ex-rnen1bers of HT have noted that the pmiy en1phasized party 
activities over basic Islanric rituals such as prayers. Fon11er n1en1bers of HT such as Ed 
Husain and Maajid Na\,vaz cited several instances of HT n1en1bers n1issing their prayers 
due to their involven1ent in the den1onstrations and public events.30 During the 2010 
Beirut conference, I noticed that HT n1e1nbers did not take tin1e off fro1n the event to 
otler prayers in a congregation preferring to use the tin1e instead to network and speak to 
1nen1bers of the press . 31 While this does not contravene lslarnic teachings, rnost -Muslin1s 
\Votdd often prioritize the act of prayer above all other activities. 32 Another exan1ple of 
this rational thought is the party's position on n1usic. The party not only allows all kinds 
of n1usic as long as its lyrics do not pron1ote un-Islan1ic ideas but has officially 
sanctioned n1ernbers using rnusic in their da 'awah effo11s. 33 The party's approach to 
lslarnic legislation is one of the key attractions for rnen1bers in the rnovernent. The 
party's rational approach to Islan1ic legislation at the personal realn1 is seen as a key 
attraction as n1any younger Iv1uslirns rnight like the political aspirations of irnplernenting 
lslan1ic la\VS at the state level but n1ight not \Vant to abide by a set of rigid laws in their 
personal lives. 
The Calipl~ate 
Another core concept of the HTI's ideology is the idea of the caliphate. For HTt no 
cuITent state in the world is Islan1ic and all are regarded as dar al-kufr (abode of infidels) ~ .. . . 
or dar al-harb (abode of war). 34 Only with the establishn1ent of the caliphate will the first 
dar al-h:lan-1 (abode of Muslin1s) be fon11ed. This is seen as the 1nost impo11ant 
con1ponent of its ideology. An-Nabhani \Vrote in The Islamic State that the appoint1nent 
of tbe caliph is an obligation upon the Musli1ns. He added an extra stipulation that it is 
sinful for J'v1usljrns to spend 1nore than tvvo nights vvithout giving a bai 'ah (oath of 
30 Interview wi th ~1aajid Nawaz and Ed Husain, 29 October 2007, London. 
31 Personal Observation of Author at the HT lnternational Media Conference 5-7 July 2010 . 
3
~ Muslims who are traveling are given th e leniency to perform their obligatory prayers at a later time 
rather than the usual specified ti me. 
:n 1\ 1 adeline Gruene ... Demographics and ~1ethods of Recruitment" in Zeyno Baran (ed) The Challenge of 
Hi::.b ut-Tahrir: Deciphering and Cornbating Radical Jslarnist ideology (Washington-: -ixon Centre, 2004), 
PP - 118-119. 
34 A -Nf l: I . J I -- . S · - 11 l n 1 a 11am, s amzc rate , p,....,_ 
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allegiance) to a caliph. The s1n would be forgiven only if a Muslin1 continued to 
endeavor towards the fon11ation of a caliphate. In justifying his argurnent, An=Nabhani 
quoted a Hadith of the Prophet Niuhatnmad in which the Prophet said that, "He who died 
not knowing the l,na,n of his ti111e has died a death of Jahilz;,yah (age of ignorance and 
sin)"35 An-Nabhani is thus 1naking a case that it is an obligation for all Nfuslitns to work 
towards reviving the caliphate and since in the views of hizbiyyin, HT is the only Islamic 
1nove111ent working towards the caliphate, it is then i1nperative on all Musli1ns to be 
1ne111bers of HT. HT 1ne1nbers are not sinning since they are struggling to revive the 
caliphate. 36 Another in1plication of this belief is that a HT n1en1ber who leaves the party 
is then viewed as having cotntnitted a grave sin. Unlike sotne of the tnore radical Sala/is ~ ~ 
. 
of the takfzri orientation , HT n1en1bers do not conden1n other Muslims as apostates. 37 
Rather, these -~fuslims are viewed as weak Muslims and hence are not part of the chosen 
elites (who are HT n1en1bers). Even so, HT do consider individuals who have left the 
party as sinners and oHen avoid having contact with the person especially if these 
individuals becon1e critical of the party. In this regard, HT can be said to adopt an 
"enclave culture", a tern1 coined by En1annuel Sivan to de-scribe fundan1entalists -who 
construct a wall of virtue based on n1oral values. This wall separates the superior 
individuals fron1 the central con1n1unity who were sinning. 38 Lately, son1e HT n1en1bers 
have insisting that the first caliph 1nust be the An1ir of HT. While sorne in HT are against 
this idea, others have asserted that such a stance is necessary si11ce only HT has the right 
ideas and n1ethodology to go about executing the building of a caliphate. 39 As a resu It 
due to the esteen1ed position of the A1nir, HT n1en1 bers are required to obey the Arnir and 
any acts of disobedience n1ay result in expulsion. Hizbzfyins are often dri I led \Vith the 
idea that allegiance to the Arnir is equivalent to loyalty to the party. This has ensured that 
rnen1bers rernain part of the party even vvhen breakaway groups en1erge at lower levels of 
the leadership. 
Js .b. -1 . ')')', I ll, p. "--"--"-• 
36 HTI published a booklet highlighting the problems with the Muslim world due to its failure to revive the 
Islamic caliphate. See Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia, 79 Tahun Tanpa Khilqf'ah lslarniyah (Jakarta: HTI Press, 
2003) . 
37 A concept within Islamic jurisprudence denotin g a Muslim who is an apostate and thus should be 
punished through killing. One of the modern advocates of this concept is Sayyid Qutb . See S Khatib , 
"Hakimiyyah and Jahiliyyah in the Thought of Sayyid Qutb" A1iddle Eastern Studies 38, no 3 (2002) , pp . !45-170. 
38 Emannuel Sivan, "The Enclave Culture" in M 11.arty (eel) Fundmnentalisn1 Cmnprehended, (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1995), p. 30. · 
39 Interview with Abdul Rahman AI -Baghdacli, 10 August 2009 , Bogor. 
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In defining the 111ethodology to achieve the Islan1ic state and caliphate, An-Nabhani and 
HT proposed the . three-step process of culturing, interaction and establishing the 
caliphate as hi ghli ghted in Chapter 2 . The party also criticizes approaches advocated by 
groups such as the MB to achieving this goal. The rnain criticisn1 against MB is its 
approach of tadart[i (gradualisn1). HT espoused that such vie\1'/S den1ean the Islan1ic 
religion as it in1plies that Islan1 is in1perfect and can only be i1np le1nented in stages. HT 
leaders also noted that often the gradualist approach results in fai lure. They vvrote that 
MB , vvhich works within the political systen1s of n1any countries, has failed to 
accornplish its goals either through the electoral process or through passive resistance. 
Another rnethodology that the party criticizes is the rnethod of rnilitary struggle or 
violence. Here the party cited the exan1ple of Prophet Ivluhan1n1ad who sought to 
overthro\,v the ruling elites in Mecca. The Prophet never used violence to do so. This 
rneans that it is wrong for Muslin1s to use violence as well. In their criticisrn of the 
rnethods used by the n1ore violent groups in Indonesia, such as FPI after the Monas 
incident, lsrnail Yusanto noted that it is irnpossible for the caliphate to be established 
throu gh violence . Citing the exan1ple of Algeria, Yusanto said that violence is just going 
to breed hatred against one another. 40 The third n1ethodology that HT is critical of is the 
be li ef that a iVlus li1n should perfect hitnself first before e1nbarking on any political 
actions . To HT, this concept is dangerous as Muslin1s will then be apolitical and keeps 
the1nselves a\,vay fron1 vital issues such as the re-establislunent of the caliphate and will 
focu s exclusively on their personal lives. Harith Abu Ulya opined that this is the sort of 
l\1uslitn that the enenii es of Islatn want to create. He dted a "report" obtained frorn the 
Briti sh archives stating that it \,vas part of the British strategy in India to support the work 
of the Tablighi Jcnnaat. The ' report ' c lai1ned that the British ' s political control will be 
solidifi ed if M uslin1 s are apolitical as encouraged by the TJ. 41 It is obv jous that its 
cnt1c1s1n of other tnethodologies adopted to revive the Islainic state and caliphate are 
10 I . . I I · 1 
· nterv1ew wit 1 sma1 Yusanto, 20 March 20 l 0, Jakarta . 
~
1 The questi on of wheth er thi s report ex isted is debatabl e. However, th e Toblighi Jamaot have been 
widely cri tici zed by oth er Muslim gro ups fo r the respect the gro up showed to the British government. T11 e 
mos t quoted example of this is a book wri tten by Maulana Rashid Ahmed Gangohi , one of the fo unders of 
the movement where he shovved hi s reverence for the British by writing that the British had every right to 
arrest him even wi tho ut any concrete reason as they are the rulers and must thus be put in high esteemed . 
See 0'la ulana Rashid Ahmed Gangohi , TazAiratur Rashid (Delhi: n.p. , 1950), p. 80. 
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directed at other Islmnist and Islmnic groups including MB, violent Islatnists and TJ. 42 
This is an exarnple of an intra-ideological con1petition for HT to show its ' superior ' 
tnethodology and ideology as compared to other Islatnists groups. 
Beyond highlighting the methodology of reviving the caliphate, An -Nabhani also wrote 
extensively about the structure and components of the Islatnic state. He high I ighted four 
key principles that 111ust guide this state: (a) sovereignty .belongs to the Shari 'ah (b). 
authority belongs to the ummah (Musliln co1n1nunity) (c) the appointtnent of a single 
caliph (cl) that the caliph_ alone reserves the right to enact laws. An-Nabhani believed that 
if any of these principles were tnissing, the ruling systen1 vvould be non-lslatnic. For a 
land to be considered an lslan1ic state, the country's constitution and la'vv, n1ust en1anate 
respect entirely frotn the Shari 'ah. 43 Therefore, these four principles must be enforced. 
The basis of the state is the caliph and final authority in all n1atters must be bestowed on 
hin1. The caliph can appoint pious Muslin1s to the positions of his Assistants; the 
Con1n1ancler of Jihad; the Judiciary; the Adn1inistrative staff; and the Jvlctilis Al [ !nunah 
(Assen1bly of the People). The structure of the State would be con1plete if these eletnents 
were in place. However, even if any of these pillars of the state structure are absent, the 
State would still ren1ain lslan1ic as long as a caliph has been appointed. The j\;Jq_jlis al-
[ l nnnah \Vill be elected by the people and rnernbers of this assen1bly \Vill then appoint a 
caliph fron1 its n1idst. 44 This is a contradiction to its said principle that the sovereignty of 
the state 111ust be in the hands of God. HT is perhaps one of the fevv Isla111ic groups that 
enacted a constitution for its proposed state, which contained features of alternative 
politicar, econo1nic and social systerns. An-Nabhani also proposed that the state 1nust be 
a unitary state clai1ning to en1ulate the Ottornan caliphate· in doing so. 
The above features of the state are i1nportant in several aspects. Firstly, HT's clain1 to 
revive the caliphate is not based on any historical precedence.45 While the party 
constantly clai1ned that it ai1ns to e1nulate the four rightly guided caliphs, the political 
and econon1ic systen1s that they seek to establish were not in existence even during the 
ti111e of the four first caliphs of Islarn. In fact the first four caliphs thernselves also 
42 Interview with Harith Abu Ulya, 5 October 2011 , Jakarta 
..iJ An-Nabhani, !slmnic State , p. 240 . 
44 ibid, pp. 244-245. 
4 5 This was highlighted by Olivier Roy, see Roy, Globalisecl lsln1 , p. 
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ditlered in the \Vay they adn1inistered the caliphate.46 The last of the caliphs, the Otton1an 
caliphate did not n1eet several of the four principles set by HT. The authority of the state 
rernained in the hands of the caliph and ordinary Muslirns did not have any authority 
vvithin the state. The Otton1an caliphate \Vas also n1onarchical, \Vhich contravenes HT's 
principle. The la-vvs in the Otto1nan caliphate vvere not ahvays based on the Shari 'ah. 
Niany pre~Islarnic Turkish traditions and lavvs had a n1ajor in1pact on the state's 
legislation. 47 In a vvay, HT vvas thus reconstructing the traditional concept of the 
caliphate by otlering a n1odern vision of it. Secondly, the criterion that the party places 
on the principles of the caliphate n1eans that no single Muslin1 country can be seen as a 
truly Islarnic state. Hence, the party rejects all other 1nodels for an Islan1ic state based on 
the argurnent that these states cannot be considered to be truly lslarnic. Due to the un-
lslan1ic nature, these governrnents are deerned · as illegal and rnust thus be opposed and 
. •. 
replaced. 
Adjacent Concepts 
Beyond the core concepts within its ideology, there are several adjacent concepts that 
rnake up HT ' s ideology. Freeden wrote that certain concepts can provide definitions to 
different ideologies.48 As such, while the ideologies of dernocracy and liberty 1night have 
their inelirninable cores, they are filled out in a distinctive way di1e to their rnutual 
proxiinity.49 In this sense, ,vithin the ·ideology of libe1iy, de1nocracy is an i1npo1iant 
adjacent concept and hence provides an in1portant n1eaning to the ideology. In the sarne 
way the concept of liberty is an adjacent concept, \Vhich provides an i1npo1iant 1neaning 
to th e ideology of de1nocracv. 
~ -.. .I 
Sirnilar to the other ideologies~ several adjacent concepts give i1nportant 1neanings to the 
ideology of HT. HT's core concepts, the Islarnic lavvs and caliphate provide the 
. . 
fran1evvork that 1nust be filled with details vvhich can be fou11.d in adjacent concepts such 
as the Islan1ic political systen1, Islan1ic econon1y and the unity of the unnnah. Its leaders · 
in Indonesia and beyond often expound these concepts in great detail in various HT 
46 f or derails of these differences , see Ira Lapidus , HistoJ J' (_~llslamic Societies, pp. 34-3 8. 
47 Norman It zkowitz. Ottornan Ernpire and Jslmnic Tradition (New York: AA Knoff Inc, 1973) , p.38. 
-lS Freeden . Ideo logies ond Political Thecn:v, p. 76 
-I Q·t · j ·7() 
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literatures as well as in speeches. The ascend and descend of concepts \Vithin ideologies 
to core, adjacent and peripheral is a con1n1on process which is undertaken to ensure that 
the ideology remains relevant. 
Islan-1ic Political Svsten-1 
HT advocates that in the caliphate, several tenets of the state tnust be observed. A key 
tenet of the caUphate is the fact that the caliph is appointed by the people, and hereditary 
rule based on notions of divine right is forbidden. This consultation process is served 
through the establishment of representative councils co111posed of rnen and won1en fron1 
all religions and ethnic groupings. HT's position on the appointn1ent of the caliph is 
perhaps the 111ost confusing aspect of its political systetn. This process, which is referred 
to as bai -'ah can assun1e n1any styles including voting by ticking a card or en1ail. 50 In 
spite of the sin1ilarity between the electoral process and elections within den1ocratic 
processes, the party ren1ainecl opposed to den1ocracy. A n1anifestation of this anti-
den1ocracy position is seen in can1paigns undertaken by HT. in different countries to 
boycott elections stating that electoral participation is prohibited in Islan1. While 
acknowledging the sin1ilarity between the Islan1ic political systen1 and den1ocracy, it is 
the conduct and rationale of elections in a de1nocracy that the party finds problen1atic. 
Fahn1i An1har explained that elections are held in a den1ocracy so that legislators can 
enact lavvs. Since the constitution and political systen1 in all Niuslin1 countries are not 
Islan1ic, this wi ll auton1atically n1ean that process of enacting the laws and hence the 
process of electing the legislators is un-Tslan1ic. 51 
The Islarnic political systen1 n1ust also entail the forrnation of a governn1ent that is open 
and accountable. It is a right of the people to question or criticize the decisions of the 
ruler especially if he contravenes Isla1nic lavvs. The ditTerence betv.;een this systen1 and · 
that of a de111ocracy is that final povver within a den1ocracy rests in the hands of the 
populace. 52 For HT, the act of legislating ne\v la\vs rnust con1ply \Vith the tenets of the 
50 Interview with Ismail A I-Wahwah, 1 July 2010, Sydney. 51 Interview with Fahrni Amhar, 9 August 2010, Jakaita. · 52 Abdul Qadeem Zalloum, DemocraC)1 is a Systenz q/Ki{/1", (London : Khilafah Publications. 1995), p . 7. 
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Shari 'ah. Thus, the act of electing legislators to draft and ratify lavvs that could 
contravene the Shari 'ah is equally unacceptable. 
Tsla,nic Econon1ic Svsten1 
Another irnpo1iant adjacent concept for HTI's ideology is the concept of an lslarnic 
econorny. At the rnost basic level, An-Nabhani argued that lslan1 believes strongly in the 
fair distribution of vvealth and that interest (riba '), is prohibited within an Islarnic 
econon1ic syste.111. An-Nabhani had also ·written that all 111oney n1ust be pegged against 
the value of gold and ave.red that the current syste.111 of pegging currencies against the US 
dollars is un-Islanric. Another dirnension of the Islan1ic econon1y ten1plate is the belief 
that ;public goods~ such as · water and oil cannot be sold as cornrnodities and n1-ust be 
distributed without charge. HT also rejects all forn1s of taxes except those ordained by 
Islarn such as zakat and ushr (land taxes). 53 An-Nabhani asser1ed that both the capitalist 
and con1n1unist econon1ic svsten1s are un-Islan1ic . 
., 
HT rnernbers try to put into practice their beliefs in an Islan1ic econornic systen1 in their 
personal lives. Rah1nat Kun1ia asserted that it is irnpcn1ant for HT to begin encouraging 
rnen1bers to adopt the practices of the future caliphate. He acknowledges that current 
state of the international econon1ic syste1n 1nakes it is i1npossible for a 1/fuslin1 to avoid 
dealing with the prohibited aspects of the capitalist econon1y, such as using paper n1oney 
in transactions. 54 Even so, it is obligatory for 1ne1nbers of HTI to avoid practices that are 
· di sallowecr by Is lain if such acts can be evaded. A case in point is the purchase of goods 
such as cars and houses on credit. As a result, 1nost HT 1ne1nbers often live in rented 
hornes or hotnes inherited frotn their fa1nilies. In a paradox within the pa11y, n1any HT 
and HTI 1ne1nbers continue to work in the banking and financial industries despite the 
fact that these institutions are the backbone of the capitalist economic system. This 
contradiction is best depicted in an interview with a HT 111en1ber in Britain in 2007. The 
interview \Vas held in a cafe at the heart of London's business district, the Canary Wharf 
where his ofiice \Vas located. This HT 111en1ber works for a firn1 that deals in financial 
services. The focus of the intervie'vv was on capitaiistn. Despite being at the heart of the 
53 Taqiuddin ,-\n -N abhani , The Econonzic Systen1 of lslmn (London: Khilafah Publications, 1997), p. 4. 
54 Interview \.Vith Rahmat Kumia , I October 2009, Jakarta. 
· 188 
Britain's capitalist econon1y and working in a organization , which feeds on the capitali st 
econon1y, he did not think that his ideological criticisn1s against capitalisn1 is at odds 
with his ovvn life. 55 It is indeed interesting that man y HT n1embers have a rather 
contradictory position on capitalis1n. While they support HT' s Islarnic econotnic syste111 , 
they see1n to contradict this position through their direct involve1nent in capitalistic 
venture, the very syste1n that they seek to eradicate. HTI leaders noted that 1ne1nbers of 
the pmiy who are involved in such capitalist ventures are encouraged to look for 
alternative e111ploy1nent oppotiunities but noted that 1ne1nbers are not expected to leave 
their jobs if they are unable to find alternative jobs. 
Unitv of the U,nnzah 
Another adjacent concept within the ideology of HT is the concept of the ununah. The 
unnnah is defined here as all believing Musl in1s. HT advocates strongly that al I fv1usl i n1s 
are equal in the eyes of God regardless of their colour, ethnicity and nationality. It is only 
piety that differentiates two Muslin1s. At a n1acro level , HT does not recognize the 
borders \vithin the Muslin1 world , as it believes strongly that these borders are colonial 
constructs designed to weaken Musl in1s. 56 .Many of the Musi in1 countries created through 
the process of redrawing of borders are perceived to be artificial creations of the West. 
They believe that nationalisn1 was spread within the Musli111 ·world to weaken the 
Muslirns and traced the collapse of the caliphate to the creation of Arab nationalisrn 
ain1ed at undern1ining the caliphate led by the Turks. In several countries \vhere the state 
ideology is nationalisrn~ HT has been the rnost fervent critic of this concept. 
At a personal level, HT n1e1nbers especially in the West apply their beliefs in the concept 
of the ununah in their personal lives by n1arrying into a di±Terent con11nunity. For 
instance, a pron1inent leader of HT in Australia of Arab Lebanese decent is rnarried to an 
Indonesian Australian vvhile another pron1inent HT leader in Britain of Pakistani origin is 
rnarried to a Sudanese n1en1ber of HT. While HT does not forn1all y encourage thi s, such 
practices are vie,A1ed positively in the party. HT ' s strong condernnation of nationalisn1 ~ 
55 Interview with Jamal Hardwood, 30 June 2006 , London . 
56 Hizb ut-Tahrir, Dangerous Concepts to Attack Islmn a,:Jd Consolidate vVestern Culture (I ,on don : 
Khilafah Publications, 1997), p. 25 . 
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does not n1ean that a strong sense of nationalis111 is absent in the party. To eradicate such 
feelings , HT has held several 111ajor international gatherings where its 1nen1bers fron1 all 
around the vvorld can gather and interact vvith one another Such gatherings \Vere held in 
Jakarta (2007)~ Khartoun1 (2009) and Beirut (2010). Nevertheless, the· issue of ethnic 
allegiance ren1ains a challenge for HT. A forn1er HTI leader adn1its that the party 
rernains largel y Arab-centric in their thinking, citing exan1ples such as the absence of 
non-Arabs in its leadership and the excessive focus on the Middle East as being targeted 
areas for the future caliphate. 
Once again despite this rhetoric about the unnnah, HTI leaders then1selves hold biased 
attitudes to\vards other nationalities and ethnic groups.57 One HTI leader recounted his 
experience \Vhile living in Malaysia and hovv he had trouble adjusting to the country. He 
noted that Bangladeshis in M alaysia had a pungent body odour and found South Asian 
food repulsive. rnaking it di±Ticult for hirn to eat in certain places58 . The leadership of 
HTI also ren1ains largely Javanese. It n1ust be qualified that HTI rnen1bers of other ethnic 
groups do not seen1 to rnind this arrangernent and the relationship bet,veen the central 
· HTI leadership and its regional leadership rernains good. 
Peripheral Concepts 
A key peripheral concept that can be i~entified vvithin the ideology of HTI is the concept 
ofjihad. The concept ofjihad is in1portant to the ideology of HT as it defines the clash 
bet\veen Islan1 and the West \Vhich in the n1ind of HT 1nen1bers is bound to happen at 
one point or another. As such, an understanding of these peripheral concepts ,v ill provide 
an understanding the actual long-tenn goal of the par1y. 
Jihad 
HT' s conception of jihad is related to the core concept of the caliphate, which the party 
considers as the only dar-Al-Jslarn. This is contrasted with the two other concepts of dar-
57 J\1 uji yonto, "Republik Bola dan Berhala" at http://l~izbut-tahrir.or.id/2010/1 2/27/republik-bola-dan -
berhala-nasional isme/ Accessed on 19 Jul v 2011. 
58 lnterview ·wi th Hafidz Abdunahm an, 12 August 2010, Jakarta. 
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al-harb and dar-al-kufi··. HT believes that it is an obi igation of Muslitns to launch jihad to 
free all Muslin1 lands that are don1inated by Western powers after the caliphate is , 
established. While 1nost Muslims see jihad as a concept with a wider tneaning that 
includes a personal struggle, a struggle to i1nprove society and a tni I itary struggle to 
defend Islatn, HT's definition of jihad refers to a rnilitary struggle. HT believes that the 
definition of jihad should be limited to a Muslitn's tnilitary struggle against the enemies 
of Islatn. The basic condition for this kind of jihad can only be declared by the caliph. 
Hence no offensivejihad can be undetiaken as long as there is no caliphate. According to 
the party, ofiensive war is "'a ,var to raise the Word of Allah" an1ong the disbelievers 
even it they did not attack Muslitns"59 This jihad \Vil! be carried out to free ~Iusli1ns 
fron1 non-Muslin1 rule. As for the dar-al-harb, the party believes that these lands ,vere 
Musli1n lands that were are occupied by non-Musli1ns. These terdtories include countries 
like Spain and the Eastern European countries, which are now inhabited by non-Muslin1s 
but were forn1erly part of the Otton1an caliphate. It will then engage in ,var to colonize all 
non-Muslin1 n1ajority countries. In the absence of the caliphate, Muslin1s can engage in 
'detensive jihad if Muslin1 lands are colonized by the enen1ies of Islan1. 60 In such a 
situation, jihad becon1es obligatory for all Musi in1s. During the An1erican attacks on 
61 Iraq, HT sacked party n1en1bers who fled Iraq. 
Beyond the core and peripheral concepts associated with its ·r deology, HT defines its 
ideology in oppositional tenns in relation to other ideologies. In doing so , the party has 
consistently criticized the West as being the enen1y of lslan1 and an entity that must thus 
be decirnated. In Indonesia, the key targets for HTI are the rnainstrean1 Islarnic 
organization supporting the Pancasila ideology of the state, which is deen1ed as a secular 
nationalist ideology by HTI vvhich is hence un-Islan1ic. The next section of the chapter 
vvill exan1ine this conflict ,vith NU. 
59 Hizb ut-Tahrir, The A,nerican Cmnpaign to Suppress Islmn (London: Khilafah Publi shers, n, d,), p. 68 . 60 Hizb ut-Tahrir, The U,mnah ·s Charter, (London: Khilafah Publications, 1989), p. 19 . 61 Interview with Ismail AI -Wahwah , 20 September 2009, Sydney. 
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Inter-Ideological Conflict: Tackling the Mainstrean1 Musli111 Organization 
(Nahdlatul lJlama) 
The inter-ideological conflicts between HTI and n1ainstrean1 Muslin1 organizations such 
as NU and Muhmnrnadiyah have intensified in the last few years. During the early days 
of its founding. HTI leaders avoided direct criticisn1 towards the organizations. The key 
strategy ernployed by I-ITI in t1cing both NU and Muharnn1adiyah is to en1phasize that 
the objectives of these organizations are to revive Islainic la\vs and re-establish the 
caliphate. A,_ scan through the objectives of these organizations would reveal such 
asse1iions are sin1ply untrue. In spite of this, in a booklet docurnenting the 
irnplernentation of Shari 'ah in Indonesia, HTI argued that the early leaders of both 
IV1uhmnrnadiyah and NU (Kyai Wahab Hasbullah) fon11ed their respective organizations 
to revive Islan1 in Indonesia. HTI highlighted that Kyai Wahab initiated the fonnation of 
a Caliphate Ccnnrnittee after the collapse of the Ottornan caliphate to assist in efforts 
ain1ed at restoring the caliphate. Subsequently Kyai Wahab and Haji Abdul Rozak 
Fachruddin fron1 Muharnrnadiyah were tasked to attend the Caliphate Congress, which 
was to be held in Cairo. It is the view of HTI that both leaders were keenly involved in 
the con1rnittee. However, this view is an overstaten1ent of the irnportance placed on the 
caliphate issue. vVhile both leaders were initially enthusiastic in thejr involve1nent vvith 
the n1oven1-ent, both began to focus on other issues deerned as being rnore in1portant to 
Indonesian Muslitns. 62 This is yet another exainple of hovv _HTI 1nakes clailns that are 
exaggerated or rnisconstrues inforn1_ation to gain suppori for the party. 
On the other hand, HT!' s strategy in dealing with NU is to criticize its leadership at the 
national level while focusing on buildjng bridges vvith leaders of NU at the provjncial 
and district levels. Freeden highlighted that 1ne1nbers of different ideolo£ies vvould often 
'- ~ '-' 
try to rnisrepresent the history of the evolution of paiiicular ideologies to give a sense 
that concepts within its ovvn ideology \Vere closer to the original concepts of a con1peting 
ideology. 63 Sorne NU leaders the1nselves are highly suspicious of HTI and have 
6 2 
.Martin Van Bruinessen, 1'Muslims in Dutch East Indies and the Caliphate Question,'1 Studia Jslamika 2, 
no . 3 ( 1995), pp.135-136 . 
03 Michael Freeden. ·'fdeology-Balances and Projections" in Michael Freeden (ed) Rea.s:::i"essing Political 
ideologies: The Durabilit_i. · c~lDissent (London and New York: Routledge, 2001), p. 196 . 
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explicitly prohibited NU rnetnbers frotn joining or even organizing activities with HTl. 64 
Hasyin1 Muzadi, the previous N.U chief even urged the Indonesian governn1ent to 
disallow the 2007 caliphate conference from being held in J akmia. In reality, these 
prohibitions have had little effect on so1ne NU leaders. During HTI' s caliphate 
conference in 2007, the provincial head of NlJ in Nusa Tenggara, Tunnuzhi Badhuli 
attended the gathering and spoke about the need for the caliphate. HTT has also co-
organized several joint activities with NU rnernbers.65 
In its ideological conflict vvith NU; HTI has focused largely on its two core concepts. NU 
leaders have stated clearly that the organization supports the Pancasila as a state 
ideology since the 1983 NU annual n1eeting where a final decision was n1ade that there is 
no inherent contradiction between Pancasila and Islarn. The discussion about the 
caliphate is thus vievved as a ,vaste of energy and resources of the Muslim community. 
The deputy head of NU noted: 
For NU, the i1nplementation of Shari 'ah at the state level should not be a priority for 
Musli1ns. It is more i1nportant that Musli1ns are first prepared at a personal level to live 
an lslan1ic lifestyle before other aspects of lslainic laws are in1plementecl. More 
importantly, there are already Shari 'ah laws implemented in Indonesia that manage 
Muslim personal laws. This is suffic ient to protect tlle interest of Muslin1s Ill 
I -1 • 66 nuonesrn. 
While so1ne NlJ leaders ackno,vledged that the founders of NU such as Wahab 
HasbuIIah did support the revival of the caliphate, this support was not necessarily 
ideological. The support for the caliphate was n1ore due to the fear that the en1ergence of 
the TiVahhabi n1ove1nent in the Middle East would restrict the freedon1 of Muslin1s of 
other n1azhab other than Hanbali. There were concerns that the new leaders of Arabia 
wou ld destroy the gravesites of the Prophet and his con1panions to prevent Muslin1s fron1 
64 
Nadh latul Ulama, Rekornendasi Kor!ferensi Wilayah Jawa Timur, PP Zainul Hasan genggong 
Probolinggo, 2007, pp. 6-9. 
6 5 For instance, see HTI Press, "HTI clan Kyai Muda NU di Kajen Pati Diskusi Tentang Khilafah" at 
http ://hi zbut-tah ri r.or. id/20 l l /06/08/hti-dan-kyai-muda-nu-d i-kaj en-pati -diskusi -tentang-kh il afah Accessed 
on 21 July 2011. 
. 
66 Interview with As ' acl AIL 20 August 2010 , Jakarta. 
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visiting as this seen to be an act of bid 'ah. 67 In addition, NU also shifted its stance by 
opposing the forn1ation of an lslan1ic state in Indonesia. NU leaders considered that a 
secular state is the n1ost appropriate forn1 of goven1ance, which \Vould allo\v Muslin1s 
and non-Muslirns to live han11011iously together. 68 
In its inter-ideological debates with NlJ, HTI atten1pted to sho,v that the concepts 
attached to its ideology is 1nore Islan1ic. The thrust of HTI's argun1ent is that its ideology 
has Islarnic roots and is therefore superior to the secular basis of the Pancasila ideology. 
In doing so, the party is atten1pting to highlight that its ideology is superior to that of NU. 
Beyond the inter-ideological debates, groups also engage in intra-ideological debates. 
The next section ,vill exarnined an exarnple of this intra-Islan1isn1 debate between HTI 
and PKS. 
lntra-Islan1isn1 Con1petition: HTI and PKS 
Freeden stated that the intra-ideological cornpetition 1s rnore significant than inter-
ideological conflicts for a group ' s ideology. Firstly, an ideology is often defined 
according to the dorninant understanding of a particular ideology. This had occurred 
earlier with other ideologies such as co1n1nunis1n vvhere the Marxist-Leninist 
'-
interpretation becan1e dorninant (as opposed to the Troskyite doctrine). This occured 
after the Bolsheviks and Lenin consolidated control over Russia. Secondly, it is also 
rnore likely that adherents of a particular ideology ,vould s,vitch to another strand of the 
sa1ne ideology than to a co1npletely different ideology.69 For instance · adherents of 
lslarnis1n, are n1ore likelv to s,vitch fro1n the radical violent lslamis1n to a non-violent 
- ~ . . . 
strand of lsla1nis1n rather than a liberal ideology. 70 This 11).eans that these intra-
0 7 Greg Feal y, Ijitihad Politik Ulama: Sejarah j Tl 1952-1967 (Jakarta: LKIS, 1998), p. 32. 
68 Shalahuddin Wahid. ··N'll dan Khilafah lslamiyah" Republika , 12 February 2008. For details of the 
ch ange in NU·s pos iti on 0 11 the Islamic laws and Islamic state, see Abdurahman \Vahid, "Massa Islam 
Dalam Kehidupan Bernegara Dan Berbangsa." Prisma Extra Edition( l 984), pp . 3-9. 
t•
9 Freeden. ideo logies and Political Th ecny , p. 78. 
70 Omar Ashour noted that violent Islamists are more likely to join non-violent Islamist movements than 
rr1 ovements of other ideo logical inclinations . He cited various examples from Egypt, Libya and Algeria as 
case studies. See Omar Ashour, The De-Radicalisation ofJihadists (London: Routledge, 2009). This 
theory was furiher strengthened after 2011 Egyptian Revolution which led to the ouster of President Hosni 
J\1 ubarak and sav,, formerl y violent Islamists like Gmna El Islmniya fom1ing the Building and Development 
Paiiy and contesting the 2011 Egyptian elections. 
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ideological conflicts could potentially result in HTI gaining n1ore n1en1 bers frorn other 
Islan1ic groups. 
HTI shares a sense of carnaraderie with sorne lslarnist movernents . This was shown 
during the trial of Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, the leader of JAT, for all eged terrorist activities in 
Ac.eh. HTI rnernbers studiously attended the couri proceedings to provide support to 
Ba'asyir. Others vvithin the party felt that it is itnportant that an lslarnist leader like 
Ba'asyir who shares 1nany of HTI's ideals be allowed to spread his ideas. Ba'asyir 
hin1self advocates the in1portance of the caliphate in his sen11ons, speeches and writings. 
As part of HTI's policy to n1aintain strong ties with other groups, they organized joint 
activities such as de1nonstrations, se1ninars and conferences. These groups include the 
JA T, FPI and MMI as vvell Islan1ic parties such as PBB. HTI leaders highlight that there 
are son1e underlying issues with son1e of these groups. Firstly, the n1ethodology of these 
groups is wrong, Secondly, these groups are confused in their understanding of certain 
concepts such as den1ocracy, jihad and capitalisn1. In this section, the focus \Vill be on 
the intra-ideological con1petition between HTI and PK.S. While HTI is critical of groups 
such as FPI and JAT, these criticisn1s tend to be n1easured. A HTI leader declared : 
Groups like FPI, MMI and JA T tend to be action-oriented; they lack a clear methodology 
and ideology. This means that it is much easier for us to guide and steer them towards 
our cause. Even if they do not join us , we are still able to lead then1 as we can see fron1 
the activities of FUI. For the political pa1iies, we do not have 1nany differ~nces with 
some Islamic paiiies . We have close relationship with the leaders of PPP and PBB. Once 
again these parties also lack a clear ideology. Their rnain objective is to win votes. We 
can convince them as well. PKS is different. They have a clearer ideology and 
methodology as they are a brach of the lkhv.;cm (M"t1siim Brotherhood). The Jk!rvva11 
opposed our ideology and 1!1ethodology fron1 Day 1 even in Jerusalam. So we need to do 
more da 'avvah. If this failed, then we need to debate then1 and show the weakness of 
l · 71 t 1eir argu1nent. 
71 Intcrvicv,, with Rahmat Kurnia, I October 2009, Jakarta. 
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While the above observation is sin1plistic, given that 111ost leaders of Islan1ist 111ove111ents 
do have their own objectives and ideology, it is a reflection of how HTI views these 
n1oven1ents and pa11ies. HTI also dichoton1ize bet\veen groups such as JA T, FPI and 
M1\IIL 'which share their rejection of den1ocracy, capitalisn1, the nation-state and 
secularism. and the PKS. HTI n1en1bers feel that PKS pose a genuine challenge to the 
party. Due to the i1npo1iance accorded to PKS, · HTI leaders have explicitly spoken 
against PKS. 
A_s rnentioned earlier in the chapter, An-Nabhani believed that the 111ain weakness with 
n1ost Islan1ic n1overnents is their inability to forn1ulate a suitable n1ethodology to restore 
the caliphate. He focused his rnain criticisn1 against ideologies tha.t allow for gradualisn1 
such as that of the ~v1uslirn Brotherhood. Hafidz Abdurrahn1an argued that the PKS is an 
exan1ple of the failures of gradualisrn. ''"The party has now been sucked into the political 
systen1 and has abandoned its aspiration to establish an Islan1ic state."72 He alleged that 
PKS is n1ore concern about attaining power than to in1plen1ent Islan1ic laws. HTI leaders 
also cited several exarnples of how PKS cooperate with secular parties and even a 
Christian party in different provincial elections. In an article written by HTI colun1nist, 
Muj iyonto, the party condernned the decision of PKS to field non-Muslirn candidates in 
elections. He argued thjs prag1natic approach to politics shovvs that the paiiy has derailed 
frorn its original airns. 73 HTI ' s assessrnent of PKS is echoed by forn1er senior leaders of 
PKS such as Abu Ridho. He expressed his disenchant1nent \rVith PKS leaders vvhotn he 
believed have drifted avvay fron1 the party's initial objectives.74 
Another core concept of the HTI's ideology that has placed the party diainetrically 
opposed to PKS is the issue of the i1nple1nentation of Shari ;ah. PKS contended that 1nost 
1 ndonesians do not understand the Shari )ah. PKS clai1ns to educate Musli1ns about the 
Shari 'ah and advocates the Shari 'ah is first observed at the individual and fmnily 
72 Interview with Hafidz Abdurrahman , 21 iv1arch 2008 , Bogor. 
73 N1uj iyonto , "Partai ls lam Kian Pragmatis" 20 August 2010 . Accessed at http://hizbut-
tahrir.or.id/20 l 0/08/20/parpol -islam-kian -pragmatis on 21 July 2011. 
74 Phone Interview with Abdi Sumaiti (Abu Ridho) , 23 July 2011. Jaka11a Also see Mohan1111ed Anshari , 
"Abu Ridho Benarkan Elite PKS Sudah J\1elenceng'' Accessed from 
http ://nas i on al .ini !ah .com/read/detai l/ 133 5 532/abu-ridho-benarkan-elite-pks-sudah-melenceng on 22 July 
2011. 
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levels. 75 Rather than focusing on the fonn of Shari 'ah, PKS seeks to first irnbibe the 
values of Sherri 'ah by fighting corruption and nepotisn1 in Indonesian society. Fahri 
Harnzah explained that PKS' approach to irnplernenting Shari 'ah lavvs involves several 
stages. Indonesian M_usli1ns must first adhere to Shari 'ah laws at the personal realm. As 
long as this is not fulfiled, the task of itnpletneting Shari 'ah at the national level wi 11 be 
arduous. The guiding principles and contents of these laws 1nust first be drafted , 
discussed and approved at the legislative level. It is only after conditions are tnet that 
these laws can be realized.76 He added that tnany PKS leaders and activists believe that it 
is adequate that the principles of Shari 'ah are applied to guide legislation process . lsn1ail 
Yusanto asserted that the PKS' understanding ofthe -Shari 'ah is erroneous. He disagreed ~ ~ 
with the vievv that it is sufficient for the principles Shari 'ah to be irnplen1entecl in 
Indonesia. He argued that the application of Shari 'ah is a fc1rd (obligation) for all 
Tl Muslin1s. In this regard, HTI's position concurs with son1e forn1er PI(S leaders 
especially those belonging to JT such as Abu Ridho. 
Ideology and the Hizbivvin 
It is in1portant at this juncture to discuss , the role of HT's ideology in influencing 
rnernbers to choose the n1oven1ent over other Islan1ist groups. An in1portant question that 
this chapter seeks to answer is the reasons why HTI 111en1bers ·-chose to HTI over other 
Islmnist organizations. As noted earlier, Freeden argued that political groups often 
engage in intra-ideological conflicts to en1phasize the strength of concepts within the 
group's definition of an ideology. In doing so~ the concepts attached to the group \Viii 
en1erge as the n1ainstrean1 understanding of a particular ideology. It is ass urned that the 
dorninant ideology vvi 11 attract adherents of other ideologies. One of the key challenges in 
ascertaining the outcorne of an intra-Islarnisrn co1npetition is the ditI1cu lty in identifying 
1ne1nbers of other Islan1ist groups who 111ight have joined or left HTI. Nevertheless~ a 
scan of forn1er n1en1bers of HTI reveal that only a srnall nun1ber actually joins other 
lslan1ist n1oven1ents. Often, these ex~n1en1bers will forn1 ne\ver groups that have the 
sarne objective of reviving the caliphate. Thie could be seen from the exan1.ples of Hi:::bul 
75 Interview with Zulkifli Mansyah, 21 October 2007, Jakarta. 76 Interview with Fahri Hamzah, 15 May 2011, Jakaria. · 
77 Interview with Ismail Yusanto , 20 March 20 l 0, Jaka11a. 
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Khilq/£7h and HDI. Intervie,vs with current 111en1bers of HTI reveal that 111any of these 
111en1bers joined the 111oven1ent due to a belief in the superiority of the HTI's ideology as 
con1pared to other Islmnist ideology. Several concepts of HTI's Islan1isn1 attracted then1 
to the pa1iy. 
Caliphate as an Obligation 
IY[ernbers of HTI often cite the party ' s ideology as being the rationale for then1 choosing 
HTI over other Islan1ist groups. The n1ost in1portant aspect of HTI ' s ideology that n1any 
of its rnern bers find appealing is the concept of the caliphate. A n1en1ber of HTI in 
Jakarta, Budi , said: 
1 have been part of n1any ls lamic groups. I come fro1n a NU background and studied wjth 
n1any NU ulama but none of then1 en1phasized the i111p01iance of the caliphate. Later, I 
joined other groups such as Persis and JT. While the then1e of the caliphate was 
discussed, it \Vas not central to the ideology of these groups. It was only when I sta1ied 
attending the pengc1jiaan of HTI that I really understood the in1portance of the caliphate 
and was clear about how the caliphate can be achieved. How can we talk about 
in,proving the conditions of Muslin1s when the poli6ca1 system is un -lslamic and we do 
not have the political strength to rnake changes. What we need is a top down change that 
would seep all aspects of our lives. 78 
The concept of the caliphate as defined by HTI, is a key attraction to 1nany of its 
tnernbers. They believe that it is this aspect of HTI's ideology that 1nakes the pa11y 
superior to other Islatnist rnove1nents. HTI rnen1bers are thus convinced that their work 
to,rVards reviving the caliphate is an obligation that 1nust be fulfilled sitnilar to how other 
Musli1ns offer the obligatory five ti1ne prayers. In doing so, they distinguished 
then1selves fro1n other Islaini.c groups and Musli1ns. 
Rational Con1prehensive Islan1 
78 Interview with Budi, 20 August 2009. Jakarta 
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At a 1nore personal level, the patiy's rational approach towards interpreting Tslamic laws 
is attractive to son1e educated individqals when differentiating between HT and other 
Tslan1i st groups. Here rational refers to HT 's interpretation of Is latni c laws which is 
heavily influenced by the use of logical thoughts sirnilar to the Mu 'tazilah sect. On the 
other band, cotnprehensive here refers to HT's approach of trying to develop alten1ative 
socio-econotnic and political 1nodels for the Muslin1 world. This could possibly explain 
the large number of better-educated individuals joining the patiy. HTI rnernbers often 
spoke about the cotnprehensive syste1ns that the party offers to thetn. Lazuardi 
Hendrawan, personal assistant to lsn1ail Yusanto observed that 
' Unlike other Islan1ist n1oven1ents that speak of concepts such as political , economic and 
social syste1ns of Isla1n in abstract tenns, HTI actually offer a comprehensive system . 
We even have our own constitution for the caliphate. · Thi s shows the cornprehensive 
nature of our program. Everything that the pa1iy decides is supported wi th clalil 
(evidence fron1 the Qur' an and Hadith), which gives strength to our argunients. 79 
The party's focus on the caliphate issue rather then ritualistic aspects of Islan1 is seen as 
an asset of the party. lvvan Dou111y the leader of GEMA in Banda Aceh explained: 
Our brothers in HTI always have an answer to every question. T·hese answers are not 
your typical superficial answers , which you get from religious scholars. These answers 
are thorough, supported by dalil and logically derived .80 
In responding to a question about controversial views held by the party such as allowing 
the vievving of nude photos, s1noking and shaking of hands between rnen and wo1nen, 
one HT leader answered: 
Thi s is the strength of HT. We do not just blindl y follo w the crowd. We assess a 
pa1iicular issue based on the ev idence; we pass a judgn1ent on the niatter and st ick by 
that judgment unless there is stronger evidence presented to us to beli eve in the 
81 
contrary. 
~ ~ Interview with Lazuardi Hendrawan, 1 February 2009, Jakarta 
~u Intervi'ew with Iwan Doumy, 24 Jrurn,u-y 2009, Banda Aceli . 8 1 Interview with a Jaweecl Khan , 10 July 2011 , Johor Bahru, Malaysia. 
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HTI activists often spoke about the fi1ct that the Isla111 that is taught in HTI has ele111ents 
of both traditional and 111oden1ist Isla111. 82 The party's tolerance for traditional practices 
and acceptance of the views of traditional Isla111ic jurists n1akes the party n1ore 
acceptable to n1any activists \Vho rnight have lean1ed Islan1 fro111 the traditionalist 
perspective. Party leaders \Vould not the1nselves organize traditional rituals but wou ld 
attend and vvould not stop rne1nbers fro111 doing so. The paiiy is also n1oden1ist in the 
sense that it has a strong culture of re-interpreting_ Islan1ic laws to tackle rnore 
conte1nporary issues. A.s one HTI activist noted, the difference bet\veen the traditionalist 
school and HTI is that HTI engages n1uch 1nore in conte1nporary issues affecting 
Muslin1s using traditional sources as \vell as rational thought, \Vhich 111akes its version of 
Islarn n1ore acceptable. 83 Another HTl rnernber explained: . 
For someone like 1ne who is fro1n NU, I find it easier to join HTI over other Isla1nist 
movements such as the Salqfi who are very critical of NU practices. When I joined HTI, 
I vvas not told that tahlilan \Vas un-Islarnic. The Salajzs like to discuss issues like this. 
Whether tahlilan is allowed or not will not the change the state of Muslin1s. V•/ e need to 
focus on bigger issues. This is the main flaw that I see with other groups like Salqfis. 
They are too obsessed with the small issues while rnissing the bigger picture in the 
84 process . 
The issue of approach to Islainic lavv see1ns to have influenced the decisions of so1ne 
HTI me1nbers to leave NU for HTI. Hafidz Abdu1Tah1nan recalled that he lea111ed 
ritualistic di1nensions of Islan1. This was taught by rote-lea111ing, which he clai1ned was 
8~ Seyyed Hossein Nas r provides a useful rich and rigorous definition for traditional Islam. He related 
traditional Islam to three important concepts, Tauhid (Belief in the supreme oneness of God)~ Shari ·ah 
(Islamic laws as interpreted by the different schools of jurisprudence) and Tasawuf (manifestations of 
spiritual Islam including Islamic mysticism, Islamic philosophy and Islamic arts). In Indonesia, NU is an 
example of a traditionalist Muslim group. See Seyyed Hossein Nasr, Islam in the Modern world (New 
York: Harper Collins, 2010). l\1oden1ist Islam often involves a reinterpretation of Islamic theology in 
response to colonialism. l\1odernist l\1uslims often calls for the return to the Qur ' an and Hadith of the 
Prophet rejecting the need for any school ofjurisprudence and often vilifying Sufism and Islamic 
philosophy as un-lslan,i c practices. Muhammadiyab is often cited as an example of a modernist movement. 
See Mansoor tv1ooadel. Js/amic A1odernism, Nationalism and Fundamentalism: Episode and Discourse 
(London: University of Chicago Press, 2005), pp. 4-8 . 
83 Interview with Abu Am.mar, 29 January 2011 , Pekanbaru . 
8 
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the conventional way Islam is being taught in NU pesantrens. He also observed that 
different NU pesantrens teach ditTerent things that n1ight even contradict each other. As 
far as he is concen1ed, NU is not united and has no clear objectives and does not organize 
any sort of significant activities. In contrast, he believed that HTI ha? a clear objective 
and also a co1nprehensible tnethodology, which is adopted by HT branches all around the 
world. For ex-NU 111e1nbers like Abdurrahtnan , the result of the inter-ideological conflict 
between HTl and NU, it is the core concepts ,vithin HTI's ideo logy .that is superi or. Such 
views are of course litnited to NlJ 1ne1nbers who are no,v with HTI. Ahmad Baso, a NlJ 
activist concur with son1e of these views when he highlighted that the younger 
generation of NU activists have stopped organizing activities 111 the 1nosques and 
mushollah (prayer roon1/area) throughout the country leading to activists fron1 radical 
groups filling in the vacuwn created by NU activists. 85 Many tnore NlJ leaders believe 
that HTI's ideology is dangerous for Indonesia and n1ust be opposed as seen fron1 open 
warnings issued by its forn1er chairn1an Hasyin1 Muzadi. 
Radical but JVon-Violent 
Men1bership of HT has been described by Wiktorowicz as high-risk acti visrn. 86 It 
involves activities such as conden1ning the state and openly calling for a coup d'etat to 
replace the Indonesian govern1nent. Sorne of HTI's radical views have led to calls by 
son1e quarters in the country to ban the party. Thi s anti-systen1i c approach of the party 
can be traced back to the core and adjacent concepts of its ideology . The pat1y rejects 
every political , social and econo111ic systen1 that currently do111inates the vvorld and ,vill 
not con1pron1ise as long as Islan1ic la,vs are not i1nplen1ented and the caliphate is not 
conceived, the vvay the party has set it out. For HTI 111en1bers, this unco1npro1nising 
position is 1nanifestation that the pmiy's ideology is indeed superior. As noted earlier in 
this chapter, the changing position of PKS on the irnplernentation of f slan1ic lavvs and 
Islan1ic state has affected its irnage as an lslarnic party. Abu lbrahin1 a forn1er activist of 
KAMMI recalled: 
85 Ahmad Baso, NU Stud;es: Pergolakan Pernikiran Antara Fundmnetalisme Islan1 dan Fundmnentalisme Neo -Liberal (Jakarta: Erlangga , 2006). 
· t(h Q . w·1 · , 
· ·· urntan 1 <:torow1cz, Radico! !s!mn Rising, p. 45. 
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\Vhen I was in KAMMI, we use to attend the pengajiaan of several ustaz and leaders of 
PKS. l was really confused. One ustaz would tell us that we need to implement Islamic 
laws imrnediately and then I attended a lecture and I arn told that we need to practice 
tadari~j and prepare the Musli1ns first before i1nplen1enting Shari 'ah laws. Later, I 
realized that the problern is with their ideology. They are not clear about their ideology 
and methodology~ a problem that Sheikh An-Nabhani highlighted years back when 
looking at the Jklnvan. In HTI, we are clear in our methods. We do not have leaders 
contradiC;ting each other. I have rnet shababs from Jayapura, UK and Holland who 
shared exactlv the same beliefs as I do ' .. 87 
-' 
Such rernarks could be reflective of an overzealous attitude of HTI activists to show the 
unity of its ideological thoughts. Notvvithstanding this, 111y intervievvs with 111en1bers of 
HT fi:on1 different parts of the ,vorld have often solicited exact answers on the party ' s 
position vvith regards to a range of issues. This n1ay be attributed to the process . of 
identity forn1ation that \Vill be discussed in Chapter 7. In choosing between PKS and 
HTI, n1en1bers highlight that P KS is too pragrnatic and opportunistic and as such is 
sir11ilar to other secular political parties. 88 Several scandals have also affected the in1age 
of PKS. Stories of the lavish lifestyles led by party leaders, corruption and 111orality 
issues ,vere cited as factors for the choice of HTI over PKS. In essence, the pa1iy' s 
changing definition rof its core concepts has resulted in the perceived weakening of its 
attach1nent to Isla1nisn1 as co1npared to HTI. 
ln spite of its radical agenda of seeking a coup d'etat , HTI has sought to this in a non-
violent fashion. Jihad is a peripheral concept vvithin HTI's ideology. As highlighted 
earlier~ HTI believe that offensive jihad can only be declared by a caliph and that 
defensive jihad is allowed only if a Musli1n country is attacked by a non-Musliln state. 
Given that there is cutTently no caliphate and Indonesia is not under attack by any foreign 
power, HTI rne1n bers do no~ need to engage in any so11 of violence. This 1neans that 
party n1en1bers can push the perin1eters of legality without actually crossing it. As one 
ex-me1nber ofHTI who is now vvith a liberal :t\1usli1n group noted: 
87 Intervie,v with Abu Ibrahim, 8 August 2009, Jakarta. 
88 It seems that HTI has delegated the task of c1iticizing other Islamic groups to GEMA. Articles that are 
critical of PKS and other lslamist groups can often be found on the GEMA website. For instance, see 
Fathuddin Ja ' far , i\1embaca Aliran Politik PKS Pasca Ritz Carlton. Accessed from 
http://wwvv.gemapembebasan.co.cc/2010/07/membaca-aliran-politik-pks-pasca-ritz.html on 24 July 2011. 
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When you are young, it is cool to be part of HTI. We de1nonstrated agajnst imperialism 
and were anti everything. We had principles and were not sell outs like PKS and other 
groups. At the same time, you can do all this within the confines of the laws without 
getting yourself into trouble with the law. You don ' t hu11 anyone and you don ' t get huri 
in the process. That was what was so attractive for me then. 89 
HTI's avowedly non-violent approach in seeking to re-establish the caliphate has been 
criticized by 1ne111bers of other Islmnist groups. Riz Farihit\ a fonner 111e111ber of JI said: 
HTI is just about demonstrations and discussions. They are all talk but in fact do nothing, 
which is why people get tired of them and leave to join groups like JI. which are more 
- . . l 90 act1on-onentec. 
For younger n1e1nbers of HTI, this allows the1n to channel their youthful zeal towards a 
'noble' cause without getting en1broiled in legal issues. In interviews with about ten 
student n1en1bers of GEMA, a question was posed about the reaction of their parents 
towards their HT n1en1bership. In all these instances, the students noted that their parents 
had been largely supportive as HTl is a legal organization, which is non-violent. 9 1 The 
perceived clarity of HTI' s core concepts over that of other lslm11 ist groups as \Veil as its 
un1vvillingness to engage in violence 111akes the party superior choice con1pared to other 
Islarnist 1noven1ents. 
Conclusion 
This chapter seeks to understand the role of ideology in the gro\vth of HTI. The key 
argurnent in the chapter is that HTI's rationalistic. anti-systen1ic ideology is the rnost 
i111portant factor accounting for . why n1en1bers choose HT1 over other lslan1ist groups. 
The chapter began \Vith a theoretical discussion of the concept of ideology and ,vhy it is 
irnportant for this concept to be included in studies of social 111oven1ent. It was argued 
89 Interview with Rahmat, 7 August 2009, Jakarta. 90 Interv iew with Riz Farihin, F~rrner ~{ember of Jl , 20 January 2011 , Jakmia. 91 Interview with members of GEMA . Some of the intervi~wees did highlight that their parents do not 
approve of them spending too much time demonstrating on the streets . 
203 
that the concept of ideology as defined by Freeden can resolve son1e of the reasons \,vhy 
SMT theorists are reluctant to use this concept. As the chapter progressed, the ideology 
of HTI \Vas deliberated through the lens of Freeden 's conception of ideology. By 
applying Freeden ' s definition, the ideology of HTI is broken clovvn into core, adjacent 
and peripheral concepts that n1ake up its ideology. This section also exan1ined how HTI 
activists en1ploy the use of concepts attached to its ideology in trying to unden11ine the 
ideologies of NlJ and other Islan1ist n1ove111ents. In line \,vith Freeden's theory, it is 
sho\vn that r11oven1ents often engaged in such conflicts and con1petition in their etT01i to 
define its ideology as the superior ideology. In the third section the question of how 
ideology has shaped rnernbers thinking to\vards the n1overnent and the outside vvorld vvas 
exan1ined. It sho\,ved that ideology is the n1ost irnportant factor that accounts for why 
rnernbers choose HTI over other Islan1ist groups. Ideology is also used as an in1po1iant 
tool when HTI cornbats the ideas associated with the governrnent and other Islarnist 
n1oven1ents. In essence, ideology is irnportant in trying to explain the decision of 
rnen1bers in choosing HTI over other n1overnents. It does not however explain the 
journey of ordinary individuals who choose to becon1e rnen1bers. The following chapter 
\Vill discuss the journeys of such individuals by utilizing the concepts frorn theories of 
identitv and the fran1ing strand of SMT. 
~ V 
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CHAPTER SEVEN: DEVELOPING A HIZBI IDENTITY 
I was really not interested in politics. I was just trying to learn Islam but the brothers in HTI 
were persuasive. They made me realize l1ovv n1y understanding of ls lan1 is so shallo\v. That 
Islam is so comprehensive and encompasses every aspect of life. This was when I realized 
that we need to fight for Islain and HTl is my vehicle to do so. (Aktnal, HTI !\/[ember, 29 
January 2009, Banda Aceh) 
The journey of a Muslirn to becorne a n1er11ber of a radical Islmnic group has been 
discussed and debated extensively. Given the relatively high cost of n1en1bership and the 
lack of benefits, it is even 111ore intriguing why so rnany 1 ndonesian Musi itns decided to 
join HTI. Most n1en1bers of HTI reported that they were not initially predisposed to the 
ideas of HTI. Nevertheless, n1any becon1e n1en1bers and adopted what I have defined as 
the Hizbi identity. This chapter focuses on the cognitive (n1icro) reasons for HTI ' s. Th is 
chapter is an atten1pt to understand the transforn1ation of a Muslin1 to a Hizb1),yin and the 
reasons for this transforn1ation. The chapter discusses the high rate of n1en1bership 
retention that HTI seen1s to enjoy. It argues that behavoural , atlective and cognitive 
changes that rnernbers undergo upon adopting HTI's Islan1ic identity is the n1ain fr1ctors 
behind the high rate of retention that the party enjoys. The creation of th is identity 1 ies in 
the processes of cognitive opening, religious-seeking, fran1ing and culturing that 
individuals undergo before becon1ing a n1en1ber. The sense of collective identity in turn 
leads these individuals to becon1e attached to the patiy 's ideology. There are three parts 
to this chapter. The first part ,vill dra,v out identity theories as discussed by Quintan 
Wiktoro,vicz in his study of the .Al-A1uhqjiroun n1oven1ent in the United Kingdon1. The 
second section will discuss the experiences of HTI 1nen1bers in their journey to,vards 
becon1ing 111e1nbers vvithin the fran1ework of the three processes described by 
Wiktoro,vicz. The last section of the chapter discusses the expression of this identity 
through the process of boundary 111arking after n1en1bers have undergone behavioural, 
afiective and cognitive changes. 
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Framing and Identity in Social Moven1ent Theory 
This thesis has utilized SMT in earlier chapters to understand the grovvth of HTI in 
Indonesia. Neve1iheless, the key lirnitation of Stv1T is its focus on the 111oven1ent or 
group as the unit of analysis. Realizing the lin1itations of this, SMT theorists developed a 
third strand of SMT, tian1ing. 1 The fran1ing theory argues that, "by rendering events or 
occurences rneaningful , fra111es function to organize experience and guide action ,vhether 
individual or collective. "2 An in1portant factor that vvould detennine the success of a 
fran1e is \Nhether fra:n1e alignrnent is achieved between individuals and rnovernent 
interpretive orientations. While frarne alignn1ent exposes an individual to a rnove1nent's 
ideas and rnight trigger certain cognitive feelings towards the n1overnent, it does not 
explain ,vhy the individual , after the initial exposure, decides to join the 1noven1ent. In 
this regard, frarning sirnply accounts for the steps taken by n1overnents to recruit but does 
not satisfactorily explain an individual's thinking towards these frames and how fran1e 
alignn1ent is achieved fron1 the perspective of the individual. Another weakness of SMT 
is the fact that the rnovernents that have been studied tend to be lirnited and are largely 
focused on progressive left-leaning groups in Western societies. As David S. Meyer 
noted ;,By ignoring rnovernents frorn the other side of the spectrun1, we collect less 
infonnation on political realities ,vith a san1pling of 1nove1nents whose bias contradicts 
what ,ve learned". 3 
"It is with this in n1ind that the thesis will utilize the theory of collective identity 
developed by Quin tan vViktorowicz. Wiktoro,vicz in his insightful analysis of Al-
\fuhqjiroun in Britain argued that individuals join and adopt a new collective identity as 
defined by the group after experiencing three stages nan1ely, cognjtive bpening, religious 
seeking and socialization.4 He noted that a crisis could produce a "c.ognitive opening" 
1 For instance, see D. A. Snow and R. D. Benford (1992) ''Master Frames and Cycles of Protest" in A. D. 
Morris and C. M. Mueller (eds.), Frontiers in Social .tvfovement The01y (New Haven, CT: Yale University 
Press, 199'2), pp . 133-155 and D. A. Snow, "Framing Processes, Ideology, and Discursive Fields" in D.A. 
Snow, S.A. Soule and H. Kriesi , (eds.) The Blackivell Cornpanion to Social A1ovements-(Oxford: Blackwell 
~ubli shing. 2004). pp . 380- 412 . 
- Sn ow et aL "'Frame Ali gnment", 1986, p. 464 . 
:; David S J\.,1ayer. "Opportunities and ldentities: Bridge-Building in the Study of Social Movements" in 
David S. Mayer, i\ancy \Vhittier, and Belinda Robnett (eds) Social klovernents: JdentitJ\ Culture, and the 
Srme (N ew York: Oxford University Press, 2003), p. 6. ' 
4 WikrorowicL Radical Islam Rising, 2005. · ·· 
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that shakes certainty in previously accepted beliefs and renders . an individual more 
receptive to the possibility of alternative views and perspectives. 5 This cognitive opening 
can happen through a variety of different ways, including experiencing econo111ic, social , 
political and individual problems. For instance, a sense of en1ptiness that an individual 
feels after the death of a close relative 111ight change his perspective towards life, thus 
111aking hitn vulnerable to recruit1nent by radical groups. Nonetheless, 111ore often than 
not, rnovetnents the1nselves can foster a cognitive opening through outreach · activism. 
Activists can use cutTent social networks to trigger a sense of crisis atnong contacts 
through discussion and subtle interactions. In the case of HTI, fran1ing strategies are 
often ernployed to foster this cognitive opening. 
Wiktorowicz elaborated further that for individuals ,vhose identity is partially tied to 
religion, a cognitive opening n1ight lead to "religious seeking". This process sees 
individuals searching "for so1ne satisfactory systen1 of religious n1eaning to interpret and 
resolve his discontent". 6 Individuals beginto look into religion n1ore deeply at this stage 
either through assistance fron1 friends and fan1ily n1en1bers or by personal research. It 
n1ust be noted that a person experiencing cognitive opening n1ight not necessarily tu111 to 
religion. They are equally likely to involve then1selves in political groups, even joining 
socially oriented groups and perhaps even taking up new hobbies. While Wiktoro\vicz 
established that the process of cognitive opening is a prerequi~nte to one's entering the 
stage of religious seeking. My research sho\VS that this pre-requisite is not as relevant in 
the case of HTI n1en1bers. Many n1en1bers are individuals who are religiou sly observant 
and seeking to understand Islan1 in a 1nore con1prehensive \vay. They rnay have si1nply 
been left unsatisfied by the way Islmn is taught by 1nainstrean1 Muslin1 organizations and 
rnay not have necessarily experienced a crisis or even cognitive opening. At this stage of 
religious-seeking, fran1ing activities can produce fraine alignn1ent whereby potential 
recruits identify v,; ith the group's goals and objectives. Wiktorowicz noted that once 
fra1ne alignrnen( is achieved ( even if only in part) deeper socialization processes could 
take place. 7 It is at this point that the individual becon1es a willing learner and delves 
1nore de~pl y into the rnoven1ent's ideology through an assortrnent of 1nicron1obilization 
5 ibid, p. 85 . 
6 John Lofland and Rodney Stark, "Becoming a world Saver: A Theory of Conversion to a Deviant 
Perspective," Anwrican Sociological Review 30, no. 6 (1965), p. 868. 7 Wiktorowicz, " Joining the Cause", p. 10 
r 
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contexts that \Vere highlighted in the previous chapter such as through attending study 
circles, sen1inars, talks and participating in collective action activities. During this initial 
stage of learning the seeker beco111es a daris of the n1oven1ent. As highlighted in 
previous chapters, this process could take anyihing fron1 two to four years. This stage 
involves the initial indoctrination process \vhereby individuals are exposed to the 
rnove n1enr s ideo logy: \vhere social net\vorks are created and identity construction takes 
place. Once these students are assessed to be sufiiciently ready and deen1ed to have 
assun1ed the Hizbi identity, they are then invited to be 111en1bers of the 111oven1ent. This 
process is how rnovernents construct "networks of shared n1eaning" rooted 111 the 
111oven1ent's ideology.8 
The rnernber is then tasked \Vith nevv responsibilities ain1ed at recruiting nevv rnen1bers 
and strengthening the position of the n1oven1ent. The above shows how the processes of 
cognitive opening, religious seeking and socialization can be used to effectively explain 
why individuals join HTI and how they adopt a Hizb identity as defined by HTI. The 
next section of the chapter will apply this theoretical fran1ework in exarnining several 
case studies of how HTl n1ernbers joined the party. 
Inciting a Sense of Crisis 
While son1e rnen1bers of HTI experienced cognitive opening as a result of identity crises 
or personal experiences such as being victi1ns of racis1n, I did not encounter any HTI 
rn etnbers who experi enced such a crisis. Many joined the pa1iy as a result of the pa11y's 
outreach. This outreach takes the fonn of public cainpaigns through recruit1nent channels 
such as organizing talks, se1ninars, exhibitions and other channels highlighted in the 
previous chapter. Outreach can also occur at a personal level through one on one 
interaction with tne1nbers of HTI. The fonn of the outrea_ch itself is perhaps not as 
in1portant as the n1essage related during the outreach process, which is ain1ed at fostering 
a sense of cri sis wi thin indi vidual s. In Septe1nber 2010, at the fifth K[!JJ event, HTI had 
a booth at the panel exhibition held in conjunction with the event. Besides putting up 
8 /\lberto ~1elluci , Challenging Codes: Collective Action in the Infonnation Age (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996) 
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colourful panels, which pron1inently featured the sy111bols of HTT., the patiy also 
continuously played videos about the party's activities around the \VOrld as well as 
videos showcasing "repression ' that Muslims around the world suffer at the hands of 
Weste111 powers. The video caught the attention of1nany of the visitors to the exhibition. 
A large crowd gathering around the HTI' s panel and in.any seetned glued to the program 
that was broadcasted. Disturbing and ghastly images of dead children and wotnen were 
di splayed to induce shock in the 1Y1inds of rnany of the bystanders. These irnages were 
intended to prompt questions about the conflicts occurring in Iraq and Afghanistan. The 
videos seen1ed to \Vork efiectively in causing revulsion an1ongst the bystanders, 
especially ainongst the younger age-groups. Following the screening of the video, HTJ 
activists were quick to engage bystanders discussing in greater detail the respective 
conflicts and explaining to interlocutors their responsibility to assist in ending the 
conflict. The bystanders were then invited to leave their contact details with HTI activists 
and were given son1e reading n1aterials to introduce these potential recruits to HTf 's 
ideas. 
A large nun1ber of HTI n1en1bers interviewed becan1e n1en1bers through this facilitated 
cognitive opening process. Many potential recruits are often shocked to watch videos or 
read about atrocities occurring in the Muslin1 vvorld. A 1nen1ber of HTI in Aceh, h-van 
Doun1y becan1e acquainted with HTI through this process -of facilitated cognitive 
opening. After being invited by a friend, first involven1ent \Vas attending a HTI talk 
where the speaker Harith Abu Ulya had spoken about the problen1s of separati sn1 in 
Aceh. 9 Being an Acehnese, he \Vas taken aback when he heard Abu lJl ya speaking about 
the need for Aceh to ren1ain part of the Indonesian state, a view that was unpopular in 
Aceh. He vvas even 111ore shocked \vhen Abu Ulya revealed the Western i1nperialist 
conspiracy to separate Aceh fron1 Indonesia so that Western gas cornpanies could 1nake 
larger profits for then1selves. Abu Ulya had explained that it is un-Islan1ic for Muslin1s to 
sp ill the blood of fello\.v Muslirns, especially vv_hen it vvi ll si1npl y benefit Western 
in1perial po\vers . hvan noted that unlike other Indonesian figures \Vho spoke abo ut Aceh, 
Abu Ulya 's case for the unity of Indonesia \Vas not rnade on the basis of nationalisn1 but 
on the basis of Islarnic solidarity. This is indeed a clever way that HTl pron1ote the 
9 Interview with lwan Dourny, 24 January 2009 , Banda Aceh. 
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agenda of the caliphate \Vithout falling foul of the Indonesian governn1ent or n1ilitary. A 
sin1ilar strategy was used in Papua as highlighted in Chapter 5. He subsequently spoke to 
Abu Ulya and began enquiring in greater details about HTI. The exainple of h,van 
showed that fi1cilitated cognitive opening is 1neant to bring about a sense of shock and 
ethos of injustice in the n1inds of potential 1nen1bers such that they start re-thinking son1e 
of their previously held belief and begin opening up their n1inds towards ideas presented 
by HTI 
Trust in Fosiering Cognitive Opening 
Perhaps one of the n1ost con1n1on \,vays, HTI activists seek to recruit potential rnen1bers 
is through individual ot1treach. Mernbers are encouraged to first recruit t1rnily rne1nbers, 
friends and neighbours. HTI activists are often told to behave in an exernplary way~ in 
order to ease the recruitn1ent of n1ernbers to the n1overnent. Often activists will discuss 
political and religious issues with people within their social network to persuade then1 to 
rethink sorne of their previously held beliefs about Islan1 and the n1eanings of being a 
iv1uslin1 and in order to facilitate the possibility of new interpretations and ways of 
thinking about Islan1. Due· to the personal nature of the relationship, HTI activists are 
also more familiar with potential recruits and thus conversations can be pitched to the 
potential recruit ' s interest level. Aishah, a n1ernber of HTI in Bali becan1e acquainted 
with HTI ideas through an aunt vvho brought her to HTI functions and continuouslv ~ • . '-.:-I .,, 
explained HTI ideas and her responsibilities as a Muslin1. Aishah noted that she was 
completely co1nfortable vvith HTI pmily because her aunt, a person whotn she respected 
and trusted greatly, was a n1e1nber of the pmiy. 10 As Wiktorovvicz noted, trust is often an 
essential part of the recruittnent process . So1ne 1ne1nbers join the 1nove1nent due to social 
networks but later begin adopting the ideas of the n1ovement and a nevv Islarnic identity. 
Trust" can be bui It through a varietv of different wavs. HTrs student activists are often 
~ . . ~ .. ~ 
encouraged to rent a roon1 near the universities where they are studying. They will then 
befriend ne\ver students especially those who originate fro1n rural areas of Indonesia. In 
2009, I had visited the leader of GEMA, Erwin Al-Jundi several tin1es at his shared 
10 Interv iew with Aishah, 19 March 2010 . Bali . 
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rented home in Depok. A student at the University of Indonesia, Erwin originated from 
Pekanbaru. He said, 
I came fro1n Pekanbaru, which is a city. Nevertheless, I was rather overwhelined when 1 
first arrived in Jaka1ia. It was more developed than Pekanbaru and really busy. I saw the 
impact of modernization and g1oba1ization. While many of these things were good, f was 
also initially shocked to see the way some women dressed as well as other immoral acts. 
T also felt alone and rea ll y missed n1 y famil y terribl y. f was lucky that I met a brother 
from HTI who invited me to stay with him at his rented home with three other guys . He 
became like an elder brother to me. He guided me about the courses I should take, gave 
me a tour of the area and guided me spiritually making sure that I woke up on time for 
morning prayers. This inspired 1ne to start a rented home as well so that I could guide 
new students and I assist them. For 1nany of them who originated from the rural areas of 
Indonesia, it is even worse. They find it difficult to cope with the urban setting and the 
±~ ±~1·1~ 11 ast pace o 1 e. 
Three undergraduates li ved in a rented house that Envin 1nanage. Tt was obvious that 
these younger students respected Ervvin i1n1nensely. It is of little surprise that tvvo of the 
three students were already daris within .HTI \Vhile the third vvas being introduced to the 
ideas of HTl. One the students, Harith said that he had first attended HTT events because 
of his trust and respect for Erwin. Later, he decided to join a halaqah after being 
. d t HTI .d 12 convince ,y .. .. _ 1 eas. 
HTI 1ne1nbers and leaders are thus cognizant of the fact that the building of frust is an ~ ~ 
in1_portant clin1ension of the recruitn1ent process. The sense of alienation and loneliness 
that new students feel _provides a convenient opportunity for HTI leaders and n1en1bers to 
recruit. By providing a sense of security and con1panionship to these potential recruits, 
the HTf n1en1bers gain their trust. My observation of Erwin and the three HTl n1en1bers 
reveals that trust is an i1n_portant factor towards fostering of cognitive opening or the 
religious seeking phase. 
11 Interview with Erwin Al-Jundi, 2 September 2009, Depok. 12 Interview with Harith , 5 April 2009, Jakaria 
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Religious Seeking and HTT's Fra111ing Strategies 
The state of cognitive opening often leads to the stage of religious seeking. Religious 
seeking is defined as the process vvhereby individuals search for a satisfactory systen1 of 
religious n1eaning to interpret and resolve his/her discontent. In the study -of Al-
1\Juh(fjiroun, Wiktoro\vicz n~ted that n1en1bers experienced cognitive opening before 
rnoving to the stage of religious seeking. As such, he argued that cognitive opening is a 
necessary pre-condition before the process of religious seeking. While son1e recruits of 
rnoven1ents like Al-A1uhqjiroun and HT do undergo cognitive opening, others rnight not 
have undergone this process at all. The experiences illustrated in the cases of several 
recruits of HTI points to the fctct that individuals do not necessarily experience cognitive 
opening before entering the stage of religious seeking. 13 These individuals are sirnply 
seeking religion as part of an everyday process to enhance their Islan1ic knowledge, a 
con1n1on trait an1_ongst religiously observant Muslin1s. Many HTI n1en1bers identified 
thernselves as · truth seekers of religion ', which rneans that they are constantly in a state 
of seeking for the true understanding of Islarn. Many were left unsatisfied with the kind 
' f 
of lslan1 that they were taught in n1osques or by other Isla111ic groups. Thus, they seek for 
a sort of systen1, \vhich provides thern with a satisfactory religious n1eaning to resolve 
their discontent. 14 It is during the stage of religious seeking that HTI ,vill start en1barking 
on frarning strategies to convince potential r11en1bers that the party provides the n1ost 
cotTect understanding of Islan1 \vhich :hey are seeking and will atte1npt to achieve fran1e 
alignn1ent \Vith potential rnernbers. Three frarnes are often quoted by n1en1bers as being 
most effective at _ capturing their initial attention. Often, these fraines transcend the 
religious. socio-econornic and political reahns and appeal to ce1iain socio-cultural 
syn1bols within Indonesian society: These fraines are also used to capture -the attentjon of 
potentjal n1e1nbers through HTI events such as talks, se1ninars, exhibitions and other 
recruitment channels . Often rnembers who have experienced cognitive openings are 1nore 
attracted to frarnes that address socio-poljtjcaI issues vvhile those who are ' truth religjous 
seekers ' are n1ore inclined to HTI ' s fran1es that are pertaining closely to Islan1. 
Interestingly , n1e1nbers do not cite key tenets of HTI ideology such as the 
in1plen1entation of lslan1ic laws and revival of the caliphate as being tl~e n1ost in1portant 
iJ vVi kto rowi cz, Radical ls /an, Rising, p. 98 . 
l -'1 Lofland and Stark. '"Becoming a world-Saver'', p. 868. 
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in capturing their attention. They see1n rnore interested in sorne of the issues propounded 
by HTI, such as those which touch on social justice. This 111eans that n1ost HTI activists 
beco1ne convinced about the core ideas of HTI at a later stage while going through the 
process of becoming a tnetnber. 
Capitalisn1 Results in In1poverishn1ent and Moral DecaJ' 
One of the co1n1non frarnes cited by HTI n1ernbers that Capitalistn has resulted in the 
in1poverishn1ent and n1oral decay in Indonesia has son1etin1es found resonance an1ongst 
HTI rnetnbers who cotne frotn 1nore secular backgrounds or those who have experienced 
cognitive opening. In one of its earliest strategies after HTI en1erged pub! icly, the party 
began to criticize the goven1rnent for its decision to raise the price of fuel. 15 HTI argued 
that the increase in the price of fuel was clue to the privatization of the oil sector in 
Indonesia, which had a1Iowed Western capitalist companies to n1axin1ize profits at the 
expense of the poor. While the validity of this argun1ent is questionable given that the 
Indonesian n1iddle class tend to benefit the n1ost fron1 these subsidies, the idea that Islan1 
does not allow the sale of natural resources and that these resources should be treated as 
God's property is hugely popular with potential n1en1bers of HTI. 16 HTI further contend 
that the Capitalist systen1 creates a constant need to 1naxi1nize profit ,vhich often leads to 
inequitable distribution of wealth resulting in the in1poverishn1ent of n1ost f ndonesians. 
One HTI activist hailing frorn a 111iddle class farnily noted, 
While growing up, I always wondered why the Indonesian Chinese are so rich. They are 
a minority and not even Muslim. Yet, they don1inate the economy of Indonesia, a 
Muslim country. Muslims who are in the majority are generally poor. I finally got the 
answer when T attended a lecture organized by HTl. The speaker Zufri Hamdani. an 
economist began exposing the problems with the neo-liberal capitalistic economy and 
how it allows a srnall group of people to dominate the wealth of the country. Later I 
attended another talk where Dr Fahn1i Amhar presei1ted on how our oil revenues have 
been used for the benefit of the West. One of the points that he high! ighted was that 
despite being the producer of oil, we are also i1nporting oil due to the fact that capitalist 
15 11encermati Kenaikan Harga BB11 in Hizbut Tahrir Indones ia, Bundel Buletin Da/o,vah Al-!slmn 
/11ela,?futkan Kehidupan !shun Tahun l (Bogor: Yasmin P~ess , 2004), p. 14 I . 
ir, .b. I 14.., 
. I IC , p. .) . 
/ 1 ·, ~ _) 
companies are just trying to profit from our revenues. This issue was what opened n1y 
eves about the need for us to do somethin g to change the svstem .17 
.,., ~ - L - _. 
The sense of injustice that Capitalisrn benefits only a sn1all group leads to n1any people 
beco111ing HTl activists. In Bali, where n1en1bers of HTI often hailed fi_·on1 poorer 
backgrounds, this sense of injustice is n1ore acute. Yatin, the HTI ,na 'sul in Denpasar, 
Bali_ felt that the capitalist systen1 is created to ensure that the non-Mlislin1s who ovvn 
n1ost of the hotels and businesses in Bali continue to repress I'v1uslin1s. 18 He also felt that 
the Capitalist systern rnakes l\1usli1ns n1aterialistic and that they are willing to sacrifice 
their religion in pursuit of rnoney. He felt saddened that Muslin1s are working in Balinese 
reso1is serving liquor and pork to non-l\1uslin1s and that son1e Muslirn \Non1en have 
resoried to prostitution for rnoney. 
lt is at this stage that frarne alignrnent is -achieved between potential n1en1bers and the 
patiy. The usage of Capitalisn1 as an evil that causes in1poverishn1ent and n1oral decay is 
not uncon1n1on an1ongst other Islan1ist n1oven1ents . In spite of this, several factors 
differentiate HTI 's usage of these issues cornpared to other Islarnist rnovernents. Firstly, 
HTI leaders who can1paign on these topics are often trained in econornics or have 
worked in the financial sectors. They are thus seen as credible individuals in the eyes of 
potential recruits. Secondly, HTI often cite Western acadernics and sources such as poll 
results to substantiate their clai1ns. Although, this is often done in an uncritical fashion , 
. ~ - -
data is sornetirnes 1nanipulated and tnisrepresented frorn the source to gives credence to 
HTrs claim. The success of thi s fra1ning strategy has encouraged HTI to devote even 
more resources to thi s strategy. An exainple of this is a new joun1al, the Journal of 
Econo1nic Ideology and ,vebsite focusing on econo1nic issues that the patiy started in 
2009. The consistent the1ne used in the j oun1al is targeted against Capitalism. 19 
17 Interview with Lazuardi Hendrawan, 1 Februarv 2009, Jakarta. 
18 lnterview with Ya tin, 20 March 20 10. Bali ., -
19 The journal is led by Dvvi Condro Tri~no a HTI leader with a PHD in economics from the National 
University of Malaysia. For details of joun1al, see http://www.jun1al -ekonomi.org/. Accessed on 15 August 
2011. 
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Western Conspiracies to Destroy Islan-1 
Another frmne utilized by HTI is the supposed Westen, conspiracy to destroy lslam. The 
·west is often potirayed as having an agenda to undennine Islarnic values and eliminate 
Islam from the lives of :~ruslims through the introduction of vVestern ideologies , such as ~ ~ . I 
secularis1n, capitalisn1, socialisrn, den1ocracy and nationalisn1. HTt espoused the view 
that the foreign policies of Westen1 countries, especially the US are airned at subjugating 
the Muslitn world and ensuring that its resources re1nain in the hands of the West. As 
part of its effort to destroy Islan1, the West would ensure that leaders of Musl in1 countries 
are their allies who ,vould stoop to any level to defend their interest. Since 9/ 11 , HTI has 
consistently advocated the view that the attacks were part of a conspiracy engineered by 
the West to justify 1nilitary action in Iraq and Afghanistan. The \vars in Afghanistan and 
Iraq are often cited as exan1ples of how the West is willing to sacrifice Muslin1 lives to 
ensure that the oil supply in the Middle East and Central Asia ren1ained in their hands. 
The FVar on Terror is thus portrayed as a "War on Islan1". As an extension of this 
argun1ent, HTI fervently argue that the terro1~ attacks in Indonesia were orchestrated by 
An1erican and Israeli intelligence. They have been in the forefront defending Abu Bakar 
Ba'asyir. 20 Ronny a n1en1ber of HTI reca11ed that n1any of his friends \Vere convinced 
that Muslirns could not have possibly perpetrated the Bali bornbings. Ronny noted: 
I stai1ed reading up about the American agenda to unden11ine Islam. In the process, I 
learned that HTI was organizing a seminar to address the issue of the Bali bombings. l 
attended the seminar and was highly impressed by the research undertaken by HTI 
speakers. They showed compelling evidence that there were signs that there was a 
campaign to undennine Islan1 that was on going. Tt staried with the 9/ 11 attacks whe11 
4000 Jews ,vere forewarned about the attacks by the Israeli intelligence and did not go to 
work on the day of the attack. Later, Gloria Arroyo, the President of Philippines, wrote to 
President Bush proposing . that the Easte111 parts of Indonesia be merged with the 
Philippines to forn1 a large Christian empire that will be dominant in the region. Even 
those who perpetrated the acts were surprised by the scale of the bombing. This clearl y 
sJ1owed that the original bo1nbs were replaced by a more devastating bomb by Am erican 
agents in the region. The An1ericans and Israelis wanted to use the bon1b ings as an 
20 Interview with Ismail Yusanto, 15 March 2009, Jaka1ia and Haficlz Abclurrahman , 7 April 2010 . 
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excuse to mcrease their presence in Indonesia and use their base here to encourage 
Christianization. I sta11ed attending 1nore HTI events to lean1 about conten1porary issues 
affecting Muslims. Later I was invited to join a halaqah and I becan1e acquainted to the 
ideas and have since been a member of HTJ. 21 
Ronny ' s experience· suggests fra1ne alignn1ent vvas achieved as a result of HTI ' s fraining 
. . 
strategy of an1plifying conspiracy theories that vvere already prevalent in Indonesia. 
Ronny 's case is not unique. Conspiracy theories that the Western countries are out to 
destroy Islan1 \Nere so do1ninant that fe\v Indonesians believed that the Bali bon1bings 
were the acts of Muslin1 terrorists or even that the JI terror network during the initial 
period.22 In this regard, the frarning strategy used resonates \,vith the feeling of n1any 
Indonesians. This r11eans that HTl can then channel their interest to the socialization 
phase of the party. 
!shun as a Co111plete 1-Vay of Life 
As highlighted above~ rnost r11ernbers of HTI that I interviewed did not experience any 
fonns of cognitive-opening in their joining process but were "seekers of religious truth". 
These individuals are constantly seeking to in1prove then1selves as Muslirns. There are 
several ways this is done. For so1ne individuals, this 1neans seeking new pengajiaan 
(religious classes), religious talks or serninars to attend. For others, it involves being part 
of an Islan1ic group or organization. Me1nbers often talk about how HTJ pengajiaan , 
talks and setninars are different fro1n what they have been used to. Ah1nad, a HTI 
member in Pekanbaru \Vas apoljtical for 1nuch of his life. He hailed frotn a pious fmnily 
and had gone to Pekanbaru to fwiher his studies at the University of R.iau. A1nong the 
first things he did when he mTived in Pekanbaru was to sta11 attending the pengc1jiaan at 
a local 1nosque near his hostel. He \Vas pa11icularly i1npressed ,vith the pengajiaan 
conducted bv [!stc:c Ihsan. a local leader of HTI in Pekanbaru. Ahn1ad recalled. 
a/ .' 
_I 
The classes conducted by Ustaz Ihsan were ditTerent from the other classes I have 
attended. Other classes often discussed ritualistic aspects of Islam such as prayers, 
21 Interview with Ronny, Member ofHTI, 1 September 2010, Batam. 
22 Sidney Jones , "Facing the Enemy vVithin" Time Asia, l-3 October 2003. 
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fasting and so on. On the contrary, the classes conducted by Ustaz Ihsan addressed more 
contemporary issues related to Islam. I understood from hi s classes that Islam is not just 
about rituals but is a way of Ii fe that goven1s every aspect of hum an 1 i fe from personal 
hygiene to state adrninistration. I started asking him questions and we devel op a personal 
,.., 
relationship. When he invited me to attend halaqah. I readily agreed . .:.) 
The belief in Islan1 as a con1plete way of life thus produced fran1e alignn1ent with Ahn1ad 
who \Vas already seeking for an Islmn that vvas tnore co111patible with his thought 
process. The above-cited fran1es are not the only fran1es that were employed to capture 
the attention of potential n1en1bers. HTT's fran1ing strategies focused on a myriad of 
cl i fferent issues fron1 cl i n1ate change to the need to ban certain groups that are cleen1ecl 
deviant such as the Ahrnadi_vah. These fran1es are used to capture the initial attention of 
potential n1en1bers. These n1en1bers are then put through a socialization process to ensure 
that they truly understand the ideas of HT. 
Wiktorovvicz noted that at the religious seeking stage, potential rnernbers of rnovernents 
are often encouraged by 1nen1bers of radical groups to shop around in order to rnake an 
infonned judg1nent about joining the rnoven1ent. Group n1ernbers often volunteer to act 
as independent guide to assist potential 111en1bers in this search process by taking then1 to 
talks and study circles sponsored by other Islan1ic groups and n1oven1ent. 24 While a study 
of HTI in Makassar suggested that HTI engaged in this strategy, this is highly unlikely. 25 
This is due to the fact that HTI explicitly discouraged its 111en1bers fron1 seeking religious 
knovvledge fron1 other sources besides that conducted by HTI and HT. HTI lead_ers rnake 
it clear that potential n1en1bers n1 ust establish an exc lusive relationship of re 1 igi ous 
learning with -HTI if they are to be taken seriously .26 HTI n1en1bers \vo uld often be 
prepared to en1phasize the inadequacies of other Islan1ist and lslan1ic groups. This is 
especially when they encounter rnernbers of another rnoven1ent. HTI leaders would often 
offer religious guidance to "seekers of religious truth". In 2008, I observed an exan1ple of 
how a HTI leader atte1npted to engage a group of "seekers of religious truth". After 
prayers at a rnosq ue located near in an area that housed 1nilitary officers, Muhammad Al-
23 Interview with Ahmad, 3 February 2011, Pekanbaru. 
24 Wiktorowicz, Radical Islmn Ris;ng, p. 101. 
25 Syamsul Rijal, "~1aking Hizbyyin", p. 57. · 
26 Interview with Rokhrnat S Labib, Chairman of HTL 15 August 20 l 0, .l akarta. 
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Khaththath overheard a group of n1en (,vhon1 he believed ,vere n1ilitary officers) 
discussing a doubt that one of then1 had with regards to an injunction on prayers. He 
irnrnediately approached thern and provided then1 the answer to their question. At the end 
of the conversation, he suggested to the n1en to attend his pengqjiaan , which was 
conducted ,veekly in a nearby rnosque, and even suggested that he could conduct private 
lessons for the rnen at their hornes. This experience suggests that upon identifying those 
vvho are religious seekers, HTI n1ernbers and leaders would then1selves ai1n to guide 
the111 to,vards H·rr rather than assist then1 in ' shopping' for the right organization that 
suited their interest. 
Culturing the Hizbivvin 
The process of soc ialization or culturing is perhaps the n1ost critical of the different 
processes that an individual undergoes before beco111ing a fully-fledged n1e111ber of HTI. 
Wiktorowicz noted that this process is "intended to alter the values of the individual so 
that self interest is defined in accordance ,vith the goals and beliefs of the n1oven1ent ' s 
ideology.''27 Beyond instilling the rnovernent 's ideology, this process also results in the 
creation of new social bonds and kinship ties with fellow rnernbers. lJltirnately, this 
process will result in the elevation of an indi vidual fro111 a daris to a 111e1nber \tVhile those 
who are deerned to be unfit to be n1en1bers n1ight rernain as daris. It is only when an 
individual is dee1ned to have adopted a Hizbi identi(v that they are elevated to the 
position of n1ernbers. After the adoption of 111en1bership, rnen1bers are assigned to 
leadership positions and are fu1iher entangled vvithin the social netvvork built by HTI. 
Halaqah: The Foundation of Culturing 
The process of culturing, or tsatq[l as co1n1nonly referred to involves several stages. The 
I 
first stage of thi s process is being paii of a halaqah. As highlighted in the previous 
chapters, these halaqahs con1prised five to eight n1en1bers who will con1e under the 
supervision of a HTI 1ne1nber refe1Ted to as mushr(l or ,nushr(la (fe1nale guide). The 
nun1ber of participants in a haloqah is capped at eight and in the case of HTI rarel y 
27 \Vik.1orowicz, ·'Joining the Cause'\ p. 3. 
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exceeds five. 28 The rationale of this srn all nu111ber is to ensure that the mushr(f .can 
engage the participants effectively. The process of being pa11 of halaqah is cor11plex. 
Pmiicjpants are carefully selected to ensure that there are no men1bers of intelligence 
agencies ,vho 1night attetnpt to infiltrate the halaqah. The secretive nature of the halaqah 
process is a legacy of the political fear that existed during the New Order period. The 
objectives of the halaqah are 111ultifold. Firstly, the rnushr(f is expected to in1pmi the 
ideology of HTI to n1e111bers. The core concepts of -HTI's ideology are introduced and 
discussed intens1vely. Secondly, the mushr(l is also responsible for ensuring that his 
daris undergo a transforn1ation whereby he will becon1e 111ore observant of his daily 
rituals and other religious observances. Thirdly, the 1nushr(f 111ust ensure that the daris 
are sufiiciently equipped to explain the concepts of HTI, rebut criticisn1s of HTI and 
engage in debates with 1ne111bers of other Islmnist rnovernents and groups. 
The halaqah itself occurs about two tin1es a vveek lasting around tvvo to three hours and 
is con1pulsory. Even senior 111en1bers, are required to attend halaqah conducted by a 
person who is higher in the party 's hierarchy at least once a week. Perhaps the only 
exceptions are the Mzr'tarnad and An1ir of HT. Forn1er HT 1nen1bers noted that the 
Mu 'tcnnad would be in individual halaqah with the Arnir' s envoy whenever he visits the 
country. 29 Only under exceptional circun1stances such as the death of fa111ily r11er11bers or 
severe illness are n1en1bers excused fro1n joining the halaqah. Even vvhen a rnen1ber is 
travelling, he will n1ake prior arrangen1ent for a halaqah session ,vith his nzushr(f to be 
conducted via the Internet. 30 Discipline is also instilled in halaqah. Men1bers are 
expected to be punctual and could be barred fron1 entering a halaqah if they are late. 
Men1bers are also not allowed to discuss 111atters not related to HTI or HT and can be 
asked to leave the halaqah if they do not abide by this code of conduct. Daris are also 
expected to give their full attention to the mushrfl and not to interject ,vhile he is 
speaking. The position of the 1nushrfl is thus elevated and daris are expected to be his 
loyal follovvers. Interestingly, the relationship bet,veen the n1ushrfland daris is sirnilar to 
that of Srffi brotherhoods where the n1urid is expected to give his blind loyalty to the 
28 Taji Farouki , Fundamental Quest, p. 125 and Interview with Harith Abu Ulya, 5 October 2010 , Jakarta . 
~
9 Interview vvith Muhammad Al -Khaththath, 25 July 201 i, Jakaiia. 30 Interview with Jaweed Khan, Member of HT India, 10 July 2011 , Johor Bahru, Malaysia . 
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shaykh of the Sz,{/7 brotherhood. 31 The halaqah vvotild occur at ofiices run by HTI and 
GEMA throughout Indonesia, the hon1es of HTI leaders or at a 111osque. There are no 
restrictions placed on location of the halaqah. In countries where HT is banned, halaqah 
could even take place in a cafe or restaurant. 
Halaqah often involves the reading of son1e texts recon1rnended by the paiiy k.novvn as 
the cornpulsory readings (thaqcicl ,nutabannah) \!\lhile there are sorne other books that are 
un-.adopted or non-con1pulsory readings (thaqc:[la ghayr ,nutabannah). The difference 
bet\veen these books are that the adopted readings are targeted at r11e111bers and thus used 
in the halaqah \Vhile the unadopted readings are ainied at introducing son1e basic ideas of 
HTI to the Muslirn con1rnunity. 32 Several books; the Syste,n of Jslan1 , lslaniic State , 
Concepts of Hizb ut-Tahrir and Structuring of the Party are con1pulsory texts for all 
daris to read and understand. These books provide an early understanding of the 
concepts of the party 's ideology. The daris will often read about a paragraph frorn the 
texts cited above before an explanation is given by murshid about the 111eaning of 
paragraph. Most of the halaqah is spent critically discussing and debating about the 
significance of the writings. W11ile other works on HTI have criticized the n1overnent for 
discouraging critical thinking, n1y observation differs. 
ln interactions \Vith HTI and HT n1en1bers, I observed that darz·s are encouraged to think 
critically, question and even disagree with the ideas expressed by An-Nabhani . An 
exarnple of this is the issue of violence, which was once discussed in a halaqah. A daris 
had asked his ,nurshid about the use of violence highlighting that in any coup atte1npt the 
chances of sporadic violence erupting is high. A · debate ensued between the two and the 
,nurshfri as he continued to deny that HTI \!\fould a11ovv violence to be used at any stage. 
Subsequentl y, the rnurshid agreed to refer to the tnatter to the pa11y ' s leadership for a 
1nore detailed ans\ver. The task of the ,nurshid is to ai1swer these questions effectively 
and addressed disagree1nent conclusively. Often, due to the experience of the ,nurshid, he 
is able to assuage concerns and address questions convincingly. This is also a process for 
the ,nurshid to differentiate those vvho 1night be dee1ned to be suitable 1ne1nbers and 
V 
31 See fo r instance Sheikh Asif, Sz{fi Code c?f Conduct (Copenhagen: world Sufi Foundation , 2003). 
32 Taji Farouki. Fundamenra! Quest , p. 135. 
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those who are not. 33 While the criterion for what a suitable 111en1ber tnight be is not 
known, forn1er activists noted that n1e1nbers rnust be intelligent enough to cornprehend 
ideas, critical enough to be engaging and not close-1ninded. As such , people who are 
charistnatic are the 111ost sought after as long as they do not show signs of being 'close 
rninded'. 34 This essentially refers to people who might be repulsed by the ideas of HTT or 
1night not agree vvith rnany of its ideas after an extended period of being in a halaqah. 
Members who are deerned to lack intellectual capacity, are kept as daris while others 
who less critical will undergo the process of learning longer. On average, daris beco1ne 
n1en1bers after undergoing two years of learning although this could stretched for as 
along as five years. 
Beyond the halaqah, murshids also rneet their daris for at least tvvo other sess ion s. These 
sessions are varied and could take n1any forn1s. In n1ost cases, the daris would read 
books that are in the list of non-con1pulsory readings. These readings are tin1ed according 
to the conten1porary developn1ent occurring in Indonesia and the world. In other 
sessions, the rnurshid n1ight ask the daris to read a con1pilation of different readings. The 
daris are also asked to ask to execute sn1all research projects where he or she is to 
investigate a topic and n1ake a presentation to his halaqah n1en1bers. These daris are thus 
equipped ,vith the 'necessary' kno,vledge that the party deerned is essential to recruit 
n1en1bers, interact with the Indonesian publiv and debate with n1ernbers of other political 
and Islan1ic groups. 35 The ,nurshid n1ight also organize individual study for daris, 
especially those who are judged as having potential to becon1e n1en1bers. In essence, the 
halaqah and study circles are forn1s of indoctrination, vvhich are done subtly to ensure 
that the participants do not sense that HTI is forcing dovvn its ideas upon then1. HTI's 
daris are often rnade to feel as if they had thoroughl y studied the ideology of HTI before 
becorning 1i1e1nbers. Daris are also rnade to feel that they are in a select group of elites. 
Thus, 1nany of the daris feel that they are part of an exclusive club and strive steadL1stly 
to ensure that they continue to enjoy the privilege of being in this club. 
33 Personal Observation at a Halaqah conducted by HTI activist in Bogor and Kuala Lumpur and Interview 
with HTI activists . 
34 Interview with }.1ursalin , 14 },,fay 2011, Jakarta. 
35 A similar observation was made by Kirstine Sinclair in .her study of HT in Denmark and Britain. See 
Kirstine Sinclair, "The Caliphate as a Hornelancl" , pp. l 25 - 129. 
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In reality, n1any daris find the experience of being a daris exhausting and constricting. It 
con1es as little surprise then that as 1nany as 60% of HTI's daris dropped out ,vithin the 
first tvvo years. HTI leaders do not seern troubled by this. -As Farid Wajidi 1naintained~ 
"We are not interested in nun1bers. It's the quality that counts."36 This is reflective of the 
paiiy ' s belief that only those vvho are fully con1n1itted to the group should becon1e 
n1en1bers. Beyond the halaqah being a platfon11 for indoctrination, the halaqah also 
serves as the basic unit of a nevv social network that the party creates for these potential 
recruits. 
Sui/ding New Social 1Vetworks 
The building of a nevv social net,vork is an irnportant paii of the culturing process. The 
nntshr(l does not sirnply irnpart knowledge about the n1overnent to the dari.s but also 
plays an in1portant role in being a guide to the daris in his personal life. The 1nushr(l act 
as a brother figure to the daris and would often take an interest in his religious 
developn1ent. The 1nzrshrU' would guide the dari.s in rnatters related to the ritualistic 
aspects of lslarn and will seek to guide hirn towards becorning a better person. A n1ushr(l 
will ahvays endeavor to be an exarnple to his dari.s. During rny interaction with Erwin 
Al-Jundi , the leader of GEJvlA, he portrayed an irnage of a good Muslirn vvho is ahvays 
striving to irnprove the society around hirn. 37 Al-Jundi will greet n1any of the older 
people living in the surrounding areas who shovved obvious fondness for hi1n. He cleans 
the n1osque on a regular basis and even feeds the neighborhood cats. It is obvious that 
such acts are undertaken so that he wi II be respected by his daris with the hope that they 
will etnulate h1n1 . The 1nushr(f will often enquire about the personal vvell being of his 
dari.s. In the cases of daris who are undergraduates, they are often invited to live in a 
rented horne or hostels , vvhich the 1nushr(f hi1nself rnight have rented, as, described 
earlier. The 1nushr(f\vill delegate the household tasks and ensure that the house is kept in 
good order to instill discipline. 
For tnembers of HTI \vith professional careers, HTI will assign then1 to halaqahs close to 
their hon1es. HTI leaders also ensure that they stay in close proxin1ity to each other. For 
36 Interview with Farid \1/ajidi, 10 June 2009, Jakarta. 
37 I vis ited thrice at his home between 2008 and 2009. 
instance, the hotnes of several H.TI leaders are also located within the gated comtnunity 
where the fonner chairn1an of HTI, Hafiz Abdurrahrnan lived in Bogor. The house 
opposite to Abdu1Tah1nan' s house is rented hotne ,vhich housed several junior n1ernbers 
of HTI. The proxitnity 1nade it easier for HTI leaders to supervise both members and 
daris. HTI ,nushr(fs also encouraged to organize activities such as camping or spotiing 
activities for their daris where social bond between the dar;s and 1nushrffis strengthened. 
The task of building new social ties rneant that potential rnetn bers now fonn 
relationships with tnetnbers of HTI ,vho beco1ne even closer to thetn than their ovvn 
fan1ily n1en1bers. This will often lead daris to ren1ain within the network .. 
Another vvay that this new social network for professional n1en1bers is created is through 
1narriage. While HT does not instruct HT mernbers to 1narry only fellow n1e1nbers , a 
large nun1ber of HT n1en1bers prefer n1arrying a person within the party. Otlicially, the 
party allows HTI n1en1bers to n1arry non-n1en1bers even if these individuals choose to 
ren1ain outside the party. Nevertheless, n1any HTI fen1ale n1en1bers prefer to n1arry 
within the party. A fen1ale HTI n1en1ber adn1itted that HTI is a good place to find a 
husband since HTI n1en1bers are good Musli1ns. Many are also better educated and hence 
hold professional jobs. l Jnlike other Islan1ist organizations, which encouraged polygan1y, 
the polygan1ous culture is not strong in HTI. 38 Marrying HTI 1ne1nbers could also rnean 
social aclvance1nents for son1e won1en n1en1bers. Even for those who prefer n1arrying 
outside the party, this is done with the ultin1ate ain1 of guiding the future spouse to 
becon1e a HTI n1en1ber. 39 While HTI does not adn1it to n1atch n1aking n1en1bers as an 
ofi1cial party policy, the tanner leader of HTI's wo1nen's ,ving, Zulia Tl1na,vati said: 
It is con1mon for us to introduce our friends to each other und er any regular context. 
Obviously we will introduce mernbers ,vho ,ve deernecl are suitable for each other since 
] l · 1 . t 1 · 40 t 1ey are 1 <e our own s1) mgs. · 
It is thus con1n1011 for n1e1nbers of HTI to rnarry a daris of HIT as part of his or her effo1i 
to ensure that kinship ties are established ,vhich in turn would indirectly lead to the 
38 Interview with Wati, 22 ~!farch 2009, Jakarta. 
39 Interview with Febrianti and Zulia IlmawatL 20 TV1arch 2009, Jakaiia 40 Interview with Zulia Iln1awati , 20 March 2009 , Jakarta. · 
strengthening of the social ties between 111e111bers and daris. It is very rare that daris ,vho 
are n1arried to HTI n1e1nbers do not becon1e 111en1bers the1nselves. 
The long period that a potential rnernber ren1ains as the party ' s daris rneans that they are 
cornrnitted to the cause at the ideational level and is paii of a nevv social net,,york vvithout 
which he or she vvill feel cornpletely loss and alone. My experience with Muhan1111ad Al-
Khaththath attested to this. As highlighted in Chapter 3, Al -Khaththath ,,yas sacked fron1 
the party in 2008 after being a n1e1nber for 111ore than two decades. It was obvious that he 
ren1inisced about his tirne in HTI and kept repeating the fact that he finds it difficult to 
believe that his 'brothers' of so rnany years decided to sin1ply push hin1 aside. He often 
explained that he is unlikely to re-join the party even if invited back, as the scar fron1 the 
experience is too deep for a reconciliation to take place.41 While the culture of pushing 
ex-rnen1bers out of the party is strong, the party avoids the practice of ta/..fir, which is . 
prevalent in sorne Muslirn organizations. This could be seen fron1 the fact that HTI 
leaders continue to ackr10,,yledge Al-Khaththath whenever they n1eet publicly and even 
exchange vie,,ys about different issues.42 
Preparing the Future E'/ites 
Upon becorning a n1e1nber, a newly appointed HTI 1nen1ber will i1nn1ediately be tasked 
vvith several responsibilities. A HTI 1ne1nber is expected to fonn a halaqah with his/her 
ovvn dari.s. A1ushrUs are also given the task of conducting sn1all talks, to be MCs at HTI 
events and to assist the )vfa 'sul of the city. At this stage, a ,nushr[f is also less likely to 
leave the party since a 1ne1nber's appoint1nent to leadership positions 'vVill create a sense 
of o,i\1nership towards the party. The in11nense tasks that the mushr[fs are given 1neant 
that HTI . n1e1nbers have little ti1ne to reflect on their involve1nent vvitb HTI. A fonner 
HTI 1ne1n ber noted that he ,vas so busy in his activities that he hardly had ti1ne to reflect 
on the decisions rnade by party leaders in Indonesia which on hindsight reflected poor 
leadership. It was only when he lost his job and had n1ore tin1e that he began to realize 
-1i Interview with Muhan1mad Al-Khaththath, 8 April 2010, Jakarta. 
-1
2 Personal Observation of author at various Islamic events in J akaiia. 
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contradictions within the HTI positions on different issues. 43 Likewise, every aspect of 
their lives often revolved around HTI.44 
J\llushrff; are often appointed to the position of Jvfa 'sul after three years of bein g a 
tnember. This could tnean that the party would instruct tn etnbers to move to another city. 
As highlighted in Chapter 5, most HTI 1ne1nbers have a day job but sorne of the HTI 
leaders draw a salary frotn the movetnent. For instance, Rahmat Kurnia, Farid Wajidi, 
Hafidz Abdurrah1nan and Harith Abu lJlya are full time tnembers of the party. In sorne 
other circun1stances, party leaders are required to n1ove to another city to carry out their 
activities. These finan cial benefits that 1ne1nbers enjoy would tie thetn even closer to the 
party. At a less intangible level , the positions that a n1en1ber occupi es w·ithin the party 
provides a sense of confidence and etnpowennent. In explaining hi s newfound 
confidence, a n1en1ber of HTI said, 
In the past I use to be a con1puter geek. I dicln ' t want to interact with anyone. I was only 
interested in anytl1ing associated with computers. In fact l didn 't kn ow how to interact 
with people. After being in HT!, r am not only confident but more a,i icul ate. I can 
present arguments even when T meet very senior academics and Islam ic scholars. Thi s is 
the unexplained benefit of doing God ' s work. 45 
The culturing process of the n1oven1ent through , halaqah, the construction of new social 
net\vorks and allocation of responsibilities to n1en1bers are part of the culturing process 
that \Vould lead n1e1nbers to adopt a collective identity as defined by HTI. 
Adopting a Hizbi Identitv 
The adoption of a new Islan1ic identity begins at the stage when a daris has just sta11ed 
participating in a halaqah. As · a daris progress to becorne a party n1en1ber, n1ore 
. pronounced changes occur leading then1 to adopting a total new Islan1ic identity. These 
4 3 Interv iew with Donny, 20 August 2009 , Jakarta . \1/hen pressed on to cite examples of this, he preferred 
not to di scuss what he fe lt was internal party matters . 44 
· I\1embers are encouraged to patronize shops owned by fellow members 45 Interview with Saiful, 19 August 2009, Jakmia 
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include changes in appearance, behaviour, social interaction and thinking. The end result 
of the process is a new identity, which I ten11ed the .l--Iizbi identity. 
In an insightfu I study of lesbian 111oven1ents, Taylor and Whittier posited three 
theoretical tools, boundaries, consciousness and negotiation for understanding collective 
identity constructions. 46 They observed . that boundary n1arkers tend to heighten 
a,Nareness of group's con1n1onalities of the lesbian n1oven1ent. 4 7 Boundaries rnark the 
social territories of group relations by accentuating the behavioural, cognitive and 
affective ditTerences vvith the outside world that is deen1ed to be hostile. The concept of 
boundaries is useful in understanding the process of identity construction \vithin HTI. 
The processes of cognitive opening .. religious seeking and culturing that HTI activists 
undergo results in n1en1bers undergoing changes in the behaviour, feelings and attitudes 
to\vards party n1en1bers and those outside the party (atTective changes) and their thinking 
(cognitive change) as a result of the construction of a new collective identity. 
Behavioural Changes 
Behavioural change is often expressed in the way n1en1bers of a particular r11oven1ent or 
group dress as an identity n1arker. Kuu1nba and Ajanaku found that the grovving of 
dreadlocks becarne a global identity 111arker for people of African descent as the hairstyle 
is seen to be a "'sytnbolic acco1npani1nent to oppositional collective identities associated 
with the Black Po\ver n1over11ents.''48 Such syn1bolic accon1panin1ents are seen in the 
dress of 1ne1nbers. The fen1ale n1e1nbers of HTI will stmi wearing headscarf with a long 
robe or with blouses and pants that are loose to ensure that the shape of the body is not 
seen. Unlike other Islan1ic groups such as the Salqfis, the wearing of the niqab , which 
46 The authors explained consciousness as the interpretative frameworks that emerge out of a challenging 
group· s struggle to define and realize its interest and negotiation as the symbols and everyday actions 
subordinate groups use to resist and restructure existing systems of domination. These concepts are less 
relevant in trying to understand the fon11ation of a collective identity within HTI. See Verta Taylor and 
Nancy E \Vhittier, "Collective Identity in Social Movement Communities: Lesbian Feminist Mobilization" 
in A.D. J\tforris and C. J\r1. J\tfueller (eds) Frontiers in Social Jvlovenzent Themy (New Haven: Yale 
U ni versity Press, 1992); p. 111. 
47 ibid. Also see Scott A Hunt and Robert D Benford, " Collective Identity, Solidarity and Commitment" in 
David A Snow, Sarah A. Soule and Hanspeter Kriesi (eds) The Blaclovell Conzpanion to Social Jvlovenzents 
(J\1alden, J\1A: Blackwell Publishing, 2004), pp. 433-459 for details of the process of the formation of 
collective identity . 
48 Kuumba M Bahati and Femi Ajanaku, "The Hair Aesthetics of Cultural Resistance and Collective 
Identity Fommtion," A1obili::ation: An International Quarter(v 3(1998)., p . 227. 
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covers the face, is not popular atnongst wo1nen in HTI nor is the use of dark clothing. 
Won1en in HTI prefer wearing colorful clothes. Wati a n1en1ber of HTl in Pekanbaru 
described herself as being a torn boy prior to her knowing HTT. She said , 
I use to be a tomboy. I kept really short hair and always wore T-shirt and jeans. All my 
friends were guys. I enjoyed hanging out with then1. After I becmne acquainted with 
HTI, I started changing. I sta1ied wear1ng the jilbab and stopped wear1ng clothes that are 
prohibited by Islam. My friends found it difficult to accept my change initially. Over 
time, they started respecting me when they realized that l an1 sti 11 the sar11e person except 
, 49 that I am now keepmg to the norms of Islam. · 
For n1en, they n1ight put on the kopiah or songkok (different types of head dress popular 
in Indonesia and Malaysia) to show piety, although this is norn1ally done during official 
HTI functions . . HTI 1ne1nbers and leaders will also atten1pt to dress in clothes to portray 
the ir11age of a party that is professional and disciplined. This often 1neans the wearing of 
suits or traditional batik shirts. A 1ne1nber of HTI noted that he could always recognize a 
n1e111ber of HTI frorn the way he is dressed. Unlike n1any other Islarnist n1oven1ents 
where there is a tendency to keep long or full beards, party 111e111bers tend to keep closely 
trirnn1ed beard and a stnall goatee to ensure that they fulfill the encouraged practice of 
keeping a beard vvhile looking neat and professional. 
Another key behaviour change is in the display of personal piety. vVhile the party tended 
to prioritize party's activities over ritual 111atters, mernbers would ensure that they 
observed the basic rituals of Islan1. As n1entioned in Chapter 6, the party views the 
revival of the caliphate to be the n1ost in1portant obligation for a Muslin1 and that it n1ust 
take precedence over other obligations. This included praying in a congregation , 
frequenting the n1osque and giving aln1s to the poor. A key n1anifestation of this new 
found JJiety is the segregation - between n1en and won1en. HTI's public events will 
separate sitting arrangernents for n1en and \VOrnen. The HTI central office in Jakarta is 
divided into two areas with ditTerent entrances to the building for n1en and women. HTI 
1ne1nbers \Vill avoid talking to 111en1bers of the opposite sex unless it is related to pai1y 
n1atters. Piety is also displayed in interactions with fan1ily n1en1bers, friends and others 
49 Interview with Wati , 22 March 2009, Jakarta. 
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\Nithin their personal and societal net,vorks. Such exernplary character is n1eant to 
encourage peers in to becon1e potential n1en1bers to HTI. In general, student n1en1bers 
have reported that their parents are happy vvith their involven1ent in HTI due to their 
increased religiosity. Piety is not sin1ply expressed through rituals but also in the daily 
lives of HTI rnernbers. For instance, HTI n1en1bers ,vill never buy anything including a 
house and car on instalrnents. Paying interests is considered prohibited in Islan1. Even 
Islamic banks that otTer interest free loans are not seen to be adhering to Islarnic lavvs . 
...... 
HT rnernbers believe that Islan1ic banking in Indonesia is sirnilar to regular banks but 
~ ..... 
these ventures rnasquerade their operations using an Islarnic disguise. Piety is also 
n1anifested through attending HTI events, participating in recruitn1ent strategies and 
engaging in debates with HTI critics. The behavioural changes are an expression of 
boundary rnarking, \vhich separates HTI n1en1bers and other outside the paiiy. 
Affective l--:hanges 
The fonnation of collective identity within social rnovernent often results fron1 the 
construction of boundaries, which in turn leads to atTective changes an1ong 1nen1bers of 
the n1overnent. Such changes could affect the way 1netnbers relate to fellow 1nen1bers 
and those outside the group. The ernployrnent of such distinction is airned at 
consolidating the collective identity developed within the 1nove1nent. 'In-the case of HTI, 
n1ernbers would often draw distinctions between the party and other groups seen to be 
opposed to the 1novernent's goals. One such distinction is in the belief that the Islain 
adhered to by HTI is superior to that adhered to · by other Muslirns. This fits into the 
analysis by Olivier Roy about groups like HT seeking to practice "a true Islarn" .50 Unlike 
the Salqfi groups of the Tcikfiri orientation in which 1ne1nbers would regard others 
outside the 1nove1nent as being infidels, HTI si1nply regards Muslims outside the group 
as sinners since they are not ,vorking tovvards reviving the caliphate. This creates a 
paradign1 of Us versus Then1 in the 111indset of HTI 111en1bers. 
50 
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The 'Us' in this conception are the metnbers of HTT who are regarded as brothers and 
sisters. Men1bers would spend virtually all their tirne \vith each other and discussing 
1natters related to the pariy. This strong social bond leads to a sense of belonging to the 
paiiy. Party 1ne1nbers also feel a sense of brotherhood with 1ne1nbers of HTI in other 
patis of the world. At HTI events, 1ne1nbers both 1nen and wotnen would cry whenever 
visuals of physical tortures of 1ne1nbers in places like Uzbekistan are screened. This 
sense of brotherhood · could also be seen in the way HTI n1ernbers relate to their 
counterpa1is frotn other countries when they are in Indonesia. These rnernbers are often 
featured in talks and sen1inars to provide a sense of pride that the party is diverse 
culturally but united in its ideas. Nevertheless , the strong bond that HTI metnbers feel 
towards n1en1bers of HT elsewhere is still lin1ited to superficial level of trying to 
showcase a united front to the world. As highlighted in Chapter 6 ., ethnic differences 
continue to atlect the way n1en1bers perceive each other. 
In her anal ys is of HT in Denn1ark and Britain , Kirstine Sinclair observed that rather than 
referring to individuals within the party (e.g. the Spokesperson, Chainnan etc), n1en1bers 
would often refer to the party as a separate entity when discussing elen1ents related to 
HT 's ideology, n1ethodology and policies. 51 Men1bers of HTI will begin their sentence 
\vith , "The party or HT believes (says) that ... " vvhen explaining ditTerent aspects of the 
party. Men1bers do not think of other n1en1bers as individuals. Rather~ they see the 
organisation as a whole. This is a reflection of the strength of its ideology and culturing 
process. This also n1eans that the leaders of HTI are not the focal point of n1en1bers. 
Leaders are obeyed as representatives of the party vvho are higher in hierarchy. The 
identification bet,veen n1en1bers and party is so strong that a departure of any leaders 
does not afiect the party significantly. 
The creation of 'Thern ' in the 111inds of HTI n1en1bers strengthens their sense of loyalty 
and attachrnent to the pa1iy. There are three categories of ' Then1 ' in thi s conception. The 
first group con1prised rnen1bers of other Islarnic groups \Vho are at the outer n1ost of 
HTI's concentric circle organizational structure. The party accords a certain level of 
respect to n1e1nbers of groups such as the MMI and JA T and vievvs then1 as allies in their 
struggle to establish the caliphate. As n1entioned earlier, HTI believed that these groups 
51 Sinclair, "The Caliphate as a Hornelancl' ', p. 153 
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are also \Vorking to\vards the re-establishrnent of the caliphate albeit in the vvrong way. 
HTI n1en1bers would befriend 111en1bers of such organizations and try to cotTect their 
rnethodology by urging then1 to adopt HTI's strategy. The second category con1prises 
Indonesian Muslin1s. Such people are seen to be potential recruits and are perceived to be 
ignorant. The last category con1prised of Muslin1s vvho are opposed to HTI and the non-
Muslin1s. Groups such as the Islan1 Liberal Netv-.1ork ()IL) fall in this category. HTI 
rnernbers feel that liberal Nluslin1 groups allied to Western po\vers to unden11ine Islan1. 
As highlighted earlier, n1any n1ernbers believed that there is a Western can1paign to 
destroy Islan1. A siege 1nentality is thus evident arnongst HTI n1ernbers. They believed 
that only through struggling for the caliphate that they can protect then1selves against 
'\N es tern attack' on Musli1ns and Islan1. This siege n1entality contributes to the sense of 
collective identity that the party n1en1bers feel. 
Cognitive Changes 
An-Nabhani constantly propounded that Muslin1s rnust have the right thinking to deal 
with the \vorld~s problerns. His fixation with the thinking process of n1en led hini to write 
the book, At-TaAfeer (Thinking), which is a co111pulsory reading for HTI n1en1bers. The 
group that would be vvorking for the re-establish1nent of the caliphate 1nust be a group 
that shares the san1e fif..Tah (thoughts) against those who think in a different way. This 
serves as an irnportant boundary 1narker. As such, by the ti1ne a person beco1nes a 
n1en1ber of HTI , there \Vould have been a profound paradigrn shift in their thinking. This 
is reflected in his/her thought process and analysis of issues. My ovvn perception is HT 
1ne1nbers all around the vvorld see1ns to have a standard analysis and ansvver to vitiually 
everything related to the Islan1 and the pa1iy. 52 The experience of Fah1ni Atnhar, a_ leader 
of HT provides an interesting anecdotal insight to this point. Fahrni A1nhar had been 
recruited as a rnetnber of HT in Austria \Vhile he was pursuing his doctorate degree in 
1989 . Since HTI \Vas yet to be part of the structure of HT, he _vvas not linked to leaders of 
HTl. An1har noted that n1en1bers of HT Austria were probably not even aware· about the 
existence of HTI. Upon coining back in 1997, he was invited to speak at a mosque. After 
finishing the sen11on, a n1en1ber of HTI approached hin1 and asked hin1 whether he was 
52 This could be seen from conversations with HT leaders from Britain, Australia, Denmark, Netherlands 
Malaysia, Indonesia~ Lebanon, Turkey_, India and Pakistan between 2007 and 2011. 
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frorn HTI. This 1ne1nber then introduced hirnself as a rnen1ber of HTI and linked Atnhar 
to the rest of the HTI leaders. HT 111ernbers profess pride and would constantly 
e1nphasize about how their thought process is in unison \Vith the party's . 
Men1bership Retention and Identitv 
The process of adopting a new Islamic identity is one that results in a cotnplete change 
mnong 1nernbers of the pmiy. Me1nbers often relate the joining process as a life changing 
experience. This life changing experience also n1eans that n1en1bers would ren1ain in the 
patty as a lifelong co1n1nit1nent. Me1nbers \Nho survived several years in the pmiy are 
likel y to be n1en1bers for life. The high rate of retention could be attributed to the fact 
that only the 1nost cotntnitted of the daris tnake it as 1ne1nbers eventually . Given the 
' culturing' process which could span several years , it is expected that the rate of retention 
is high for those who succeed to be 111en1bers. Men1bers who choose to be part of the 
party have con1n1itted a large part of their lives within the party and thus find it difiicult 
to ' throw' a\vay a large part of their lives. 
The difficulties that forn1er n1en1bers of the party encounter in their process of quitting 
can also explain ,vhy rnost rne1nbers ren1ain in the party. The 1nost cited reason for their 
initial reluctance to quit is clue to the sense that they are sinnin-g. As highlighted in the 
previous chapter, the task of reviving the caliphate is seen to be an obligation for all 
Muslin1s. Men1bers believe that a decision to leave HT will incur the wrath of God. 
Wiktoro,vicz and Kaltenthaler explained that 111en1bers join Isla111ic groups to receive 
eternal salvation as part of the saved group. "53 Inversely. leaving the group ,votild 1nean 
that individuals are no n1ore part of this saved groups and is thus sinning. 
A 1najor detenninant that led to n1e111bers staying is the kinship ties that rnen1bers lose if 
they ,vere to leave HTI. Ex-111en1bers reported that their spouses ,vho chose to re111ain in 
HT have threatened to divorce then1. For certain n1en1bers of HTI, the fear of losing 
friends c9uld result in then1 continuing to ren1ain n1en1bers of the party. This n1eans that 
they risk losing their entire social network they n1i ght have. built over the years. It could 
53 Quintan Wiktorowicz and Karl Kaltenthaler, "The Rati o~rnlity of Radi cal Is lam ," Politico/ Science Quarter~v 12 L no. 2 (2006). , p. 3 18 . 
also mean losing farnily n1en1bers. The exan1ple of Al-Baghdadi is in fact reflective of 
the difficulties a forn1er n1en1ber of the party undergoes once he chose to leave the party. 
AI-Baghdadi described his leaving experience as being particularly difiicult. He \Vas 
shunned by n1ost rnen1bers of HTI following an order that can1e fron1 the HT leadership 
that n1en1bers rnust cease all contact vvith hin1. This ostracisn1 acts as a deterrent for 
others to not quit the party. 
HTI ' s high rate of retention does not rnean that all n1en1bers ren1ain vvith the party 
throughout their lives. Several · rnern_bers and even two forn1er chainnen, Al-Baghdadi 
and Al-Khaththath quit after spending their entire adult lives being rnen1bers of HTI. 
Exarnples of n1ernbers quitting have been cited in Chapter 2 and 3. · In virtually all these 
cases the reasons cited for leaving the pa1iy \Vas over di±Terences vvith decisions n1ade by 
both the party 's leaders in Indonesia or the central leadership, rather than over doctrinal 
issues . This is in contrast with exarnples of n1ernbers who quit in other HT chapters 
where sorne n1en1bers have opposed the party and adopted a diarnetrically opposing 
position to that of HT. 
With the exception of one ex-n1ernber, all the tanner rnernbers interviewed expressed 
their c01111nit1nent tovvards HT's objectives of reviving the caliphate and are in different 
Islarnic groups vvith the sarne airn. In sorne of these cases such as in the groups like 
Hizbul Khilc1fc7h and Hizbut Dak1vvah -Indonesia (HDI), nearly every aspect of HTI's 
ideas, rnethodology and even reading n1aterials are n1aintained. i'v1en1bers also overcon1e 
the problem of sinning in such circun1stances. It is also a reflection of how successful the 
process of collective identity forn1ation is \Vi thin HTI that even individuals who are no 
longer part of the party retain their beliefs and co1n1nit1nents to the objectives of the 
party. The fonnation of these groups is also a \Vay for HTI 1ne1nbers to avail the1nselves · 
fn_)fft 's inning ' since they are still \vorking to\vard the revival of the caliphate albeit in a 
djfferent \Vay. 
Fonner 1ne1nbers also do not seern to harbour any negative thoughts tovvards the party 
- itself. Their anger and disappointn1ent are targeted against the leadership of HT and HTI 
who1n in their n1inds have strayed a\vay fro1n the original teachings of An-Nabhani and 
other ideologues of the party. In this regard, they strive to retun1 the teachings of the 
-~ 
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paiiy to its original fonn through the fonnation of different groups with sirni lar 
objectives to HT. At another level, for.n1er n1en1bers of HTI tend to congregate around 
these groups. The shared experience of being in HTI and sharing a collective bond and 
identity tneans that these 1ne1nbers do not feel the sense of loss as tnuch. A case in point 
is the sacking of Al-Khaththath from HTI. Several key tnetnbers of HTI had left the party 
with hitn . Me1nbers of H;zbul Kh;lafah who expressed their interest to join HDT 
approached hitn. Fonner H.TI 1ne1nbers involved in HDI also began attending the weekly 
classes conducted by Al-Bagdadi. As such, the process of leaving becornes less arduous 
for these n1en1bers who continue to share this collective identity forn1ed during their tin1e 
in HTI but continued after they left the party. 
Conclusion 
This chapter is an atten1pt to understand the n1icro din1ension of the growth of HTJ 111 
Indonesia. It argues that the affective and cognitive changes that 111en1bers undergo upon 
adopting HTI's Islan1ic identity explain the high rate of retention that the party enjoys. 
This identity is fostered in the processes of cognitive opening, religious seeking, fran1ing 
and culturing that individuals undergo before becon1ing a n1en1ber. Collective identity in 
turn leads to individuals beco1ning attached to the party 's ideology. The chapter began by 
sketching the theory presented by Wiktorowicz in his study of the Al-}vfuhqjirour1. Unlike 
the case of the Al-MuhaJ;roun, individuals vvho becorne n1en1bers of HTI do not 
necessarily go through the process of cognitive seeking. Instead, their first encounter 
with the paiiy occurs at the stage of religious seeking. The chapter then disc(1ssed the 
experiences of HTI n1en1bers in their journey to becon1ing n1ernbers \Vithin the 
frarne\vork of the processes described by \Viktoro\vicz. The chapter then discussed the 
changes that individuals undergo upon adopting a •Hizbi identU_y. It is noted that th is 
identity is expressed through the process of boundary n1arking where rnernbers undergo 
behavioural, affective and cognitive changes. This section also discussed the in1portance 
of identity in retaining n1en1bers within the party. 
CHAPTER EIGHT: CONCLUSION 
It is unlikely that HTl will revive the Khilc{fcdz in Indonesia. For that matter., it is highly 
unlikely that HT can revive the Khilqf'ah anywhere in the world. The leadership of HT 
does not understand the local dynamics of its different chapters. As long as this is the 
case, the Khilqf~zh will remain a distant dream (Muhatnn1ad Al-Khaththath, Fonner 
Chainnan of HTI, 15 Feb 20] 0, Jaka11a) 
lt is not a question of whether the Khilafah will be revived or not The ·Khilafah will be 
established. It is the pror11ise of Allah in the Qur' an. The question is when this will 
happen. I believe that the Khilafah is near. lnshallah (God Willing) we will see it during 
our lifetime (Isn1ail Yusanto, Media Representative of HTI, 12 August 2009, 
Jakarta) 
In 2004, the American National Intelligence Council published a repo11 ., which drew a 
scenario of events, one of vvhich vvould see the establish1nent of a caliphate by 2020. 1 
The growth of groups like HT in Indonesia, Bangladesh and Pakistan see1n to affinn this 
vievv. This has resulted in grovving apprehension in so1ne circles in the ,vest, about the 
irnn1inent threat posed by HT. \tVhile such fears are understandable, responses to HT 
n1ust be n1easured and 'Nell thought out. Misconstruing the threat posed by then1 and 
other si rni lar groups or overreacting to this supposed threat is likely to intensify, rather 
than ten1per, the proliferation of these n1oven1ents. In-depth studies to understand their 
grow1h are critical to allaying such fears. Bearing this in 1nind, I have explored the 
con1plex factors that have led to the growth of HTI. I have also proposed a new 
theoretical fran1ework for studying and understanding Islan1ist n1ove111ents. In 1ny 
conclusion, I shall state the policy in1plications of the findings in n1y study, by discussing 
their relevance to providing son1e indications about the -likely threats posed by HT and 
HTl , as well as the future direction they hold for the n1oven1ent. 
Con1prehending and Reflecting on the Growth of HTI 
This study has shovvn that HTI has gro\iv11 significantly in the last decade due to its ability 
to build a con1111on identity an1ongst its 111en1bers. This has been facilitated largel y by 
fi1ctors such as institutional and non-institutional political oppo11unity structure (POS) 
POS, effective resource n1obilization strategies and a rationalistic anti-systen1ic ideology. 
i 1':ational Intelligence Counci l, A1apping the Global Future: Report of the National Intelligence Counc1Ps 
1010 Pn~ject_, (\Vashington D. C: NIC, 2004), p. 83. 
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In the next section, I shall elaborate on the itnportant role played by these factors m 
HTI ' s growth. 
The Centrali(v of Collective ldenti(v 
The role played by collective identity m attracting nevv 1ne1nbers and retaining them 
within the party cannot be underesti1nated. Through intensive intervi ews conducted with 
n1ore than one hundred HTI 1ne1nbers, I have been able to de1nonstrate the processes 
undergone by a person before beco1ning a 1nember. They include a series of 
psychological processes, such as cognitive opening, religious seeking, fran1ing and 
socialization , leading to a 1ne1nber's co1nplete initiation. Here, l differ fro1n scholars who 
suggest affiliation to such causes is the result of an identity crisis due to perceived 
gnevances, often contributed to by socio-econo111ic problerns. This research clearly 
shows that individuals are introduced to HTI as a result of religious seeking or by 
cognitive opening. It also details the in1portance of socialization in transforn1ing 
individuals to becon1e n1en1bers of HTI. The socialization process takes the forn1 of 
halaqah, the forn1ation of new social networks and according positions of responsibi I ity 
to these individuals. The study shows that as a result of these processes, an individual ' s 
identity is transforn1ed when they begin to adopt a new identity, which 1 have referred to 
as the Hizbi identi/J'. Individuals often display pern1anent behavioural cognitive and 
affective changes as a result of this new identify. An individual who has adopted this 
ne\v identity is unlikely to change and as a result, the n1e1nbership retention rate in HTI is 
extren1ely high. Even ·when individuals leave the n1oven1ent, it is rare to find son1eone 
giving up their identity. Analsysing this process of collective identity fonnation and its 
in1pact on recruitrnent and 111en1bership retention is central to this thesis. 
Structural Factors in HTJ-'s Growth 
While collective identity is the n10st in1po1iant factor in HTI's growth, it is by no rneans 
the only one. Several structural factors have been identified to explain this grow1h. 
nan1ely, the availability of institutional and non=institutional support and HTI' s effective 
resource rnobilization strategies. In explaining the role of these structural t:1ctors. I have 
resorted principally to the use of the twin theoretical frarneworks, narnely the POS and 
the RMT variant of SMT. It is to be noted that the open political systen1 that followed the 
collapse of the Ne\v Order governn1ent, gave the party space to en1erge publicly, recruit 
n1en1bers, and launch collective actions. While the issue of political context has been 
addressed in other \vorks, n1y study provides a broader understanding of hovv n1oven1ents 
ernerge and launch collective actions. My extensive intervie\VS with HTI leaders \vho 
\Vere involved \vith the rnovernent in the 1980s and 1990s have provided insight into the 
factors that irnpacted their decision-n1aking process. This allo\ved identification of both 
the external opportunities and constraints facing HTI. 
In explaining how HTI exploited the expanded public space wrought by the period of 
de1nocratic transition, I have dra,vn essentially on the Resource Mobilization Theory 
(RMT) variant of SMT. My observation was that this was an opportune n1on1ent for HTl 
to build a dynarnic organizational structure, recruit n1en1bers, procure funds and garn~r 
social capital. Rather than just describing the resource rnobilization strategies used by 
HTL I have analyzed then1 to sho,v how they are interconnected ,vith the party's growth. 
It was shown that HTI rnade use of active recruitn1ent and consensus fonnation in order 
-
to strengthen different con1ponents of its organizational structure. The description of 
HTI ' s organizational structure also n1ade an appraisal of the relationship between HT 
central and HTl , to better understand how transnational rnovernents like HT adn1inister 
their \videspread and vast 1ne1nbership. These structural factors serve to explain the 
rnacro dirnension of HTI' s gro,vth. I have dernonstrated this by detailing how HTl 
deploys its resources and spearheads- its strategies, thereby allovving it to expand its 
rnanpo,ver and resources and growing as an organization. On its own, the structural 
aspect does not address the issue of hovv individuals react to the 1nove1nent's strategies, 
what I have referred to as the micro dirnension of HTI's grovvth. I have sought to achieve ~ V 
this by using the theories of identity and ideology. 
Ideology as a Differentiating Factor 
This stu-dy has also shown that the ideology of a n1oven1ent is an in1portant factor when 
individuals decide to choose one Isla1nist group over another. As outlined earlier in this 
thesis , scholars of social n1oven1ent theory have avoided exan1ining a n1oven1ent ' s 
ideology as the concept do not fit rational choice theory , \vhich underpins SMT. I have 
drawn on the definition of ideology by political theorist, Michael Freeden, to explain 
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how ideology could be brought into the study of social 1nove1nents, vvhile resolving the 
issues associated with the traditional understanding of ideology. Drawing on .freeden 's 
study of the evolution of ideologies, I have been able to show that HTT has been 
successfu l in potiraying the ideas attached to its Islatnist ideology as being superior to 
those of other Islmnist groups. This explains the growing popularity of HTl over other 
Islmnist 1novetnents. 
Theoretical Proposition 
In the introductory chapter, J challenged the prevailing academic and journalistic wisdom 
that lslatnist tnovements grew chiefly as a result of repression during Suharto's rule, the 
ensuing political and socio-econon1ic disorder following the den1ise of the New Order 
regin1e and successful n1obilization strategies. While the thesis did not discount the 
in1portance of these structural factors, I proposed that a focus on these structural factors 
alone would not ansvver n1any questions related to the growih of rnoven1ents. For 
instance, structural fi1ctors cannot explain an individual ' s choice of one Islan1ist 
111oven1ent over another and the successful retention of n1en1bers in a n1oven1ent. I also 
challenged the application of SMT alone to understand this gro,vth. While SMT is useful 
in understanding structural factors of growth, it tends to ignore the role of the individual , 
,vhich leads to an unsatisfactory and incon1plete account of -n1oven1ent's gro,vth. I 
consequently proposed that the recognition of the inte1vlay of cognitive factors, such as 
ideology and identity, ,vas irnperative in trying to understand the growth of Islamist 
1noven1ents like HTI. The approaches taken by POS theory. RJVIT. ideology theory 
(although less pop\ilar) and collective identity theory. have been applied and tested in 
nurnerous studies of Islarnist groups and other social 1nove1nents. What is unique about 
. the proposed theoretical approach is in the ,vay the theories are synthesized and applied 
to explain the factors that in1pact the growth of HTI. 
While n1y work is focused on HT in Indonesia, n1y aspiration is to use this fran1ework to 
explain the growth and decline of other lslan1ist n1ove1nents. I could not en1bark on 
con1parative studies of HT chapters in different countries due to the constraints of tin1e 
and resources. However, I have applied this fran1ework in studying HT in Malaysia and 
in particular, Gabungan Mahasiswa Islan1 Malaysia (GAMIS), the unofficial student 
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·wing of PAS, in n1y other vvorks. Based on these prelin1inary studies, I have reason to 
believe that this fran1ework can be applied to study other Islan1ist n1oven1ents. 2 There 
,vill ren1ain so111e doubt as to whether this fran1ework is universally applicable to all 
Islan1ist rnoven1ents. I leave it to other researchers to confin11 or disprove this. 
Rethinking Hizb ut-Tahrir 
One of the stated airns of this study is to re -assess current understandings of HT as a 
global, cohesive r11oven1ent with a con1n1on goal. 3 Another prevailing notion is that it is a 
111ove111ent that transcends differences in ethnicity, language, traditions and culture. This 
thesis challenges such perceptions of HT, and sho,vs in fact that it is an Arab-centric 
rnovernent that is focused on re-establishing the caliphate in the Arab vvorld. It is 
transnational in so far as its con1n1on ideology is concerned, but the party 's Arab-centric 
agenda rnakes it ditlicult for it to corne to tenns with ethnic differences in its overseas 
chapters. 
Several studies on HT have speculated about the actual relationship between HT central 
and its chapters around the world.4 These works do not provide ernpirical data supporting 
the assertions, often leading to n1is-infonnat1on , and in s01ne cases exaggerated clai1ns 
about the in1pending HT threat. Through extensive interviews with n1en1bers of HTI and 
HT and the use of literature previously unavailable, I have explored the relationship 
between HT central and its chapters, sources of its funding, the leadership ' s grasp of 
global politics and its position on violence. 
-' .Mohamed Nawab i\1oharned Osm.an , ·'Hizbut Tahrir i\1alaysia: The Emergence of a New Transnational 
Islamist Movement in 1vfalays ia" Al-Jc:irn; 'ah: Journal of Islamic Studies 47, no. 1 (2010), pp. 91-110 and 
lv1o hamed Nawab Mohame_d Osman, "Muslim Student Activism in Malaysia: A Case Study of the 
Gabungan i\1ahasiswa Islam 11alaysia'~ in Sophie Lemeire (ed) Contemporary Jvfala.ysia (Kuala Lumpur: 
SIRD, 2012) (forthcoming) . 
3 See Taji-Farouki , Fundmnental Quest and Mandaville, Global Islamic Politics. The only scholar that 
challenges the notion of HT as a global movement is Kirstine Sinclair. However, she came to this 
conclusion based on the different activities organized by HT chapters in Denmark and UK. She does not 
highlight that even at the level of objective, there is a difference in the thinking the central leadership of 
HT and local level leadership . 
4 Baran, Hi::bur Tahir, 2005; Karanggianis, HT in Central Asia, 20 IO and Sinclair, Hizb Tahrir. 
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Studying Islan1ist Moven1ents in Indonesia 
Studies on Islmn and Islatnistn in Indonesia have produced so1ne insightful works that 
have enriched our understanding of these topics. In studies of Islmnist movetnents, there 
has been a stronger focus on the study of violent groups, like JI, or political parties like 
PKS. 5 Other studies have focused on NlJ and Muhan1n1adiyah. There has been less focus 
on sn1aller Islan1ist groups like FPI, FUI and MMI, which are less influential. Studies on 
these other 1nove1nents are in1po1iant, and must be encouraged, so that the potential 
threat they pose can be assessed in a 1nore inforn1ed fashion. 
With the exception of Noorhaidi Hassan's exceptional work on LJ , there is a dearth of 
good analytical works grounded on a sound theoretical fran1ework. As n1entioned in 
Chapter 1, n1any studies of Islan1ist groups tend to be descriptive in nature, focusing on 
their goals, activities and ideology. The few studies that have atten1pted to actually 
understand these n1oven1ents, concentrate on the structural din1ensions of these 
n1oven1ents, such as their recruitn1ent and fran1ing strategies.6 A n1uch sn1aller nun1ber of 
these works have a stronger focus on the cognitive dilnensions. 7 In this thesis I have 
proposed a ditlerent approach of assessing groups, \vhich takes -into consideration both 
the n1acro (structural) and n1icro (cognitive) aspects of a rnoven1ent ' s activisn1. This 
approach provides a n1ore con1prehensive understanding as to why Muslin1s join Islan1ist 
n1oven1ents. The theoretical fran1ew'ork here could otier a ternplate to future studies of 
Islan1ist 111ove1nents in Indonesia. 
Is HT a Threat and How Do We Dea] ,,vith It? 
While it is not the purpose of this thesis to expound on state policies tcnvards HT, the 
sheer volun1e of acaden1ic and general ,vorks portraying HT is a security threat rneans 
5 Sidney Jones and her team at the ICG have enriched our knowledge of terrorist groups such as JI. Also 
see Machmudi, Islarnising Indonesia; Rosyad, A Quest for True !shun and Burhanuddin r.1uhtadi , Dile,na f KS: Suara Dan Syariah (Jakarta: Gramedia, 2012) for good academic works on PKS. 6 Salim, The Rise ofHizbut Tahrir Indonesia , Ward, "Non -Violent Extremists" and Fealy, "Total Islami c Identity" . 
· 7 Rijal , " Making Hizbiyyin", 20 I 0. 
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that this subject cannot be entirely ignored. 8 IV1aterial in this thesis can be dravvn on to 
suggest . ways in which policy 111akers 111ight better deal with I-IT. Several countries 
including Bangladesh, Russia, Saudi Arabia and all of the Central Asian countries have 
"- i,._. . .- •. 
banned HT. It has also been proscribed in Pakistan, a country ki1ovvn for its high 
tolerance for extren1ist groups. 9 For these countries, HT's agenda of replacing the current 
governn1ent 1vvith a caliphate, by an11ed revolution if necessary, is vievved as dangerous 
enough to irnpose a ban. I believe 1nany of the fears are un\varranted. 
In light of this strong perception of the ' danger ' posed by HT, the Indonesian authorities ' 
rnanner of handling of the potential threat has been contrary to the non11. There has not 
been any report of HTI rnernbers being arrested or detained. HTI leaders have sat on the 
\ 
IVIlJI panel, a body that often advises the Indonesian goven1111ent on Islan1ic 111atters and 
have even been part of various international level cornrnittees. They are also kno\vn to 
have forged good relationships \Vith rnilitary and intelligence officers. 10 My 
conversations with senior leaders of Muslirn organizations indicate that they are less 
concerned about HTl than the rnore 1noderate lslarnist parties like PKS. HTI leaders are 
guests at rnany Islarni.c events at which PKS leaders are persona ·non grata. An exan1ple 
of this is the fifth gathering of the K·un in 2010 where PKS leaders were not even 
invited. 
Despite this openness, HTI bas never posed a security threat to the Indonesian 
governrnent. No HTI n1en1ber has been involved in violence and there has been no 
evidence of any infiltration into the ranks of the anned forces or police. This is in direc.t 
contrast to the experiences of several countries vvhere it is banned. For instance, Jordan, a 
country where they are proscribed, has seen the party atte1npting at least thre~ rnilitary 
coups. Bangladesl\ another country \vhere HT is banned, has also seen a coup attetnpt 
8 For instance see Baran, Islam 's Political lnsurge~1cy, 2004 and i\hmed and Stuart. Ideology and Strateg_1-;, 
2010. 
c; For details about the tolerance for Islamist groups in Pakistan, see Hussain Haqqani, Pakistan: Betiveen 
A1osque and A1ilitary (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005). 
10 One HTT leader had once even shown me a sms exchange between a senior intelligence officer and 
himself which indicates the good relations that HTI maintains with the intelligence officers. 
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orchestrated by the group. This is despite the fact that the Bangladeshi chapter 1s 
relatively new, having been forn1ed only in 2000. 11 
The Bangladesh case 1s interesting for several reasons. There are tnarked sitnilarities 
between Bangladesh and Indonesia. 12 Both countries have open political systetn s where 
elections are held regularly and there is an active civil society. 13 The memberships of HT 
in both countries cotnprise students and young professionals. The key difference I ies in 
the fact that HT is proscribed in Bangladesh , \Vhile the party is legal in Indoilesia and 
operates freely. 
Here I believe that banning the party had the effect of strengthening its resolve to 
overthrow the Bangladeshi goven11nent. There are several reason s to support this 
hypothesis. Sources in Bangladesh have reported that HT began aggressively to recruit 
n1ilitary otlicers rather than students, after it was banned . lt was reported that the party' s 
outlaw·ing in fact crippled its ability to recruit students in universities. The ban also had 
the effect of creating public syn1pathy for the 1noven1ent, since its activities were 
regarded as peaceful. The party also successfully took advantage of this public sy1npathy 
by fran1ing its ban as being paii of the larger Indian and An1erican conspiracy to destroy 
I slan1 in Bangladesh. Furthern1ore, the ban in Bangladesh al lowed the party to exaggerate 
its real strength . Many of the coup plotters \Vere n1ade to believe-that they had the strong 
suppo1i of the arn1y \Vhen in [1ct their nun1ber \Vas just several dozens. 14 While HT has 
generally been secretive about its actual size, n1en1bers are able to gauge its nun1bers 
based on public activities. Lastly, the ban resulted in the party ' s n1onopoly over the 
Islan1isn1 discourse. The goven1111ent and n1oderate Muslin1s could no longer challenge 
its discourse publicly in an open den1ocratic setting. 
11 The chapter was formed in Bangladesh after Paki stan became a nuclear state in 1999 . The paiiy 
leadership saw Pakistan as a potential target as a location for the caliphate to be re-established . The 
chapters in Bangladesh and India were fornied to assist the Pakistan chapter and a potential future caliphate in the country. Interview with l\1oien Ibrahim, 2 July 2006, London. 12 To date, there has not been a substantial study done on HT in Bangladesh . Only one work bri efl y 
mention some of its activities in Bangladesh. See Ali Riaz, Islamist Jvfilitancy in Bangladesh: A Comple.x Web (London and New York: Routledge, 2008) . 
13 A comparison between Indonesia and Bangladesh in the Eill Democracy index 2011 reveal s similar 
numbers in the electoral process and pluralisn1 as well as the civil rights categori es. Indones ia scored 6.92 
and 7.06 in these categories respectively while Bangladesh· scored 7.42 and 7.06 in the same categori es . 14 
'-Con fi clen ti al Source. 
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For these reasons , I aver that Indonesia ' s hands-off strategy had the n1oderating etTect of 
actually curbing HTI ' s influence and grow1h. While the n1oven1ent has grown, its 
continuous public engagernent ,vith the governrnent, n1oderate Muslin1 organizations, 
and liberal groups, have given Indonesian Muslin1s an opportunity to properly assess 
HTI's objectives and policies. This allo,vs individuals to 111ake 111ore inforn1ed decisions 
if they decide to join the party. 
The question of the threat posed by the HT, should also be tackled through an analysis of 
its political strategies and actions. It is naYve to assurne that a rnoven1ent that has 
atternpted 1ni l itary coups in several countries in the last five decades, is controlled by a 
foreign leadership \.Yhose identity rernains unknown, and believes in revolutions to 
overthrovv goven1111ents, poses no security threat. Yet, despite this, there is no reason to 
heighten the n1.agnitude of the HT threat. Suggestions that the party is the next Al-Qaeda 
or the next n1ajor threat to the world are alarn1ist. Several observations support rny view 
that HT is in fact a less significant threat than it is n1.ade out to be. An in1portant factor to 
note is the incon1.petence of HT's leadership. The leadership has failed to con1prehend 
the context of local politics in rnany of the countries that the party is active in. Their 
dealings with the Iranian, Libyan and Taliban political leaders have particularly shown 
the HTI' s naivety and ineptitude. The pa1iy has failed in every coup atte1npt it has staged 
since the 1960s. These failures are no co1ncidence. In general, the coups were poorly 
planned and coordinated. In Bangladesh, there ,vere three different HT cells in the 
111.ilitarv. None of the cells was aware of the existence of the other cells, leading to a 
~ . ~ 
rnassive debacle. This occutTed \Vhen a 1netnber of one of the cells told on a 1ne1nber of a 
second eel l. thinking that another group not related to HT was also planning a coup. This 
is so as the patiy has clearly prohibfred violence in the fonn of offensive jihad as long as 
there is no caliph. There is also no substantial evidence of HT men1bers caiTying out acts 
of violence~ even in the 1nost repressive circu1nstances, such as in the Central Asian 
states. The foregoing shovvs hovv an avovvedly non-violent position, along with an inept 
secretive leadership, underscore the point that the threat of HT has been overstated. 
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The Future of HTI and H _T 
Several studies of HTI indicate that the party is likely to grow further due to its appeal 
mnong young Musli1ns and the lack of Muslitn groups with the sort of credentials that · 
the patty possesses. 15 Others like Greg Fealy suggest that there is I itn it to its growth. 16 
My own analysis of .HTI concurs with that of Fealy. While I agree that HTT is likely to 
grow in the short tenn, I doubt that the party can sustain its expansion in the long tenn 
but achieving its goal of reviving the caliphate in . Indonesia is quite another tnatter. 
Several reasons could be cited here. The party has not atten1pted any serious expansion 
into the rural areas. Even if the patiy devised strategies to attract metnbers fron1 the rural 
areas, it is unlikely that they will find resonance an1ongst the rural population and the 
less educated groups within the country. 
Since the focus of HTI ' s ideology is the restoration of the caliphate, lethargy might begin 
to set in an1ongst n1en1bers if no caliphate is forn1ed in the near future. In a sin1ilar vein , 
in the late 1990s, 1nany HT 1nen1bers in Britain left the party. 17 Many activists were 
disappointed that the pron1ise (of HT leaders) that a caliphate was in1n1inent in Jordan 
did not n1aterialize. Since 2007, HTI has also organized n1ajor events and conferences in 
order to dernonstrate its ability to dra,v cro,vds and portray societal leadership. There are 
indications that these events are beginning to raise expectations an1ongst its n1en1bers by 
sho,ving HTI"s actual strength. Many younger n1en1bers I spoke to are convinced that the 
caliphate will be established in Indonesia. A failure to deliver on these expectations is 
likely to in1pact on the 1norale of son1e these n1en1bers, leading sorne to leave the party. 
The single n1ost in1portant factor that n1ight ha1nper HTI's gro,vth is the Arab-centric 
leadership of HT. This leadership does not understand the political context of Indonesia 
and is likely to rnake decisions in the future, ,vhich rnay impede its grovvth. This trend 
can only be reversed if structural changes are to take place ,vithin the larger HT. 
HT has long envisaged the staging of peaceful revolutions against the Middle Eastern 
regi111es and believed that these dictatorships will be replaced by a caliphate led by H-T. 
15 Salim, Hizbut Tahir and R ij al , 1vfaking Hizbiyyin. 
16 Fealy "Seeking a "Total" Muslim Identity", pp . 162-163. 17 Husain, The lslmnists, p. 120 · 
The recent Arab spnng did see revolutions taking place in the Middle East, but HT 
played no role in then1. Contrary to its expectations, these revolutions have instead 
installed den1ocratic govern1nents, led by their archrivals, the MB. The ne,,v scenario has 
n1ade it necessarv for thern to ±:1ce unpalatable truths about the n1oven1ent for 1nanv of 
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the HT rnernbers. For one, the pa1iy does not possess a popular base in the Arab ,,vorld. 
Secondly, the pa1iy leadership's eleventh . hour stand in 111ustering 111en1bers to forn1 
chapters i11 Tunisia and Egypt proved e111barrassing. The party could only n1obilize less 
than a hundred 111en1bers in den1onstrations held to support it. A high profile vvon1en ' s 
conference that the party held in Tunisia drew less than two hundred participants. It 
could thus be assu111ed that HT's political future in the Arab ,vorld is bleak. The one 
exception that rnight provide the pa1iy with a potential POS is if the MB led govenunents 
in these countries fail to resolve the socio-econon1ic problen1s faced by the people. 
In spite of this, HT is likely to grow in certain countries like Bangladesh and Pakistan. 
The persecutions of HT, the failure of secular leaders to deliver econon1ic goods, and the 
tarnished irnage of lslan1ist parties have given · HT the political space to grow. 18 
Nevertheless, the Arab-centric goals of its central leadership n1ight deter the party frorn 
allocating resources in these countries and rnight thus in1pede its growth. The issue of 
HT ' s Arab-centric leadership has once again ilnpacted the pa1iy. A 1ne1nber of HT 
Malaysia recently infonned n1e about a proposal by HT Turkey to refonn HT. 19 This 
proposal cal ls for the party to re-think about its leadership selection process and 
suggested the possibility of a rotating the position of the A1nir arnongst the A1u 'tarnad of 
HT's leading chapters. There has also been a criticisrn of the leadership's over e1nphasis 
on the Arab chapters of the pa11y. It see1ns that leaders of HTI and HTM have suppo11ed 
this proposal. The future of HT thus lies in its ability to re-invent itself by focusjng on its 
growing chapt~rs outside of the Arab countries and lowering its expectations in the Arab 
world. 
18 lslamist parties in Pakistan have been discredited due to their cooperation with the military regime of 
General Pervez ~1usharraf. For details of this and other problems associated with Pakistani politics, see 
Christophe Jaffrelot, ed. Pokistan: Nationalisrn 1vithout a· Nation :7 (New York: Zed Books,2002). and 
lmran Khan. Pakistctn: A Personal Histm:v (London: Bantam Press, 2011 ). In Bangladesh, the main 
- Isla.mist pa11y in Bangladesh the Jamaat-e-Islami has the ill repute of being collaborators with the 
Pakistanis during the 1971 Bangladeshi war of independence. For details of this see Ali Riaz, God Willing: 
The Politics qf1s!mnisn1 in Bangladesh (Lanham, J\1D Rowman & Littlefield, 2004). 
19 Conversation with a HTJv1 leader, 10 February 2012, Singapore. 
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Suggestions for Future Research 
Few studies on HT have undertaken the task of understanding the reasons for tnetnbers 
joining the 1nove1nent (the exception being K.aragiannis ' work on HT in Central Asia). 
l\l[ore should be done in order to allow interesting comparative studies to be done 
between different chapters of HT. I could not ascetiain whether there are so1ne key 
differences in the way HT central d~als with its chapters in the Arab W'Orld and those in 
Indonesia. This would strengthen (or undennine) tny argu1nent about the Arab-centric 
nature of HT's leadership. I have con1e to this conclusion based on the en1pirical data I 
collected through discussions with HT leaders in Indonesia and Australia. Studies on HT ..... 
chapters in Malaysia and places where the political openness is similar to that of 
Indonesia would also 1nake an interesting cotnparison. 20 Such studies could be used as a 
testing ground for the theoretical fratnework I proposed fu1iher. 
Another area that I did not elaborate on in this thesis is the relationship betvveen the 
central leadership of HTI and its leadership at the provincial level. My study did not 
establish the sin1ilarities, differences and tensions that might exist betvveen chapters of 
HTI at the difierent provinces. While l conducted interviews vvith several n1embers of 
MHTI, as a n1ale researcher, I was unable to delve enough into the vvorld of PHTI. The 
interviews I conducted reveal son1e unique behavioural dynan1ics an1ongst these won1en. 
There seen1s to be an odd convergence of fe1ninis111 and Islarnis111 in rnany of thern. As I 
have· highlighted in Chapter 5 and 7, a clear disjuncture exists between the ideals that 
these vvo111en uphold and the practical aspects of their lives. A study of PHTI would thus 
bring to light not only the role played by \Vornen in Tslan1ist n1oven1ents but also the 
potential confluence of fen1inisn1 and Islarnisn1. 
With the exception of Indonesia, I discovered during the course of n1y I ibrary research 
how fevv studies there are of the reasons for Muslin1s joining Islainist groups and parties 
in Southeast Asia. There ,vere hardly any acaden1ic studies docun1enting the attraction of 
Muslin1s to n1oven1ents like the Angkatan Belia Islam A1alqvsia (Assernbly of !\1alaysian 
:'.o While there is more political openness in Indonesia, both countries were described as flawed 
democracies in the ETTJ democracy index . Indonesia was ranked 60 and Malaysia was ranked 7 1. See 
Economist Intelligence Unit, De,nocracy Jnde).: 201 l :De,n~cra(v Under Stre;s, p. 5. 
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IVIuslin1 Youth, ABIIVI) in Malaysia, the Pattani insurgency 111oven1ents in Southen1 
Thailand, the rvioro groups in Southe111 Philippines and Muslin1 civil society groups in 
Singapore, such as the Association of Muslin1 Professionals (AMP). Studies focusing on 
the attraction to these rnovernents would deepen our understanding of the phenornenon of 
lslarnisrn in Southeast Asia. 
Another area of potential research is the question of why people turn to fundan1entalist 
organizations. Sirnilar to the literature on Islan1isn1 in Indonesia, the larger literature on 
religious frmdarnentalisn1 have sought to understand a person' s journey to 
fundan1entalisrn by a·ssessing grievances caused by socio-econon1ic and political 
problen1s, organizational etTorts at reaching out to individuals and the adoption of a new 
identity. Studies that focus on the interplay and confluence of both structural and 
cognitive factors would contribute rewarding perspectives in the understanding of 
religious fundan1entalisrn. 
In sun1·111ing up , n1y study has explored the developn1ents that have led to the grow1h of 
HTI. There are several qualifications that n1ust be n1ade about HTI. For all its rapid 
growth, HTI is still relatively srnall in Indonesian tenns . Despite its internal secrecy, the 
party has rernained rather benign. Most irnportantly, its leaders ' resou11ding predictions 
of future success in founding a caliphate, in reality seerns little rnore than a pipe drearn . 
N onetheless, HTI does give expression to a particular kind of Islamist sentitnent in _ 
Indonesia!· and in a den1ocracy, such political organisations should be welcorned rather 
_ than excecrated. A knee jerk reaction of clainping dovvn on hs activities 1nay backfire 
with unintended consequences , as could be seen with HT Bangladesh. 
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